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PREFACE

Around the turn of the century the neo-Kantian socialist Hermann
Cohen wrote in his Introduction and Critical Epilogue to Friedrich
Albert Lange's History of Materialism that Kant "is the true and real
originator of German socialism." 1 His claim, of course, is not to be
taken too literally. After all, Kant to a large extent defended the
minimal state and accepted the emerging capitalist market economy, whereas socialists have typically rejected both. Rather, the
point of Cohen's challenging statement is that Kant's practical philosophy contains moral and philosophical-historical insights crucial to socialist thought and that his notion of the highest good, or
moral society of colegislators who seek to enhance one another's
ends, can be extrapolated to set forth the demand for the socialist
ideal. Thus the statement suggests a conception of socialism that is
ethical in nature and involves not a mere denial of liberal thought
but rather its critical extension in the form of economic democracy.
A final aspect of Cohen's claim which needs to be stressed is its
implicit criticism of Marx on the grounds that a morally defensible
socialism is an ethical socialism and that the philosophical foundations of a tenable socialism are to be sought in Kant, not in Hegel.
These issues are the focus of the present study. In Part One, I
offer a critical reconstruction of the central role in Kant's work of
the duty to promote the highest good as a social duty, arguing that
this duty is to be interpreted as comprising the moral requirement
that we seek the republican state and international peace. Thus I
place politics, history, social conflict, and the moral commitment to
change society at the core of Kant's practical philosophy, attempting to undercut the view of his ethics as primarily concerned with
the struggle between individual duty and inclination. Although
my reconstruction in its basic orientation is influenced by Cohen
and the Kant interpretation of the Marburg School in general, I
present a new systematic examination of the social dimension in
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Kant's practical philosophy, taking into account much current literature on or relevant to this topic. It is my hope that this reconstruction will be judged not only in terms of its possible significance for
socialist thought but also in terms of its discussion of elements of
Kant's practical philosophy which presently receive insufficient
philosophical attention.
In Part Two, I turn to Cohen's transformation of Kant's ethics
into a socialist ethics. My discussion aims to show that Cohen's
social and moral thought has been unjustly neglected ever since it
was effectively repressed by the wave of racist and fascist philosophy in the 1920s and '30s in Germany. I examine his practical work
in some detail, emphasizing his idea that the socialist society of
producer cooperatives instantiates, or best approximates, the moral
ideal of the community of colegislators. My study ends by offering
an extensive Kantian analysis and critique of Marx's view of morality, concluding that Marxist thought can greatly profit from making
Kantian ethics its moral foundation. In a word, I argue that this is a
tenable enterprise, because Marx and Kantian socialist ethics share
a common basic evaluative outlook, and a much needed enterprise
because, much to the damage of the socialist cause, Marx denied
that action toward the socialist ideal must be a moral praxis. Here
again my approach is not historical; the major exception to this is
my discussion of Cohen's perceptive critique of Marx's materialist
conception of history. My main reason for taking this approach is
that the Kantian socialists and their critics at the time were unfamiliar with a large part of the Marxian corpus, such as the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. I have added, however,
an appendix with a historical note on Kantian ethical socialism, in
the expectation that this may contribute to a better understanding
of some of the philosophical and political concerns expressed in
the text.
That the duty to promote the highest good is to be understood
as a social duty is also argued by Yirmiahu Yovel in his Kant and
the Philosophy of History. Notwithstanding some essential interpretative disagreements, my study is greatly indebted to his work.
Our objectives, however, are quite different. Yovel's main purpose
is to elucidate history as a fundamental category in Kant's critical
system as a whole, whereas my primary aim (in Part One) is not
only to expose but also to assess critically and develop further the
ramifications of Kant's idea that the highest good sets a moral task
for humanity. Thus I do not hesitate to make explicit what is merely
implicit in Kant's practical writings, adding my own arguments
where necessary, and even to traverse roads he hinted at but never
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took. An example of the former is my argument that the duty to
promote the highest good can be derived from the different formulations of the categorical imperative. An example of the latter is
my discussion of a variety of moral problems that arise from Kant's
turn to the idea of historical progress for the sake of praxis aimed
at the highest good, such as the question whether we can uphold
the dignity experienced in the fulfillment of our social duties once
we realize that future generations may hold that our efforts fell
short of the ideal because they may have a different conception of
the demands of the moral law. To give one more illustration, I
argue that although Kant's notion of respect for the moral law does
not capture the emotive components of the moral commitment
(the "good will") to change society, it is nonetheless the case that
his theory of moral feeling offers an adequate conceptual apparatus for examining some emotive elements of this type of commitment which are mentioned but not analyzed in his historical writings, such as moral indignation about present social conditions
and moral enthusiasm engendered by progressive political events.
These examples, it may be noted, underline the reconstructive nature of my Kant discussion and also illustrate that Kant's ethics is
important for ethical socialism as a philosophy of praxis.
In the course of this discussion I occasionally criticize some
aspects of other Kant interpretations. These criticisms take on two
basic forms that should not be confused: strong and weak claims.
A strong claim in this context is the contention that a certain author
misinterprets what I consider to be Kant's view. The point of my
strong claims is, of course, to raise interesting problems and questions for my own reconstruction. A weak claim is here to be understood as an argument that a certain author fails to recognize that
the Kantian text contains another relevant reading besides the one
he or she in fact offers. It goes without saying that my choice to
elaborate precisely this other possible reading reflects my purpose
of developing Kant's practical philosophy as a crucial step toward
an adequate Kantian socialist ethics. This raises the following
question: Why did Kant not take the direction that I, all things
considered, think he should have taken? Or, to put the matter
more bluntly, why did Kant not become an ethical socialist, not in
word but in spirit? In addressing the reasons for his different
philosphical and political orientation I use in effect the same kind
of distinctions and selection criteria that guide my criticisms of
various Kant interpretations. Thus I argue, for instance, that Kant's
nearly total rejection of all forms of political resistance is inconsistent on his own terms (a strong claim), and I maintain that the
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basic premises of his doctrine of the highest good do not necessitate his view that the moral society itself cannot be institutionally
expressed and must be seen as an "inner" unification of good wills
(a weak claim). Both strong and weak claims play, moreover, a role
in my discussion of his commitment to the minimal state and
capitalist economy. And again, the scope and intent of my criticisms is ultimately circumscribed by my over-all aim of constructing a viable Kantian socialist ethics.
My final preliminary comment concerns my argument
throughout this study that morality, with its motivational, corrective (placing moral constraints upon social action), and directive
(steering this action toward proper ideals) functions, is a sine qua
non for a defensible socialist theory and praxis. This argument
must not be equated, as many Marxists tend to do, with some kind
of voluntaristic plea, whistling democratic socialism in the capitalist darkness. Mediation is important, as I stress at several points in
the text, and the question must be addressed how under the present social and political circumstances socialist values can be promoted and realized. The primary task of a philosophical study,
however, is to raise the question, not to answer it.
*

*

*

*

This study owes more to my teacher and friend Steven S.
Schwarzschild than I have been able to express in my notes to his
work. He initiated my interest in Kantian socialism, strongly influenced my Kant interpretation, and gave his expertise and commitment to the execution and completion of this study. I would like to
express my deep gratitude for his generous assistance. I would
also like to thank Edward F. McClennen, whose incisive comments
contributed to improving the first chapter. Sidney Morgenbesser
and Thomas W. Pogge were so kind as to send literature relevant
to my study, and their perceptive comments and suggestions were
very helpful in writing its final version. My discussions with
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viewpoint. Thanks also go to my parents, as well as to Rita Adler,
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Paulson, and Carl P. Wellman for their encouraging words and
various other forms of support.
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Harry van der Linden
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PART ONE

Kant's Highest Good
as a Social Duty

CHAPTER I

Social Versus Private Ethics:
The Highest Good and the
Categorical Imperative

In his critical writings Kant frequently states that it is our duty
to promote the highest good, or summum bonum. In Critique of
judgment, for example, he writes: "The moral law . . . determines
for us . . . a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive,
and this purpose is the highest good in the world possjble through
freedom" (p. 301; § 87; V: 531). Kant elaborates: "We are a priori
determined by reason to promote with all our powers the si1111 mum bonum (Weltbeste), which consists in the combination of the
greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition
of the good in itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with
morality most accordant to law" (p. 304; § 88; 534).
At the outset, this claim raises a variety of interrelated questions: What is the moral foundation of the demand that we ought
to seek a moral society? What are the implications of this mora]
requirement for the understanding of our individual duties? What
motivational account can be given of the fulfillment of the duty to
promote the highest good? What are the moral constraints that
must be placed upon such an endeavor? Does the moral ideal
specify a tenable human project, both from the perspective of history and from that of the laws of nature? And, finally, what are the
institutions that are most fitting to, or best express, the moral
3

4

Social Versus Private Ethics

ideal? The first part of this study seeks to reconstruct critically how
these questions, as aspects or ramifications of the highest good as
a social duty, are addressed in Kant's work. The rationale and
guideline of my reconstruction are discussed in the Preface: to
develop Kant's practical philosophy as an essential step toward my
over-all aim of constructing a Kantian socialist ethics.
A problem that needs our immediate attention is that there is a
certain ambiguity embedded in Kant's notion of the highest good.
Is it his view that we must promote or further the highest good, or
does he hold that it is the duty of humanity to realize this good?
Kant usually says that it is our duty to promote the highest good,
arguing that it is not within our power to so transform nature that
each individual will be happy in the moral society. Thus one would
expect him to argue additionally that the highest good as the final
end set by the moral law is a moral society in which human beings
attempt to make one another happy, but do not necessarily succeed. Kant, however, does not explicitly draw this conclusion. The
two conceptions of the highest good are conflated in his work, and
the notion of the highest good as the union of universal virtue and
universal happiness predominates. Thus it would seem that Kant
holds that the failure to realize universal happiness is a deontic
failing. I will touch upon this problem at some other points in this
chapter, and in the next chapter it will be a focus of my attention.
Unless noted otherwise, in the present chapter I interpret the
highest good as a moral society in which human agents seek to
make one another happy, leaving it an open question to what
extent this universal cooperation leads to universal happiness. The
upshot, then, is that I change somewhat Kant's common definition
of the highest good, but preserve the meaning of his claim that we
must promote the highest good (as the union of universal virtue
and universal happiness).
I will call any moral theory, such as Kant's ethics, that puts
forward the demand that we actively seek the realization of ideal
institutions a social ethics, and I will use the term private ethics as
the opposite term. The point of using the latter term is to signify
that any moral theory that fails to make such a social demand
leaves our moral initiatives and efforts limited in effect to the private realm. This does not mean that the moral agent of private
ethics does not participate in institutions and does not fulfill duties
imposed upon him by these institutions; rather, it means that this
agent fails to question morally these duties and to see it as his task
to support just institutions or change unjust institutions in light of
some moral ideal. In short, private ethics (implicitly) limits our
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duties to individual duties and passive, as distinguished from active, social duties. I use here, and will continue to use, the terms
'individual duties' and 'social duties' in their common meanings;
their distinction hinges on the type of ends pursued, the ends of
particular individuals or social (institutional, collective) ends. Further, for the sake of brevity, from now on, when I speak of "social
duties," I mean active social duties.
My working definition of social ethics should not be interpreted too narrowly. There are numerous ways in which we can
fulfill our social duties and contribute toward the realization of
ideal institutions, besides political action aimed at these ends.
Kant's own work, as we will see, offers illustrations as diverse as
engaging in educational reform and writing a philosophical reconstruction of history that seeks to ground hope for progress as
conducive to moral praxis toward the highest good. Social duties
can, moreover, be directed toward the private realm. The attempt
to overcome individual bias toward minority groups may serve
here as an example, assuming that its final end in view is to come
to a nondiscriminatory society. In general, my working definition
of social ethics leaves room for social duties directed toward a
variety of intermediate social goals, but, in accordance with Kant's
view, it seeks to make clear that a rational pursuit of such goals
presupposes some larger directive framework in the form of idea l
institutions.
In the first section of this chapter I will begin to spell out the
role in Kant's work of the highest good as a social duty, arguing
that this duty integrates the diverse branches of the practical
sys~m and that it makes his ethics a social ethics, because it
comprises such social duties as seeking the perfect state (the
republican state) and peace between the nations. In the second
section I will point out that, although there are some reasons for
interpreting Kant's ethics as a private ethics, it is also the case
that his practical philosophy is at variance with some basic characteristics of private ethics. This indicates that those reasons cannot
be adequate or nullify the social dimension in Kant's moral
thought. It is from this angle that I will attempt to rebut in the
third section one of the more important reasons for interpreting
his ethics as a private ethics, namely that the categorical imperative
does not seem to ground such social duties as pursuing the ideal
state and international peace. My procedure will be to show that
each of the formulations of the categorical imperative, as they are
explicated in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, demands
that we seek a moral society in which human agents try to make
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one another happy. Considering my argument in the first section,
this grounding of the duty to promote the highest good implies a
grounding of these social duties as well. Nonetheless, I will
provide some additional arguments that strengthen the link between the categorical imperative and social ethics. I will close the
chapter by briefly examining the impact of the idea of the highest
good on the status of individual duties in Kant's practical thought.

1. Social Ethics

To come to a first demonstration of the central significance of the
highest good as a social duty in Kant's practical philosophy, I will
analyze here two sections from his work which were written at the
time when his critical ethics was in the process of development.
Through them it will become clear that from the very beginning
Kant was concerned with constructing his ethics as a social ethics.
I will end my discussion by relating the concerns of the two sections to those of the later Kantian practical corpus, emphasizing
their continuity.
While Kant was writing the Critique of Pure Reason he was
lecturing on ethics, taking Alexander Baumgarten's work as his
point of departure. Three students transcribed these lectures; their
notes have been published as Lectures on Ethics, and the text is
considered accurate. 1 Our concern is with the last section of this
work, entitled "The Ultimate Destiny of the Human Race." Kant
says that this destiny is the moral perfection of each individual as
well as the happiness that arises within such a condition. Both
here and in the next section that I will discuss, Kant suggests that
each individual wilJ be happy in the ideal society, but, since his
remarks are made in passing, there seems to be no good reason to
put too much weight on them. 2 What seems essential is that universal cooperation is a great step forward toward universal happiness. In Kant's later writings the moral society as the final destiny
of humanity is described in terms of the highest good, the ethical
commonwealth, the realm of ends, and the kingdom of God on
earth. At first sight, he seems to be arguing in the lectures that the
road toward universal cooperation and, hence, toward the highest
good is a question of each individual seeking his own moral selfimprovement. Kant states:
The universal end of mankind is the highest moral perfection. If we all so
ordered our conduct that it should be in harmony with the universal end
of mankind, the highest perfection would be attained. We must each of us,
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therefore, endeavor to guide our conduct to this end; each of us must
make such a contribution of his own that if all contributed similarly the
result would be perfection. (Lectures on Ethics, p. 252).

Thus it may seem that the duty to promote the highest good is,
in effect, a duty to seek our own moral betterment; when we all
cooperate with out fellow beings the moral society will emerge.
The most obvious problem with this view is that the call for
universal individual moral improvement is hardly a plausible scenario for change toward the highest good. Kant himself, however,
is the first to point this out, for he continues directly with the
following observations:
How far has the human race progressed on the road to perfection? If we
look at the most enlightened portion of the world, we see the various
States armed to the teeth, sharpening their weapons in time of peace the
one against the other. The consequences of this are such that they block
our approach to the universal end of perfection. The Abbot of St. Pierre
has proposed that a senate of the nations should be formed. If this proposal were carried out it would be a great step forward, for the time now
occupied by each nation in providing for its own security could then be
employed for the advancement of mankind.

For Kant, then, the constant preparation for war, not to speak of
war itself, is a serious obstacle on the road toward the moral
society or highest good, making it imperative that a "senate of the
nations" be formed that will guarantee international peace.
The importance of this claim cannot be sufficiently emphasized, for it makes clear that the duty to promote the highest good
has a definite social content. Since peace between the nations is
required to make the highest good possible, to seek peace and its
institutional prerequisites is a social duty that follows from, or is
an aspect of, the duty to promote the highest good. The claim also
signifies that the highest good is a historical ideal that functions as
an evaluative perspective. Kant judges his own time and society in
terms of progress toward the moral society, and in this manner he
comes to criticize the ruling powers of his day for establishing an
unstable peace through military force. More specifically, Kant
maintained that the "princes" were more interested in satisfying
their "lust for despotic power" and defending their "individual
sovereignty" than in upholding the "Idea of right." And, in a courageously straightforward manner, he said to his students: "[S]o
far no prince has contributed one iota to the perfection of mankind ... ; all of them look ever and only to the prosperity of their
own countries, making that their chief concern" (ibid., p. 253).

8
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Having sketched this deplorable political state of affairs, Kant
asked: " Wherein lies our hope?" At the time of his lectures, he
based his hope for true peace between the nations chiefly on educational reform, at both the domestic and the civil levels. In accordance with this, he sought financial support for J. B. Basedow's
private school in Dessau and publicly praised its educational program. What Kant saw as especially meritorious about this experimental school was that it taught religion along nonsectarian- and
ultimately moral-lines. 3 Thus we may interpret Kant as inviting
his students to join him in his efforts toward a better educational
system when he told them that " [t]he Basedow institutions give us
hope, warm even though small" (Lectures on Ethics, p. 253). In a
word, his more specific hope was that properly educated rulers
and other servants of the state, reinforced by an enlightened public
opinion, would bring about peace and general cooperation between the nations. And, of course, this hope implies one possible
further substantiation of the duty to promote the highest good.
Kant ended his lectures with the statement that the realization
of the final end of humanity is still centuries away and that, when
it is realized, "the authority, not of governments, but of conscience
within us, will . .. rule the world." This might suggest that he
thought that in the moral society the state will be abolished, but
this is to be doubted in light of the section that I will now discuss.
It is from Pure Reason and is entitled "The Ideas in General."
The central issue of this section is Plato's conception of ideas
and, in particular, his idea of the perfect city. Plato explicitly rejected conventional morality, as represented by Cephalus and his
son, and Kant's own view here points in the same direction. Opening his discussion by castigating those philosophers who repudiate
Plato's political vision as useless, impracticable, and as purely
imaginary perfection, Kant argues that this vision should not be
thrown aside, but rather clarified. From a critical-epistemological
perspective, this clarification involves casting aside Plato's tendency to hypostatize ideas, conceiving them instead as a priori
and, accordingly, as regulative. Further, we must limit the scope of
ideas more than Plato did; their major value must be sought
in the practical sphere, although they may also have a heuristic
value for scientific inquiry. Last, the Platonic vision of the ideal
society must be put in a new perspective. Then the insight will
arise that
fa] constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance
with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all
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others-I do not speak of the greatest happiness, for this will follow of
itself-is ... a necessary idea, which must be taken as fundamental not
only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws. (p. 312; III: 258).

Since Kant has previously said that happiness will follow from the
moral perfection of humanity, whereas now it is said to be the
result of a perfect constitution and its corresponding laws, we can
infer that the moral perfection of humanity and, hence, the moral
society will develop within the framework of the state. Thus, the
thesis that the conscience within us will rule the world when the
moral society is realized means not that the state will be abolished,
but that it will lose its repressive character. Another conclusion
that emerges is that the duty to promote the highest good encompasses the duty to realize the perfect state. This conclusion is
supported by Kant's further considerations of Plato.
Kant continues his criticism of the opponents of Plato with the
contention that any appeal to adverse experience as a basis for
claiming that visions of a perfect state have no practical value is
misplaced, because such adverse experience would not have occurred in the first place if pure ideas had been used to make the
laws. Kant turns the tables in similar fashion on those opponents
who argue that present imperfect political institutions are the inevitable and unchangeable product of a flawed human nature. He
argues that the real explanation for political imperfection is "the
neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the Jaws" (ibid.) . The
interesting suggestion here is that what appears as a flawed human nature is itself in large measure the product of faulty political
structures. This leads Kant to develop the radical claim that the
more legislation and government harmonize with the idea of a
perfect constitution the rarer punishment will become, and h e
argues that it is, therefore, rational to maintain, with Plato, that in
a perfect state no punishment will be necessary. This radical
claim-wrongly ascribed to Plato'-shows again that Kant perceptively held that certain sociopolitical conditions block moral progress. It also shows that the duty to seek the highest good includes
the duty to pursue the perfect state, and, indeed, Kant asserts here
that it is the duty of humanity to bring existing legal institutions as
close as possible to the ideal. To what degree this can be accomplished cannot be said in advance, because "the issue depends on
freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and
every specified limit." (Pure Reason, p. 312; III: 259) .
The merit of Plato's work, Kant proceeds to argue, is that it
demonstrates that ideas originate not in empirical reality but in
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reason. This is of crucial importance, since "[n]othing is more
reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought
to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circumscribed" (313; 259). Kant's ethics,
then, makes its own progressive nature a question of principle.
Practical reason projects and argues for moral ideals that always
leave room for improvement of the existing state of affairs. Even
the moral society is, strictly speaking, not an absolute final end;
for, although his lectures might suggest otherwise, Kant usually
writes about this ideal as one of moral perfection in the sense of
virtue (and it is this meaning that I have adopted), not in the sense
of "holiness" as the complete overcoming of the conflict between
desire and reason. Thus moral self-improvement is possible within
the moral society, which reflects Kant's view that morality sets an
infinite task.
Kant ends his analysis of Plato with some observations concerning the relation between ethics and epistemology, claiming,
although the previous moral considerations give "to philosophy its
particular dignity," he must first deal with "a less resplendent, but
still meritorious task, namely, to level the ground, and to render it
sufficiently secure for moral edifices of these majestic dimensions."
He explains that uncritical reason with "its confident but fruitless
search for hidden treasures ... threaten[s] the security of the superstructures," and that it is, therefore "[o]ur present duty .. . to
obtain insight into the transcendental employment of pure reason"
(3B-14; 259-60). Dogmatic metaphysics, then, is to be refuted, so
that the moral ideal can be grasped and grounded in the clearest
possible manner. For Kant the danger of this kind of metaphysics
is not so much that its alleged transcendent insights may be antithetical to moral praxis (although this is a concern), but that it
brings about as its very opposite a skepticism that "wars against
morality" (29; 25) . Generalizing these remarks, we can infer that
epistemology is logically prior to ethics in that it must prepare the
ground for a philosophically defensible ethics, but that ethics itself
is practically prior to epistemology, because the development of an
adequate epistemology is a task set by the highest good. This
integrates Kant's epistemology into his practical philosophy.
It needs to be stressed that neither in his lectures nor in his
Plato discussion is Kant making the claim that ideal institutions
such as the perfect state or a "senate of nations" cause moral progress. Such a claim would undermine his doctrine of moral autonomy. The moral agent must be his own cause. That is, genuine
moral action is the result of self-determination; to act morally is to
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act in accordance with the self-legislated moral law out of respect
for this law. It would, therefore, be a contradiction in terms to
speak of "caused" or "forced" moral progress. What Kant does say
is that poor institutional arrangements and other deplorable
sociopolitical conditions block moral progress and that the removal
of these impediments facilitates the development of the moral disposition (the good will) . He explicates his view in Perpetual Peace,
while describing the moral relevance of the institutionalization of
the rule of law:
[Government] not only gives a moral veneer (causae non causae) to the
whole but actually facilitates the development of the moral disposition to a
direct respect for the law by placing a barrier against the outbreak of
unlawful inclinations. Each person believes that he himself would hold
the concept of law sacred and faithfully follow it provided he were sure
that he could expect the same from others, and the government does in
part assure him of this. Thereby a great step (though not yet a moral step)
is taken toward morality, which is attachment to this concept of duty for
its own sake and without regard to hope of a similar response from others
(p. 123n; VI: 462- 63n).

The rule of law, then, guarantees equal external freedom for each
individual, as Kant's previous definition of the perfect constitution
and its laws puts it, and this creates a climate favorable to moral
autonomy, because it is to a much lesser degree the case that the
threat posed by others tempts one to act immorally. 5 Moreover, the
external rule, we may hope, will gradually become internalized;
the discipline from without becomes discipline from within. The
rule of law is also important for creating conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness, but Kant in general stresses this aspect
less than the legal facilitation of moral progress proper. Similar
observations apply to the moral significance of international peace
and cooperation. Further, Kant argues in Judgment that the fine arts
and the sciences, although not making us morally better, "win us
in large measure from the tyranny of the sense propensions, and
thus prepare men for a lordship in which reason alone shall have
authority" (p. 284; § 83; V: 513) . In conclusion, then, cultural progress, including sociopolitical progress, can facilitate moral development and prepare us for this kind of development, but the realization of moral perfection is possible only through moral autonomy.
Kant's major works on practical philosophy were written after
the two sections just discussed. The passage cited from Peace illustrates that certain changes emerge within his practical thought.
Legal progress appears here as merely setting the stage for moral
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progress, whereas his Plato analysis indicates that earlier he had
held that legal and moral progress mutually condition each
other-that is, that legal progress requires moral progress, and
vice versa. 6 Much more striking than such changes, however, is the
continuity and consistency of Kant's project. We may see the major
practical writings as fundamentally concerned with explicating
and elaborating the ideas found in these two sections. A brief tum
to the various practical writings will underline this. The guiding
thread throughout is the highest good as a social duty. First of all,
the political writings address the political institutions that make
this good possible. The perfect state is further specified as republican, and, although Kant develops his own unique peace proposal,
there remain certain affinities with the proposal of the Abbot of St.
Pierre. Besides, he continued to express his sympathy with this
earlier plan and to emphasize that it is our duty to seek peace
within and between the states. 7 Further, in his essays on history,
Kant investigates whether past historical developments are a
source of hope with respect to the possibility of the republican
state and international peace, arguing that this hope is conducive
to moral action aimed at these political ends. Again, he looks for a
specific "historical sign" that supports hope for progress. This sign
is no longer the Basedow school, but the French Revolution, a
world-historical event that Kant said engendered enthusiasm
among its spectators, reflecting their moral interest in promoting
republican ideals. He also relates this political event, and the history of humanity in general, to the possibility of the moral society,
or highest good. The concern with the moral society is, moreover,
central to Kant's writings on religion. The church was in his time a
dominant social force, and it is in this light that his contention is to
be judged that the church must reorganize itself on the basis of the
moral ideal. For Kant this means that the church, and all religious
undertakings, must anticipate and imitate the ideal of the moral
society. His sympathy with the religious instruction at the Basedow school prefigures this view. Last, Kant's moral writings proper
are in various ways concerned with the highest good as a social
duty. For example, the need for grounding this duty is expressed
in his Plato analysis, and I will argue in the third section of this
chapter that the categorical imperative is adequate to the task.
And, to give a different twist to Kant's statement in the lectures,
cited previously, that "our conduct ... should be in harmony
with the universal end of mankind," his later moral writings
proper make this into a general criterion for determining the
morally permissible means by which we may pursue the highest
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good. In a word, this criterion is that the means must mirror
this end.
These synoptic remarks suffice as a first demonstration of the
central significance of the highest good as a social duty in Kant's
work. This duty integrates all the branches of the critical philosophy. We may, then, interpret the highest good as the final and
comprehensive end that guides the critical enterprise in its various
stages of development and completion. This project also argues in
accordance with its own basic rationale that humanity ought to
actualize the moral ideal. This means that Kant's social ethics adheres to and exemplifies the primacy of praxis. Practical reason
views the world in both its natural and human aspects as a field
for the expression and realization of the highest good, and it
holds, moreover, that our ultimate purpose and satisfaction are to
be found in transformative activity directed toward this ideal. This
idea of the primacy of praxis is one aspect of Kant's "primacy of
pure practical reason." 8 Lucien Goldmann in his Immanuel Kant
captured this aspect of Kant's philosophy quite well when he said
that for Kant the fundamental category of existence is "the task of
creating a world." 9 Combining the idea of the primacy of praxis
with that of the highest good, we come to the conclusion that a
core thesis of Kant's social ethics is that (empirical) humanity, in
order to express its humanity (rational/moral nature), must produce humanity (the moral order) .

2. Private Ethics
From a sociological perspective we may see our duties as emerging
from two basic sources: social networks and moral principles. 10
Many of our duties arise in virtue of our membership in the legal/
political community, our occupation, family relationships, and
other social ties and functions, but these obligations leave room for
a wide variety of moral actions, such as contributing to the struggle for peace and helping others in need, which should be performed in view of certain moral principles. Which of our duties
emerge from social networks and which from moral principles is,
of course, an individual and historical question. What characterizes private ethics is that it (implicitly) limits the duties that have
moral principles as their source to individual duties. Social ethics,
to the contrary, maintains that, beyond the duties arising from our
social networks, we have not only individual duties but also the
obligation to contribute to the realization of ideal institutions. Pri-
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vate ethics is the dominant view of morality in our society, and this
makes it not altogether surprising that the social dimension of
Kant's ethics often receives inadequate attention and that his ethics
is at times even portrayed as a mere private ethics. Be this as it
may, there are several reasons for interpreting Kant's practical philosophy along these private lines. Two of these reasons must be
mentioned at this point.
The first is that the categorical imperative seems to lead to
individual duties and passive social duties, not to active social
duties. This is suggested by the fact that all the illustrations that
Kant offers in the Foundations of how we should use this imperative for deriving specific duties seem to concern individual duties
or passive social ones. The illustrations are that we should not
commit suicide or make false promises for our private gain and
that we should develop our talents and help others in need. We
may see the first two of these duties as passive social duties arising
from the social networks of Kant's time, which explains why he
sees only the last two duties, which appear to be concerned with
the ends of particular individuals, as meritorious (p. 48. IV: 288-9) .
Further, Kant uses the categorical imperative in The Metaphysics of
Morals to ground two types of duties that encompass all our duties: the duties of justice and the duties of virtue, neither of which
seem to include active social duties. The duties of justice in principle can be legally enforced, and their common denominator is that
we respect the equal right of each individual to external freedom.
(For Kant this right is the basis for a variety of common civil and
political rights.) There is a gap between this demand of passively
respecting the right of others and the demand that we actively
seek the perfect state and peace between the nations as conditions
under which such a right is secured for all human beings." So the
duties of justice do not seem to include active social duties. Also,
we can be forced to uphold the standards of the perfect state and
international peace once they are actualized-this would be the
fulfillment of passive social duties-, but we cannot be forced by
imperfect legalJpolitical arrangements to transform them into perfect ones. Considering Kant's definition of the duties of justice,
then, active social duties must be duties of virtue, the concept of
which presupposes the moral motive (internal coercion versus
external coercion) . However, all the duties of virtue that Kant
mentions in The Metaphysics of Morals are individual duties, except for his claim that it is a duty of virtue to fulfill the duties
of justice with a proper motive. In short, it seems that his moral
theory proper grounds a private ethics, not a social ethics.
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The second reason for interpreting Kant's ethics as a private
ethics concerns his contention that it is not within our power to
realize the highest good as the union of universal virtue and universal happiness. Kant argues that the affirmation of the tenability
of this ideal is ultimately an act of faith (the postulate about God),
and this suggests that the relevance of the highest good must be
sought not in the realm of human action but in the sphere of (a
metaphysically interpreted) religious hope. The elimination of the
highest good as setting a human task leads us back on the road to
private ethics, especially if we take into account the first reason for
interpreting his ethics in these terms. The two reasons, in other
words, are complementary, making together a case for Kant's ethics as a private ethics which we cannot ignore. I will address the
first reason in the next section, and the second reason in the next
chapter. Now I wish to point out three fundamental characteristics
of private ethics, each of which is at variance with Kant's ethics.
This argument indicates that the two reasons just cited are all in all
not adequate or overriding. It also reinforces the conclusion from
the previous section that the duty to change society in light of
some moral ideal plays a central role in Kant's ethics. My model for
private ethics is conventional morality as it is shaped by the capitalist-liberal tradition, but it can readily be seen that similar remarks apply to any private ethics whatever.
A first basic characteristic of private ethics is that it is implicitly
conservative. 12 Typically it does not argue for a conservative viewpoint, but rather accepts conservatism without any argument for
doing so. Kant's ethics, to the contrary, formulates a principled
rejection of conservatism. A few remarks on conservatism may
help to clarify these points.
Michael Oakeshott in "On Being Conservative"' 3 rightly
argues that conservatism is best understood as a disposition rather
than as a body of beliefs. He writes:
The general characteristics of this disposition are not difficult to discern ... . They center upon a propensity to use and to enjoy what is
available rather than to wish for or to look for something else; to delight in
what is present rather than what was or what may be (p. 168).

Thus the conservative comes to emphasize that "[c]hanges
. have to be suffered" and that "[t]o be conservative . . . is to
prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the
unbounded, the near to the distant, . . . the convenient to the
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perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss." (pp. 169 and 171). The
political implications, I think, are clear. The conservative
favors the preservation of existing sociopolitical structures, looks
with suspicion upon innovation, and, in general, considers
legitimate only those changes which maintain and reinforce the
status quo.
Private ethics neglects the possibility that it may be our obligation to change existing institutions in light of some moral ideal.
Hence, such ethics is implicitly conservative because it does not
bring its acceptance of the status quo into the open. It is conservatism by default. Thus it may be the case that the moral agent of
private ethics or conventional morality accepts the sociopolitical
given for reasons different than those of the affirmed conservative.
His acceptance may perhaps be based on political resignation
rather than on a preference for the existing state of affairs.
Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, who interpreted Kant's ethics as a
private ethics and who saw his highest good as a mere object of
religious hope, came to the conclusion that political resignation is
the mark of his ethics. They wrote in The German ldeology 14 :
The state of affairs in Germany at the end of the last century is fully
reflected in Kant's Kritik der praktischen Vernunft . ... The impotent German burghers did not get any further than "good will." Kant was satisfied
with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result, and he
transferred the realization of this good will, the harmony between it and
the needs and impulses of individuals, to the world beyond. Kant's good
will fully corresponds to the impotence, depression and wretchedness
of the German burghers, whose petty interests were never capable of
developing into the common, national interests of a class and who
were, therefore, constantly exploited by the bourgeois of all other nations
(p. 208).

But whether political resignation or a silent favoring of the status
quo guides the agent of private ethics, the practical result is the
same: conservatism is the hidden premise of private ethics.
This uncritical acceptance of the status quo is not a feature of
Kant's practical philosophy. His social ethics explicated its own
political commitment; it operated at the progressive edge of his
time and pushed forward the existing limits. So the interpretation
of his ethics as a private ethics seems to be wrong. Note, moreover,
that Kant's ethics offered a principled rejection of conservatism in
claiming, as we have seen in the section on Plato, that "[n ]othing is
more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought
to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by
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which the latter is circumscribed." The Kantian agent, then, adheres to a preference scale which is the very opposite of that of the
affirmed conservative; he prefers the unbounded to the limited,
the perfect to the convenient, the possible to the actual, etc.
A second basic characteristic of private ethics is that it lacks
any awareness of the relevance of history for moral praxis. The
agent of private ethics is absorbed in his own limited present. His
concern is not the past, present, and future of humanity, but the
well-being of atomized individuals. The alternative is not to make
oneself at home in history, as Hegel urged us to do, and to embrace all the suffering in history as a mere inevitable moment
toward the good. Rather, the suffering of the past must be related
to moral praxis directed toward the future. Can this suffering be
redeemed by the realization of a truly human society, or does it
make such a society altogether impossible? Is history solely a
source of despair, a chain of senseless and violent events, or can it
also be a source of hope? And is this hope required for moral
action that aims at a better society? These are questions that a
private ethics fails to address. In contrast, Kant's ethics, as we will
see later in more detail, deals with these questions or invites us to
reflect upon them. So again the interpretation of his ethics as a
private ethics is contradicted; this interpretation cannot satisfactorily explain why Kant turns so often to history in his practical
writings.
A final basic characteristic of private ethics is that it does not
offer a comp rehensive end in view (a totality concept) that
positively synthesizes individuaJ moral actions. Thus within the
contours of private ethics moral actions seem to lack any real continuity and unity, either in terms of their intentions or of their
consequences. '5 To elaborate, private ethics tends to sketch moral
actions and objectives not as an important aspect of the life plan of
the individual but merely as conditioning this life plan in a negative manner. The life plan of the agent consists of the pursuit of
private ends, and, hence, moral endeavors are seen as mere constraints. Or, at best, morality is positively esteemed as the task of
furthering the ends of some particular individuals. It is true that
some agents of private ethics may focus their lives upon this task;
yet this is not a demand set by private ethics, and it is not at a ll
evident that such an end can successfully function as a totality
concept. The situation is altogether different for Kant's social ethics. The idea of the primacy of praxis in conjunction with that of
the highest good implies that the Kantian moral agent incorporates
the highest good as a social ideal into his life plan. Kant's own life
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illustrates this point, since we may view his intellectual labor as his
way of fulfilling the duty to promote the highest good. His wellknown patterned life style, then, is to be understood from the
perspective of intellectual discipline as moral discipline. The highest good and its intermediate ends can also satisfactorily function
as a totality concept for a life style that unfolds more directly
within the sociopolitical arena. Granted, the actions of the agent
with this type of life style may not have the intended consequences
and may be aborted by social and political repression. Many human lives have been failures in this respect; but this only emphasizes the point that there is a duty to promote the highest good.
We may see it as a duty owed to those in the past who have
struggled for the ideal without success. '"

3. The Highest Good and the
Categorical Imperative
The discussion in the previous section poses a clear problem:
Kant's ethics conflicts with private ethics on at least three basic
grounds, and, yet, the categorical imperative, as the central moral
principle of his ethics, seems to lead to private ethics. This problem will be solved if it can be shown that the categorical imperative
grounds the duty to promote the highest good; for we have seen
that this duty grounds a variety of social duties, making Kant's
ethics a social ethics. Accordingly we must show that the highest
good (defined as a moral society in which human beings attempt
to make one another happy) is the final obligatory end set by the
moral law. Admittedly, it also would be possible to ground Kant's
ethics as a social ethics through a reconstruction of the categorical
imperative which focused on showing that this imperative leads
directly to such social duties as seeking the perfect state and international peace. " What makes the "highest good" strategy more
attractive for our purposes is that it is much more comprehensive,
leaving room for a specification of our social duties that varies
with our historical understanding and circumstances. Thus we
may late r come to the conclusion, without thereby violating the
basic tenet of Kant's social ethics, that the highest good requires for
our present historical situation different or additional social duties
from those Kant proposed. Another distinct advantage of my strategy is that it can do justice to the fact that Kant claimed that the
moral law demands that we pursue the highest good. My procedure will be to analyze the different formulations of the categori-
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cal imperative in the Foundations, arguing in each case that the
highest good is the final moral end set by this imperative. Initially,
my analysis will be in the main a step-by-step reconstruction of the
Kantian argument, but I will end with some critical comments and
suggestions of how this argument can be strengthened.
In the Foundations we find six formulations of the categorical
imperative. Strictly speaking, Kant should have discussed eight
formulas-four basic ones, each having its own typic. (A typic adds
to its basic formula a type or model of the moral law and its final
end. This type is the natural order, regulatively interpreted, as it
applies to both human and external nature.) Kant, however, does
not mention that the autonomy formula has a typic, and he fails to
draw a distinction between basic formula and typic with respect to
the humanity-as-an-end-in-itself formula. This imprecision is understandable in light of his contention that the different formulas are
only so many different expressions of one and the same moral law.
Many Kant interpreters have rejected this claim, but I think it is
defensible in that the common denominator of the formulas is that
they all demand that we seek the highest good. I will, accordingly,
limit my analysis to the six formulas put forward by Kant.
What is the final end set by the moral law? Or, to put the
question differently, what is the final purpose of general obedience
to the moral law? Kant's answer can be found in Lectures on Ethics:
Moral goodness consists . . . in the submission of our will to rules
whereby all our voluntary actions are brought into a harmony which is
universally valid. Such a rule, which forms the first principle of the possibility of the harmony of all free wills, is the moral rule . ... Our actions
must be regulated if they are to harmonize, and their regulation is effected
by the moral law (p. 17).

The moral law, then, has a final purpose that is social in nature. It
must make possible a harmony of free or rational wills. To be sure,
the moral law in this passage is not yet the moral law of the critical
ethics, but, as will soon become clear, a proper understanding of
the categorical imperative leads to the same social end.

The Universal-law Formula
The first formula of the categorical imperative, the universal-law
formula, states:
Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law (Foundations, p. 39; IV: 279).

20

Social Versus Private Ethics

This formula might suggest that the categorical imperative must be
seen as a test or procedure for determining the limiting conditions
of the pursuit of one's private ends. It is undeniable that this is one
aspect of the universal-law formula, as is indicated by Kant's illustrations cited earlier; but to limit the formula to this purpose, as
so often is done, is to distort Kant's meaning. To begin with, the
view that the virtuous agent wills to subject only his own maxims
to the universality test is too restricted. The moral agent who
adopts the standpoint of practical reason wills not merely that his
own maxims be tested in this way but that everyone act only on
maxims that can be willed to become universal laws. That this is so
we can infer from Kant's claim that what characterizes the immoral
agent is that he wills that everyone except himself obey the moral
law. To use one of Kant's own examples, the immoral agent wishes
that everyone else follow the policy of keeping promises, so that
he himself will be able to make a false promise for the sake of his
own private gain. The virtuous agent, to the contrary, does not will
to make an exception for himself or for a particular group he is
part of, and this means that he wills that everyone subject his
maxims to the universality test. Another consideration is that reason is not particular but universal; its demands hold for all rational
beings, and so the agent who adopts the standpoint of reason, the
virtuous agent, wills that all rational agents follow its demands.
Kant holds that, if everyone subjects his maxims to the universality test, the pursuit of private ends will no longer give rise to
conflict. The purpose of the categorical imperative, then, is to
make possible a harmony of rational wills, and the agent who
obeys this imperative out of respect for the moral law wills this
harmony. In the words of H. J. Paton:
Kant's v iew is clearly that coherence of rational wills can be based
only on obedience to one and the same universal law as such, and that
without this there can be no genuine coherence ....
If this is so, in seeking to obey universa l law as such we are seeking to
realize the condition of coherence among rational wills.'"

That Kant indeed adheres to this view is indicated by his argument
that in order to deduce the moral law we must abstract from any
object of desire as the determinant of moral action, because the
diversity of the objects of desire among human agents leads to
conflict when any given such object is made into the moral
guideline for human action. Thus he states in Critique of Practical
Reason that the desire for happiness is inadequate as a practical
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law, because general obedience to it results in "the extreme opposite of harmony, the most arrant conflict." He jokes that the
"harmony" arising from this law resembles "that depicted in a
certain satirical poem as existing between a married couple bent
on going to ruin, 'Oh, marvelous harmony, what he wants is what
she wants."''" The point of the moral law as a formal law, then, is
to come to a harmony that is not a mere accidental, and at times
disastrous, harmony (cf. Paton, op. cit., p. 140).
To do justice to Kant's view, we must take an additional step
beyond the interpretation that the categorical imperative is only a
negative test that limits the pursuit of one's private ends. Thus far it
seems that the virtuous person aims at a harmony of rational wills
so that everyone can pursue his own private ends. In other words,
he seeks indirectly to promote universal happiness. This harmony
of rational wills, however, encompasses universal external freedom, and we have seen that for Kant such freedom has the
additional and even more important purpose of universal moral
perfection. Accordingly, the virtuous person seeks to bring about
conditions that are conducive to the development of the moral
disposition. Considering Kant's notion of autonomy, this is all the
virtuous person can do in the area of moral improvement besides
seeking his own moral betterment; for the development of the
moral disposition is an autonomous task. I may add that this duty
to seek the conditions of universal moral perfection can be derived
directly from the universal-law formula . The virtuous agent seeks
the conditions of his own autonomy, and he cannot rationally will
these conditions and their prerequisites while failing to promote
them for others. The universalization of this maxim undermines
the very same conditions of autonomy that the virtuous agent
treasures for himself.
There remains one step from the universal-law formula to the
duty to promote the highest good. One aspect of this duty is that
we not only indirectly, but directly, promote the realization of a
world in which human agents seek to make one another happy.
Kant argues that it is our duty to contribute to the happiness of
other agents. As he often puts it, we must make their individual
ends our own end, provided that the pursuit of these ends can
pass the universality test. In the Foundations, the duty to make the
ends of others one's own end is often put in negative fashion as the
duty to help others in need, whereas in The Doctrine of Virtue Kant
states that the happiness of others is an end of practical reason.
The difference between the two formulations seems rather small,
for promoting the happiness of others is foremost a question of
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relieving them of their hardship. The real problem is that both
formulations seem to fall short of what is required by the highest
good as a social duty. This duty demands not merely that we
promote the realization of individual ends, but that we direct our
efforts toward the realization of a world in which all persons promote one another's ends. This apparent gap, however, can be
bridged along by now familiar lines. The virtuous agent does not
merely will that he alone make the ends of others his own end, but
rather wills that everyone act likewise. So this agent is morally
interested in conditions that directly promote universal happiness.
And again, the universality of practical reason reinforces this
claim. That Kant does indeed have this broader concern in mind
becomes clear when we turn to the second formula of the categorical imperative.

The Natural-law Formula
In the Foundations this formula is stated as follows:
Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a
universal law of nature (p. 39; IV: 279).

The formula is expressed more clearly in Practical Reason:
Ask yourself whether, if the action which you propose should take place
by a law of nature of which you yourself were a part, you could regard it
as possible through your will (p. 72; V: 77).

Kant presents the natural-law formula as an explication of the first
formula. This explication offers a gain in two respects. First, the
natural-law formula suffers to a lesser degree from creating the
impression that the categorical imperative is merely a restrictive
principle. Kant's real meaning now becomes more apparent, namely
that in testing our maxims we are constructing a moral world.
Second, a guideline is provided for this constructive activity. The
natural world and its laws serve in the second formula as a type of
the moral law (the law of freedom) and its final end (the moral
world). Hence, both the first and second formulas demand that the
moral agent act as if he were a legislator in a possible moral order
(making universal laws), but only in the second formula is the
regulatively interpreted natural order presented as a model that
helps to clarify what such a legislation involves.
In Kant's writings, the natural order is approached from two
different angles-the causal perspective and the teleological per-
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spective. Kant holds that, from an epistemological point of view,
the two perspectives are not contradictory but complementarythat is, only causal claims can be scientific claims, but teleological
observations have an indispensable heuristic value in helping to
discover causal connections. Both perspectives have practical value, but I will emphasize the teleological perspective, because only
this perspective shows that mutual promotion of happiness is an
essential aspect of the harmony of rational wills.
There are at least three features of the causal perspective that
are relevant to using the natural order as a model for the moral
order. First, Kant believes that natural laws are characterized by
universal uniformity in the sense that these laws do not admit of
exceptions. 20 We have already encountered the practical value of
this idea. Kant states:
When we observe ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find
that we do not actually will that our maxim should become a universal
law. That is impossible for us; rather, the contrary of this maxim should
remain as a law genera lly, and we only take the liberty of making an
exception to it for ourselves or for the sake of our inclination, and for this
one occasion (Foundations, p. 42; IV: 282).

Second, laws of nature are in principle public. The analogical value
here is that maxims and governmental policies, as well as juridical
laws, which cannot become public are unjust. Kant claims with
respect to the former: "A maxim which I cannot divulge without
defeating my own purpose must be kept secret if it is to succeed;
and, if I cannot publicly avow it without inevitably exciting universal opposition to my project, the necessary and universal opposition which can be foreseen a priori is due only to the injustice with
which the maxim threatens everyone (Peace, pp. 129-30; VI: 469).
Thll:d, physical reciprocity can function as a model for the reciprocity of legal obligations. The law of the equality of action and
reaction, which is a specific expression of the third analogy of
experience presented in the first Critique, exhibits in analogy that
each citizen is, or, more precisely, should be, equally subject to
legal coercion. Thus it is an act of injustice to exempt oneself from
rules that one wills that others obey, and the analogy exposes this.
The restraint of others is not met by an equal restraint of oneself.
There is a disproportion between action and reaction, and this
makes impossible external freedom for all, just as it would prevent
the free movement of natural bodies. 21
Although the first of these three analogies seems to commit
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Kant to a rigoristic viewpoint, I think that this would be stretching
the analogy too far. His point seems to be not that moral rules
never allow for exceptions, but that these exceptions should be
rationally and morally motivated rather than determined by our
inclinations. In other words, exceptions should be guided by rulegoverned behavior, as is illustrated by Kant's numerous "casuistical
questions" in Virtue. Much more problematic is the second analogy and its resulting publicity criterion. It seems, for example, to
lead to too easy a condemnation of all forms of deception as well
as of many forms of political resistance. I will later discuss Kant's
view of the right to revolution and to other forms of political
resistance, and it will then become clear that he does, indeed, use
the publicity criterion to come to a rejection of this right. For the
moment it suffices to note that the difficulty with the second analogy seems to arise from a general ambiguity embedded in the
natural-law formula. It is one thing to claim that our maxims must
be formulated from the perspective of the ideal of the moral order
as a natural order or that we must always attempt to mirror this
ideal in our actions; it is another thing to claim that we must act as
if we were already living in the moral order as a natural order. I
assume that Kant adhered to the first claim, not the second, and,
yet, his use of the publicity criterion seems to be based on this
second claim. For, if I am the only virtuous person in a world of
devils, universal public outcry over my maxim does not show anything at all about the wrongness of this maxim. What is more
important, however, is that in general the failure to take into account that we do not live in a world of saints may lead to immoral
behavior. 22
In order to discuss the practical significance of the teleological
perspective we must briefly turn to Kant's notion of an organism.
The guideline is that there is an analogy between the concept of a
natural organism and that of the moral order as an order of universal cooperation ("society as an organism"). Kant develops his concept of an organism in Judgment. He says that a first defining
characteristic of an organism is that the function and existence of
the parts are determined by the function and existence of the
whole, but he notes that this is not a sufficient characterization of a
natural organism, since an artificial product satisfies this condition
as well. For a product to be classified as a product of nature it is,
secondly, necessary that "its parts should so combine in the unity
of a whole that they are reciprocally cause and effect of each
other's form. Only in this way can the idea of the whole conversely
(reciprocally) determine the form and the combination of all
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the parts." 23 This difference between a product of nature and an
artificial product--centered around the observation that only the
former displays natural development or growth-is further explicated by Kant in the following passage, which also addresses the
first defining characteristic:
In .. . a product of nature, every part not only exists by means of the
other parts, but is thought as existing for the sake of the others and the
whole-that is as an (organic) instrument. Thus, however, it might be
an artificial instrument, ... but also its parts are all organs reciprocally
producing one another. This ca n never be the case with artificial instruments .... Only a [natural] product ... is an organized and se/f-orga11izi11g
being (Judgment, p. 220; § 65; V: 451-2).

According to Kant, then, an organism is characterized by its capacity to produce its own organization and unity. The parts produce
one another, and their interaction determines the form of the
whole; conversely, what the whole is (or will be) determines the
way the parts interact to maintain (or to produce) it.
It is to be stressed that Kant is engaged here not in a teleological metaphysics but in a critique of judgment. The idea of the
whole or natural purpose must be understood as "the ground of
cognition for him who is judging it," and Kant explains this as
meaning that "[t]he concept of a thing as in itself a natural purpose .. . is no constitutive concept of understanding or of reason,
but . . . a regulative concept for reflective judgment, to guide our
investigation about objects of this kind by a distant analogy with
our own causality according to purposes generally" (pp. 220 and
222; 451 and 453). No claim, then, is made that purposive causality is
determinative of reality-only causal connections proper are constitutive. The same critical position is taken when Kant deals with
the idea that nature in its totality is a purposive whole. He argues
that this idea necessarily follows from the notion that an organism
is a purposive totality and claims that with respect to collective
nature a maxim holds which is also applicable to organisms: "viz.
everything in the world [or organisms] is some way good for
something; nothing is vain in it" (p. 225; § 67; 457). And again Kant
emphasizes that this principle is regulative and not constitutive.
The teleological perspective on nature exhibits in analogy several important aspects of the moral order. In Judgment Kant points
out some homologies between the perfect state and the natural
order as a teleological order. Presumably alluding to the French
Revolution, he wrote:

26

Social Versus Private Ethics

In a recent complete transformation of a great people into a state the word
organization for the regu lation of magistracies, etc., and even of the whole
body politic, has often been fitly used. For in such a whole every member
should surely be purpose as well as means, and, while all work together
toward the possibility of the whole, each should be determined as regards
place and function by means of the Idea of the whole."

Considering Kant's notion of the perfect state, however, it seems
more accurate to say that the natural order conceived of as an
organism portrays in analogical fashion the moral order as such (of
which the perfect state is only an aspect). Using Kant's definition
of an organized product of nature, it follows in analogy that the
moral order "is one in which every part [read: person] is reciprocally
purpose [end] and means. " 25 Thus within this order each individual
fulfill s the task of contributing to the realization of the ends or
purposes of other moral agents, just as the parts produce one
another in an organism, and thi s will be done either directly by
making the ends of others one's own ends or indirectly by making
possible the moral order. The realization of human purposes comprises two types of ends: moral perfection, and the fulfillment of
individual ends that pass the universality test. Finally, the analogy
shows that the moral order can be established only if each person
is guided by the idea of the whole, and its continuation is subject
to the same precondition. The natural-law formula, then, projects
the same ideal as the universal-law formula, although more clearly
so: in the moral order as a harmony of rational wills human agents
uphold and promote the conditions of universal moral perfection
(autonomy) and seek to make one another happy.
The teleological model is not free from difficulties. A minor
problem is that the model does not fit with the dominant contemporary conception of external nature. (To some degree the same
can be said of the causal model.) Accordingly, one might object
that not all organisms seem to be well adapted to their purposes
and that the Darwinian view of nature evokes the idea of universal
conflict rather than that of universal cooperation. This is not a
serious objection, because, after all, Kant appealed to the dominant conception of nature in his own time merely in order to
facilitate understanding of wh at legislation in the moral order
involves. Granted that the model has lost its practical value
(although recently growing "ecological awareness" points in the
opposite direction), the task is to seek a model more appropriate
for our own time. Or, alternatively, an argument can be made
that Kant's ethics can dispense with such a model altogether. 26
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Another, and more serious, difficulty with the teleological
model is that it is misleading in at least three important respects.
First, it is implausible to hold that an organism (the whole) exists
for the sake of the parts- a thesis which is to be distinguished from
the correct claim that the whole determines the parts and vice versa.
Yet Kant held that the moral order exists for the sake of the legislators (all moral agents) who form it. Here, then, the analogy fails;
for it has totalitarian overtones that are not present in Kant's work,
to wit, that the legislators exist for the sake of the whole, the moral
society. Second, the analogy conceals rather than reveals
the fact that an essential difference between the natural order (or
organism) and the human order (or individual) is that only the
latter is a rational order-not given, but to be created. Kant makes
this sufficiently clear on the institutional level, but not always on
the individual level. (In this regard his historical writings are to be
preferred to his moral writings proper.) For example, his discussion of suicide and sexual morality is colored by the view that
certain purposes pertain to human nature, such as self-preservation and procreation, and that to act contrary to these purposes is
unnatural and, therefore, immoral. u Kant neglects here the open
character of human nature (human beings are what they make of
themselves) and fails to argue that human nature is to be transformed in light of the moral ideal (the ethicization of human nature). Just as the moral society requires the transformation of
institutions as well as of external nature, so the ideal of the human
agent as a rational order (i.e., the reconciliation between virtue and
the pursuit of happiness) requires the transformation of human
nature. And, of course, the two processes reinforce each other.
The third way in which the teleological model is misleading is
that (unlike my interpretation) it may suggest that the moral society must be defined as the union of universal virtue and universal happiness. The problem is that this model does not bring out
the distinction between moral well -being (virtue) and physical
well-being (happiness). A well-functioning organism is one in
which each part realizes its purpose; thus it may seem in analogy
that the moral society as a well-functioning society is one in which
each individual realizes his ends of virtue and happiness. This
conclusion, however, is based on equivocation. The moral society
is by definition a society of moral well-being (virtue), and what the
teleological model exhibits in analogy is that all human beings in
this society aim at universal physical well-being; but the failure to
realize universal well-being in the latter sense does not imply a
failure to realize universal well-being in the former sense. Equiv-
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ocating on the two senses of well-being, it seems that the highest
good as the final end of the moral law is the union of universal virtue and universal happiness; the failure to realize universal
happiness appears as a deontic failing. I suspect that Kant's usual
definition of the highest good is based on a similar equivocation,
but I will postpone consideration of this question until the
next chapter.
The road through Kant's teleology leads from the duty to obey
the moral law to the duty to promote the highest good. In testing
his maxims by way of the natural-law formula, the moral agent
comes to construct a moral order in which human beings seek to
enhance the universal ends of moral perfection and happiness,
and if this agent is virtuous, he seeks to act on maxims that accord
with and mirror this ideal. Again, it is to be stressed-and Kant
would have avoided much misunderstanding if he had emphasized this-that the agent with a virtous motive wills that everyone
act along these lines. In other words, the virtuous agent wills the
moral order as a natural order, that is, as a moral society in which
human beings seek to make one another happy. Willing this is
identical to willing the highest good. Generalizing this result, it
follows that the universal requirement to obey the moral law implies the duty of humanity to promote the highest good. As Kant
puts it in Practical Reason, "the moral law ideally transfers us into a
nature in which reason would bring forth the highest good [as the
union of universal virtue and universal happiness] were it accompanied by sufficient physical capacities; and it determines our will
to impart to the sensuous world the form [universal law as such] of
a system of rational beings" (p. 45; V: 50) . Switching from one
conception of the highest good to the other, as Kant presumably
unwittingly does here, it seems that the latter task is within our
power, the former perhaps not. But even if we come to the conclusion (with Kant) that humanity lacks the physical capacities to
make each individual happy in the moral society, it remains the
case that we must try to approximate such a condition. The second
formula of the categorical imperative, then, demands that we promote the highest good as the union of universal virtue and universal happiness or realize the highest good as a moral order of universal cooperation.

The Humanity-as-an-end-in-itself Formula
Kant puts the third formula of the categorical imperative in the
following words:
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Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as a means only (Foundations, p. 47;
IV: 287).

The formula is often rephrased as demanding respect for persons:
we must treat ourselves and others as rational moral agents. Thus,
to use once more Kant's own illustrations, self-respect means that
we should not commit suicide but should develop our talents,
because we must both sustain and develop ourselves as rational
moral beings, whereas respect for others involves on similar
grounds such duties as helping them in need and not deceiving
them for the sake of our private gain. The problem with this interpretation is that it fails to do justice to the social dimension in
Kant's moral thought. This dimension is also visible in the third
formula .
The first thing to be noticed is that Kant does not speak of
"respect for persons" in the above formula, but of treating "humanity in your own person or in that of another as an end and
never as a means only." The question to be asked is how humanity
(Menschh eit) can be in the individual. Kant provides the answer in
the first illustration of the third formula: " [H]e who contemplates
suicide will ask himself whether his action can be consistent with
the idea of humanity as an end in itself" (ibid., my emphasis). In
view of the basic premises of Kant's social ethics it is evident that
this idea is a regulative or task-setting idea. Correspondingly, the
idea of humanity does not refer to humanity as it now exists but to
humanity as it ought to exist. This insight is clearly expressed by
the neo-Kantian Cohen, who reformulates the third formula as
follows:
"Do not act as an I, in the empirical sense, but as the I of mankind, in the
ideal sense. Regard your own person as well as any other not in the
physical, racial, or narrowly historical term s of individual existence, but
exclusively as an embodiment of the eternal, world-historical idea of
mankind."' 6

Cohen adds: "Mankind is man's final purpose and goal." This ultimate purpose is the highest good; it is the idea of the moral order
as applied to the human condition. Thus we can link the third
formula with the two previous ones. To treat humanity in oneself
or in others as an end is to act only on maxims that are consistent
with the idea of the moral order; it is to act only on maxims that
can become universal laws or laws of nature.
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To elaborate, in projecting the moral law the moral agent projects the legislative self (the noumenal self, the ideal person) and
with it the moral order of legislators, or humanity as it ought to be.
As Jean-Paul Sartre writes in Existentialism Is a Humanism, "In
choosing myself, I choose man. [T]he man who involves himself
[is] a lawmaker who is, at the same time, choosing all mankind as
well as himself." 29 Thus in committing oneself to the moral law, one
commits oneself to the moral self and to a moral humanity. Hence,
respect for the moral law and respect for the self that is a legislative self are two sides of one and the same coin. Moreover, to act
out of respect for the moral law is to will oneself and others as
legislative selves or members of the ideal order; it is to will the
moral order of universal cooperation or humanity as it ought to be.
This means that we ought to promote the highest good. In accordance with this, Kant emphasizes that the "harmony [of our
actions] with humanity as an end in itself is only negative
rather than positive if everyone does not also endeavor, so far as
he can, to further the [personal] ends of others" (Foundations,
p. 49; IV: 289).
We must interpret along the same lines the idea of treating
humanity in oneself or others as a means only. To treat humanity
in oneself as a means only is to deny that one ought to act on
maxims that could function as universal laws in the moral order.
This means to renounce that self in oneself which is a legislative
self-that is, following Cohen, to act solely out of the empirical self
with its narrow outlook. Since practical reason is universal, this
also involves the denial of the possibility of the moral order; or, to
put it otherwise, one constructs with the maxims of the empirical
self the historical reality of this self, eliminating in one's construction the ideal world. Duties to oneself, then, are, in the final
instance, duties to humanity. It is from this perspective that Kant's
much better argument (as compared to his naturalistic argument)
for the moral impermissibility of suicide is to be understood:
To destroy the subject of morality in one's person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, so far as this is in one's power; and
yet morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose of oneself as a
mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's own person
(homo noumenon), which was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for
its preservation. JO

Further, to treat humanity in other persons as a means only is to
act contrary to the demand that we should create a society of
legislators who seek to promote one another's personal ends. This
idea has a critical implication, for most existing economic and po-
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litical institutions aim only at the satisfaction of the ends of some
of their participants and not all participants are legislative members. These institutions fail, therefore, to uphold the standards of
practical reason. It follows that they must be changed in light of
the moral ideal, and this shows in turn that the duty to promote
the highest good is to be expounded as a social duty.
That the phrase 'humanity in a person' is not Kant's way of
saying 'a human person' is also argued by Thomas E. Hill, Jr., in
his recent paper "Humanity as an End in Itself." 31 Hill claims that
"Kant thought of humanity as a characteristic, or a set of characteristics, of persons (p. 85)." This set includes, among others, the
capacity to act on hypothetical as well as unconditional principles,
the power to set any end whatsoever, and the ability to understand
the world. A similar view is put forward by John E. Atwell in
his "Kant's Notion of Respect for Persons" ;32 Atwell emphasizes
that "humanity" refers to those capacities which set human
agents apart from nonrational animals. On both their accounts,
to treat humanity as an end in itself is to strive to exercise and
develop these capacities. Thus it is morally wrong to impair one's
rational capacities or to destroy them, and one must develop
one's talents. Likewise, with respect to others, one must enhance
their use of reason rather than manipulate them by nonrational
means, and one must support them in their pursuit of morally
permissible ends.
Kant's reasoning often takes the form outlined by Atwell and
Hill, in particular, in Virtue, and their interpretation is a succinct
explication of what it means to say that the third formula demands
"respect for persons." This does not, however, invalidate my interpretation. Rather, my interpretation encompasses theirs and, in
addition, does justice to the social dimension in Kant's ethics. The
realization of the moral order of legislators, or humanity as it
ought to be, presupposes the use and fulfillment of typically human characteristics. Accordingly, the duty to promote the highest
good includes and sheds new light upon the above duties which
require us to exercise our own rational capacities and to enhance
their development in others. But to strive for humanity as it ought
to be also involves the demand to pursue the institutional preconditions for the development and exercise of these capacities. About
this duty Atwell and Hill, but not Kant, remain silent.
The Remaining Formulas and Summary
The remaining formulas of the categorical imperative can be stated
with relatively few comments. The fourth formula demands that
the moral agent
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... act only so that the will through its maxims could regard itself at the
same time as universally lawgiving (Foundations, p. 52; IV: 292).

Kant states that this formula makes clear that "the will is ... not
only subject to the law but subject in such a way that it must be
regarded also as self-legislative and only for this reason as being
subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)"
(p. 49; 290). Hence, the fourth formula expresses the principle of
autonomy. This principle is embedded in the formulas discussed
previously. The difference is only a matter of emphasis, as is indicated by the fact that the self in the word 'autonomy' (the "law of
the self") is the legislative or ideal self that accords with the idea of
humanity or the moral order. 33 Autonomy, then, is not a given but
a task, and heteronomy is determination or conditioning by laws
that are not rationally produced (i.e., self-legislated) . What is to be
noted in addition is that these concepts are not merely internal"
private") concepts but also social concepts. Kant observes that "if
reason will not subject itself to the law it gives itself, it will have to
bow under the yoke of laws which others impose on it."J.• In other
words, heteronomy is not merely being conditioned by the laws of
the inclinations, but also being subject to the (arbitrary) will of
others. Thus we can characterize existing social and political
institutions as heteronomous, whereas the moral society is the
autonomous society.
The fifth and sixth formulas also merely make explicit what is
implied in the other formulas. These two formulas are, respectively, the realm-of-ends formula and its typic:
11

11

(

[E]very rational being must act as if he, by his maxims, were at all times a
legislative member in the universal realm of ends (Foundations, p. 57; IV :
297).
[A]ll maxims which stem from autonomous legislation ought to harmonize with a possible realm of ends as with a realm of nature (p. 55; 295) .

This realm is described as "a whole of all ends in systematic connection" (p. 51; 292). This systematic connection has the two
aspects that within the realm of ends moral agents respect each
other as legislators or as ends in themselves (i.e., everyone will
uphold and promote the conditions of autonomy), and that they
seek to enhance one another's personal ends. The realm of ends,
then, is the moral order as a natural order, or humanity as it ought
to be. Nonetheless, a new element comes into the picture. In my
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explication of the highest good, or realm of ends, I have assumed
that all rational beings that are part of this moral order are on an
equal footing. Kant, however, holds that "[a] rational being belongs to the realm of ends as a member when he gives universal
laws in it while also himself subject to these laws," and that "[h]e
belongs to it as sovereign when he, as legislating, is subject to the
will of no other" (p . 52; 292) . The new element is easily explained,
and supports my thesis that the grounding of the duty to promote
the highest good is a central concern of the Foundations. It also
illustrates the fact that two conceptions of the highest good are
conflated in Kant's work: the realm of ends as a moral society in
which human beings attempt to make one another happy, and the
realm of ends as a moral order in which each individual is happy.
For Kant goes on to state that the sovereign of the realm of ends is
"a completely independent being without need and with power
adequate to his will." 35 This divine being, we may suppose, is the
same divine being of which Kant says that it must be postulated so
as to affirm the tenability of the highest good as the union of
universal virtue and universal happiness.
Kant summarizes his discussion of the different formulas of
the categorical imperative in the Foundations with the statement
that they are "only so many formulas of the very same Jaw, and
each of them unites the others in itself." He adds: "There is, nevertheless, a difference in them, but the difference is more subjectively than objectively practical, for it is intended to bring an idea
of reason closer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and
thus nearer to feeling." 36 My discussion has attempted to clarify
this. The basic formulas demand that we adopt the standpoint of
legislators in the moral order and thus seek this order; the typics
help to explain what this legislation involves--that is, they bring
the moral order closer to our intuition.
Another aspect of Kant's summary which is worth mentioning
is that he says that all maxims have a form (universality), a material (human agents as ends in themselves), and a complete determination (consistency with the realm of ends as a realm of nature) .
The threefold division is derived from the first subdivision of the
table of categories as developed in Pure Reason. The subdivision
consists of the categories of quantity: unity, plurality, and totality.
It follows that the purpose of the moral law as applied to the
human condition is to make possible a unified plurality, a totality.
The unity (the form) is the moral law. The plurality (the matter)
consists of human agents and their individual ends. The former
applied to the latter creates a moral totality (the complete deter-
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mination), the moral society or highest good. This totality has two
aspects corresponding to the two aspects of the plurality. Within
the moral totality the human agents will respect one another as
ends in themselves or as legislators, and they will seek to promote
one another's personal ends. Finally, the very idea of the moral
totality as a unified plurality shows that Kant did not intend to
express totalitarian ideas with his view that the natural order can
function as a model for the moral order; for what characterizes
totalitarianism is that the universal does not truly unify the plurality, but negates it-the totality is without a plurality, and thus
the individual is sacrificed in the name of the state, the party, etc. 37

Critical Notes and Conclusion
The moral society is the final end set by the moral law. The virtuous agent makes the moral law his own end, which means that
this agent makes the moral society his own end as well. But does it
follow that this agent will engage in active social duties? Why
should he not limit his actions to respecting the autonomy of each
individual and to enhancing their private ends? After all, Kant
himself suggests in the closing section of Lectures on Ethics that if
each of us behaves in this way the moral society will emerge. In
short, it may still seem that the categorical imperative leads to
private ethics, not to social ethics. To be sure, individual duties will
now be fulfilled with the highest good as their end in view, but
this difference from the private-ethics interpretation of Kant's practical philosophy does not transform his ethics into a social ethics.
Kant's reply would be that, since we cannot expect that universal virtue will arise in adverse sociopolitical conditions, the virtuous agent will see it as his task to change those conditions. That
is to say, this agent will see it as his social duty to seek the perfect
state and peace between the nations. This much is clear from my
analysis of the section on Plato and the closing section of Lectures
on Ethics. My discussion of the different formulas of the categorical
imperative reinforces this conclusion: the person who obeys the
moral law out of respect for this law will actively seek the conditions of universal autonomy, such as external freedom for all, and
since the perfect state and international peace secure such freedom, this person will actively seek these ideal institutions. Thus
there is a direct link between the categorical imperative and social
ethics. I think, however, that this link can, and should be, strengthened on at least two grounds.
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The first ground concerns the duty to promote a world in
which individuals seek to enhance one another's ends. Kant does
not consistently explore thi s demand for universal happiness as a
social duty other than by maintaining that we must strive for ideal
political institutions that make it possible, through universal external freedom, for each of us to engage in the pursuit of private ends
and fulfill the duty of beneficence. 38 As we will see later in more
detail, his mistake is that he assumes that within the contours of
the perfect state, international peace, and a capitalist economy, the
universal fulfillment of the duty of beneficence suffices for promoting universal happiness. This kind of good willing is not enough.
Even if everyone were altruistic in this way, it remains the case that
in stitutional efforts must be undertaken for the sake of the coordination and optimal realization of individual ends. 39 Moreover,
the moral ideal of the realm of ends seems to express in the first
place the demand that we transform all our institutions so that
they directly aim at the satisfaction of the rational needs of all
human beings. Thus we can further undercut the above argument connecting the categorical imperative with private ethics
by the contention that it is not the case (contra Kant himself) that
if everyone were to respect the autonomy of others and to fulfill
the duty of beneficence the moral society would emerge of itself.
The second ground also breaks this tie and establishes an even
stronger link between the categorical imperative and social ethics.
This ground is that institutions are in a very direct sense required
if we are to come to moral decisions that accord with the moral
law. Lon L. Fuller states in The Principles of Social Orde1" 0 :
Today converging streams of ethical philosophy have nea rly obliterated
the notion of an ins titutional or procedural morality. Among the influences that join in this work of destruction we may m e ntion such apparently diverse philosophies as utilitarianism, noncognitive and e motive
theories of moral preference, a nd Kant's solitary e thical soliloq uizer,
impartially legislating for all mankind, including himself. What is lacking
in all these philosophies is the simple picture of human beings confronting one another in some social context, adjusting thei r relations reciprocally, negotiating, voting, arguing before some arbiter, and perhaps
even reluctantly deciding to toss for it.

We may wonder whether Fuller does not partly mjsinterpret what
these theories see as one of their functions, namely, to offer
guideHnes for decisions made in an institutional setting. Certainly,
Kant's moral theory explicitly offers such guidelines. Yet, what
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seems to be the rational core of Fuller's contention is that moral
rules cannot always be applied or decided upon in a monological
fashion, but instead often require dialogical action. 4' This means
that we need free institutions- that is, institutions that permit and
even promote moral dialogue---in order to come to decisions that
accord with the moral law.
The insight is not Jacking in Kant's work, but it is not sufficiently pronounced. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this.
First, Kant contends that representative democracy is the best
approximation of the perfect state. That is to say, this type of democracy offers us the best hope for laws that guarantee external
freedom for all, and we may, moreover, see the right to vote as
an instantiation of this freedom. Thus Kant seems to recognize
that dialogical action is needed in order to come to a legal system
that accords with the moral law. Political education, political action
and discussion, the development of the awareness of conflicting
interests, etc., are all aspects of the voting process. The testing
of individual maxims, then, is not enough, even if it is universally performed, although it may be a truly indispensable
aspect of the formation of political agreement. Accordingly, the
virtuous agent will seek free institutions, not only because he
views these as a precondition for the emergence of universal virtue, but also because he realizes that such institutions are essential
for arriving at universal laws. Kant, however, does not take this
step all the way. He limits the right to vote to economically independent male citizens and suggests that what really counts is not
so much the form of the state (e.g., representative democracy or
monarchy) as its mode of government; what in essence matters is
that the decisions of the sovereign reflect the will of the people.
Thi s leads Kant to claim that a kingdom (temporarily, at least) is
unobjectionable as long as the king legislates along representative
lines. •2 In other words, the ideal of the perfect state can be approximated by the conscientious ruler. This view is the logical outcome
of the idea that maxims can be tested adequately in monological
fashion; the virtuous ruler can determine which laws accord with
the moral law. The need for free institutions is, in effect,
undermined.
This first example can be extended from the legal/political
realm to the socioeconomic realm. The scope of the second example is even more extensive. Kant emphatically claims that freedom
of public expression of one's thought is required for human
enlightenment. He argues forcefully for his case in the following
passage from "What Is Orientation in Thinking?":
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Certainly one may say, "Freedom to speak or write can be taken from us
by a superior power, but never the freedom to think" But h ow much, and
how correctly, would we think if we did not think as it were in common
with others, with whom we mutually communicate! Thus one can well say
that the external power which wrests from man the freedom publicly
to communicate his thoughts also takes away the freedom to think-the
sole jewel that remains to us under all civil repression and through
which alone counsel against all the evils of that state can be taken
(p. 303; IV: 363).

The relevance of freedom of public expression of one's thought is
not limited to the legal/political realm. Communication is crucial
not only for the formation of right political opinions but also for
coming to right moral decisions in a variety of social and religious
institutions. The same holds for the family, and repression of communication seems in general to darken our vision of our individual
duties. Scientific and technological progress may also be placed on
this list-that is, communication is a sine qua non for arriving at
both empirical and moral truth. It follows that the virtuous agent
will seek free institutions that make possible unrestricted communication for the sake of the moral law and its demands. But
again we see that Kant undercuts the link between the categorical
imperative and social ethics. He claims at times that the demands
of the moral law are clear to any conscientious person; knowing
what we ought to do is a question of virtue only. ' 3 This leads us,
in effect, back to a monological ethics, weakening the case for
social ethics.
Both grounds that I have offered for strengthening the link
between social ethics and the categorical imperative point in the
same direction. What Kant does not make sufficiently clear is that
this imperative demands that we seek a society not of legislators
but of colegislators. The ideal projected by the moral law must be
understood as a society thoroughly democratic on all its institutional levels. (Perhaps on some levels representative democracy
may substitute for direct democrary in order to come to terms with
problems of magnitude and time arising from direct democracy on
a large enough scale.) It is crucial to note, however, that the moral
law places limiting conditions upon radical democracy and gives
direction to such a democracy. The conditions of autonomy, such
as external freedom and freedom of public expression as its derivative, must be safeguarded for each individual, and the final end in
view of each institution must be the ends of all individuals, not
only the ends of those who are its members.
These two grounds also are reasons (among others) for argu-
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ing that an adequate social ethics must at some point go beyond
Kant. We will reach this point in Part Two. It will also become clear
there that the above sketch of the moral society as a society of
colegislators is essentially the Cohenian moral ideal. Yet, much still
is to be learned from Kant, and his vision is sufficiently close to
this ideal (if not always factually, then logically) for us to take it as
our guideline in the discussion of his work. In short, we can leave
Kant's deviation from this ideal as a separate issue of concern.
In conclusion, then, the total end set by the moral law is the
highest good, or moral society of colegislators, who uphold and
promote the conditions of universal autonomy and enhance one
another's personal ends. The moral ideal has four basic functions:
it sets a historical and moral task; it is a totality concept that can
integrate our single actions into a comprehensive and meaningful
totality; it is a perspective from which existing institutions can be
criticized as morally inadequate; and finally-and here we see a
decisive break with consequentialist moral theories-the moral
ideal places a restraining condition upon action toward the ideal in
that this action must always seek to mirror that for which it strives.

4. The Highest Good and
Individual Duties
My claim that Kant's ethics is a social ethics is not to be interpreted
as a denial of the importance of individual duties, either in Kant's
writings or in moral life. Morality cannot be limited to individual
duties alone, but it would be equally mistaken to hold that our
duties are limited to active social duties. The fact that we are
bound by both types of duties is a source of moral dilemmas; for
there are situations in which our individual and active social duties
conflict with each other. I will not attempt to deal with this issue in
my study, but instead will end this chapter by briefly explicating a
conclusion that is implied by the previous analysis of the categorical imperative, namely that individual duties must also mirror the
highest good. Yet it may be noted that this insight at least softens
the possible conflict between individual duties and active social
duties. Also, my explication implies a criticism of the "privatistic"
understanding of individual duties.
Kant's social ethics, in contrast with his ethics interpreted as a
private ethics, projects a morally perfect world as the ultimate aim
of our moral action. This moral ideal, if not actually changing the
content of individual duties as explicated in the private-ethics in-
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terpretation, at least gives a new meaning to these duties. A good
example is Kant's view of punishment. In accordance with his
claim that punishment will no longer be necessary in the perfect
state, Kant argues that teachers and parents ou ght not to punish
children when they transgress the moral law. The perfect state
makes possible moral autonomy and perfection; education must
aim at the same end. Kant maintains that punishment is detrimental to this end:
If you punish a child for being naughty, and reward him for being good,
he will do right merely for the sake of the reward; and when he goes out
into the world and finds that goodness is not always rewarded, nor wickedness always punished, he will grow into a man who only thinks about
how he may get on in the world, and does right or wrong according as he
finds either of advantage to himself..,

A little further on, Kant sums up his view with the statement that
"[i]f we wish to establish morality, we must abolish punishment."
Instead of punishment, Kant argues, we must express strong disapproval and try to infuse respect for the moral law by instruction.
[Kant also calls such disapproval "moral punishment," contrasting
it with "physical punishment," which consists of the infliction of
pain or the refusal to grant certain requests of the chi ld (ibid., pp.
87 ff; 493 ff).] Thus on the individual level we must attempt to
establish the same end as on the sociopolitical level: the conditions
of moral autonomy. Paraphrasing Kant, the guideline in moral instruction is that "if we wish to establish moral autonomy, we must
treat children as (potentially) autonomous." Within the privateethics interpretation the same conclusion may be drawn, but what
is lacking is the broader context that moral instruction anticipates
and mirrors the moral society, the highest good.
Other individual duties can be analyzed along the same lines,
and in each case the result will be a criticism of the private-ethics
interpretation of Kant as well as of the "privatistic" understanding
of individual duties in general. Consider, for example, the duty to
develop one's talents. It is often argued that Kant grounds this
duty as follows. The maxim "I will fail to do anything needed to
develop my talents" fails to pass the categorical-imperative test.
The universal form of this maxim is "Everyone will fail to do
anything needed to develop his talents," which is inconsistent with
the fact that all rational agents set ends that they wish to obtainthat is, the pursuit of happiness. For rational beings will the means
to their ends, and when no one develops his talents the means will
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be lacking. It follows that it is not permissible to act on the maxim
of neglecting to develop one's talents, and this implies that developing one's talents is an obligatory end. This kind of reasoning
is typical of the private-ethics approach to the categorical imperative. To be sure, it represents an important aspect of the way Kant
grounds the duty to develop one's talents, but the interpretation is
one-sided and fails to do justice to the social dimension which is
also present in his ethics. Kant appeals not only to self-interest, but
also to the interest of humanity, as the logical basis of this duty.
Kant writes that the failure to develop one's talents "might perhaps be consistent with the preservation of humanity as an end in
itself but not with the furtherance of that end." 45 We may reconstruct his argument as follows. We have noted that Kant holds that
cultural progress faci litates the realization of the highest good.
Thus to develop one's talents is an obligatory end, because the
universalized maxim "Everyone will fail to do anything needed to
develop his talents" is inconsistent with the idea of cu ltural progress and, hence,. with the idea of promoting the highest good. Or,
more positively, the virtuous moral agent who wills to develop his
own talents wills that everyone develop his talents; he wills not
only the cultural faci litation of his own moral improvement but
cultural progress in genera l as a step toward the moral improvement of humanity and the corresponding happiness. And, obviously, in this particular case the highest good gives not only
a new meaning to our individual duties but also a different content. Private ethics steers the development of one's talents toward
individual gain, whereas social ethics aims additiona lly at the
social good.
These two examples should suffice to make clear that the highest good as a social duty implies a broadened understanding of our
individual duties. These duties must mirror the moral ideat and in
this manner their fulfillment will contribute to the realization of
this ideal. Another important difference between the two ways of
looking at individual duties is that only the social-ethics approach
is likely to do justice to the fact that a satisfactory fulfillment of
these duties depends on numerous institutional conditions. We
have seen that free institutions that permit public expression of
one's thought are important for the recognition of what our individual duties are in the first place. Turning again to the duty to
develop one's talents, we can detect other such conditions. The
fulfillment of this duty presupposes adequate economic conditions, a school system accessible to alt and again freedom from
censorship, to mention only a few of the institutional prere-
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quisites. The realization of these prerequisites remains an ongoing
task. Similar observations can be made with respect to other individual duties, such as helping others in need. What if one lacks the
means? Or what if the cause of distress is a corrupt political order?
As we will see in the next chapter, Kant argues that the ability to
fulfill the duty of beneficence depends on the possession of property which is itself largely the product of unjust political relations. '11'
The irony that emerges is that those who are able to fulfill this
duty do not deserve moral praise for doing so because their wealth
is unjustly acquired, whereas those who rightly could receive moral praise for fulfilling the duty of beneficence lack the means for
practicing it. The irony has a critical edge: individual duties point
to active social duties. Conjoining this insight with the thesis that
individual duties, properly understood, contribute to the realization of the moral society, we come to the conclusion that, from
the perspective of Kant's social ethics, individual duties and active
social duties are in the end complementary.

CHAPTER II

Moral Commitment and the
Limits of Human Action

Kant's social ethics projects a moral ideal, the community of colegislators, or highest good, and declares that it is our duty to
transform the world in light of this ideal. To engage in such activity
is often, if not always, to fight against the odds, and, hence, it
presupposes on the side of the moral agent a strong moral commitment to his cause. Partly basing myself on Kant's ethical and historica l writings, I will discuss in the first section below three emotive
components of this commitment: moral indignation about present
social conditions, moral enthusiasm engendered by progressive
historical events, and solidarity with the victims of repression. In
addition, I will show that, although Kant did not use his theory of
moral feeling to explain the genesis of these specific moral feelings, his theory can be fruitfully used for this purpose. Accordingly, I will open this section by examining this theory.
In the second section I will focus on the ambiguity embedded
in Kant's notion of the highest good which we have encountered in
the previous chapter. Is this good to be defined as a moral society
in which human agents attempt to make one another happy, but
do not necessarily succeed, or should we define it as the union of
universal virtue and universal happiness? The latter conception of
the highest good predominates in Kant's work and leads to the
postulate about God. Arguing that "human capacity does not suf42
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fice for bringing about happiness in the world proportionate to
worthiness to be happy [i.e., virtue]" (Religion, p. 7n; VI: 146n).
Kant claims that, in order to make tenable the duty to promote the
highest good, we must assume a supreme cause of nature, a divine
being that harmonizes nature with the moral intention. Contrary
to Kant, I will contend that the argument concerning the limits of
human action does not show that a divine being must be postulated; rather, it indicates that the other conception of the highest
good which we find in his work is the proper conception. I will
argue that Kant failed to draw this conclusion because he confused
the demands of morality (we ought to promote universal happiness) with those of desire (each individual ought to be happy in
the moral society). My point of departure in this section will be the
antinomy of practical reason, as explicated in the second Critique.
In the third and final section of this chapter I will briefly
discuss the broader context in which the antinomy of practical
reason is to be placed: moral faith. This faith encompasses the
hope that the victims of injustice will be redeemed and that our
moral actions will not be in vain in a world which seems so alien to
our moral endeavors. Hope is a fourth emotive aspect of the moral
commitment to change the world. My conclusion will be that this
hope, to the extent that it can be philosophically justified, is to be
grounded in the idea of historical progress. To provide such justification is a central concern of Kant's historical writings, to which I
will turn in the three remaining chapters of Part One.

1. Moral Feelings in the Context of
Social Ethics
Respect for the Moral Law and
the Idea of Autonomy
The pursuit of the objects of desire offers a "promise of happiness." The moral law does not offer such a promise, and Kant
claims, moreover, that any act motivated by this promise lacks
moral worth. To have moral worth an act must be performed for
the reason that it is the right act to do; thus it must be done for the
sake of duty, not from inclination. How are such virtuous acts
possible for human beings as sensuous beings? Kant's answer is
that the moral law provides its own incentive, i.e., respect for the
law, and that human agents as beings with a free will (Willkiir) are
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able to subordinate sensuous incentives to the moral one. This
answer, in turn, poses another question: How can the moral law
create such moral incentive? It is this question primarily that Kants
theory of moral feeling seeks to address.
Kant holds that our awareness of the moral law, or consciousness of our duty, is accompanied by a feeling of respect for this
law. He analyzes the genesis of this moral feeling along the following lines. The moral law has a constraining effect upon our propensity to let the inclinations rule our actions. More specifically,
this law shatters the conceited belief that the maxims of self-love or
our own happiness can function as practical laws. What strikes
down our self-conceit humiliates us. Kant states: "Now if the idea
of something as the determining ground of the will humiliates us
in our self-consciousness, it awakens respect for itself so far as it is
positive and the ground of determination." He adds that "[t]he
moral law, therefore, is ... a cause of respect" (Practica l Reason, p.
77; V: 82-83). On Kant's account, however, it would be a mistake to
interpret the esteem that the law effects in us merely negatively as
fear of a power that humbles us and puils us to a painful constraint
on the inclinations. Kant argues that "since this constraint is exercised only through the legislation of one's own reason, it also
contains something elevating, and the subjective effect on feeling,
in so far as pure practical reason is its sole cause, can also be called
self-approbation with reference to pure practical reason" (ibid.,
p. 83; 89). Respect for the moral law, then, also has a positive
component. In experiencing a painful constraint of the inclinations
we become aware that we can act on principle and can be our own
cause, as opposed to being conditioned by sensuous feelings. In
this way the moral law meets with our approval; it points to our
higher vocation of autonomous action, and in positively esteeming
the law we positively esteem our moral or legislative self.
That the moral law puts us down and also elevates us reflects
the fact that we are both moral and sensuous beings.1 From the
perspective of sensuous nature and its longing for happiness, the
demands of the moral law are experienced as requiring a painful
constraint, and we feel humbled in our inadequacy to live up to
these demands. But from the perspective of moral reason and its
interests, these feelings are approved, for they show that pure
practical reason is effective-that is, the law is recognized as binding. Thus these feelings signify our capacity to act out of the moral
law and lead to the experience of elevation. To put the issue otherwise, the human agent as an empirical self feels humiliated by the
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projected ideal self, the noumenal self, in light of which his moral
shortcomings and imperfections are emphasized, but, at the same
time, he feels elevated in that he is a being who is guided by such
an ideal self, and this is the source of his dignity.2
Kant was well aware that the manner in which respect for the
law is experienced varies with the situation and with the individual involved, as is manifest in his description of this rational feel ing, which ranges from a sense of duty, or feeling compelled by
the law, to awe and reverence, emotions closely akin to religious
feeling and our experience of the sublime. He emphasizes,
however, that all human beings feel respect for the law to some
degree; they all have what in Virtue he calls "moral feeling." This
feeling is defined as "our susceptibility to feel pleasure [Lust] or
pain [Unlust] merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty." 3 Kant asserts in Virtue:
No man is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely lacking in capacity for it he would be morally dead. And if (to speak in
medical terms) the moral life-force could no longer excite this feeling,
then humanity would dissolve (by chemical laws, as it were) into mere
animality and be mixed irrevocably with the mass of other natural beings
(p. 60; VII: 210) .

Accordingly, Kant argues here that there is no duty to have or
acquire moral feeling but only a duty to cultivate or strengthen
that feeling. One way this can be accomplished is by reading and
discussing examples of individuals who have chosen to do their
duty in the face of the greatest hardship or temptation. 4 The recognition that their actions were motivated by the moral law creates
in us a positive appreciation for the law, making us more susceptible to the moral feeling that this law effects in us when we consider whether our own maxims are consistent with or contrary to
it. (My use of the term 'moral feeling', it may be noted, accords
with Kant's in that he uses this term to refer both to our capacity
for moral feeling and to the feeling itself. Cf. Beck, Commentary,
p. 224).
Kant explicates the pleasure (Lust) aspect of moral feeling in
terms of "contentment" and "peace of soul." He writes:
When the reflective man has overcome the incentives to vice and is conscious of having done his often painful duty, he finds himself in a state
which could well be called happiness, a state of contentment and peace of
soul in which virtue is its own reward (Virtue, p. 34; Vil: 185).
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This moral well-being or satisfaction is not to be equated with
happiness as such. In the second Critique, Kant says that "selfcontentment" is the best word to describe this kind of satisfaction,
because it "does not indicate a gratification, as 'happiness' does"
(p. 122; V: 128). Here he also distinguishes between the two feelings in terms of "intellectual contentment" and "sensuous contentment," stressing their different origins. Further, Kant thought
that the happy immoral life is, finally, not worth living, but he did
not make the opposite mistake of praising the moral life so that
happiness becomes irrelevant. For Kant the good life is not a life of
inner satisfaction in a world of chaos. Rather, it requires the complete transformation of our social and natural environment; for
only if that occurs can we rationally hope that virtue and happiness will meet, not just for ourselves, but for all human beings.
Moral feeling and respect for the moral law are essentially the
same feeling, although Kant emphasizes in his analysis under the
term 'respect' the humiliation of the empirical self, whereas under
the term 'moral feeling' he stresses instead the pleasure and joy of
moral praxis (cf. Beck, Commentary, p. 224). To explicate, the elevating feeling that accompanies awareness that we can act on maxims
consistent with the law is a pleasant rational feeling, and the virtuous agent who acts on such maxims affirms and strengthens this
feeling, setting aside, but still experiencing, the sensuous pain that
arises from thwarting the inclinations. This agent also still feels the
humbling of the phenomenal self, but recognizes it as a selfimposed feeling and so uses this feeling to support his resolve to
fulfill his duties and to bridge the gap between the empirical and
the ideal self. The immoral person takes the opposite road; he
turns his back on the elevating feeling, as it were, weakening the
effects of the moral law on his sensible nature, and opts instead for
maxims that enhance his sensuous feelings. Yet, as long as he has
not completely abnegated his moral personhood, he feels moral
dissatisfaction amid the pleasure he derives from satisfying the
inclinations, for he is still aware that he has denied his higher
vocation and that his maxims cannot function as practical lawsthat is, the moral law continues to humiliate him and to pull him
to higher grow1d.
To act out of respect for the moral law, then, is to act (at least
partly) out of a feeling of satisfaction with the law. It is to act out of
contentment with oneself insofar as one is a legislative self. This
poses the following problem. Is moral satisfaction the reason for
obedience to the demands of the moral law? If so, human autonomy appears to be an illusion. The eudaemonist argues that moral
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satisfaction is indeed the ground for acting virtuously. Kant
replies:
[Tjhe pleasure [Lust] that must precede our obedience to the law in order
for us to act in conformity with the law is pathological, and our conduct
follows the order of nature [and, hence, is heteronomous]; but the kind of
pleasure that can only be felt when the law precedes it, is in the 111oral
order.-lf we fail to observe this distinction, and take as our basic principle
eudae111onis111 (the happiness principle) instead of e/eutherono111y (the freedom principle of inner legislation), we effect the euthanasia (painless
death) of all morals (Virtue, p. 35; VII: 186; translation altered).

Thus moral satisfaction does not undermine autonomy, because it
is the effect of taking the moral law as the determining ground of
the will. Logically speaking, this satisfaction can be felt only after
the law is recognized as valid for all rational beings, and the affirmation and strengthening of this feeling results from acting in
accord with the demands of the law. The eudaemonist, then, errs
in his etiology of moral satisfaction, for this satisfaction does not
condition the choice for the moral law, but is conditioned by the
choice for this law. The eudaemonist wishes to explain that which
cannot be explained without a contradiction in terms: freedom of
the will. We can explain how sensuous beings can act out of a pure
practical principle-the answer is: through the existence of the
moral incentive-, but we cannot explain why they opt for doing
so-it is a question of freedom of the will. Kant comments: "These
people [such as the eudaemonists] are dedicated to the omnipotence of theoretical reason, and the discomfort they feel at not
being able to explain what lies entirely beyond the sphere of physiological explanation (freedom of the will; Willkiir) provokes them
to a general call to arms, as it were, to withstand that idea, no
matter how exalting this very prerogative of man-his capacity for
such an idea-may be" (ibid.; 186-87; translation altered).
Kant is, in general, critical of feelings that condition our obedience to the moral Jaw, including those "natural feelings" which
incline us to fulfill some of our obligations. He states that "[e]ven
the feeling of sympathy and warm-hearted fellow feeling, when
preceding the consideration of what is duty and serving as a determing ground, is burdensome even to right-thinking persons,
confusing their considered maxims and creating the wish to be
free from them and subject only to law-giving reason" (Practical
Reason, p. 123; V: 128--29; my emphasis). Kant somewhat overstates
his case here, inviting the familiar criticism that he distorts moral
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practice by failing to recognize the positive role of benevolent feelings in such practice and by making it joyless and harsh (see also
Beck, Commentary, p. 231). His main point, however, is well taken.
Benevolent feelings are not always in accord with our duties and
may misguide us in the determination of where our duties lie.
What is morally required, then, is the ethicization of human nature. On Kant's account, once benevolent feelings are brought into
accord with the moral law, they can facilitate our obedience to the
law, i.e., cooperate with the moral incentive and enrich our moral
life, although Kant seems to have held that the greatest joy
of moral life is rooted in the experience of autonomous action
as such.
A. Murray MacBeath in "Kant on Moral Feeling" 5 raises a more
important objection to Kant's theory of moral feeling, arguing that
Kant mistakenly assumes that human beings always need an incentive in order to act in accord with the moral law. Rejecting the
thesis that reason alone cannot move us to action, MacBeath claims
that a consistent defense of this thesis implies that "every kind of
reason for action will have to prompt the agent to action by means
of a feeling." He continues: "This is not only far-fetched: it is also
at odds with our normal use of the word 'feeling', in which feelings cannot be unfelt-at odds, I say, because I at least am not
conscious of any particular feeling which accompanies all my acts
of rational choice, and these feelings, if I have them, must therefore be unfelt" (p. 310). MacBeath proposes on this ground that we
reformulate Kant's criterion of morally praiseworthy acts: an act
has moral worth when one's reason for performing it is a good
moral reason. Thus Kant's notion of autonomous acts can be upheld without reference to the feeling of respect, and it is the possibility of this reformulation, I presume, that is the basis of MacBeath's remarkable closing statement that "what is so astonishing
[about Kant's theory of moral feeling] is that ... a theory so breathtakingly absurd, should prove as rewarding as it does" (p. 314).
It is to be granted, I think, that we do not always act out of
some particular feeling, say, whenever we tell the truth in a
(seemingly) spontaneous manner, although we may have good
moral reason s for performing such unreflective acts. Moreover, it
seems that we do not always act out of some particular feeling
when we base our actions on consideration of moral reasons-for
example, when after some reflection we opt for telling a lie in a
given situation so as to prevent harm to some individual. Contrary
to MacBeath, however, I hold that these observations do not show
that Kant's theory of moral feeling is thoroughly misguided. They
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indicate, rather, that his theory is in need of further specification to
make clear that the moral incentive is indispensable only in the
formation and continuation of our preparedness to guide our conduct by moral reasons. My view, in other words, is that respect for
the moral law is essential only in the development and affirmation
of a good character or moral disposition. Kant's Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone is helpful in clarifying this claim and even
seems to confirm it.
Kant argues here that a person ha s a good character when he
has firmly adopted the "maxim of holiness" -that is, the resolve
to subordinate sensuous nature and its longing for happiness to
moral reason and its law (see pp. 42-44; VI: 186-87). For Kant such
a dispositional act (or what he calls the "grounding of a character") consists of-and is possible only through-the subordination
of sensuous motives to the moral incentive. The virtuous person,
then, has respect for the moral law built into his character, or basic
motivational structure, and seeks to perform his individual acts in
accordance with the maxim of holiness. This does not mean that
he always succeeds in upholding this standard, nor does it mean
that all his virtuous acts are accompanied by a feeling of respect for
the law. Instead, two other conclusions should be drawn. First,
since the virtuous person is human and since holiness as the complete pacification of human nature sets an infinite task, this person
must from time to time reaffirm his resolve to act out of the maxim
of holiness. Moments of great hardship or temptation will "test"
his basic moral intention, and the feeling of respect for the law is
needed as an incentive to continue his (steady) progress toward
the ideal of holiness. Second, it is meaningful to say that even the
"unfelt" moral acts of the virtuous person, whether th ey are
(seemingly) spontaneous or based on moral deliberation, are done
out of respect for the moral law and thus have moral worth; for
these actions, we may assume, are rooted in his moral disposition
of satisfaction with the law (i.e., the maxim of holiness is the
ultimate ground of his other maxims). The virtuous person himself is the best judge of this, for he can attempt retroactively to
recapture his basic moral intention. What may be noted, though, is
that there seems to be in general no good reason to engage in such
introspection at every point. Self-examination, both before and
after the performance of our moral acts, has a significant place in
moral life, but we should also learn to act directly on the basis of
moral rules and practices which we have made our own through
respect for the moral law.
The upshot is that, on my account, Kant is not necessarily
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committed to the thesis that MacBeath ascribes to him (although
he may in fact have held it) and that his criterion of morally
praiseworthy acts need not be fundamentally changed. Kant's mistake seems to be that he often describes the moral life in such a
way as to suggest that our very commitment to the moral law and,
hence, to guiding our conduct by moral reasons, is at stake in
every moral act-although in his defense it may again be noted
that he views respect for the law as a feeling that varies with the
situation and the individual involved. MacBeath, however, seems
to make the more serious opposite mistake of failing to recognize
that we encounter conditions under which our very commitment
to the law is "tested"; for, when this happens, it indeed seems that
moral feeling is needed to move us along the arduous road toward
the good.
The real problem with Kant's theory of moral feeling, I propose, is not that it postulates some superfluous moral feeling, but
that it is limited in scope through failing to incorporate the social
dimension that, I have argued, is present in the categorical imperative. His theory, in other words, does not address the emotive
effects of integrating the highest good into one's life-plan and of
making this good the end of one's social actions. As will soon
become clear, the notion of respect for the moral law does not
adequately describe these effects. This is hardly surprising, because Kant seems chiefly to have linked this notion with individual
duties, as is indicated by his claim that all human beings feel
respect for the law to some degree. After all, it is plausible to hold
that everyone recognizes some individual duties as binding, but
the same cannot be said of active social duties, and, certainly, there
is no universal recognition of, or agreement upon, the idea that the
social totality ought to be changed in light of some moral ideal
such as the highest good.
My main concern in the rest of this section is to analyze some
emotive components of what I have earlier referred to as the moral
commitment to change the world in light of the highest good.
Kant's practical writings offer valuable suggestions for discerning
several emotive aspects of this commitment: moral indignation and
moral enthusiasm may be seen as social analogues of, respectively,
the negative and positive components of respect for the moral law,
whereas solidarity may be seen as a social version of "natural
sympathy." Moreover, the two former "social" feelings are mentioned, though not investigated, in his historical writings. Before
proceeding with my analysis, however, it is necessary to deal once

Kant's Highest Good as a Social Duty

51

again with the autonomy/heteronomy issue, now as it relates to
moral commitment and its final objective, the highest good.

Moral Commitment and the Idea of Autonomy
It is often pointed out in the literature on Kant's practical work that

his doctrine of the personal highest good, which states that it is
rational for the individual to hope that his virtuous behavior will
bring him happiness, raises the problem of heteronomy. The problem is that autonomy is surrendered when this hope conditions
the individual's obedience to the demands of the moral law. At first
sight, it may seem that no similar problem arises with regard to
the highest good as a social duty. Yirmiahu Yovel argues in his
Kant and the Philosophy of History not only that Kant's theory of
motives can take care of the heteronomy problem but also that
Kant can rely on the point that "the realization of the highest good
is an infinitely remote ideal, and man is aware of it." Yovel adds:
"[This agent] acts, then, with the knowledge that his goal of universal happiness is not a personal interest but a universal world
order, to be established by the cumulative work of generations"
(p. 68). The difficulty with this argument is that it neglects the
fact that one's personal happiness may be involved in the small
incremental steps toward the highest good. To be generally practical, the pursuit of the highest good as a social duty must be
seen as including intermediate goals toward this final end, and
one's own well-being may be at stake in the pursuit of these
goals. To use an example provided by Allen W. Wood in Kant's
Moral Religion, 6 consider a person living in a slum and fighting
against unjust and poor housing conditions to which he and his
neighbors are subjected. Suppose that his efforts pay off. This
means that the reformer gains in personal happiness, i.e., improved housing conditions for himself, and one might argue
on this ground that the highest good as a social duty is inconsistent with the idea of autonomy. The objection in this case seems
even stronger than with regard to the personal highest good, for
one's personal happiness now appears not merely as an object of
hope but as an object of moral action. 7 Thus it seems that the
very notion of moral commitment is heteronomous.
Wood has shown convincingly that the charge of heteronomy
results from confusing a motive of an action with its end (see
pp. 49££). It is assumed that, once an empirical end such as happiness becomes a moral (i.e., obligatory) end, it also becomes a motive. The logical outcome of this assumption is that practical rea-
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son cannot prescribe any end whatever except purity of intention.
Practical reason thus becomes merely restrictive; its task is only to
conform the pursuit of private ends to universal law. Ka nt, to the
contrary, holds that practical reason specifies a variety of obligatory ends-ends that are duties. The highest good comprises the
entirety of all moral ends and is, accordingly, the total object of the
pure will. But, as Kant argues in Practical Reason, "it is still not to
be taken as the determining ground of the pure will; the moral law
alone must be seen as the ground for making the high est good and
its realiza tion or promotion the object of the pure will" (p. 113; V:
119). In other words, the autonomous agent ignores the whole
issue of whether he happens to desire certain aspects of the highest good or its intermediate ends, such as his own happiness or
that of others. That is, his choosing to promote this good is not
determined by the lower fac ulty of desire, i.e., the inclinations;
rather, his ground for making this end the object of his will is th e
moral law. Kant also puts it as follows. The autonomous will is
determined b y the legislative form of a maxim, not by its matter or
object. This means that the virtuous person wiHs the highest good
because of its form-it is a universal end. The sa me can be said of
the intermediate goals toward the highest good. Hence, the willing
of this virtuous person is rationally produced, not sensibly conditioned; it is autonomous willing.
At times Kant's statements seem to conflict with this analysis.
In Religion h e asserts that "man seeks something he can love;
therefore the law, which merely arouses his respect, even though it
does not acknowledge this object of love as a necessity does yet
extend itself on its behalf by including th e moral goal of reason
(the highest good] among its determining grounds" (pp. 6-7n; VI:
145n). Moreover, Kant sta tes in Virtu e that obligatory ends are
material determining grounds of the will, again making the highest good a determining ground of the will. H Kant should have been
more careful here, but, once his meaning is understood, there is no
serious problem. A crucial thesis of his ethics is that the supreme
principle of morality must not, and cannot, be defined in term s of
the good, but that the good must be defined in te rms of this
principle. The first way of proceeding leads to heteronomy, for
one's obedience to a moral law is conditioned by one's desire for
the good. This procedure also excludes the formulation of the
supreme principle of morality, a universal principle, because of the
great variety of human desires. Hence Kant's insistence, in the
Analytic of Practical Reason, that no object should be the determining ground of the will and that the supreme principle of morality
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can only be a formal law, i.e., the moral law. However, once the
moral law is firmly established and the object adequate to it is
found-the highest good as comprising all moral ends-it becomes innocuous, although not very precise, to claim that the
highest good is the determining ground of the will. For now the
object that determines the will does not precede the law, but follows from it. The claim is imprecise because the highest good
determines the will not directly, but indirectly, since it is mediated
by the moral law.
The idea of moral commitment, then, is consistent with the
notion of autonomy. What makes this commitment autonomous is
that the highest good is a social ideal projected by the moral law,
an ideal in light of which it is obligatory to change the present
social situation. Thus the decision of the morally committed person to engage in social action is based not on his inclinations but
on his conviction that the world is unjust. To be sure, this person
probably is attracted to the highest good and its intermediate ends
and repelled by the present social condition-for instance, the reformer of Wood's example presumably will cherish the prospect of
better housing for himself and his neighbors and feel appalled by
the poor housing conditions-but this does not undermine his
autonomy as long as these feelings do not condition his decision to
seek change. Alternatively, it may be that these feelings arise from,
and are conditioned by, his choice to make the highest good the
end of his will-they are autonomous feelings. I will now explore
this alternative. I might add that this exploration may be seen in
part as a suggestive explication of Kant's contention, in the above
quote from Religion, that the highest good is an object of love,
whereas the law is only an object of respect.

Moral Indignation
That respect for the law does fail to capture the emotive aspects of
the moral commitment to change the world becomes clear when
one compares the genesis of respect with the genesis of this commitment (insofar as it is a feeling). The latter, in contrast to the
former, cannot be explained in individualistic terms. For what produces this commitment is not primarily that the moral law humiliates the individual in his inclination to let desire rule his conduct,
but that this law upholds an image of a morally perfect world-an
ideal society-in light of which the present state of affairs must be
described as deplorable. Thus the genesis of moral commitment is
mediated by a social dimension which is absent in Kant's descrip-
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tion of the genesis of respect. Accordingly, it seems that this commitment comprises a feeling of moral indignation about the world
which cannot be found in the internal ("private") interaction between the moral law and human desire. (I will also use the term
moral anger to describe this feeling; this term better captures the
intensity of the moral feeling J have in mind, but the disadvantage
of using it is that it suggests temporality and lack of control.) Kant
hinted at this feeling when he wrote in "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" that
[o]ne cannot suppress a certain indignation when one sees men's actions
on the great world-stage and finds, beside the wisdom here and there
among individuals, everything in large woven together from folly, childish
vanity, even from childish malice and destmctiveness (p. 12; IV: 152).
It is also this moral indignation, I suggest, that brought Kant to
make the often-cited statement that "from such crooked wood as
man is made of, nothing perfectly straight can be built (ibid., pp.
17- 18; 158). Yet Kant did not discuss this feeling in his moral writings proper, and in his historical writings it is merely mentioned.
The foregoing indicates that moral indignation about the present state of affairs is the social analogue of respect for the law in its
negative component. The humiliation embedded in respect for the
moral law is conjoined with a feeling of dissatisfaction with oneself
insofar as one is a sensibly conditioned or heteronomous self. This
dissatisfaction is rooted in the experience of one's own shortcomings in light of the ideal self, the legislative self. The social analogue of such dissatisfaction with oneself is moral dissatisfaction
or anger with the world and present humanity, prompted by the
moral inadequacy of present social conditions as compared with
the highest good and humanity as it ought to be, ideal humanity.
Both feelings of dissatisfaction have a place within an adequate
Kantian social ethics, but moral anger or indignation must receive
more emphasis than personal moral dissatisfaction. This is implied
by Kant's thesis that moral progress is blocked by corrupt sociopolitical conditions and that universal moral perfection is to be
expected only in a situation of international peace and perfect
states. Thus the burden must shift. The individual should not carry
on his shoulders all the weight of guilt and dissatisfaction with
himself arising from his imperfections; part of this weight, if not
most of it, should be placed upon his sociopolitical environment.
What is to be recognized, then, is that the internal conflict between
moral reason and its law, on the one hand, and the inclinations, on
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the other hand, reflects social conflict and that social conflict intensifies it. This does not exclude moral responsibility-notice that
Kant says that corrupt sociopolitical conditions block moral progress, not that these conditions directly cause an immoral disposition-and, moreover, it must be taken into account that we are not
all alike victims of injustice. (Witness Kant's trust in the basic moral
decency of ordinary persons--following Rousseau-and his sharp
and biting criticism of the "politicians." 9 )
An additional reason for emphasizing moral indignation
rather than individual moral dissatisfaction is that the former feel ing seems more effective for the development of the moral self
than the latter feeling. Moral indignation inspires social action,
and, ideally, such action is a cooperative activity, reflecting the
moral society and the legislative self. Provided that social action
approximates this ideal, it will be conducive to the cultivation of
cooperative values and, hence, to the development of the moral
disposition. Moreover, social action may even be necessary for the
affirmation or continuation of the moral self; for resistance to oppression may be a precondition for regaining or upholding selfesteem and dignity which are lost or threatened in arbitrary treatment, political violence, and other processes of dehumanization. 10
From the perspective of a viable Kantian social ethics, then, the
saying "Improve the world, start with yourself" is to be reversed:
"Improve yourself, start with the world." 11
The anger of moral reason should not be confused with what
may be called the "anger of oppressed human nature." Moral anger is a rational feeling; it is moral pain of a social nature which
goes hand in hand with the conviction that changes in present
conditions are imperative and can be undertaken in light of some
moral ideal. The anger of oppressed human nature, on the contrary,
emerges when no alternative to the conditions of oppression is
recognized other than a mere negation of the existing state of
affairs. Continuous oppression and denial of legitimate human
needs lead under these circumstances to an anger which is bound
to erupt in uncontrolled destruction and violence. This anger of
oppressed human nature should not be too easily condemned. To
be sure, it should be censured, but the task is also to understand
the social factors that promote such anger and to promulgate this
knowledge, so that the anger can be transformed (ethicized) into
moral indignation and organized social action. This underscores
the importance of morality for social action. The anger of oppressed human nature by itself will not lead to collective action
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aimed at social change. However, if the moral ideal is not from the
very beginning upheld as a standard and guide for collective
action, this anger may play a role in the struggle for social improvement, and the result may be that the circle of oppression
is continued-the internalized structural violence of the old
society becomes the structural violence of the new society. In accordance with my later critique of Marx, it may be noted that these
observations conflict both with Marx's view that morality is superfluous for social action and with his claim that ethical socialists
pursued social change in vain when the time was not yet "ripe"
for doing so. Social action in its various expressions and forms
should be judged not only in terms of its "outer" success, but also
in terms of what it may effect with regard to "inner" change.
Certainly, it is imperative that the anger of oppressed human
nature be either prevented or else transformed into the rational
politics of moral indignation.
That a certain indignation-e.g., the anger of protest and of
standing on one's rights-often accompanies or impels social action refutes the common notion that such action is usually motivated by mere self-interest. (The fact that in some cases the anger
of oppressed human nature is also visible does not undermine my
thesis. The two types of anger are altogether different in their
expression; moreover, the anger of oppressed nature is not mediated by reason and so can be understood neither as motivated by
moral reasons nor as motivated by self-interest.) What disproves
this common notion is that the indignation embedded in social
action emerges only when, on the basis of some moral ideal, the
given social totality is perceived as lacking moral authority; just as
respect arises only when, on the basis of the moral law, it is recognized that the maxims of self-love cannot function as practical
laws---that is, that our inclinations as such lack moral authority.
Thus even social action with a limited end in view, reflecting the
self-interest of its participants, may be interpreted as morally motivated action provided that the participants feel indignant about
not receiving what they consider to be their due. One may hesitate
to call this sense of injustice "moral anger," but, just as respect
admits of degrees, so moral anger, too, takes on different forms.
This anger varies with the gap between the projected ideal and the
actual situation. Kant holds that "[n]othing is more reprehensible
than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what
is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is
circumscribed" (Pure Reason, p. 313; III: 259). His ethics, therefore,
is an ethics of radical moral anger.
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Moral Enthusiasm
We have seen that moral commitment has as its negative component a feeling of strong moral dissatisfaction with the world, but,
like respect for the moral law, it has a corresponding positive component as well. Just as the virtuous person may derive moral pleasure from individual acts that accord with the moral law, so the
commitment to change the world may be accompanied by moral
enthusiasm, inspired by those historical events which intimate that
humanity is taking a moral interest in the highest good or its
intermediate ends. This does not mean that moral pleasure may
not also result from this commitment; my point is, of course, to
emphasize here precisely those feelings which differentiate moral
commitment (as a feeling) from respect. Likewise, we should not
exclude the possibility that this commitment involves social acts
done out of a sense of duty, constraining the inclinations, or out of
moral reasons as such. What we may suppose, though, is that
morally committed persons are susceptible to moral indignation
and moral enthusiasm, just as Kant claims that all human beings
have moral feeling, and that these "social" feelings are conducive
to the development and continuation of the commitment to change
the world, this in rough analogy to the role played by respect in
the formation and affirmation of good character.
Kant displayed moral enthusiasm in word and spirit after the
French Revolution, notably in his "An Old Question Raised Again:
Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?," Part Two of The
Strife of the Faculties (1798). His main purpose there is to "predict"
future progress, so as to support moral praxis aimed at the highest
good. His argument is that, if a certain historical event signifies
that the human race is morally concerned with improving its situation (i.e., a "moral cause" is operative in humanity), then we can
predict progress, because we may assume, first of all, that sooner
or later conditions will emerge similar to those which gave rise to
this progressive historical event and, second, that, when this happens, the moral cause will again lead to efforts directed toward
societal improvement (see "An Old Question," section 5). Kant
argues that the enthusiasm the French Revolution engendered
among its spectators shows that such a moral cause is, indeed,
operative in humanity:
The revolution of a gifted people which we have seen unfolding in
our day may succeed or miscarry; it may be filled with misery and atrocities to the point that a sensible man, were he boldly to hope to execute it
successfully the second time, would never resolve to make the experiment
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at such cost-this revolution, I say, nonetheless find s in the hearts of all
spectators (who are not engaged in this game themselves) a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm, the very expression of which is
fraught with danger; this sympathy, therefore, can have no other cause than
a moral predisposition in the human race (ibid., p. 144; VII: 398; my emphasis).

Kant continues to state that the moral cause at work here consists
of two elements, reflecting two aims that the French Revolution
pursued, namely, the right to self-determination of the people and
the ideal of the republican state. He emphasizes the significance of
the latter aim, arguing that this obligatory end "establishes the
condition whereby war (the source of all evil and corruption of
morals) is deterred." Thus if the moral importance of this end for
humanity is widely recognized, as the enthusiasm of the spectators seems to confirm, and if we assume that conditions favorable
to change will sooner or later occur again, we can infer that "progress toward the better is assured humanity ... , for it is at least
left undisturbed in its advance [toward the highest good]." Kant
concludes on this ground that the enthusiasm of the spectators
makes clear that "genuine enthusiasm always moves only toward
what is ideal, and, indeed, to what is purely moral, such as the
concept of right, and it cannot be grafted onto self-interest.'' 12
Kant's remarks here support some of the theses I have earlier
defended. The republican state sets an end which is a duty, and
the universal realization of this end and the ensuing international
peace eliminate an impediment to moral progress. What is most
striking about his remarks, however, is that he addresses the enthusiasm of the spectators of the French Revolution, not the enthusiasm that lived among its initiators. Or, more broadly, Kant
attempts to detect the "moral predisposition in the human race"
not through investigating the behavior of th e revolutionaries,
but through analyzing the behavior of the spectators. Why so?
In Chapter V, I will assess an answer to this question which takes
as its point of departure the recognition that Kant condemned revolution as such in the strongest possible terms. I will then offer
a more detailed discussion of "An Old Question" and argue that
his rnoral disapproval of all revolutionary action is inconsistent
with the basic premises of his social ethics. For my present purpose of "socially" extrapolating his theory of moral feeling, however, it suffices to argue briefly for two other theses which my
discussion in Chapter V will further substantiate. The first is that
Kant, notwithstanding his condemnation of revolution as such,
holds-or, at least is rationally committed to holding-that the enthusiasm of the spectators is action-oriented: their enthusiasm, in
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other words, is not merely enthusiasm for republican ideals but also
enthusiasm for action based on these ideals. The second thesis
is that Kant's turn to the spectators can be explained without
recourse to his moral disapproval of revolutionary change.
That Kant, indeed, holds that the enthusiasm of the spectators
is action-oriented follows from the fact that he speaks in the above
of a "wishful participation" of the spectators in the French Revolution. Note, moreover, that he says here that this epoch-making
event may turn out to be so violent that a sensible person would
not resolve to execute it a second time--thereby at least suggesting
that it may well have been sensible to start the Revolution the first
time. What is more decisive, however, is that Kant's argument
for progress presupposes that the enthusiasm of the spectators is
action-oriented; for the point of this argument is that we may, and
should, cherish the prospect that the spectators, like the revolutionaries, will act out of republican ideals when a later occasion for
doing so emerges. That is, the final import of the enthusiasm of
the spectators is that they, or spectators of future generations who
recall the Revolution, will act like the revolutionaries, out of enthusiasm for the "concept of right," and ultimately, we may hope, out
of enthusiasm for the moral society.
This last observation in itself already explains Kant's turn to
the spectators, in that focusing attention on the enthusiasm of the
revolutionaries alone would hardly ground the hope for progress.
But there is another factor that plays a role. A crucial premise of
the argument for progress is that a moral cause is at work in
humanity-that is, "the disposition and capacity of the human
race to be the cause of its own advance toward the better" ("An
Old Question," p. 142; VII: 396). The disposition Kant is referring
to is the moral disposition, and the cause must be understood as
the capacity of the human race to be its own cause, i.e., the capacity to effect social change on autonomous grounds. I have little
doubt that Kant thought that these features were manifest in (at
least some of) the participants of the French Revolution, and his
argument for progress supports this; however, on his own terms it
would be difficult to argue directly for this claim, since we may
assume that the Revolution was at least to some extent in the selfinterest of its initiators. The situation is different for the spectators.
In their case the suspicion of heteronomous volition does not arise,
because the Revolution was not to their personal advantage. To the
contrary, because the governments of the spectators attacked the
Revolution, the very expression of their enthusiasm was "fraught
with danger." The enthusiasm of the spectators demonstrates,
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therefore, that a moral cause is at work: their wishful participation
was motivated not by any subjective interest but by an objective
(moral) interest in advancing humanity toward better political institutions, as a step toward the highest good. As Kant puts it, "genuine enthusiasm always moves only toward what is ideal [and]
purely moral, .. . and it cannot be grafted onto self-interest."
These considerations indicate that moral enthusiasm may be
seen as a social analogue of moral satisfaction. The idea of autonomous action arouses moral pleasure in the virtuous person, and
what substantiates this feeling is his acting on maxims that accord
with the law. The social analogue is that the idea of a moral humanity creates moral enthusiasm in the morally committed person, and what gives support to this feeling are those events which
intimate that humanity is, indeed, taking an interest in the highest
good or in its intermediate ends. Or we may say that, just as the
final source of respect in its positive component is the ideal self,
the final source of enthusiasm is ideal humanity, and, just as the
virtuous person is morally satisfied with himself insofar as he is an
ideal self, the person of moral commitment is enthusiastic about
humanity insofar as humanity is an ideal humanity. Moral enthusiasm, then, can be ascribed to spectator and actor alike, and its
occasion is not limited to epoch-making events. Rather, it is triggered in varying degrees by all those events which give us hope
that it is not the case, to use the words of Kant cited earlier, that
"everything in large [is] woven together from folly, childish vanity,
even from childish malice and destructiveness." And, to stress a
previous point once more, this hope is the hope of action, not that
of mere contemplation.
Other conclusions can be drawn from explicating the social
analogy between moral satisfaction and moral enthusiasm. We
have noted that Kant argues that pleasure in the law can be cultivated through moral education by way of examples of individuals
who have obeyed the moral law in adverse circumstances. These
individuals deserve and receive our approval and admiration;
more fundamental, however, is the fact that their actions inspire
positive respect for the law. Initially, their actions humble us and
strike down our superficial satisfaction with our own conduct, but
this feeling turns into its opposite. We wish to follow the example
set by their actions, and hence we wish to obey the law, recognizing the great worth of the law and the legislative self that guided
the actions of these morally courageous individuals. Analogous
observations can be made concerning the educative value of progressive historical events. Familiarity with events like the French
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Revolution breaks down preoccupation with oneself and opens up
new horizons of identification: humanity's final end-the highest
good-and those individuals who have struggled for it. Further,
such events are a source of inspiration and enthusiasm-an enthusiasm which is, at the final instance, an enthusiasm for the moral
society and ideal humanity, stimulating action toward this ideal.
And what makes this enthusiasm possible is not just that certain
progressive historical events have brought humanity to higher levels, but also that at least some aspects of the great episodes of
political history (e.g., the French Revolution and the Paris Commune) offer a glimpse of what the future may hold: voluntary
cooperation and reciprocity is not merely a philosophical dream.

Solidarity
Thus far my analysis has shown that, although Kant's theory of
moral feeling operates within too narrow confines, his essays on
history point to a broader conception. Moreover, my analysis indicates that this very same theory can be fruitfully used to provide
an adequate foundation for this broader conception, in that it furnishes the conceptual apparatus for grounding the ideas of moral
anger and moral enthusiasm. The same holds good for the third
and final emotive component of moral commitment that I wish to
discuss here, namely, the feeling of solidarity. But now I will turn
to Virtue (rather than to Kant's writings on history) and its notion
of "natural sympathy" to explicate my proposal.
I will use the term 'solidarity' here as it is used at times in the
socialist literature and tradition: it is sympathy with the victims of
injustice. The German equivalent of sympathy, Mitleid, conveys
better the core of this feeling: it is co-suffering, making the suffering of the Mitmensch one's own. '3 Mitleid is a broader concept than
solidarity. One reason for placing solidarity rather than Mitleid in
the foreground of a viable Kantian social ethics is that the most
manifest needless human suffering is caused by unjust sociopolitical systems and that the commitment to change the world, accordingly, is focused on this needless suffering. Another reason is that
the suffering caused by external nature and the human body can
most adequately be dealt with under just sociopolitical arrangements, because sociopolitical conflict prevents the full employment
of science and technology toward universal alleviation of this kind
of suffering. Both reasons are historical reawns, in that solidarity
will have become superfluous in the moral society and will be
replaced by Mitleid.
Like moral indignation and enthusiasm, solidarity is a ra-
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tionally-i.e., morally-produced feeling. This does not exclude
recognition that this feeling has natural roots; rather, the point is
that solidarity must be seen as a social-moral transformation of
"natural sympathy." Kant's Virtue offers valuable suggestions for
exploring solidarity along these Jines:
But while it is not in itself a duty to experience sadness . . . in sympathy with others, it is a duty to participate actively in the fate of others.
Hence we have an indirect duty to cultivate the sympathetic natural (aesthetic) feelings in us and to use them as so many means to participating
from moral principles ... . Thus it is our duty: not to avoid places where
we shalJ find the poor who lack the most basic essentials, but rather
to seek them out; not to shun sick-rooms or debtors' prisons in order
to avoid the painful sympathetic feelings that we cannot guard against
(p. 126; VII: 271).

An explanatory note: the duty to cultivate the feeling of sympathy
is an indirect duty because one cannot force oneself to have this
feeling (or, for that matter, any other feeling; compare Kant's claim
that we have an indirect duty to be happy). What can be done,
however, and according to Kant ought to be done, is to seek, or not
to avoid, situations that evoke sympathy.
Three other comments are in order with respect to the above
passage. First, although Kant does not mention explicitly that the
feeling of sympathy must be ethicized, the logic of his argument
points in this direction. If this feeling is to be appropriate to moral
principles, it cannot be an empirically conditioned feeling, because
our identification with others does not "naturally" comprise all
those who suffer in adverse and unjust conditions.'"' Thus it is the
task of moral education to broaden the scope of natural sympathy
and to bring it into accord with the requirements of the moral law.
On similar grounds the feeling of solidarity is to be interpreted as
mediated by morality, for its presupposes some moral ideal in light
of which present suffering is seen as unnecessary and unjust. This
observation leads to my second comment. There is no indication in
the above passage that human suffering has sociopolitical roots. In
other places in Kant's work, however, these roots are exposed. I
have already discussed his radical thesis that crime arises only
under corrupt constitutions. I have also alluded to his hardly less
radical view concerning the roots of poverty. While raising casuistical questions about the duty of beneficence, Kant states in Virtue :
The ability to practice beneficence, which depends on property, follows largely from the injustice of the government, which favors certain
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men and so introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need
help. This being the case, does the rich man's help to the needy, on which
he so readily prides himself as something meritorious, really deserve to be
called beneficence at all? (p. 122; VII; 268).

The implication is that poverty will be abolished once just governments are created. Thus "natural sympathy" in the above examples resembles solidarity: the sympathy with the poor and the
inhabitants of the debtors' prisons is co-suffering with the victims
of injustice. 15 Third, on this basis we can infer that from a Kantian
perspective it is our indirect duty to cultivate the feeling of solidarity, the rationale of which is that this feeling helps us to fulfill
our social duties.
The appeal to solidarity has always played an important role in
the struggle for socialism. Marx, for example, stated in a speech
after a congress of the First International (Amsterdam, September
8, 1872):
Citizens, let us think of the basic principle of the International: Solidarity. Only when we have established this life-giving principle on a
sound basis among the numerous workers of all countries will we attain
the great final goal which we have set ourselves. The revolution must be
carried out with solidarity; this is the great lesson of the French Commune
[March- May, 1871], which fell because none of the other centers-Berlin,
Madrid, etc.,--developed great revolutionary movements comparable to
the mighty uprising of the Paris proletariat.

And, in a rare reference to his own motivation for joining this
struggle, Marx proceeded to say:
So far as I am concerned, I will continue my work and constantly
strive to strengthen among all workers this solidarity that is so fruitful for
the future. No, I will not withdraw from the International, and all the rest
of my life will be, as have been all my efforts of the past, dedicated to the
triumph of the social ideas which-you may be assured- will lead to the
world domination by the proletariat. "'

From a Kantian perspective, this call for solidarity may be
rephrased as a call for making the suffering of the victims of repression one's own suffering, for this co-suffering means that one
makes the struggle of others one's own struggle, setting aside
"contingent" differences that separate those who seek improved
social conditions. This latter point is crucial and underlines the
moral nature of solidarity: it is only from the angle of some moral
ideal, such as the socialist ideal, that differences in self-interest
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appear as inessential and do not prevent united collective action.
Marx's own life abundantly illustrates the preparedness to set aside
what was, "objectively" speaking, in his own self-interest, and so
his declaration of solidarity with the cause of the working class
seems to be morally motivated. Yet this is not how Marx himself
interpreted his own motivation; at least, his "official" theory, the
materialistic conception of history, does not seem to permit such
self-understanding. What this, in conjunction with his general remarks on the significance of solidarity, indicates is that the role of
morality in his work is "repressed." And, as we will see in more
detail in the closing chapter of this study, what further supports
this contention is that a spirit of mora l indignation prevails
throughout Marx's writings and that he, despite himself, was morally enthusiastic about a historical event that fulfills in his work a
function analogous to that of the French Revolution for Kant: the
Paris Commune.
In conclusion, then, Kant's theory of moral feeling does not
sufficiently incorporate the social dimension present in the categorical imperative: the highest good as a social ideal. Nonetheless,
his work is helpful for discerning some emotive aspects of the
commitment to seek the highest good, such as moral indignation,
moral enthusiasm, and solidarity. More importantly, his theory of
moral fee ling, once suitably ("socially") modified, grounds these
emotive aspects and yet preserves autonomy. I may add that my
attempt to develop these issues, moving into what seems to be a
relatively unexplored area within Kantian and social-moral
thought, falls short of what eventually needs to be said. But I hope
that my discussion shows at least two things. First, the "social"
feelings I have outlined are important for understanding moral
commitment and collective action. This is not to say that these
feelings are indispensable as incentives for social action, but they
certainly facilitate such action, and we may interpret social actions
performed out of moral indignation, moral enthusiasm, or solidarity, as moral actions. These feelings are autonomous feelings,
and their cultivation is imperative because they strengthen moral
commitment. Second, to the extent that these feelings play a role
in Marx's work, we can say that there is a Kantian dimension to his
work. In Chapter VII I will exhibit several other such "Kantian
elements" in Marx's social thought, noting that, since the role of
morality is "repressed" in his work, none of these elements receives adequate philosophical grounding and explication. This argument will be a crucial step toward my final critical-constructive
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conclusion that Marxism can greatly gain from making Kantian
(socialist) ethics its moral foundation .

2. The Antinomy of Practical
Reason
In Practical Reason Kant raises the question, "How is the highest
good practically possible?" (p. 117; V: 123) and argues that the
sea rch for an answer leads us into the antinomy of practical reason. (Considering the wide variety of "conflicts of reason with
itself" that Kant discusses under the term 'antinomy', it is difficult
to give a short satisfactory definition of this notion. For our purposes, however, it suffices to say that an antinomy consists of two
apparently contradictory propositions, the thesis and the antithesis, each of which is supported by seemingly conclusive theoretical or moral arguments.) This question can be understood in
two ways, depending on whether the highest good is defined as
the personal highest good, expressing the hope that the virtuous
agent will experience happiness, or as a social ideal. My concern is
with the latter, and I will accordingly focus on those aspects of the
antinomy of practical reason which address the question, "How
is the highest good as a social ideal practically possible?" Thus the
antinomy has as its proposed solution the postulate of the existence of God. Kant's arguments for the antinomy and its solution
develop along the following lines:
(a) The moral law demands that we promote the highest good
in the world.
(b) The fulfillm ent of this duty requires that the highest good
be possible.
(c) "In the highest good which is practical for us, i.e., one
which is to be made real by our will, virtue and happiness are
thought of as necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be
assumed by a practical reason without the other belonging to
it"(ibid.).
(d) This combination of virtue and happiness is either analytic
or synthetic.
(e) It is not analytic because there is no identity between the
pursuit of vi rtue and that of happiness. In other words, the practical principles of virtue and happiness are not the same. (Kant
castigates the Epicurean for holding that the pursuit of happiness
encompasses that of virtue. He is equally critical of the Stoic con-
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tention that the pursuit of virtue encompasses that of happiness.
Moral contentment must not be confused with happiness, and vice
versa.)
(f) It follows that the combination of virtue and happiness
must be synthetic. There are two possibilities: the pursuit of happiness must be the efficient cause of virtue, or the reverse.
(g) The first alternative is impossible, because making the
maxim of furthering one's own happiness into the determining
ground of the will is heteronomous willing.
.
(h) Therefore, virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness ..
But this is also impossible, "since every practical connection of
causes and effects in the world, as a result of the determination .of
the will, is dependent not on the moral intentions of the will but
on knowledge of natural laws and the physical capacity of using
them to its purposes; consequently, no necessary connection, sufficient to the highest good, between happiness and virtue in. the
world can be expected from the most meticulous observance of the
moral law" (p. 118; 124).
(i) It follows that the highest good is not possible.
(j) Considering (a) and (b), "the impossibility of the highest
good must prove the falsity of the moral Jaw also. [For if] the
highest good is impossible .. . , then the moral law which commands that it be furthered must be fantastic, directed to empty
imaginary ends, and consequently inherently false" (ibid.).
(k) We must avoid this disastrous inference through modifying
(h). "[T]hat a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness
is not . .. absolutely false" (p. 119; 125). It appears to be completely
false because attention has been limited to the sensible world.
(1) Accordingly, we must turn to the intelligible world-that is,
we must postulate the existence of "a cause of the whole of nature,
itself distinct from nature, which contains the grounp. of the exact
coincidence of happiness with morality" (p. 129; 135).' This cause is
an intelligible cause, for it is to mediate between moral intention
and happiness; it is God.
(m) In conclusion, "the postulate of the possibility of a highest
derived good (the best world) is at the same time the postulate of
the reality of a highest original good, namely, the existence of God
[and since] it was our duty to promote the highest good . .. , it is
morally necessary to assume the existence of God" (p. 130; 136).
At the outset, Kant's arguments here pose a variety of problems. To begin with, he says that the antinomy is to be found in (f),
namely, the thesis is that "striving for happiness produces a
ground for a virtuous disposition," and the antithesis is that "a

Kant's Highest Good as a Social Duty

67

virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness" (p. 119; 125).
These propositions, however, lack even the appearance of being
contradictory (they both may be false), and no support is offered
for the thesis. The problem is easily solved. The antinomy must be
sought in (h) or, more in accordance with the fact that the highest
good is central to the antinomy, in (b) and (i). Thus the antimony
consists of the propositions that virtue produces happiness and
that virtue is not the efficient cause of happiness; or, alternatively,
the thesis and antithesis are, respectively, that the highest good is
possible and that the highest good is not possible (cf. Beck, Commentary, pp. 247-48). In either case, the moral law is the ground for
the thesis, whereas the antithesis is supported by our empirical
knowledge of the sensible world. Moreover, in both cases the crux
of the solution of the antinomy is that the antithesis is true only of
the sensible world without an intelligible ground, and that, since
theoretical reason can neither refute nor affirm the possibility of
such a ground, practical reason may assume it for the sake of
making tenable the duty to promote the highest good-a procedure which Kant sees as justified by his doctrine of the primacy
of pure practical reason in its methodological aspect.
A second problem is that Kant's statement in (j) is misleading;
for, if we take his claim seriously that the impossibility of the
highest good proves the "falsity" of the moral law, there is no good
reason to proceed with the argument for the existence of God.
Rather, we should return to the Analytic of the second Critique and
consider that the argument there for the "validity" of the moral
law was not altogether convincing. 17 Obviously, Kant did not have
this in mind. The c::ertainty of the law is presupposed; for only then
is there an antinomy of practical reason and a prima facie need to
postulate God.
A third problem is that it is unclear what the ultimate concern
is that the antinomy addresses. Is Kant's concern with what will
happen "in the end" (the identity of universal virtue and universal
happiness)? Or is his concern with the present practicability of the
moral ideal in the natural world-that is, are the two seemingly
heterogeneous orders with their own kind of causality in principle
compatible? My own view on this issue is that Kant poses in the
antinomy the limited problem of the gap between the highest good
itself and what humanity can do to actualize it, but that the postulate of the existence of God as the solution of the antinomy is
meant to tackle the broader problem of the gap between the moral
order and the natura l order in general. To postulate God is to
postulate a common ground or unity between the two orders, a
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unity in potential form, to be actualized in the highest good. Or, as
Kant puts it in (m), God is the "highest original good," whereas
th e moral society is the "highest derived good." Thus God is the
" guarantee" of the ontic possibility in nature of an increasing unification of the moral order and th e natural order through human
action, which means that the main objective or systematic function
of the postulate of God within the practical system is not to bridge
the gap between the highest good itself and what we can do to
actualize it, but to offer a ground for the belief in the feasibility of
our efforts in this direction in the first place. Although this point is
insuffi ciently stressed in Kant's work, it finds support in the fact
that he frequently states with respect to the realization of the highest good that "man [must] proceed as though everything depended on him." Kant continues: "[OJnly on this condition dare
he hope that higher wisdom will grant him the completion of his
well-intentioned endeavors."'" Th e focus, then, is on what w e can
do, not on what God may do.
A possible alternative to my position is that the broader problem itself is the basis of the antinomy. The text, however, favors my
view, because it emphasizes as a crucial premise of the antinomy
that the physical capacities and natural knowledge of humanity fall
short of what is needed to unite universal virtue and universal
happiness [see (h); cf. Religion, p. 7n; VI: 146n] . The reading that is
most definitely to be rejected is that Kant's over-all concern is
limited to what will happen "in the end"; for this alternative, in
contrast to the other two, conflicts with the primacy of praxis in
his work. What furth er supports this claim is that Kant holds that
moral faith as the subjective outcome of the postulate of the existence of God is conducive to, if not necessa ry for, a moral life
committed to the pursuit of the highest good.
A final problem concerns Kant's contention in (c) that practical
reason thinks of virtue and happiness as necessarily combined
within the highest good. We have seen, however, that the realization of universal happiness is not intrinsic to the idea of the
moral society, for the moral law demands only the realization of a
community of colegislators who aim at universal happiness. So
what is the basis of Kant's claim?
This final problem will be pivotal to my further analysis of the
antinomy of practical reason. I will first deal with the question of
whether universal happiness is an attainable ideal. For this purpose I will examine Kant's view of the pursuit of happiness and
briefly discuss the major sources of human suffering. My conclu-
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sion will be that the realization of universal happiness indeed
seems to fall outside the capacities of humanity; but, contrary to
Kant, I will argue that this does not imply (without the assumption
of God's existence) that the moral law projects an "empty" ideal
[see (j)]. My contention will be that Kant confuses the demands of
morality with those of desire in holding that practical reason
thinks of virtue and happiness as necessarily combined within the
highest good. This good must instead be seen as a moral society of
colegislators who attempt to realize one another's ends, but who
do not necessarily succeed. My critique will lead to a discussion of
some misunderstandings concerning the role of the highest good
in Kant's work. The implication of my proposed definition of the
highest good is that the antinomy dissolves and that the postulate
of the existence of God should not be admitted to the practical
system. I will end this section by providing two additional arguments for this claim. Its ramifications will be my concern in the
third section, where I will turn to the importance of practical faith
for moral praxis.

The Pursuit of Happiness
Although Kant holds that happiness constitutes an intrinsic part of
the highest good, he does not offer an extensive analysis of the
pursuit of happiness. His view might be called "liberal" and "antipaternalistic" in that he argues that it is not the task of moral
philosophy to prescribe the ends individuals seek in the pursuit of
happiness; it can demand on ly that this pursuit remain within the
limits set by the moral law. 1'' On Kant's account, then, the moral
law leaves us free to pursue any end whatever provided that our
pursuit can pass the universality test and thus does not undermine
the external freedom of others. It remains, of course, true that the
law demands that we seek certain ends which are duties, but Kant
examines this kind of pursuit under the heading of the pursuit
of virh1e.
It is within this general framework that we can find two concepts of happiness in Kant's work. 20 On the one hand, he seems to
adhere to a hedonistic view, arguing that the objects of desire are
willed solely for the pleasure they may bring. Thus Kant claims
that "a rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life
which without interruption accompanies his whole existence is
happiness" (Practical Reason, p. 20; V: 25). On the other hand,
happiness is conceived of as harmony of ends. The follow ing pas-
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sage from Religion expounds this view, and it also specifies the role
of practical reason in its pragmatic aspect in bringing about happiness as a harmony of ends:
Natural inclinations, considered in themselves, are good, that is, not a
matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want to extirpate them but
to do so would also be harmful and blameworthy. Rather, let them be
tamed a nd instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into a
harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness. Now the reason which
accomplishes this is termed prudence (p. 51; VI: 198).

Likewise, Kant states elsewhere that the unification of "all the
ends which are prescribed by our desires [is] happiness" (Pure Reason, p. 632; III: 537-38) . As examples of such ends he mentions,
among others, "riches," "knowledge," "vision," and "health." 21
Further, we may assume that the prudential task here comprises
not only the systematization of personal ends into a unity but also
the endeavor to find means that fit with those ends.
The concept of happiness as a harmony of ends is more satisfactory than the hedonistic view. The latter view derives its initial
credibility from a confusion between the plausible claim that ends
such as friendship and knowledge bring us pleasure and the implausible claim that these ends are sought only for the pleasure
that may accompany their realjzation or possession. The first of
these claims is consistent with the concept of happiness as a harmony of ends; hence, we may suspect that Kant confused the two
claims. The hedonistic view fails also in that it omits the uniquely
human dimension of happiness, as is manifest in the argument
that Kant gives to show that happiness as such is not the purpose
of our being endowed with reason:
Now if its preservation, its welfare-in a word, its happiness-were the
real end of nature in a being having reason and will, then nature would
have hit upon a very poor arrangement in appointing the reason of the
creature to be the executor of this purpose. For all the actions which the
creature has to perform with this intention, ... would be dictated much
more exactly by instinct, and that end would be far more certainly attained
by instinct than it ever could be by reason (Foundation s, p. 11; TV : 251).

This argument is based on the premise that happiness is a matter
merely of self-preservation, instinctual gratification, and pleasure.
But, certainly, human happiness involves more than this, containing elements such as knowledge, insight, and creativity, which all
require free and rational activity. These elements can be better
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accounted for in Kant's concept of happiness as a harmony of ends,
and this is an additional reason why this concept is to be preferred
to the hedonistic view. A final consideration is that the hedonistic
view is hard to reconcile with the fact that most human beings
project long-term ends and attempt to integrate them, making
their life into a meaningful and systematic totality. Happiness is
not just an accumulation of pleasant feelings, but is a process
of living an integrated life, or having success in fulfilling one's
life plan.
This idea of happiness, however, as a process of living an
integrated life, is a somewhat broader notion than Kant's idea of
happiness as a harmony of ends. It includes both the happiness of
reason, i.e., moral contentment, and the happiness of the inclinations. Kant's idea of happiness as a harmony of ends is restricted to
the latter kind of happiness, as is clear from his claim that the
pursuit of happiness is a mere prudential task. This raises the
following question. Although Kant was undoubtedly correct in
asserting that in his society there was no identity between the
pursuit of virtue and the pursuit of happiness as a harmony of
ends, should we see this disparity as a given, or should we see it,
at least in part, as a historical contingency? That is to say is it rational to hope that in the moral society the happiness of reason will
no longer be acquired primarily at the expense of the happiness
of the inclinations? A negative answer to this question darkens
the prospect of universal happiness as a harmony of ends; for the
conflict between moral reason and desire means that this harmony
is based upon painful constraint. Moral contentment may compensate for this kind of constraint but does not eliminate it.
We may see Kant's claim that we should seek holiness as a
partial response to the above question. In order that a reconciliation between moral reason and the inclinations, as the two determinants of the human will, may take place, practical reason must
be assigned not only a restrictive function, limiting the pursuit of
individual ends to those which pass the universality test, but it
must also be given a constructive role: to transform human nature
so that desires and needs no longer conflict with the moral lawthe ethicization of human nature. For the sake of happiness, then,
the general framework in which the pursuit of happiness as a
prudential task proceeds must be seen as more constructive and
less restrictive than Kant often suggests. This is also morally important, because the continuous conflict between moral reason and
desire may tempt one to opt for the inclincations rather than for
the moral law. In Kant's defense, however, it is to be noted that the
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idea of striving for inner peace is implied by his claim that we must
seek holiness. The holy will is never tempted to deviate from the
moral Jaw and thoroughly likes to obey the law, which ceases
altogether to be a command (see Practical Reason, pp. 84 and 86;
V: 90 and 92). Thus the holy will has only desires that accord with
the moral Jaw, and, hence, in seeking this ideal or archetype, the
human agent must ethicize his desires. But, even in this context, Kant's remarks are not altogether satisfactory, falling short of
the idea that the moral society involves a great step toward
the achievement of peace in human nature.
It frequently seems that Kant thinks of seeking holiness as a
mere process of overcoming desires, in the sense of negating them
with painful constraint. The ethicization of human nature requires
such self-compulsion, but Kant fails to stress that we may see selfcompulsion as instrumental in overcoming itself, in that moral
discipline leads to inner peace. A more serious problem pertains to
one of his arguments which intends to show that holiness is unattainable for human beings:
To such level of moral disposition [as holiness] no creature can ever attain.
For since he is a creature and consequently is always dependent with
respect to what he needs fo r complete satisfaction with his cond ition, he
can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because
they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral
law, which has an entirely different source (Practical Reason, p. 86; V: 92).

Kant might be right in asserting that internal nature is alien to the
moral law and that sensible beings cannot completely overcome
this alien character by morally reshaping their nature. The problem, however, is that Kant suggests here that it is the very fact that
human beings have sensuous desires which precludes holiness.
Seeking holiness becomes then a question of freeing oneself of
desires-and, of course, there are limits to this undertakingrather than a question of ethicizing desires. The argument is also
misleading in that it focuses on the "natural" opposition between
desires and moral reason, thereby neglecting the fact that human
desires are socially and historically mediated. What needs to be
emphasized is that social conflict greatly intensifies the conflict
between the inclinations and the moral law and that the ethicization of human nature, therefore, is intrinsically lin ked to the ethicization of human relations. Thus we may rationally hope that, in
the moral society as a state of socia l peace, the conflict between
moral reason and the inclinations, and, hence, the conflict be-
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tween the pursuit of virtue and the pursuit of h appiness, will
become manageable for the individual and lose its sharpest edges,
even if it does not disa ppear altogether beca use holiness sets,
strictly speaking, an infinite task to be continued in the moral
society. Happiness as a harmony of ends, then, will be brought
onto a higher plane in the ideal society, in that the systematic unity
of the ends of desire will to a large degree come to harmonize with
the ends of moral reason.
Incorporating this regulative idea that happiness as a harmony
of ends can be brought onto a high er plane, should we infer th at
universal obedience to the moral law, i.e., the end of social conflict,
leads to universa l happiness? A glance at the major sources of
human suffering makes clear that this conclusion would be too
hastily drawn.

Th e Major Sources of Human Suffering
There seem to be three major sources of human sufferin g: the
unfitness of external nature for the human person, the limitations
of the human body, and social conflict. The unfitness of nature
manifests itself not only in the occurrence of natural disasters, but
also, and primarily in the fact that nature ha s to be transformed in
order to satisfy even the most basic huma n needs. The human
body suffers in the process of death, with di seases and fatigue,
and these physical phenomena inhibit th e fulfillment of individual
projects in the pursuit of happiness. Social conflict, in turn, shatters individual life plans and leads to violence and untim ely death.
These major sources of human suffering are closely related. Th e
rise of social conflict within the history of the human sp ecies is not
understandable unless we see it as caused in part by the unfitness
of external nature and the limitations of the human body. The
scarcity of material goods and the strenuous labor needed to obtain them have always contributed to social conflict. (Note that
these factors alone do not explain social confli ct; some other factors are what Kant calls the "unsocial sociability" of th e human
person, which we will discuss in th e next chapter, and the inability
to rationally control institutional interaction.) But, also, we cannot
understand the suffering caused by the unfitness of external nature and the limitations of the body in separation from social conflict; such conflict has always inten sified this suffering for most
human beings for the sake of the few.
Human reason evolves from human suffering, a nd its task is
to lessen this suffering. From this angle we may reformulate the
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duty to seek the highest good as the duty to diminish the impact
of the major sources of human suffering. 22 Universal obedience to
the moral Law, as embodied in the idea of the moral society, means
the end of social conflict. What does not follow, however, is that in
this setting of universal cooperation all social proble ms and, hence,
all socially determined suffering will have disappeared. Universal
obedience to the Jaw guarantees that social disagreements will be
settled in a peaceful and rational manner, not that such disagreements will not occur. Moreover, the end of all social suffering
presupposes that all institutional changes and decisions will have
no inadvertent negative effects. But will it ever be within the scope
of human reason to make completely transparent the workings of
social m echanisms? This much is sure: within the moral society
such unintentional negative consequences will be counteracted as
soon as they occur, thereby minimizing their impact on human
suffering. Further, the end of social conflict will tremendously
lessen the suffering inflicted on humanity by the unfitness of nature. Human and natural resources will no longer be wasted, and
the impetus behind scientific-technological development will be
the furtherance of human happin ess, rather than the prese nt
threat of the annihilation of the species. Most importantly, all of
humanity will enjoy the fruits of this development. Yet it is doubtful that exernal nature can ever be brought into complete harmony
with human desires and needs. Natural disasters and inadvertent
negative effects of the domination of nature undermine the hope
for the end of all suffering caused by the unfitness of external
na ture. Finally, death, di sease, and fatigue will continue to be
sources of suffering in the moral society, although the end of social
conflict and the ensuing progress in health conditions will lessen
their impact.
In s hort, the end of social conflict will be an enormous step
forward in the reduction of human suffering, but suffering will
remain. Death, disease, and the incapacity to understand and rationa lly control all social and natural mechanisms point to the
Limits of human action. These limits are limits to the idea of the
end of all human suffering. This does not m ea n, however, that this
idea cannot function as a historical regulative idea or that we
s hould not operate on the assumption that the "limits of suffering" cannot always be pushed forward by "history." The importance of this regulative idea of the end of all human suffering is
that it prevents any premature acceptance of human suffering. In
addition, it is to observed that the suffering in the moral society
wi ll take on a different character compared to suffering in the
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present world. What makes present suffering particularly depresssing, deplorable, and intolerable, as Kant noted for his own time
(see On the Old Saw, p. 77; VI: 394), is that, for the most part, it is
suffering that human agents directly or indirectly inflict upon one
another. Nature causes pain and untimely death, but nature does
not torture, murder, humiliate, and deprive human agents of their
dignity in calculated processes of repression. Human violence is
qualitatively different from natural violence, and only the latter
kind of violence will remain in the moral society. In this society,
moreover, the suffering inflicted on humanity by nature will be
experienced in a cooperative setting: co-suffering (Mit/eid) alleviates suffering.

A Further Specification of the Duty to Promote
the Highest Good
The implication of the foregoing is that universal obedience to the
moral law will not lead to universal happiness, or, at least, our
present knowledge of the world makes this possibility implausible-a conclusion which becomes even stronger when we view
happiness as uninterrupted pleasure rather than as a harmony of
ends, for the latter view does not seem to exclude all suffering as
inconsistent with itself. Kant came to the same basic conclusion;
for his view, as we have seen in step (h) of his argument for the
antinomy, is that "since every practical connection of causes and
effects in the world ... is dependent not on the moral intentions
of the will but on knowledge of natural laws and the physical
capacity of using them to its purposes ... no necessary connection ... between happiness and virtue in the world can be expected from the most meticulous observance of the moral law"
(Practical Reason, p. 118; V: 124) .
So far, then, my analysis supports and elaborates Kant's view.
The relation between the moral society and universal happiness is
not analytic but synthetic, and with respect to this synthetic relation it cannot be shown that universal obedience to the moral law
is a sufficient cause of universal happiness. Kant, however, mistakenly infers in (j) that this means that (without the assumption
of God's existence) the moral law demands that we seek an unattainable ideal. To see the ground of Kant's mistake, we must
further examine a distinction drawn previously between two conceptions of the highest good, which are conflated in Kant's writings. The first is that the highest good is "a moral kingdom of
purposes .... viz., the existence of rational beings under moral
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laws" (Judgment, p. 295; § 86; V, 524-25) . The second is the conception of the highest good embedded in the antinomy of practical
reason, as displayed in the second Critique, in which virtue and
happiness are thought of as necessarily connected. I will call these
conceptions, respectively, the highest good,,, and the highest goodd,
where 'm' stands for "moral" and 'd' for "desirable." 2-' My reason
for using this denotation will soon become more clear.
We have seen in our discussion of the Foundations that the
categorical imperative demands that we seek the highest good,,, .
That is, we ought to seek a moral order of colegislators who enhance one another's ends. This moral order is a morally (deontically) perfect world, and, hence, its realization means that moral
reason will be satisfied. For within this order everyone will obey
the moral law and will cooperate to promote universal happiness.
Yet this world is not the most desirable world, because it is to be
ex pected that human suffering will still occur. Accordingly, we
desire the high est good". In the words of Kant:
That virtue .. . is the supreme condition of whatever appears to us to be
desirable and thus of all our pursuit of happiness ... [has] been proved
. . . But [this does ] not imply that virtue is the entire and perfect good as
the object of the facu lty of desire of rational finite beings. For this, happiness is also required, and indeed not merely in the partial eyes of a person
who makes himself his end but even in the judgment of an impartial
reason .... For to be in need of happiness and also worthy of it and yet
not to partake of it cou ld not be in accordance with the complete vol ition
of an omnipotent rational being, if we assume such only for the sake of
the argument (Practicnl Reason, pp. 114-15; V: 120-21).

Granted that impartial reason makes this claim, expressing an objective desire, it does not follow that the failure to realize this
object of desire is a deontic failing. After all, it is meaningless to
say that we are obliged to do things we simply cannot accomplish
after even the most serious and persistent effort-the limits of
what we possibly can do are the limits of what the moral law can
require us to do ("ought implies can"). It seems that Kant held this
view, as is indicated by his usual contention that we must promote
rather than realize the highest good", and, yet, the untenable conclusion of a deontic failing follows from his claim in the argument
for the antinomy that the highest goodd is the final end of the
moral law. It seems, then, that Kant failed to draw a clear distinction between the demands of the law and those of desire, thus
making the mistake in the antinomy, and elsewhere in his work,
of presenting the "ought" of desire as a deontic "ought." Accord-
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ingly, in premise (c) of the antinomy, the connection between
virtue and happiness is declared to be morally necessary, whereas
it is in fact necessary only from the perspective of impartial desire.
This criticism would be incorrect if Kant had shown that the
law demands that we realize the highest goodd, but an adequate
argument to this effect cannot be found in his work. This good is
not grounded in the categorical imperative, although Kant may
have thought otherwise, for the two conceptions of the highest
good are also conflated in the Foundations; rather, the ground that
is provided for this good is that it accords with the desire of the
disinterested observer, i.e., the judgment of an impartial reason,
and that an omnipotent rational being would bring it about. Here
metaphors tend to take the place of philosophical reasoning and
explanation. 2" In Judgment Kant even speaks of a "voice within,"
which tells us that virtue and happiness ought to be conjoined
within the universe (p. 309; § 88; V: 539) . This voice, it need not be
said, is not the voice of duty, but that of desire.
The objection might be raised that for Kant the highest goodd
is not merely an object of desire but the outcome of his principle of
justice (Gerechtigkeit, not Recht) that the virtuous among us deserve
to be happy. Now since we ought to seek a just world, the highest
goodd presents us with a deontic "ought." This objection, I think,
is merely a reformulation of the mistake embedded in the antinomy, although the principle of justice indeed seems to be a primary motivating factor behind Kant's construction of the highest
goodd. The point is that the appeal to justice is not essentially
different from the appeal made in the name of impartial desire. To
be sure, the idea that everyone deserves to be happy in the moral
society may seem to fit with our moral intuitions, but, from the
perspective of duty, the only meaning that can be given to this
desert is that it is our duty to attempt to make one another happy.
The principle of justice, in other words, does not in fact set a
deontic task different from the task implied by the idea of the
highest good
In conclusion, then, Kant's misguided contention that the limits of human action show that (without the assumption of God's
existence) the moral law projects an "empty" ideal is based on his
confusion of the demands of practical reason with those of desire.
What these limits show instead is that the duty to promote the
highest goodd is vacuous for human beings insofar as it extends
beyond the duty to promote the moral order of colegislators who
seek to enhance one another's ends. Note, moreover, that the highest good,,, is also adequate as a moral ideal for beings more power0 ,.
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ful than human beings; for, in seeking to realize the highest goodm,
these beings will realize the highest good". The only practical function I can see for the highest goodd is that it sets more clearly than
does the highest good"'-but only more clearly-a regulative standard for human conduct: we ought always to continue to reduce
human suffering and seek the happiness of all moral agents; morality presents us with an infinite task, and practical reason will be
satisfied only when we all seek to fulfill this task. 25
The conflation of the highest good"' and the highest goodd in
Kant's work explains some misunderstandings concerning the significance of this good in his ethics. Equating his notion of the
highest good with the highest good" alone-that is, considering it
in abstraction from the highest good"'-, the highest good is at
times seen as a complete break with reality as we know it. Thus
the relevance of this ideal is transferred from the realm of human
action to the sphere of (a metaphysically interpreted) religious
hope. Engels and Marx made this error, for, as we have noted, they
claimed that Kant was satisfied with placing the harmony between
the good will and its desires in the "world beyond." The result is
that the highest good as such loses its praxis-related character.
Besides, their view conflicts with Kant's contention that the highest good is the kingdom of God on earth.
A variant of this misunderstanding can be found in Lewis
White Beck's A Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason."
Beck argues that the duty to promote the highest good is vacuous:
For suppose I do all in my power-which is all any moral decree can
demand of me-to promote the highest good, what am I to do? Simply act
out of respect for the law, which I already knew. I can do absolutely
nothing else toward apportioning happiness in accordance with desertthat is the task of a moral governor of the universe, not of a laborer in the
vineyard (pp. 244-45).

This contention is correct with respect to the highest good" considered in itself; or, as I just have put it, the duty to promote the
highest good", insofar as it extends beyond the duty to promote
the highest good,,,, is vacuous. Focusing attention on the highest
good" alone, I can also agree with Beck's claim with respect to the
duty to promote the highest good that "Kant is almost casual in
introducing his readers to this command of reason" and that
"[n]one of the formulations of the categorical imperative have had
this content" (p. 244). Failing to discern the distinction between
the highest good.., and the highest goodd, Beck, however, draws the
wrong inference that the duty to promote the highest good as such
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is vacuous and not grounded in the categorical imperative. Thus
Beck ha s contributed to the view that Kant's ethics is a private
ethics. But the fault is not Beck's alone. By conflating the two
notions of th e highest good, Kant himself made insufficiently clear
that the duty to promote the hi ghest good is a social duty which
follows from the moral law; it is only through a reconstruction that
this social dimension in Kant's th ought becomes appare nt.
Beck's argument concerning the vacuity of the duty to promote
the highest good has been contested by John R. Silber, but in doing
so Silber gives an altogether different content to this duty than
Kant did. Silber asserts that "it is obvious, Beck's denial notwithstanding, that in rearing children, serving on juries and grading
papers one tries to do and actually ca n do som ething 'about apportioning happiness in accordance with desert."' 26 Silber, then,
maintains that th e duty to promote th e highest good requires that
virtuous age nts be mad e happy and that immora l persons be
punished. What accounts for this interpretation?
One explanation is that Silber ha s misunderstood Kant's common claim to the effect that the highest good is "happiness in the
world proportionate to worthiness to be happy" (virtue) (see, e.g.,
Religion, p. 7n; VI: 146n). Kant's meaning is not that we must make
human beings as happy as they are virtuous, but that we must
seek a world in which a virtuous humanity will be happy. Silber
seems to have drawn the opposite conclusion. That he is in error
we can infer from the observation that his view implies that the
unhappy virtuous agent has a duty to become less virtuous, so as
to balance virtue and happiness. 21 But perhaps Silber's interpretation is based on a different ground. We have seen that Kant adheres to the principle of justice that virtuous persons deserve to be
happy. In a similar vein he says at some points in his work that
"impartial reason" demands that the immoral deserve punishment. 28 Thus th e broader principle of justice to be found in Kant is
that virtuous p erson s deserve happiness, whereas the immoral
deserve punishment. We may see Silber then as interpreti ng thi s
pdnciple of justice as a rule for human action.
There is no adequate textual support for this interpretation
(see note 31, below), and the examples that Silber provides to give
credibility to his view are either implausible in themselves or in
conflict with Kant's moral viewpoint. To begin with, the exa mpl e of
gradi ng papers is misguided in that it is based on equivoca tion.
Grading papers is a question of intellectua l desert, not of moral
desert, and it is unlikely that Silber thinks oth erwise. The second
example concerning rearing children contradicts Kant's much more
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enlightened view of moral education. Kant argues, as we have
seen in the closing section of the previous chapter, that neither
punishment nor reward is a proper means of moral instruction,
because their use leads to the view that morality has merely instrumental value. For Kant moral education must instill respect for the
moral law and must proceed through discussion and examples of
truly moral action. Immoral behavior, moreover, must be met by
expressing moral disapproval, which aims not at physical pain for
the child, but at moral pain. What is wrong with Silber's final
example is that the task of the members of a jury is to determine
not moral guilt but legal responsibility. Kant was of this opinion.
As he puts it in Religion (p. 66; VT: 214), "a human court of justice
[as opposed to a divine court of justice] . . . attends merely to
single offenses and therefore to the deed itself and what is relative
thereto, and not to the general [moral] disposition." 29
In general, Silber's interpretation of the duty to promote the
highest good fails in that it is hard to reconcile with Kant's thesis
that we can never be sure whether our actions have moral worth
because it always remains doubtful, even after the most thorough
self-examination, whether they are based on self-love or on respect
for the moral law (Foundations, pp. 22 ff; IV: 263 ff). Kant seems
somewhat to overstate his case, one of his points being that we
should continue with our moral efforts rather than flatter ourselves about our moral accomplishments. At any rate, the uncertainty concerning moral motives is even more manifest when the
acts of other agents are to be judged, particularly in those cases in
which morality and self-interest speak with one voice. (Recall that
Kant turned for this reason to the spectators of the French Revolution rather than to its participants, in order to establish that the
moral motive is operative in humanity.) From a Kantian perspective we should, therefore, be hesitant to judge the moral status of
others on the basis of their acts, let alone distribute happiness
according to desert. 30 To be sure, the cases for virtue and for vice
are not symmetrical. It is more plausible to assume an evil motive
behind a series of wrong acts than a virtuous motive behind a
series of right acts. After all, the right acts could have been done
merely for the sake of expected rewards. Accordingly, there is still
the possibility that the second half of the principle of justice-the
immoral deserve to be punished-has deontic relevance for Kant's
ethics. His view on moral education points to the contrary. Moreove1~ Kant never says that human beings have the (moral) right to
punish other human agents outside the legal realm, and he does
not argue that the duty of beneficence should be qualified as de-
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mantling the promotion of the ends of virtuous agents o nly. 3 ' The
restriction on this duty is not that we should not promote the e nds
of immoral agents, but that we should not promote individual ends
that do not accord with the law.
The principle of justice in Kant's writings is best unders tood as
a cosmic principle, i.e., a principle of divine justice. 32 His concern
here goes beyond the highest goodd, which may be seen as the
product of applying this principle to one particular situation, the
final destiny of humanity. As Yovel observes in Kant and the Philosophy of History, one can find in Kant's work "a deep sensitivity
to the phenomena of the suffering ju st and the prosperous sinner"
(p. 63n). This concern does not translate into moral action except
that we ought to seek the highest good"" a lthoug h Kant mi sleadingly suggested otherwise by maintaining that we must seek
the highest good d. The significance of the principle of justice must
be sought in the sphere of hope. Ka nt holds that we may (rationally) hope that the suffering just will not always conti nue to
suffer and that the prosperous sinners will not always continue to
prosper. This hope is one aspect of moral faith. We may wonder
whether it is morally defensible to hope that the happiness of th e
sinner will be shortlived, but I will not attempt to address this
question, holding that this hope is not relevant for moral praxis. 33
What may be noted, though, is that the hope that the just will
prosper and that the sinners will become just receives much more
empha sis in Kant's work, and that only this hope is important for
his concept of the highest goodd. The (different) hope that the
virtuous will be rewarded and that the sin ners will not go unpunished reflects the traditional belief in God as the m.oral judge.
Interestingly enough, Silber acknowledges at one point that the
task set by the highest good, as he interprets it, is "God-like in
dime n s ion ." ~'

The Postulate of the Existence of God
Provided that my argument is correct that we must seek the highest good"', there is no antinomy of practical reason and, hence, no
need to postulate God. More precisely, thi s postulate is no longer
justifiable on the basis of the antinomy, for the substitution of the
highest good,,, for the highest goodd in the argument for the antinomy di ssolves the antinomy.
This is not to say that there are not certain presuppositions
embedded in the idea that we ought to seek the highest good"'.
Past experience shows that nature is sufficiently susceptible to our
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moral efforts to make this good possible, but, of course, we cannot
prove that this will be also the case in the future. In the broadest
terms, then, the idea that we ought to seek the highest good"'
presupposes that nature will continue to be (to some degree) consonant with the moral task. The postulate of the existence of God
grounds this "continuity" assumption: the moral order and the
natural order have, regulatively speaking, their common origin in
God, and God is the "guarantee" of (and explanation for) the ontic
possibility in nature that the moral order can be impressed upon
the natural order. Th e fact that we may see the postulate of God as
fulfilling this function within the practical philosophy is, however,
not a good rea son to admit it to the practical philosophy. For the
moral law is the ultimate ground for the postulate, and this ground
can also be given for the bare assumption that nature will not
defeat our efforts to realize the highest good'". To be sure, in
m erely assuming this, rather than postulating God, there is a loss
in explanatory power, and the contingent character of nature is not
really overcome, but this is irrelevant, even on Kant's own terms.
The concern is moral praxis and its necessary presuppositions, not
a metaphysical understanding of the universe. Moreover, we will
soon see that a defensible understanding of the idea of the primacy of pure practical reason in its methodological aspect points
precisely to the view for which I am arguing.
Even if we accept Kant's contention that we ought to seek the
highest goodd, there remains the problem that the solution of the
antinomy is inconsistent with the claim that we ought to seek this
good. In order that the gap between the highest good"' and the
highest goodd be bridged, there must be a being with divine-like
properties. Kant explains:
[W] e s hall think this original Being as a/I-knowing; thus our inmost dispositions (which constitute the proper moral worth of the actions of rational beings of the world) will not be hid from Him. We shall think Him
as all-mighty; thus He will be able to make the whole of nature accord with
thi s highest purpose (the highest good"] (Judgment, p. 295; § 86; V: 525) .

Although not in equal detail in each case, Kant argues similarly
that we must ascribe to this Being such "transcendental properties" as "all-good," "just," "wisdom," "eternity," and "omnipresence." But now consider again premise (a) of the argument for the
antinomy. Strictly speaking, this premise must be understood as
saying that we must realize rather than promote the highest goodd;
for only in that sense does the crucial premise and conclusion (b)
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follow, that the highest goodd must be possible. The solution of the
antinomy contradicts premise (a); the passage just cited makes
clear that it is God, not humanity, who must at the final instance
realize the highest goodd. Moreover, we have seen (p. 68) that Kant
says that we may expect that God will complete our moral endeavors. And, in accordance with this, Kant usually maintains that we
must promote rather than realize the highest goodd. This means, in
effect, that it is our duty to seek the highest goodm. The solution of
the antinomy, then, further supports my previous argument that
there is no good reason for claiming that there is an antinomy in
the first place.35
A final problem with the postulate is that it has more content
than is needed to solve the antinomy. (For the sake of the argument, I again assume that the highest good.i is the final end set by
the moral law.) This constih1tes a sufficient reason to reject it as a
solution of the antinomy. My basis for this claim is Kant's doctrine
of the primacy of pure practical reason in its methodological aspect. This doctrine sanctions the acceptance of cognitive statements that (1) are undecidable: that is, such that theoretical reason
can neither demonstrate nor refute them, (2) can be shown to state
necessary conditions for moral praxis, and (3) are affirmed only for
the sake of moral praxis. 36 The second statement is essential for my
purposes here. In order that the doctrine be defensible, condition
(2) must be strictly adhered to; for otherwise the critical system
would lose its critical edge, opening the door to various unfounded (metaphysical) beliefs. I have taken condition (2) into account in my comment on the presuppositions of the idea that we
ought to seek the highest good,,,. Kant, however, violates this restriction, for in postulating God he assumes more than is strictly
necessary to solve the antinomy. All we need to assume is that
somehow nature can be brought into complete harmony with morality. Certainly, it is not required that we postulate the existence of
an omnipotent, all-knowing, and all-good Being. To use Kant's own
words, in order to solve the antinomy "we must assume something
which contains the ground of the possibility and practical reality,
i.e., the practicability, of a necessary moral final purpose" [the
highest goodd] (Judgment, p. 308, § 88; V: 538).
Objectively, this "something" is all we need to assume, and yet
Kant states additionally that it is "a wise Being governing the
world according to moral laws." He maintains that the interpretation of the "something" as God is "subjectively necessary by the
constitution of our cognitive faculties" (p. 309; 539). That is to say,
our mode of cognition, taking as its model human intention and
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crea tive activity, " forces" us to view the " somethjng" as a divine
being; for we ca n imagine only that such a divine being can bridge
the gap between th e highest good,,. and the highest goodJ . We ca n
leave the merits of Ka nt's observation an open question, for his
observati on is irre levant as a justification for admitting the postulate of the existence of God to the practical system. The doctrine of
the primacy of pure practical reason as applied to the antinomy
permits us to accept that which ha s logical fo rce, not that which
has subjective and imaginative force.
Ka nt's ma jo r reason for stepping beyond what is, logically
speaking, required to solve the antinomy is, however, to be sought
elsewh ere. His surprising conclu sion of the discussion of the
antinomy in the second Critique hints at this reason. Ka nt fi rst
qualifies his argumen t for the antinomy:
I have sa id above that in the mere course of nature happiness exactly
proportionate to moral worth is not to be expected and is indeed impossible and thM therefore the possibility of th e highest good fro m this side
cannot be granted except under the presupposition of a mora l Author of
the wo rld. . . . In fac t, the impossibility me ntio ned is merely subj ective... . [We] cannot prove that [the highest good,i] is impossible according to unive rsal laws of nature [only], i.e., sh ow this by objecti vely sufficient reason s. . . . [Thus] reason cannot objectively decide whethe r it is
[possible] by uni versaJ laws o f nature without a wise Autho r presiding
over nature or w hether only on the assumption of such an Author (pp.
150-51; V: 157).

This qualification is enti rely appropriate. We cann ot m a ke the
objective claim that nature ca nnot be completely reshaped by us so
that universal happiness will be the result, for th e statement in this
form tran scends the limits of theoretical reason. Noneth eless, we
may criticize Kant fo r failing to recogruze that the issue at stake is
our ability to contro l not only natural mechanis ms but also social
ones, in that it is doubtful that universal virtue suffices fo r the
elimination of all socially determined suffering. At any rate, the
belief that we cannot produce universal happiness contains a subjective element: it is our limited knowledge that forces us in the
direction of this concl usion. This is all the more reason to leave the
solution of the antinomy open- that is, we should not even claim
that the "something" is n ecessarily a transcendent or supersensible ground.
Kant, to the contrary, continues his concluding remarks by
stating that although "the m anner in which we are to think [the
high est goodd] as possible is subject to our own choice," there are
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two subjective factors that settle this choice. But why should we
settle this choice? Again, from the perspective of the doctrine of
the primacy of pure practical reason, as applied to the antinomy,
this is inappropriate. The first subjective factor l have already commented upon; it is the contention that our mode of cognition
forces us to think of the highest good 0 as possible only on the
assumption of a moral governor of the universe. What may be
noted, though, is that Kant weakens his case here by his claim that
we can entertain the possibility that this good is attainable via the
laws of nature alone. The second subjective factor concerns our
motivational structure. Kant argues that of the two alternatives(1) the highest good" is possible by the laws of nature alone, and
(2) it is possible only when we assume the existence of a wise
Author presiding over nature-only the second "is conducive to
morality" (ibid., p. 151; 157). Kant does not explain here how the
belief in God can be supportive of the moral task, but, considering
the primacy of praxis in his work, we may assume that, of the two
factors that settle the choice for the postulate of God, this is the
decisive one: the assent to this postulate as the product of our
mode of cognition is ultimately morally motivated. Instead, Kant
states here that, as a voluntary decision, the choice to assume the
existence of God is not commanded. His closing words, however,
show that he thought such a command to be superfluous: "[Faith]
rather springs from the moral disposition itself. It can therefore
often waver even in the well disposed but can never fall into unbelief" (ibid., p. 151; 158).
What is surprising about the above conclusion is Kant's acknowledgment that the postulate does not necessarily follow from
the moral law; rather, it is a matter of choice. Thjs conclusion
contrasts sharply with another view we can detect in Kant, namely,
that there is at least an objective ground for the postulate-the
"something" as a transcendent ground-which we may th en subjectively further specify as "God." The conclusion is even more in
disagreement with Kant's usual contention that the moral lawand, hence, the whole practical system-stands or falls with the
postulate of the existence of God. His usual contention is concisely
set forth in the following passage from the second Critique:
It is a duty to realize the highest good as far as it lies within our power to

do so. . . . Consequently, it is unavoidable for every rational being in the
world to assume whatever is necessa ry to its objective possibility. The
assumption of the existence of God is as necessary as the moral law, in
relation to which alone it is valid (p. 149n; 156n) .
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In summary and conclusion, my previous arguments have shown
this to be incorrect. Since it is our duty to seek "the highest good
as far as it lies within our power to do so," it does not follow that
the highest goodc1 must be possible. Hence, there is no antinomy,
which means that the moral Jaw alone does not provide a ground
for the postulate of God. Tills also follows from my claim that the
law demands that we seek the highest good"' and that the highest
goodc1 considered in itself is rooted only in th e demands of objective desire. Finally, even if we abstract from these considerations
and maintain that the highest goodc1 is morally necessary, the resulting antinomy can be solved by the assumption that a mere
"something" is the ground for the possibility of this good. This fits
best with the doctrine of the primacy of pure practical reason in its
methodological aspect and is, moreover, at least compatible with
the idea that we ought to realize the highest goodc1 .

3. Moral Faith and Hope
That Kant's major reason for stepping beyond the "minimal" solution of the antinomy is, indeed, his idea that belief in God is
conducive to moral praxis becomes clear when we turn to judgment. He describes in the following words the predicament of the
person who holds that there is no God and future life and yet
respects the Jaw and seeks to fulfill its demands:
[This person] desires no advantage to hjmself from following [the moral
law], either in this or another world; he wishes, rather~ distinterestingly to
establish the good. . . . Bu.t his effort is bounded. . . . Deceit, violence,
and e nvy will always surround him, although he himself be honest,
peaceable, and kindly; and the righteous men with whom he meets wiJI,
notwithstanding all their worthiness of happiness, be yet subjected by
nature, whkh rega rds not this, to all the evils of want, disease, and untimely dea th .. .. So it will be until one wide grave engulfs them together
(honest or not, it makes no difference) and throws them back ... into the
abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter. . . . The purpose, then, which
thi s well-intentioned person had and ought to have . .. , he mu st certainly give up as impossible. Or else, if he wishes .. . not to weaken the
respect with which the moral Jaw immediately inspires him, . .. he
must . . . assume the being of a moral author of the world, that is, a God
(pp. 303-4; § 87; V: 533-34).

Strictly speaking, Kant is mistaken in asserting that the atheist
must give up the idea that the highest goodc1 is possible; for, as we
have seen, the atheist may simply assume a mere "something" as
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making this good possible. But this is not really the issue at stake
in the above passage. Kant's concern here is not so much with the
objective function of the postulate as with its subjective or motivational significance in terms of present moral action directed toward
the moral ideal. Lacking faith, the atheist is confronted not only
with the fact that he views the universe as indifferent to his own
well-being and efforts, but also with the fact that he sees it as
indifferent to the well-being of others and their efforts. Notice,
incidentally, that Kant emphasizes the latter, not the former; even
his doctrine of the personal highest good is in a sense more social
than it often is taken to be, expressing Mitleid, if not solidarity. The
atheist painfully observes that many virtuous persons around him
do not experience their deserved happiness, while some sinners
prosper, and he is convinced that their ultimate fate is alike-"one
wide grave [will] engulf them together." Kant thinks that the atheist, confronted with these lamentable facts, will become morally
discouraged, losing altogether his hope in the tenability of the
moral project. Allen Wood puts the matter well when he states
that for Kant the hope of the atheist for a good world "is not positively refuted by suffering and failure, but only rendered groundless. [That is], [f]ailure, suffering, and the evils of the world do not
so much refute hope as exhaust it" (Kant's Moral Religion, p. 160) .
Wood perceptively continues by pointing out that Kant held
that "[m]oral faith is the outlook of the rational man who has
chosen not to succumb to moral despair, who has chosen hope
rather than despair." The person with faith is confronted with the
same evils as the atheist, but he chooses to believe that the universe is not without justice. His trust in God is an expression of the
trust that his moral actions do make a difference-for himself and
others-even if he fails to see that they actually do make a difference. More emphatically, he trusts that the righteous will experience their deserved happiness, even if he fails to see how this
will happen. The brute forces of nature are the first word, but the
person with faith is confident that they will not be the last word.
Presumably, in accordance with Kant's view, one may add that
faith is an expression of the hope that, although the forces of
injustice are the first word, they are not the last word. Such faith is
not to be equated with certainty nor with knowledge; rather, it is a
limited belief in suspense. Kant argues, accordingly, that any attempt to provide a theodicy is doomed to failure; such attempts
transcend the limits of reason and are even harmful to the moral
disposition and faith. His sympathy is with Job, not with Job's
friends, who try in vain to explain Job's fate. 37 The idea that the
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universe is not without justice, then, is a regulative idea. But, for
Kant, uncertainty in "religious matters" is to be praised, not to be
regretted. He declares that our limited insight is itself an indication
that divine wisdom is operative in the universe, for if we were
allowed to have more than "a glimpse" into "the realm of the
supersensuous" and if "God and eternity in their fearsome majesty would stand uncea si ngly before our eyes," then "most
actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, few
wou ld be done from hope, none from duty," (Practical Reason,
pp. 152-53; V: 159-60).
One's initial response might be, with Ralph C. S. Walker in his
Kant, that the above observations concerning the atheist are " obviously wrong," for, as h e puts it, "fi]f the atheist can adhere to the
moral law despite his depressing beliefs so much the better for
him, and there is no reason why he should not be able to." 38 I think
that this claim has its merits, but is too facile. Walker explains that
what is "so much the better" for the virtuous atheist is that he, in
contrast to the believer, is not subject to the danger that his moral
motive will be clouded by the thought of "heavenly rewards and
punishments." Kant was acutely aware of this danger, arguing that
hope (faith) is not to be equated with certainty and that hope is
conditioned by obedience to the moral law. Yet -he was at times
critical of the human need for hope as embedded in faith, declaring it to be a question of man's "inescapable limitations" and of
"human frailty" (see, for example, Religion, p. 6n; VI: 145n). So
what is the basis of my claim that Walker's response is too facile?
Hope is a fourth emotive component of the moral commitment
to change the world. The moral reformer who lacks faith, as expli..:
cated by Kant, may be able to face the fact that his moral actions
are not conducive to his own well-being and even harm him; but is
he able to face the indifference of the universe to the righteous
individuals around him? Perhaps. He may even turn Kant's point
around: the very fact that the brute forces of nature cause so much
suffering may strengthen his resolve to seek a society in which the
domination of nature will be a truly collective enterprise, benefiting all of humanity. Yet he must face the fact that even in this
society there will remain suffering caused by nature. Can the reformer, without losing his moral determination, accept the view
that it will always be the case that the fate of some human beings
is beyond hope? More importantly, is he able to face the enormous
suffering of the victims of injustice throughout history, while holding that this suffering cannot be redeemed? As I suggested earlier,
this suffering is much harder to face than the suffering caused by
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nature. But, again, the hope for redemption as embedded in faith
may not be the best answer. The reformer may argue that the very
fact that social suffering cannot be redeemed is all the more reason
to seek a society in which this kind of suffering does not arise.
Still, hope remains important for the reformer; he hopes that the
future will bring progress toward the moral ideal. Can this hope be
justified in light of the past? Is history steadily moving toward the
moral ideal? Is the reformer justified in believing that others will
collaborate in seeking the moral ideal? Are nature and morality
sufficiently consonant to make this enterprise tenable?
Faith is an answer to all the above questions. My suggestion is
that this faith, notwithstanding its profundity, may not be the best
answer, but that all these questions should be addressed. The
failure to take note of this makes Walker's response too facile. I see
two basic problems with Kant's notion of faith as it relates to the
moral commitment to change the world. First, faith is not specific
enough to ground the hope that is conducive to this commitment.
Or, at least, it is desirable that this hope be grounded in, or further
supported by, past hjstorical developments. Also, the idea that
nature and morality (reason) are compatible needs to be further
explicated in the only manner in which this idea can be really
explicated within the limits of human experience: we shou ld look
at the gradual transformation of nature into a historical and humanized nature, corresponding to the gradual evolution of human
reason in its moral and nonmoral aspects. Moreover, faith gives
undue attention to the suffering caused by nature, which is a general problem w ith Kant's antinomy. The greatest dilemma for humanity is posed not by nature but by social conflict. 39 Second, Kant
has not succeeded in providing an adequate philosophical foundation for faith. There is no need to repeat here all my arguments for
this claim. Let me only point out once more that Kant did not in
general hold that the very fact that faith is conducive to morality
and satisfies the need for hope is a suffi cient reason to admit the
postulate of God to the practical system. Rather, Kant maintains
that this motivational element is one factor that justifies the step
from the objective ground of the postulate- the "something" as a
transcendent ground-to its interpretation as an omnipotent just
being; or, much more typically, he argues that the antinomy-and
the moral law- make faith an objective practical necessity.
In short, a different approach is needed to ground hope as it
relates to the moral commitment to change the world. I will argue
in the next three chapters that a much more adequate approach
can be found in Kant's historical writings. Here hope is grounded
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not in the logical perplexities of pure practical reason, but in the
historical process interpreted in regulative fashion. Thus the reflective judgment takes the place of the doctrine of the primacy of
pure practical reason in its methodological aspect, and history becomes the bridge between the natural order and the moral order.
Yet it would be a mistake to declare history to be the panacea for
the practical philosophy and moral life as such. The idea of historical progress should not blind us to the immense suffering embedded in history. Hope may be unstable in light of this suffering, and
faith here offers support, even if it is philosophically unfounded.

CHAPTER III

The Philosophy of History (A):
Hope and the Morality
of the Idea of Progress

In the first section of this chapter I will discuss Kant's contention
that hope for historical progress is conducive to social action. I will
also attempt, on the basis of Kant's notion of historical progress, to
distinguish hope from optimism. My argument will be that optimism is based on a dogmatic (metaphysical) understanding of the
idea of historical progress, whereas hope reflects a regulative understanding. On the same ground I will draw a distinction between pessimism and despair. I will end the section by arguing
that hope for progress, as facilitating the moral task, does not
undermine autonomy.
In the second section T will give a commentary on "Idea for a
Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (1784),
which provides a good overview of the basic premises of Kant's
philosophy of history as it seeks to ground hope for progress. This
essay raises, moreover, two major issues central to a Kantian understanding of the idea of historical progress.
The first is whether this idea accords with the demands of
morality. It has been claimed that the notion of historical progress
is morally objectionable in that it implies that human beings are
mere means for bringing about progress. Another problem arising
from the idea of historical progress is embedded in the so-called
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"paradox of anamnestic solidarity." It seems that the moral society,
if it is to be a truly human society, must remember those who have
struggled and suffered for its realization, but this remembering
seems to conflict with the fact that a main objective of this society
is to make human beings happy. This paradox points to the problem that history as a source of hope also invites despair, which
emerges from the awareness that the suffering of the uncountable
victims of injustice cannot be redeemed, a despair which may keep
one from engaging in moral action toward the ideal society. In
summary, the first major issue is that the turn to history for the
sake of morality seems to contradict morality in various ways. I
will discuss this issue in the third section.
The second major issue concerns the scope of the two vehicles
of progress which Kant discerns within the course of history
and which he projects toward the future: the mechanisms of selfinterest, i.e., the "cunning of nature," and moral praxis. Kant offers
the regulative idea that we may hope that self-interest alone will
suffice to bring about the perfect state and international peace
which constitute the highest political good. This idea: that moral
action is not a sine qua non for the realization of the highest political good, deserves critical evaluation. It also raises the question of
how we should perceive the relation between the highest political
good and the moral society as the highest moral good. The highest
political good seems to be an aspect of the moral society, but if
self-interest alone can bring about ideal political institutions, then
such institutions can hardly express that which is characteristic of
the moral ideal, to wit, universal virtue. So in what social or institutional form, if any, will the moral society find its true expression? I will discuss the second major issue and its ramifications in
Chapter IV.
Finally, in Chapter V, I will further explore Kant's view of the
French Revolution as a sign of moral progress, and address his
rejection of the right to revolution and to other forms of political
resistance. I will also summarize the main theses of his philosophy
of history and briefly assess the extent to which his hope for
progress has materialized.

1. Hope for Progress and Its
Relevance for Social Action
In On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory but Won't Work in
Practice, Kant writes:
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If it is a sight fit for a god to see a virtuous man wrestle with tribulations
and temptation and yet stand firm, it is a sight most unfit, I will not say for
a god, but for the commonest man of good will to see the human race
from period to period take upward steps toward virtue, only to see it soon
after relapsing just as deeply into vice and misery. To watch this tragedy
for a while may perhaps be touching and instructive, but eventually the
curtain has to fall. For in the long run the tragedy becomes a farce, and
though the actors, fools that they are, do not tire of it, the spectator will.
After one or two acts he has had enough of it; he can correctly assume
that the never-ending p lay is forever the same (p. 76; VI: 392-93).

But what is the bored or, more precisely, appalled spectator to do?
Close his eyes or turn his back to the stage, concluding that any
attempt to improve the human condition is in vain? No doubt, this
is a common reaction, but it is not Kant's response. He maintains,
in effect, that the drama we have just watched displays only the
surface of the history of humanity. Accordingly, on his account,
the spectator must reconstruct the human tragedy so that its progressive aspect becomes visible, watch the reconstructed drama,
and encourage others to see it as well; then, inspired by it, he, and
they, will attempt to steer the next act toward the moral society. To
outline the basic features of such reconstruction is the moral task
that Kant set for himself. The product is his work on history, in
which he argued that the human race is indeed progressing.
These ideas can be deduced from the third section of On the
Old Saw, which is a critical reply to Moses Mendelssohn's contention that "men progress but mankind constantly wavers within the
same fixed limits; viewed as a whole it maintains at all periods of
time about the same level of morality, the same measure of religion
and irreligion, virtue and vice, happiness(?) and misery" (76; 392).'
The outcome of this view is that the spectator of the human drama
will indeed avert his eyes from the stage. Projecting this somber
view into the future, he will not participate in the act to come, or,
at least, he will fail to play a constructive role in it, for, as Kant
observes, "[w]ithout [the] hope for better times the human heart
would never have been warmed by a serious desire to do something useful for the common good; this hope has always influenced the labors of right-thinking men" (77; 394) .
Kant argues that we should make an assumption which is
directly opposed to Mendelssohn's, namely, "that our species, progressing steadily in civilization as its natural end, is also making
strides for the better in regard to the moral end of its existence,
and that this progress will be interrupted now and then, but never
broken off' (77; 393). 2 Kant claims that he does not have to prove
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this assumption and that the burden of proof is on its opponent.
His ground for this claim is that the assumption accords with our
duty to improve both society and the fate of humanity-a duty
which is futile when we accept Mendelssohn's pessimistic thesis,
undermining, as it does, the hope for human progress. Kant adds:
"Let any number of doubts be drawn from history to dispute my
hopes, doubts which, if conclusive, might move me to abandon a
seemingly futil e labor; but as long as the futility cannot be made
wholly certain, I cannot exchange my duty . . . for the rule of prudence not to attempt the unfeasible" (77; 393-94).
Kant's contention that his assumption is not in need of proof is
mistaken and is based on the conflation of two different issues. It
is one thing to claim that we are always justified in hoping that
humanity will make progress in the future; it is another thing to
claim that hum anity ha s made progress and that, therefore, we are
justified in hoping that this progress will continue in the future.
The former hope is necessary for the moral ta sk, the latter only
conducive to it.
The first claim, that we a re always justified in hoping that
humanity will make progress in th e future, cannot be refuted by
historical evidence, as Kant himself suggests in his reply to Mendelssohn, no matter how damaging this evidence may turn out to
be for the second claim, that humanity is making progress toward
the better. The thesis that the fate of humanity will always resemble that of Sisyphus transcends the limits of reason; it is an insta nce of dogmatic teleology in that it presumes that some purpose
is dete rminative or constitutive of the historical process. (Mendelssohn maintains that our Sisyphean fate is an aspect of divine
intention.) To explicate: on the basis of Kant's critical teleology we
ca n, through a reflective judgment, ascribe a certain purpose to the
hi storical process (viewed as the largely unintentional outcome of
human conduct), but we cannot legitimately claim that this process
constitutes itself along the lines of this purpose. Thus Kant's critical viewpoint rightly precludes our making any claim to the effect
that we know that history is-or, is not- moving toward some goal,
which, of course, does not imply that we ca nnot rationally hope (or,
for that matter, fear) that certain "trends" will continue in th e
future. In genera l, we can counter the thesis that humanity will
always move within the same boundaries of vice and virtue by
noting that the future is to some extent open and that, as long as
human beings are moral and free beings, moral progress belongs
to the realm of possibilities. Now since the moral law demands
that we seek the betterment of humanity, we should act on the
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assumption that humanity will seek its own improvement, even if
the odds are against it-hope against hope. The situation is altogether different for the second claim concerning the fact of progress, corresponding to Kant's assumption that the human species
is progressing and will continue to progress, despite som e possible
interruptions. For, although historical evidence cannot conclusively
refute or affirm such a thesis of progress, it is needed to give the
thesis a certain degree of plausibility. In reflecting on the actual
course of history, the philosopher may, or may not, be able to
discern certain patterns or events that support his case- that is, he
may, or m ay not, succeed in putting historical data into a cogent
interpretive framework.
Once Mende lssohn's thesis of con stant misery and vice is
stripped of its dogmatic character, it is at the outset, i.e., in the
absence of any historical evidence, as plausible as Kant's thesis of
progress. Moreover, Mende lssohn's thesis in this form does not
make the duty to seek the improvement of humanity altogether
futile. Yet the thesis is an impediment to the moral task, declaring
as it does that the past gives us no good reason to hope that the
future will bring progress. In this respect, Kant's thesis is to be
preferred as a point of departure. Both theses are teleological in
character and, as such, have a regulative function. Their major
regulative function is practical, not theoretical. 3 Kant's thesis will
stimulate social moral action, whereas Mendelssohn's thesis w ill
discourage it. Additionally, it seems that only Kant's thesis can
help us to come to terms with the problematic fact that we are
beings situated within history. Hence, the moral law demands and
justifies taking Kant's thesis as our point of departure. I deliberately say "point of d eparture," becau se it remains true that the
thesis of progress must be substantiated. Kant seems to have been
aware of this; for, despite hi s denial that his thesis need be proved,
he continues his reply to Mendelssohn as follows: "Besides, there
is a good deal of evidence to show that in our age, compared with
all earlier ones, mankind has by and large really made considerable
moral progress for the better" (78; 394).
Kant then proceeds to sketch som e evidential support for his
thesis of progress, from which it is clear that he rests his case on
two basic observations. The first is that the cunning of nature has
forced humanity to institutionalize the rule of law and w ill continue to force humanity to seek the p erfect state and peace among
the nations. That is to say, we may hope that the mechanisms of
self-interest will bring humanity toward the realization of progressive political ends. (Contra Mendelssohn, then, we sh ould
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look behind the veil of constant misery and vice, so as to discern a
progressive dialectic that develops notwithstanding, and even
through, human selfishness.) These political ends are also required by the moral law, and so we may speak of progress, though
not moral progress, because the moral motive is lacking. The second basic observation is that humanity is in fact making moral
progress. We have noted that Kant saw the enthusiasm of the
spectators of the French Revolution as indicative of a moral interest
in republican ideals. This signifies moral progress, in that the moral motive was here at least directed toward proper political ideals.
Rebutting Mendelssohn, Kant points out another sign of moral
progress: "It can ... be shown that the screaming about an irresistibly growing depravation of mankind comes from the very fact
that, upon reaching a higher level of morality, we can see farther
ahead, and that the severity of our judgments about what we are
compared with what we ought to be-in other words, our selfcriticism-increases the higher we have climbed on the moral ladder in all of what we have come to know of the world's course" (78;
394-95). Thus one would expect Kant to hold that the hope and
prospect for the future is that the vehicle of progress will be to a
lesser degree the cunning of nature and to a greater degree selfconscious action toward the mora l ideal. In fact, however, he does
not draw this conclusion in full force, but rather maintains, even in
On the Old Saw, that we should expect progress to take place
primarily through the cunning of nature:' We will later see that
Kant had too high an expectation of what the mechanisms of selfinterest can accomplish in this regard.
What is most fascinating about Kant's reply to Mendelssohn is
the suggestion that hope-and, hence, the grounding of hope in a
reflective history-sets a moral task. Viewing the past as an eternal
recurrence of the same evils, as a process devoid of progress,
moral agents will most likely look to the future with despair. From
here the step may be taken to resignation and pessimism, an attitude and feeling in which all moral action toward the better is
declared to be futile. In light of our duty to improve society, then,
it is morally imperative to fight against despair and to attempt to
discover behind the veil of suffering and vice a progressive development, which grounds hope.
Recently this same idea has been forcefully put forward by
Jean-Paul Sartre, in a conversation with Benny Levy that addressed
the relevance of hope for revolutionary praxis and the impact of
despair on Sartre's work. Having described the "temptation of despair" during the years of the Second World War and the Korean
War, Sartre ended the talk with the following words:
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With this third world war, which is going to break out one day, with
this miserable en semble that our planet is, despair returns to tempt me
again: the idea that we will not ever finish it, that there is not any goal,
that there are onl y individual goals for which peopl e s tru ggle . . . .
[T]here is not a goal for humanity, ... there are only disruptions. It is
possible to think something like that. This thought tempts us e ndlessly. . . . But ... l resist, and l know that I will die in hope; but it is
necessary to create a foundation for this hope.
We must try to explain why the world, now, ... is only a moment in
a long hi sto rical development, that hope has always been one of the dominant forces of revolutions a nd uprisings, and w hy I feel hope once again
as my conception of the future. 5

Regrettably, dea th prevented Sartre from taking on this project.
His remarks in the conversation with Levy indicate that it would
have been essentially a Kantian project, but I will not attempt to
argue for this claim here, my concern being to point out instead
that Sartre supports Kant's view that hope is important for moral
action directed toward social change. What may be briefly noted,
though, is that Sartre argues here in very Kantian fashion that
truly moral action prefi gures the final goal of revolution- that is, a
brotherhood of humans.6 Thus through action we ca n uphold the
hope for the moral ideal, even in "hopeless" tim es.
Grounded or ju s tified hope for historical progress, as
con tra sted with wishful thinking, is to be distinguish ed from
optimism as it relates to the idea of progress, just as despair and
pessimism denote different attitudes and feelings in this context.
These distinctions can be explicated along Kantian lines. Optimism is an attitude of certitude, in which it is declared that the
triumph of good over ev il is inevitable and guaranteed. This optimi sm is often established at the cost of neglecting all th e evil and
suffering embedded in the historical process-hence, its shallow
overtones. Kant's view of history is n ot optimistic, and he does not
cover up the darker side of the past of humanity. His weapon
against optimism is irony, unmasking the foolishness of human
behavior, both in the past and in the present, and th e pretense that
cultural and scientific progress are by them selves indica tions of
truly human progress-that is, moral progress of the species. Optimism transcends the limits of reason and involves a dogmatic
inte rpretation of the idea of progress. Such historical optimism
can, for exa mple, be found in the work of Marx at those points
where the fall of capitalism and the rise of communism are declared to be inevitable, as being the product of natural, i.e., immanent or constitutive, laws of history. Hope, to the contrary, moves
within the limits of reason and the critical reflective judgment,
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professing uncertainty about that which is uncertain for us, the
future. In Kant's philosophy of history ideas such as that of the
cunning of nature have not a constitutive but a regulative status,
supporting the praxis-related hope that the future will bring
progress. Despair is a lack of hope; one recognizes that hope is
important for moral action but fails to see that there are good
grounds for hope. This may lead to pessimism . Failing to see
grounds for hope, one declares that there are no such grounds,
now or in the future, and that the triumph of evil over good will
always remain with us. Mendelssohn's thesis is pessimistic in
nature, reversing the dogmatism of optimism.
Kant's assertion in On the Old Saw that "[w]ithout [the] hope
for better times the human heart would never have been warmed
by a serious desire to do something useful for the common good"
may seem to conflict with his notion of autonomy. Whether hope
is justified seems to be a contingent matter, depending, among
other factors, on past and present sociopolitical developments,
and, once our obedience to the moral law is conditioned by such
contingent states of affairs, autonomy is surrendered. Here again
the distinction between two kinds of hope, or between two different ways in which we can justify our hope, is important. We are
always justified in hoping for moral progress as such-whether it
is on the individual or the collective level-irrespective of contingent developments. This hope is embedded in the very notion
of autonomy; for autonomy sets a task-that of realizing the selflegislating individual or the community of colegislators-and, in
seeking to fulfill this task, we assume and hope that it is within the
scope of human power. Were it possible to show that the human
race would never make progress, which Kant rightly denies, not
onJy would the hope for better times be undermined, but Kant's
ethics itself would collapse. As for hope as it relates to the idea of
historical progress, this is not necessary to the moral task but
conducive to it. This hope is on a par with the other emotive
components of the moral commitment to change the world. Certain feelings cooperate, as it were, with the demands of the moral
law, e.g., moral enthusiasm and solidarity, whereas other feelings
make obedience to the law more difficult, e.g., self-love. Hope
grounded in the idea of historical progress belongs to the former
group, despair to the latter. Such hope is an autonomous feeling,
arising from taking an interest in the moral law and its final end.
The same might be true of despair-after all, such feeling typically
arises from taking a moral interest in the future-but the law also
demands that we resist its "temptation." Even when the idea of
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historica l progress turns out to be unwarranted, despair can still be
resisted. We can always fall back on hope as it is gro unded in the
notion of autonomy. Moreover, we ca n turn our atte ntion to those
who have struggled for the betterment of humanity, even in the
most discouraging situations, and we ca n attempt to follow th eir
example, both in feeling and in action. We may once again note
(with Kant and Sartre) that where there is moral acti on th ere is
hope; in mirroring the moral ideal in prese nt social action we can
keep the hope for the idea l alive.

2. A Commentary on

"Universal History"
"Idea for a Unive rsa l History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View"
consists of an introduction and nine theses with explications. The
central concern of this essay is to ground hope for progress, but it
also seeks to reflect on th e moral significance of th e fact that we
are historical beings. Th e two concerns are complementary in that
their shared aim is to inspire moral action.
In the introduction Kant expresses his indignation, disc ussed
in the previous chapter, about the foolishness and destructive ness
of human ac tion s through out history. Although such moral anger
may lead to the resolve to change society for the better, th ere is
danger that reflection on hi story may result in despair and eve n
pessimism. It is, therefore, impera tive to seek ground s for the hope
that the fo lly and malice of human actions are of a passing nature. 7
This h ope cannot be grounded in the ends that (most) his torical
agents set for th em selves, for folly and mali ce arise precisely because these agents seek only subjective ends, often in opposition to
one another, each following his natural impulses and inclinations.
Kant prese nts the follow ing solution:
Since the philosophe r ca nnot assume th at humanity in its drama at large
ha s a ratio nal purpose of its own, there is no other expedien t for him
except to try to see if he ca n discover a natural p urpose in thi s idiotic
course of things human. In keeping with this purpose, it mig ht be possible to have a history w ith a definite pla n of nature for creatures who
have no pla n of their own (p. 12; IV: 152; translation al tered) .'

In other words, since the history of humanity is not the result of
humanity's shaping its own destiny along some agreed-on plan,
but rather the blind product of selfish action (rationa l versus natu-
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ral hi story), the philosopher must attempt to discern a progressive
pattern within human history which is unintended, i.e., a plan of
nature. This claim that human history is a natural history is not
to be taken too literaUy, for, as Kant wryly remarks in his introduction, it is no problem to write a systematic history of bees
or beavers.
Throughout the essay Kant uses the term 'nature' as though
nature were a quasi person with a will and intention. This is awkward and confusing, not so much in those cases in which 'nature'
refers to human nature or our natural environment as in those
cases in which it refers to (aspects of) the historical process. His
general meaning in these instances, however, can be easily reconstructed as follows. When Kant argues that nature wills something, we can rephrase this as saying that we can ascribe a definite
purpose or plan to certain historical developments or events. This
purpose or plan is not consciously pursued by the historical actors;
rather, it is unintentionally shaped, just as natural organisms
"blindly" develop toward their ends. Now since it is the Kantian
philosophical historian who ascribes a definite purpose or plan to
the historical drama in its various aspects, it may seem that what
nature wills is really what this historian wills. This is true in the
limited and specific sense that the moral law guides the reconstructive-historical labor of the Kantian historian. What does not
follow, however, is that this historian wills history as it is. History
is not rational, although certainly the Kantian historian sees it as
hi s task to offer an interpretation of history that is rational, i.e., the
grounding of hope in the idea of progress. He seeks, in other
words, to ascribe a rational purpose or plan to certain historical
developments and events, but this does not mean that he views
these processes as in themselves rational. This distinction is essential, for the mistake that must be avoided is to interpret Kant
as engaged in a justification of history in the manner of Hegel.
That Kant is indeed not engaged in a justification of history we can
infer from the fact that his philosophy of history is based on a
critical teleology, not, like Hegel's philosophy of history, on a
dogmatic one.
The natural plan, as the title of the essay indicates, is to be
understood as a regulative and reflective idea; it unfolds within the
history of the human species (i.e., a universal history), and it aims
at a "unjversal cosmopolitan state." The purpose of this perfect
political union is the moral society. However, in this essay Kant
does not yet draw a clear distinction between the highest political
good and the highest moral good; the distinction is only hinted at,
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as when he asserts under the seventh thesis that the union o f
states "is the halfway mark in the development of mankind" (p. 21 ;
161). This reflects the fact that " Universal History" pred ates Kant's
major ethica l and sociopoJitical writings. Nonetheless, thi s essay
accords in general with these w ritings and is to be seen as belonging to the critical corpus.
The first thesis formulates the regulative p rinciple that " [a]ll

natural capacities of a creature are destined to evolve completely to their
natural end" (p. 12; 152). Applying this principle to the human
animal, we become aware of the unique situation in which this
rational being find s himself.
The second thesis states:
ln man (as the only rational creature on ea rth) those capacities which are
directed to the use of his reason are to be fully developed in the race, not in /h e
individual (p. 13; 153).

Kant supports th is thesis with the observation that reason requi res
trial, practi ce, and instruction so that it may proceed to hig he r
levels. That is, reason must produce itself step by ste p; it is not a
given but a task (Aufgabe) . In contrast to other animals, th en, th e
human animal is not what may be called a "closed" organi sm,
having a determined end with capacities adequate to it, but is a n
"open" organism, destined to realize his capacities, as Kant says,
in " unreckonable series of generations." This m ean s th at it is our
fate to be historical beings; what we are depends on our position
in the historical process. 9
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Kant furth er
explicates the capacities that set human s apart from other animals:
Among the living beings that inhabit the earth, man is easily distinguished fro m all other natural beings by his technical pred ispositi on fo r
manipulating things ... , by his pragmatic predisposition (for using oth er
men skillfully for his purposes), and by the moral predisposition in hi s
being (to treat himself and others acco rding to the pri nciple of freed om
under laws) (p. 183; VllJ: 216).

Kant adds that any one of these predisposition suffices to distinguish the huma n creature from other creatu res because each
predisposition is rational in nature. The technical predispositio n
manifests itself in human labor, and its primary tool is the huma n
hand. Kant makes the interesting observatio n that the very fac t
that the human hand lends itself to multifa rious purposes ind icates that the human animal is a rational animal, fo r this open
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character of the hand requires the use of reason (p. 184; 217-18).
The pragmatic predisposition allows the fulfillment of the human
agent as a social and cultural being and encompasses "his natural
tendency in social relations to leave the crude state of mere private
force and to become a well-bred (if not yet moral) being destined
for concord" (p. 185; 218). However, the human agent is not only a
social being; he is unsocial as well, wishing that everything go his
way. The fourth thesis of "Universal History" (to anticipate) makes
clear that, since the road to concord traverses discord, the realization of the pragmatic capacity for social control develops at a high
human cost. Kant places science also on the pragmatic level, which
reflects the fact that science in his time had predominantly cultural
rather than technological value. The fulfillment of the pragmatic
capacities in general requires instruction and education through
suffering and failing, and, again, it is noted that, in contrast to
other animals, "the human race can work its way up to its destiny
only by progress throughout a series of innumerable generations"
(ibid.) . The same holds for the moral predisposition and its evolution. The highest good is the ultimate purpose and regulative idea
of hi story, and humanity can only gradually approach this ideal,
both in understanding and in action.
Kant's distinction between three predispositions and, hence,
three levels of progress is crucial for his philosophy of history. His
main thesis is that developments on the technological level, and, in
particular, on the pragmatic level, including social control, science,
and culture, set the stage for and are conducive to developments
on the moral level. Culture and science discipline human beings'
crude desires, and, together with political peace in and between
the states, they prepare the ground for universal obedience to the
self-legislated moral law, i.e., the moral society.
The third thesis reflects on the fact that it is our fate to be
historical beings:
Nature has willed that man should, by himself, produce everything that
goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should
partake of no other happiness or perfection than that which he himself, independently of instinct, has created by his own reason (p. 13; 153).

Guided by the regulative principle that "nature does nothing in
vain," the philosophical historian wonders what the purpose could
be of our lack of instinctual determination. Kant argues that it
indicates that we must create ourselves so that we can take credit
for what we have made of ourselves. Insight, intelligence, happi-
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ness, and virtue are not given, but rather pose tasks for humanity.
The affirmation of these tasks-that is, the affirmation of free rationality-leads to self-esteem and, Kant adds, makes us "worthy
of life and well-being." Nonetheless, a certain injustice seems to be
embedded in the historical process. Kant writes:
It remains strange that the earlier generations appear to carry
through their toilsome labor only for the sake of the later, to prepare for
them a foundation on which the later generations could erect the higher
edifice which was nature's goal, and yet that only the latest of the generations shou ld have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a
long line of their ancestors had (unintentionally) labored without being
permitted to partake of the fortune they had prepared. However puzzling
this may be, it is necessary if one assumes that a species of animals should
have reason, and . .. should develop their capacities to perfection
(14; 154).l<l

Certainly, most members of past generations have unintentionally
labored for the sake of future generations, and what makes this in
a sense unfair is that they lacked the self-esteem that would have
arisen from the conscious affirmation of free rationality. Their
arduous labor was not freely chosen, but was rather the forced
product of a lack of instinctual determination and a hostile natural and social environment. The conscious affirmation of free
rationality, in other words, is an option which is itself the product
of historical progress.
This leads William A. Galston in his Kant and the Problem of
History (op. cit.) to argue that Kant's philosophy of history conflicts
with the basic injunction of his ethics that human beings should
never be treated as a means only. Galston maintains that on Kant's
account, history uses not only past generations as a mere means,
forcing them unwittingly to contribute to historical progress, but
also later generations as well, in that they are forced into the moral
condition. Thus Galston comes to the conclusion that, according to
Kant's conception of history, later generations do not have good
reason for self-esteem; they are merely lucky (p. 233) . This view is
mistaken. For Kant, history cannot force human agents to affirm
free rationality; rather, certain historical conditions (will) facilitate
the occurrence of such affirmation. Moreover, morality sets an infinite task, and moral agents who take on this task are justified in
their self-esteem.
That Kant's notion of historical progress is somehow inconsistent with his ethics is also argued by Hannah Arendt in her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy":
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In Kant him self there is this contradiction: Infinite Progress is the law of
the human species; at the sa me time, man's dignity demands that he be
seen (every single o ne of us) in his particularity and, as such, be seenbut without any comparison and independent of time-as reflecting mankind in general. In other words, the very idea of progress-if it is more
than a change in circumstances and an improve me nt of the world--contradict's Kant's notion of man's dignity. It is against human dignity to
believe in progress. Progress, moreover, means that the story never ha s an
end. The e nd of the story itself is in infinity. There is no point at which we
mig ht stand still a nd look back with th e backward glance of the historian
(p. 77) .

Arendt's lectures break off at thi s point, leaving us to guess what
the import is of the last sentence. Perhaps s he wished to convey
that, since the idea of infinite progress implies a changing conception of ideal humanity, it precludes our perceiving ourselves, in
reflecting on our historical condition, as mirroring humanity in
general-that is, we cannot "look back with the backward glance
of th e historian" and are degraded to mere pages in the endless
story. In the third section of this chapter I will return to Arendt's
criticism as well as to Galston's objection insofar as I have not yet
rebutted this objection.
In the fourth thesis Kant expounds the idea I have earlier referred to as the cunning of nature:
The means employed by nature to bring about the develop111e11t of all the
capacities of men is their 11nt11gonis111 i11 society, in so far as this is, in the end,
the cause of a lawful order 11111ong 111en (p. 15; 155) ."

Kant explains that by 'antagonism' h e means "the unsocial
sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, bound
together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to
break up the society." The individual is inclined to associate with
others because they are needed in order for him to develop and
affirm his ego and thus to overcome his mere natural existence. At
the sa me time, the individual wants everything to go his way and
in this respect others pose a threat, undermining th e centrality of
hi s will by their attempt to impose in their turn their selfish wills. 13
Hence, Kant says that the human agent wants "to achieve a rank
among hi s fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he
cannot withdraw." The conflict between individuals does not always take on an overt form; it is at times disguised. In Anthropology Kant perceptively observes that the human agent may hide his
selfishness "so that his apparent self-abnegation and specious
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modesty will give him a better chance of being highly esteemed by
others (p. 10; VIII: 12). Further, it is to be noted that, although in
"Universal History" Kant empha sizes recognition and lus t for
power as factors that make human beings enter society and bring
them into conflict, he did not neglect "material" factors such as
survival, wealth, exploitation, and division of labor, as we will see
in the next chapter.
The antagonism between human beings forces them gradu ally
to develop their talents and refine th eir taste. The crude pass ion s
are controlled, a sen se for free choice is developed, and unintentional preparation is made for a legal orde r. Kant elaborates:
"[T]he beginnings are laid for a way of thought which ca n in time
convert th e coarse natural disposition for moral di crimination into
definite practical principles, and thereby change a society of men
driven together by pathological causes into a moral whole" ("Universal History," p. 15; IV: 155; translation altered). Through what in
Judgment is called "the culture of discipline," then, un social sociability gives rise to a mode of thought in which it is realized that
social conflict will continue as long as the social order reflects a
particular will rather than a universal will, i.e., th e rule of law.
Kant held that thi s mode of thought was emerging in his own
time; it is (the best of) the spirit of the Enlightenment.
Unsocial sociability is nature's trick of forcing historica l agents
to promote unintentionally a lawful order. This cunning of nature
is highlighted by th e fact that these agents often long for the very
opposite of what nature force s them to accomplish. Kant maintains
that without the "unamiable characteristics of un sociability ... all
talents would remain hidden, unborn in an Arcadian shepherd's
life," for the human agent wishes "to Jive comfortably and pleasantly." Nature, however, "wills th at h e should be plunged from
sloth and passive contentment into labor and trouble, in order that
he may find means of extricating himself from them." This lead s
Kant to exclaim: "Thanks be to nature, then, for th e inco mpatibility, for heartless competitive vanity, for the insatiable d esire
to possess and to rule!" He add s: " Without th em, all the excelle nt
natural capacities of humanity would forever sleep, undeveloped "
("Universal History," p. 16; IV: 156).
The wryness of th ese statements s hould not be missed, as if
Kant were engaged in a justification of nature or history. Why
should we be truly grateful for the fact that the internal (and
external) nature of humanity is such that pro gress takes place
through suffering and violent di scord? History cannot be justified,
and the past cannot be undone. So the problem is to give it a
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meaning that fits best with the future and moral praxis. In reflecting on history, we discern that the rise of reason and culture is
rooted in and promoted by the most dislikable human traits, such
as lust for power and competitive vanity. One response to this
deplorable situation is to reject reason and culture; thus evolves
the longing for the pre-cultural life free from worries, i.e., the
Arcadian shepherd's life. This response is inadequate, not only
because it contradicts the unsocial sociability of the human individual, which precludes his being satisfied with the simple life, but
also because it conflicts with the demands of the moral law. Besides, it "conveniently" forgets that the pre-cultural life is one of
hardship due to lack of control of external nature. The response
that accords with the law is that we affirm reason and culture and
that we seek to eliminate their deplorable roots through the realization of the moral society. This means that, up to a certain point,
there is an overlap between moral reason and the cunning of I).ature; the former demands that we seek the development of our
rational capacities, the latter forces us in this direction. In other
words, the cunning of nature unwittingly prepares humanity for
that which is also morally demanded, a legal order (as a step
toward the moral order). The moral person cannot, and does not
wish to condone unsocial sociability-after all, he seeks to overcome it in the moral society-or deny its positive effect, either in
the past or in the future. After all, the cunning of nature is a
source of hope that a truly legal order will come about. Expecting
that something good will come from something evil, the moral
person thanks nature with a touch of irony, while attempting by
way of moral action to make its role superfluous.
The longing for the simple life is discussed in more detail in
"Conjectural Beginning of Human History" (1786), which is a philosophical interpretation of the Book of Genesis (2-6). With humor
and insight, the tasting of the forbidden fruit (an attempt at free
choice), the fig leaf (imagination, mastering mere sensual impulse), and the departure from paradise (conscious expectation of
the future) are interpreted as so many steps in the awakening of
reason and the release from the "womb of nature." The human
individual often experienced this release as a mixed blessing. Kant
observes: "In the future, the wretchedness of his condition would
often arouse in him the wish for a paradise, the creation of his
imagination, where he could dream or while away his existence in
quiet inactivity and permanent peace" (p. 59; IV: 333). Kant saw
these yearnings also displayed in his own time, as in poetic dreams
of a future golden age in which human beings would live in peace
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and equality, being content with the "mere satisfaction of natural
needs" and "childish play." After pointing out that such yearnings
have been spurred by stories like Robinson Crusoe and reports of
the South Sea Islands, he writes: "The existence of such yearnings
proves that thoughtful persons weary of civilized life, if they
seek its value in pleasure alone, and, if, reminded by reason that
they might give value to life by actions, fall back on laziness, to
counteract this reminder (p. 68; 341) .
Behind the longing for paradise as the "imagined state of
bliss," then, is hidden the refusal, rooted in laziness, to take on the
burden of promoting reason and the advancement of humanity, a
refusal which may even express itself in a hatred of reason. 1·1 From
this, and his other criticisms of the longing for the pre-cultural life,
we should, however, not draw the conclusion that Kant considered
the need for peace, tranquility, and simple happiness as altogether
illegitimate. We may speculate that he even had a certain sympathy
for this kind of longing insofar as it reflects a critique of the shallow aspects of the culture of the Enlightenment; for he suggests
under the seventh thesis of "Universal History" that this culture is
primarily "nothing but pretense and glittering misery." Yet, as we
have indirectly noted, the proper response to longing for tranquility in a chaotic and artificial society is not less culture but more
genlline culture, including moral and political education, so that
"art will be strong and perfect enough to become a second nature."
Kant declares that this is "the ultimate moral end of the human
species." 15 In short, then, the regressive need for simple joy must
be brought onto a higher plane: true pacification of human nature
requires its ethicization which, in turn, requires a just social order.
The fifth to eighth theses of "Universal History" are concerned
with the intermediate steps toward the "ultimate moral end" and
discuss nature's not-so-gentle hand in pushing humanity in this
direction. In addition, they explicate what is meant by the "lawfu l
ordering among men," as mentioned in the fourth thesis.
The fifth thesis states:
The greatest problem for the human race, to the solution of which nature
drives man, is the achievement of a universal civic society which ad1ninisters
law among men (p. 16; 156).

Kant describes this society as one "in which there is mutual opposition among the members, together with the most exact definition of freedom and fixing of its limits so that it may be consistent
with the freedom of others." Since the members of this "perfectly
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just c1v1c constitution" stand in antagonistic relation to one another, reflecting their unsociability, Kant argues that an "irresistible power" is needed to guarantee "freedom under externa l laws."
This poses what seems to be an insoluble dilemma, namely, how
can such power be universal in character in a society in which
citizen's wi lls are particular?
Partly because of this dilemma, the sixth thesis maintains that
the problem of achieving a universal civic society "is the rnost

difficult and the last to be solved by m.ankind" (p. 17; 157).
In his explication of this thesis, Kant puts the dilemma as
follows :
[A]lthough as a reasonable being [the human agent] wishes to have a law
which limits the freedom of all, his selfish animal impulses tempt him,
where possible, to exempt himself from them. He thus requires a master
who wi ll break his will and force him to obey a will that is universally
va lid, under w hich each ca n be free. But whence does he get his master?
Only from the human race. But then the master is himself an animal, and
needs a master (p. 17; 157). 11•

Kant declares that a complete solution of this dilemma is impossib le, pointing out that "from such crooked wood as man is made
of, nothing perfectly straight can be built." I have said earlier that
this statement reflects moral anger. Here the statement also seems
to indicate that the idea of a perfect civic constitution is a regulative idea, setting an infinite task for human beings. 17 That is, legal
improvement is always possible even within the ideal state, in that
the laws of this state can always be further changed so as to express better equa l freedom for its citizens. At any rate, Kant then
proceeds with the following observations to show why the realization of the perfect constitution is the last problem that will be
solved by humanity: "it requires that there be a correct conception
of a possible constitution, great experience gained in many paths
of life, and- far beyond these-a good will ready to accept such a
constitution" ("Universal History," p. 18; IV: 158; my emphasis).
This last observation suggests that the realization of the perfect state presupposes self-mastery. The master sought is the moral
law, and th e autonomous citizen freely obeys this self-imposed law
and its corresponding constitution, which requires varying
degrees of se lf-constraint. If this is so, Kant was mistaken in describing the perfect state as one in which mutual opposition is
regulated by external laws, requiring for their enforcement an irresistible external power. An additional difficulty is that Kant frequently states that the perfect state facilitates the development of
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the mora l disposition or the good will, but now it seem s that thi s
disposition is a precondition for the achievement of this state.
Clea rly, morality cannot be both precondition and outcome of a
just political order. '8 A third difficulty is th at, if a good will is
indeed a sine qua non for the perfect state, the realization of this
state cannot be the work of nature alone; for, as soon as humanity
shapes its destiny accord ing to some m oral plan, natural hi story is
left behind and rational history has begun. This accords with
Kant's explication of the fourth thesis-it is an enlightened and
moral mode of thought that must in th e final instance make possible a universal legal order-but his explication of the fifth thesis
points in the opposite direction. Here Kant suggests not only th at
"need" has forced human agents to enter imperfect legal arrangements but also that we may hope that "need" will compel th emthrough the negative effects of unrestrained competition- to form
a perfectly just civic constitution, so as to counteract or prevent
such effects (see pp. 16-17; 157).
These difficulties raise a fourth problem, m e ntioned previously, namely, to define what the relation is between th e highest
political good and the highest moral good. I will focus on all th ese
problem s in the next chapter, where I analyze some of Kant's later
hi storical works in which a sharper di stinction is drawn between
th ese two good s and in which the scope of the two vehicles
of progress (i. e., the cunning of nature and moral praxis) is further specified.
The seventh thesis offers an additional reason for holding that
the perfect state is the last problem to be solved by humanity:
The problem of esl:ablishing a perfect civic constitution is dependent upon
the problem of a lawful external relation among states and ca nnot be solved
without a solution of the latter problem (p. 58; 158) .

Apparently Kant took this th esis to be evident, for he does not give
an argument to support it. Perhaps his argument is that wa r between the nation s leads to revolutions and externally imposed new
politica l regimes. This argument however, shows only that without
lasting peace the continuity of perfect states is threatened. Furthermore, th ere is at least one good reason for holding a view directly
opposed to the seventh thesis. As Kant himself later argues in

Peace:
The republican constitutio n ... gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., p erpetual peace. The reason is this: if the consent
of the citizens is required in order to d ecide that war sh ould be declared
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(and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural
than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game,
decreeing for themselves all the calamHies of war (pp. 94-95; VI: 436).

He maintains, therefore, that one road toward perpetual peace is
that republican states associate together, gradually spreading their
constitutions to other nations and enlarging the federation of
states (ibid., pp. 100---01; 441-42). For the sake of consistency, then,
the seventh thesis must be modified to state that, without a just
international order, the continuity of perfect states, or approximations thereof, is threatened. This suffices to show that the realization of such an order is an urgent matter. Moreover, the thesis in
this form is corroborated not only by the fact that war may lead to
the external overthrow of republican states but also by the fact that
preparation for war threatens just states; as the past has taught,
the military often usurps emerging democractic instituti.ons.
In his explication of the seventh thesis, Kant sketches a second
road toward the cosmopolitan order, and here his remarks are
consistent with his view as developed in Peace. This road is built
on the basis of tremendous human suffering; it is the road of war.
The role of war in establishing peace between the nations is analogous to that of unsocial sociability in achieving the perfect stateconcord through discord, unity through opposition. Kant holds
that through war, through the never-ending accumulation of
weapons, and through constant preparation for war in peacetime,
which all ultimately block the development of our capacities, nature forces human beings to make the first tentative attempts to
seek international peace. He continues: "finally, after devastation,
revolutions, and even complete exhaustion of their inner powers,
she [nature] brings them to that which reason could have told
them without so much sad experience, namely, to step from the
lawless condition of savages into a league of nations" ("Universal
History," pp. 18-19; IV: 159; translation altered).
This statement shows that Kant, contrary to Hegel, does not
see human history as an unfolding of reason. It also shows that
Kant condemns war on the same ground as unsocial sociability.
The regulative principle that guides the assessment of these immoral means of progress is that "[m]oral evil has the intrinsic
characteristic of being opposed to and destructive of its own purpose .. . ; thus it gives way to the moral principle of the good,
though only through a slow progress" (Peace, p. 127; VI: 466; translation altered). War, then, is a great evil, but we may hope that it is
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self-destructive and, hence, will bring us peace. In light of past
experience it is rational to expect that this will happen, but this
does not make war Jess evil. And, as is also the case for unsocial
sociability and its role in bringing about the perfect state, moral
reason sees it as its task to make these immoral means unnecessary so as to prevent the "sad experience" of "slow progress."
This condemnation of the immoral means of progress leaves
open the question to what extent humanity viewed as a collective
is to be blamed for the fact that history has unfolded through such
means. Kant seldom directly addresses this question, and, when
he does-as, for example, in the "Concluding Remark" of "Conjectural Beginning"-he tends to place the blame too heavily on the
shoulders of the human race. Yet the following remarks seem to be
consistent with and partly to reflect his over-all view.
It would be equally mistaken to hold that all injustices of the
past were caused by factors beyond human control as to claim that
humanity is completely responsible for them in a moral sense.
Both views are unwarranted and opposed to moral praxis. Ascribing all evils that humanity has suffered throughout history solely
to its moral failing, we are likely to conclude that the human race is
morally so corrupt that it is senseless to strive for its betterment.
The outcome would be that moral action would be limited to the
private realm, and even in that realm the inference might be
drawn that our moral efforts are in vain. To be sure, Kant's epistemology precludes the drawing of these pessimistic conclusions
in full force, but the elimination of their dogmatic character still
leaves us with an almost insurmountable impediment to moral
action. This view fails to take into account several factors that help
to explain past evils, such as the historicity of norms, the difficulty
of finding institutional forms that adequately express certain
norms, and the burden imposed upon humanity by external nature and the limitations of the human body. An additional factor is
that, although human agents make their own history, they do so
under circumstances they have not chosen. The past has a great
limiting impact on the future, both on the institutional and on the
ideological level. In Marx's famous words from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, " [t]he tradition of all the dead generations
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living."IY These observations, however, do not imply the correctness of the dictum "tout
comprendre, c'est tout pardonner." The dictum betrays a dogmatic
interpretation of history; for, as Isaiah Berlin points out, its ground
is a notion of historical inevitability; moral judgments are alleged
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to be se nseless and inappropriate because nothing could have
bee n otherwise than it in fact was. 20 Indignation and anger,
however, do have their proper place in historical reflection; for
moral responsibility for past injustices cannot be explained away
by factors beyond human control, whether in the name of an alleged "historical necessity," "fate," or the admittedly harsh natural
and social conditions from which human agents had, and still
have, to emancipate them selves. The possibility of moral and social
improvement has always existed, and human agents have always
projected norm s that transcended their society, making social
change imperative. The denial of this amounts to a reification of
history-human beings do not make history, but history produces
them, and this is a situation that can never be overcome. The
second view, then, is as inconsistent with a praxis-oriented philosophy of history, such as Kant's, as the first. Moreover, it is to be
noted with respect to the second view that a too facile legitimation
of past injustices leads to a legitimation of future ones; in maintaining that the injustices of the past were beyond human control,
we are likely to condone those of the future. Finally, we may suspect that both views serve at times as apologies, covering up a lack
of preparedness to fulfill one's social duties.
Kant makes some other interesting observations and suggestions under the seventh thesis. He maintains that without a "secret
wise guidance in nature" we cannot exclude the possibility that the
discord between human agents may lead to the annihilation of
civilization. The outcome of history may be a "hell of evils," resulting from "barbarous devastation." At first sight, it may appear that
on Kant's own terms the coming about of this possibility is hardly
a regrettable event. He declares that "[ e]verything good that is not
based on a morally good disposition ... is nothing but pretense
and glittering misery," and, moreover, esteems the culture of his
own time as primarily a "glittering misery," as is indicated by his
statement that Rousseau was not far wrong in preferring the "state
of savages" above the stage of human evolution of their own time
("Universal History," p. 21; IV: 161). Can we pride ourselves that
our situation is altogether different? What basic reason do we have
to regret the return to "barbarism?" For Kant it is the future that
provides the answer: such possible return is in the final instance to
be regretted only from the perspective of the future union of
states, and, ultimately, since this union is only the "halfway mark
in the development of mankind," the basic rationale for our (or his)
cu lture is the moral society.
The eighth thesis sums up the previous theses:
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The history of Lhe h11111an species ca11 be seen, in the large, as the realizatio11
of a hidden plan of nature lo bring forth an internally, and for this purpose, also
an externally perfectly co11stituted state, as the 011/y co11dition in which all !he
capacities of hu111anity can be fully developed (p. 21; 161-62; translation
altered).

Kant says that, thanks to this plan, "philosophy can have her beli ef
in a millennium." Her millena rianism is not utopian; it has a place
because the "Idea can help." In other words, there are indica tions
that nature is pushing the human race toward the better. Kant
emphasizes here one such indication not yet mentioned : th e increase in commerce, both in and between states. In order th at a
state may retain its powerful position among states, or may acquire
such a position, it must permit and even stimulate free commercia l
actions. This means that the state must allow for civil liberties,
for the curtailment of these liberties has a negative impact on
commercial developm ent. Thus commerce serves the rise of civil
liberties, which, in turn, contributes to the emergence of the perfect state and, hence, to peace between the nation s. Comm erce
also contributes in a more direct fashion to peace-the third road
toward peace. War inter rupts co mm erc ial tra nsaction s betwee n
nations, which is an ince ntive for maintaining p eace. Ka nt
argues that, in order to prevent such interruptions, states will
offer them selves as arbiters between feuding groups within the
state-national instability lead s to internationa l instab ility-and
"thus they will pre pare the way for a distant great body politic
[Staatskdrper] for which there is no precedent in world history.'' 21
Similar observations ca n be m ade with rega rd to co nfli cts between nation s.
Nonetheless, Kant did not see the rise of commerce, i.e., the
rise of capitalism, as only beneficial to the prospect of peace. In
Peace he points out that the internationa l credit system crea tes the
possibility of huge investments in war efforts, leading to great
nationa l debts. Debt may lead to bankruptcy, which may endanger
the economic well-being of even those states not involved in the
increasing war prepara tion. This adds to the already te nse international relations, and Kant states, therefore, as a preliminary article
for lasting peace that " [n]ational debts shall not be contracted with
a view to the external frict ion of states" (Pence, p. 88; VI: 429) .
Evidently, there are other economic d ete rminants of war, such as
the securing of marke ts and resources, but although Kant is aware
of these (as his remarks below on colon ialism indicate), they do
not trans late into other specifically cconorn.ic measures to guarantee
international peace. The over-a ll result is that his proposal for
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peace is focused too much on the need for political change, thi s
at the cost of required economic change.22
The hidden plan of nature must not remain hidden. In revealing the plan, the philosophical historian grounds the hope that
humanity is moving toward peace and th e perfect state, and thus
he stimulates moral action toward these ends. This is important;
for although the realization of the "universal cosmopolitan condition" is to be expected only "after many reformative revolutions,"
it is also the case, Kant notes, that "our own intelligent action may
hasten this happy time for our posterity. 23 Accordingly, grounding
the hope for progress in a philosophical reconstruction of history
is to be seen as a moral task. In the words of the ninth thesis:
A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history according to
a 11atural p/1111 directed to achieving the civic union of the human race must
be regarded as possible and, indeed, as contributing to this end of nature
(p. 23; 164) .

This thesi s, then, supports the view that Kant's philosophy of history is praxis- and future-oriented.
Kant begins his explication of the ninth thesis by noting that
he has offered in "Universa l Hi story" only guidelines along which
a hi story of the human species is to be written. Th e essay exhibits
the "Idea" and invites others to write a history of the world in
accordance with the "Idea." Kant briefly sketches here the subject
matter of such a history. It should start with Greek history (which
gives us information concerning more ancient history), study its
impact on the Roman state, then turn to Roman influence on their
conquerors, and so on down to the nations of eighteenth-century
Europe, "which will probably give law, eventually, to all the
others." Further, one must focu s on the history of the constitutions
and their laws as well as on the history of the relations between
the nations. Thus one will be able to detect elements that made
nations flourish as well as factors that destroyed them. Moreover,
one will be able to detect th e aspects carried over from one political
formation to another. Kant states: "[l]f, I say, one carries through
this study, a guiding thread will be revealed." Clearly, this guiding
thread has already been exposed in "Universal History": higher
forms of the state (and other factors conducive to international
peace) have emerged within the historical process, and history
aims at the union of perfect states as a precondition for the full
development of all our rational capacities. The point of the concrete history, then, seem s to be to support further the tenability of
the "Idea" and to reveal the finer details of its gradual realization.
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This sketch may seem to suggest a "Eurocentrism" in Kant's
work, but this would not be a fair assessment. Kant displayed a
genuine interest in other cultures, as is manifest in the numerous
references in his writings to other cultures, and we cannot blame
him for the fact that in his time knowledge of other civilizations
was rather limited. Moreover, Kant strongly objected to colonial
conquest in the name of the betterment of humanity ("cultural
paternalism"), arguing that good intentions "cannot wash away
the stains of injustice" (Justice, p. 127; VII: 160). In response to
colonialism Kant developed the definitive article for perpetual
peace that "[t]he right of world citizenship sha ll be limited to
conditions of universal hospitality" (Peace, p. 102; VI: 443; translation altered) . The rights of all people and the autonomy of each
political body must be recognized . The right of the stranger is the
right of hospitality, not that of plunder. In his discussion of this
article, Kant castigates the "commercial states of our part of the
world" (i.e., Europe) for engaging in oppression and for treating
the inhabitants of conquered lands as counting for "nothing."
They spread "famine, rebellion, perfidy, and the whole litany of
evils which afflict mankind," and, accordingly, "China and Japan
(Nippon), who have had experience with such gu ests, have
wisely refused them entry" (pp. 10~05; 44~5). Kant unmasks
with biting criticism the religious zeal accompanying colonial
conquest, stating that while the colonial powers "drink injustice
like water, they regard themselves as the elect in point of orthodoxy" (p. 105; 446).
Kant ends "Universal H istory" by briefly discussing the purposes that may be served by a universal history. Minor purposes
are that such history clarifies the "confused play of things human," which leads to intellectual satisfaction; that it produces
pragmatic knowledge, which is beneficial for governing and anticipating future changes; and that it reminds politicians that they will
be remembered only for what they "have contributed to the goal of
world-citizenship," a reminder which may direct their ambitions to
better ends. The major prupose of a universal history is that it
offers a "consoling view of the future." This is significant
for social action, in that the expectation of better times facilitates
the fulfillment of our duty to seek the perfect state, international
peace, and, ultimately, the moral society. Failing to see a plan in
history, we may "turn our eyes away from it in disgust" and
come to the conclusion that a rational purpose cannot be found
in this world, but is to be hoped for only in "another world"
(p. 25; IV: 165) .
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3. Morality and the Idea of Progress:

An Alleged Inconsistency
In this section I wm deal first with William Galston's contention
that Kant's philosophy of history is inconsistent with his ethics
because it implies that numerous agents are unwittingly a mere
means for progress. I will use consideration of Galston's objection
as an occasion for outlining briefly some basic differences between
Kant's and Hegel's philosophies of history, a discussion which will
be important for my analysis in Chapter VII of the Hegelian elements in Marx. Next, I will turn to Hannah Arendt's claim that
Kant's notion of historical progress conflicts with his idea of human dignity. I will end this section by analyzing the paradox of
anamnestic solidarity and its ramifications for present moral action
toward the ideal society. What these three proble ms have in common is that, if they are genuine and unresolvable problems, they
undermine the rationale of Kant's philosophical reconstruction of
history: the grounding of hope for the sake of morality. Accordingly, these problems seem to be significant for any philosophy of
praxis, but we will see later in our discussion of Marx that Marx
either ignored them or addressed them rather superficially and
with a certain moral insensitivity.

The Hegelian Lens: A Misinterpretation uf Kant 's
Philosophy of History
Galston's claim that Kant's philosophy of history is inconsistent
with his moral viewpoint is based on the premise that Kant seeks
to offer a justification of history in the manner of Hegel-a theodicy. 2" Once this premise is accepted the objection is well taken,
but, as my commentary on "Universal History" has already indicated, the premise is unwarranted : Galston looks at Kant through
a Hegelian lens. 25
This mistake can be found often in the literature on Kant's
philosophy of history. Perhaps one factor that explains this is that
Kant's claim that we may see history as having a rational plan can
be confused with the claim that history is rational. Another factor
that seems to play a role is that Hegel, in his lectures on the
philosophy of history, largely followed the outline of a political
world history which had been sketched by Kant under the ninth
thesis of "Universal History." Thus it has seemed that Kant's philosophy of history was a mere anticipation of Hegel's. A final con-
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sideration is that Kant occasionally suggests that he is concerned
with a justification of history. In the closing section of "Universal
History," for example, he states that to present "a consoling view
of the future," as derived from past history, is to give "a justification of nature-or, better of Providence." He continues in rhetorical fashion: "[W]hat is the good of esteeming the majesty and
wisdom of Creation in the realm of brute nature and of recommending that we contemplate it, if that part of the great stage of
supreme wisdom which contains the purpose of all others- the
history of mankind- must remain an unceasing reproach to it?"
(p. 25; IV: 165) What are we to make of such remarks? Should we,
after all, conclude that the hidden plan of nature is a divine plan?
There is only one sense in which Kant's critical thought permits an affirmative answer to this last question. The plan of nature
is divine in that it accords with the moral law; it is a rational plan
that seeks to ground hope for progress. Or we may say that the
ends set by the plan-the perfect state and international peacereflect divine (i.e., moral) intention. The plan is not, however, divine in the sense that a higher cause is operative within human
history, pushing humanity toward these ends. To make a claim to
this effect would transcend the limits of reason proposed in Kant's
epistemology. 26 It is in this vein that Kant, after a careful discussion
of the idea of providence in relation to history, concludes in Peace
that "[t]he use of the word 'nature' is more fitting to the limits of
human reason and more modest than an expression indicating a
providence unknown to us" (p. 108; VI: 448--49). Further, the very
idea that we can know that a divine cause is operative in human
history conflicts with the main tenet of Kant's notion of faith. Faith
expresses trust, not knowledge, and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Kant holds that any attempt to explain the "ways of
God" is not only doomed to failure but also antithetical to faith
and morality. His use of terms such as 'providence' and 'wisdom'
with regard to history, then, is to be understood as just a manner
of speech, reflecting the common discourse of his time. Again,
wisdom is to be found not in history but in the reconstruction
thereof and in the intent of this reconstruction. By the same token,
what Kant misleadingly calls his "justification of nature" is not in
any sense a theodicy, but a claim to the effect that it is rational to
see history as grounding hope. What is justified is the view that
belief in progress is tenable, the rationale of which is to spur moral
action so that human history will at last become a rational history
(and thus Jive up to divine commands).
Hegel, to the contrary, declares that "Reason governs the
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world, and has consequently governed its history." 27 He explains
that his philosophy of history "aims at realizing the conviction that
what was intended by eternal wisdom, is actually accomplished in
the domain of existent, active Spirit, as well as in that of mere
Nature." Hegel continues: "Our mode of treating the subject is, in
this aspect, a Theodicaea-a justification of the ways of God... so that the ill that is found in the World may be comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the
existence of evil" (p. 15). To his credit, Hegel never sought to base
this reconcilation on a denial of the tremendous amount of suffering embedded in history. As he said in famous passages, "History
[is] the slaughterbench at which the happiness of peoples, the
wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized" (p. 21), and "[t]he History of the World is not the theatre
of happiness" (p. 26). Rather, "[p]eriods of happiness are blank
pages in it, for they are periods of harmony-periods when the
antithesis is in abeyance" (pp. 26- 27). Acceptance of historical
evils, then, is grounded in the realization that such evils are necessary moments in the dialectical unfolding of the good. History
becomes lifeless without the "antithesis" (opposition), and what is
significant and enjoyable about history is not happiness but the
activity of the Spirit or Reason, 28 an activity which Hegel sees as
leading to higher forms of human freedom rooted in the state.
Moral reason abhors this claim that the evolution of freedom
necessarily encompasses the terror of negation, both in the past
and future, and, accordingly, Hegel argues that moral categories
have no place within history
(T]he history of the World occupies a higher ground than that on which
morality has properly its position; which is personal character-the conscience of individuals-their particular will and mode of action; these have
a value, imputation, reward or punishment proper to themselves. What
the absolute aim of Spirit requires and accomplishes-what Providence
does-transcends the obligations, and the liability to imputation and the
ascription of good or bad motives, which attach to individuality in virtue
of its social relations (The Philosophy of History pp. 66-67).

Thus Hegel continues to argue that the "litany of private virtues"
must not be raised against those who shape by way of violence and
selfish aims the destiny of humanity-the world-historical individuals-and that persons who on such grounds have resisted the
stream of history display "only a formal rectitude-deserted by the
living Spirit and by God."
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Hegel is even more critical of those persons who condemn the
course of history not on the basis of individual morality but in light
of social and moral ideals, who "contrast unfavorably things as
they are, with their idea of things as they ought to be" and who
adopt "a position not merely of discontent, but of an open revolt
against the actual condition of the world" (p. 35). Their actions are
not truly real (wirklich) and reflect the immature discontent of
youth (p. 36). 29 The older and tolerant mind, on the other hand,
taught by the "grave experience of life," is aware that what ought
to be is realizing itself in history, not through the vain politics of
abstract morality, but through the politics of power and self-interest, within and between states. Hegel launches several other objections against moral idealism in its various forms. He maintains that
such an attitude to the world involves a subjectivism that undermines the stability of the state, that it prevents real understanding
of the rational core of existing social and political institutions (the
ethical life as embodied in customs, the family, civil society, and,
notably, the state), and that it may lead to repression designed to
bring reality into accordance with the ideal-Hegel's prime example here is the regime of terror of the French Revolution. 30 A final
objection is the following:
One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought
to be. Philosophy in any case always comes to the scene too late to give it.
As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already
there cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed. . . . The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of
the dusk. J'

What the youthful moral idealist fails to see, then, is that reflection
(Nachdenken) is afterthought. Hegel sums up his view in making
clear that the older and tolerant mind is the philosophical mind:
"The insight then to which- in contradistinction from those
ideals-philosophy is to lead us, is that the real world is as it ought
to be-that the truly good- the universal divine reason- is not a
mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realizing itself"
(The Philosophy of History, p. 36).
Some of Hegel's criticisms of moral idealism raise significant
issues, but their intended primary target-Kant's practical philosophy-escapes them. Kant recognizes the need for mediation, as
his historical essays show, and we will see in Chapter V that he
sharply rejects the politics of moral terrorism, in which evil means
are seen as justified in light of the moral end or in which repres-
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sion is unintentionally imposed out of enthusiasm for the good.
(His alternative is a "moral politics," in which the means reflect the
moral end.) Besides, it seems implausible to maintain with regard
to Kant's political ideals that "[p ]hilosophy ... always comes to
the scene too late." (In fairness, Hegel bases his generalization on
the more plausible example of Plato's Republic, although even here
we may see Kant's Plato discussion in the first Critique as an interesting "reply.") My present main concern, however, is not to address Hegel's objections to Kant's practical thought but to point out
some basic differences between their respective philosophies of
history.
A crucial consequence of Hegel's justification of history is that
his philosophical system lacks an evaluative perspective that is
logically independent of the course of history. (Morality insofar as
it is critical is delegated to the private realm.) His well-known
statement that "the history of the world ... is the world's court of
judgment" is the logical outcome of his view that "what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not 'without God,'
but is essentially His Work." 32 The crux of the matter is that Hegel's
philosophical system permits no answer to the question of how to
determine what is essential (i.e., instantiates what ought to be) or
accidental ("idle" existence) other than to look at the course of
history. 33 The judgment is not with us but with the march of dialectical reason. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Hegel condoned
the ruthless imperialism of his day, declaring that civilized nations
have the right to treat the autonomy of "barbarians" as "only a
formality," for, quite obviously, the activity of the Spirit was on the
side of the "civilized" nations (see Philosophy of Right, p. 219).
And, to give one more example of the negative side of the dialectic,
noting that througout human history war has spurred the development of human capacities, Hegel rejects the idea of perpetual
peace as opposed to the "ethical health" of the nations
(the Spirit needs opposition for its progressive unfolding) (see
ibid., p. 210).
Here, then, we see a first difference between Kant's and
Hegel's philosophy of history. They both maintain that the mechanisms of mere self-interest and power struggle push humanity to
higher levels, but, whereas Kant condemns such historical processes from an independently formed evaluative perspective,
Hegel holds them to be essentially and inherently rational. fo
other words, only Kant's critical teleological interpretation of history, as opposed to Hegel's dogmatic understanding of the idea of
progress, is critical also in a social-moral sense. Note, moreover,
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that, even at those points where Kant detects a "moral cause"
operative in humanity, it would be incorrect from his perspective
to speak of history as reason incarnate; rather, we should say that
history here is gradually approaching the infinite ideal of practical
reason. (Hegel calls this "bad infinity," contrasting it with his own
notion of "good infinity," in which the infinite unites the finite
from within.) In short, Hegel is making what Kant declares to be
the most serious of all moral-philosophical mistakes, namely, "to
derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done,
or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circumscribed" (Pure Reason, p. 313; III: 259).
In a sense, however, this is saying too much; for, although
Hegel frequently made political recommendations on the basis of
his understanding of the course of history, he also maintained that
it is not, and cannot be, the task of philosophy to offer such recommendations. Shlomo Avineri observes: "An intriguing paradox is
thus presented by Hegel: those who make history [notably, the
world-historical figures who are motivated only by their own aimsj
do not understand it, and those who understand it do not (and
should not) make it. At the end of Hegel's long road, consciousness
and action, subject and object, doer and knower, are still separate
and the tension between them has not been aufgehoben."J.• And, to
push this point a bit further, Hegel contends that the aim of his
philosophy of history is to make us feel at home in the world,
overcoming the alienation that we may initially experience in reflecting on its course: "Here is the rose [reason incarnate], dance
thou here [enjoy present realityj." 35 Unlike Kant's philosophy of
history, then, Hegel's is not praxis-oriented. The perspective of the
spectator in Hegel is superior to and has no consequences for the
perspective of the actor, whereas in Kant these perspectives are
regulatively united in the duty to promote the highest good. A
final main difference between their respective philosophies of history is that only Kant's is future-oriented, as is clear from the
reason that Hegel provides for holding that philosophy cannot
instruct the world as it ought to be, to wit, that philosophy is
afterthought. This difference also follows from the logic of Hegel's
philosophy. Hegel maintains that Spirit becomes aware of itself as
Spirit within his system and that this self-consciousness is the
absolute aim of Spirit; thus its journey is essentially completed. 36
To come back to Galston's objection, it can now readily be seen
that his charge of inconsistency is mistaken. History indeed uses
many human agents as a mere mean&--this is captured by the idea
of the cunning of nature-but Kant does not condone history in
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this form, nor is he forced to do so on the basis of his philosophical position, as Hegel is. The inconsistency is to be found not in
Kant but in historical reality, and Kant's social ethics for this reason
consistently seeks to change the reality.

Human Dignity in the Face of (Infinite) Progress
Arendt poses a more important dilemma. The issue is no longer
that "fate drags the unwilling" but that the "willing" are crushed
in their dignity once they face the idea of the (infinite) progress of
humanity. Or, at least, this is what I take to be the ultimate significance of Arendt's criticism that Kant's notion of (infinite) progress
conflicts with his idea of human dignity.
Recall the passage I cited in section 2 above, which states her
criticism. Arendt claims that Kant's notion of dignity involves the
demand that the human person "be seen ... in his particularity
and, as such, be seen-but without any comparison and independent of time-as reflecting mankind in general." She then argues
that the idea of progress, and, in particular, that of infinite progress, precludes our perception of the human agent along these
lines, supporting her contention with the statement that the idea
of infinite progress implies that "[t]here is no point at which we
might stand still and· look back with the backward glance of the
historian."
Precisely what the ground is of Arendt's criticism is unclear,
because she does not explain here what she means by "the backward glance of the historian." We may begin our interpretation of
her criticism by briefly turning to Ronald Beiner's long Interpretive
Essay on her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Beiner argues
that Arendt holds that one important task of the historian is to
rescue from the oblivion of history those "miraculous" episodes in
which "hope flickered briefly," such as the revolutionary councils
of the Paris Commune, the soviets of 1905 and 1917, the German
councils of 1918-19, and the Hungarian uprising of 1956 (p. 127; the
examples are from Arendt's On Revolution). Beiner does not tell us
in so many words what it is that makes these events into "miracles" of history, but we may infer that their significance is not
political success, for, as he himself notes, in terms of success these
collective actions failed (which may be true even if we take as our
measure their long-range effects); rather, their value must be
sought in that they demonstrate that voluntary human cooperation
is possible, reflecting the ideal of a truly cooperative society, and
that human dignity can be upheld even under the most adverse
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sociopolitical circumstances-that is, the refusal to be treated as
means only. Thus it is fitting that Beiner adds the Warsaw Ghetto
resistance to the above list of hope-giving historical episodes, citing the memorable words of Ari Willner of the Jewish Combat
Group (December 1942): "Not one of us will leave here alive. We
are fighting not to save our lives but for human dignity."
Beiner continues by stating that, for Arendt, rescuing these
unique episodes from the oblivion of history is important because
it salvages "a portion of human dignity, which would otherwise be
denied to the participants in these doomed causes." He interprets
Arendt as maintaining that the historian therefore must "illuminate the universal [reflected in the historical event] without
thereby reducing the particular to universals." Thus the event "is
able to take on universal meaning while retaining its particularity,
which is not the case when the particular serves merely to mdicate
a historical 'trend'" (p. 127). 37 Beiner further explicates this point
by saying that the judgment -of the historian "is more decisive for
the securing of human dignity than even the absolute fulfillment
of history, as envisioned by Hegel or Marx, would be. Not History,
but the historian, is the ultimate judge." The upshot, then, is that,
in order to uphold the dignity of the participants in the "miracles"
of history, the historian must, on Arendt's account, assess their
effortsand, hence, the events themselves, not merely in terms of
their effective contribution to progress ("History is the judge") but
rather as mirroring ideal humanity (the "universal"). Or, more
generally, the "backward glance of the historian" is one in which
the actions of morally committed historical actors are not merely
gauged on the basis of political success-this would degrade these
actors to the status of "historical instruments," robbing them of
their dignity-but rather are esteemed as reflecting humanity as it
ought to be.
Thus far it seems that the point of Arendt's criticism is that
Kant's notion of (infinite) progress implies that the morally committed persons of the past are to be viewed as mere means for
bringing about the moral society. Now, provided that Kant's notion
of (infinite) progress has in fact this consequence, it is to be admitted that that notion would conflict with his idea of human dignity.
For Kant, it is the colegislative or noumenal self, which exemplifies
humanity as it ought to be, that gives human beings unconditional
worth, i.e., dignity. Hence, his ethics demands that those who have
sought humanity as it ought to be and thus have displayed dignity
in their actions are not retroactively reduced to mere means for
progress, having conditional worth only. 38 Before we assess the
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cogency of Arendt's criticism in this form, however, let me propose
a broader meaning we can ascribe to her over-all criticism. Returning to her closing statement that the idea of infinite progress implies that "[t]here is no point at which we might stand still and
look back with the backward glance of the hi storian," it seems that
on her account the role of the judging spectator is not limited to
the historian proper but must also be ascribed to the actor. Thus
the broader-and, in terms of moral praxis, more importantproblem emerges that the question is not only whether the idea of
(infinite) progress precludes upholding the dignity of the actors in
past historical events but whether the actors themselves can maintain (or experience) dignity in the face of the (infinite) progress of
the human species. What reason do those who seek the betterment of humanity-whether in the past, present, or future-have
not to view their efforts and themselves as mere instruments for
progress?
This still leaves open the question of what makes, for Arendt,
infinite progress so objectionable, as compared to the idea of historical progress toward a definite end. Her use of the metaphor of
history as a story suggests the following interpretation. The idea of
infinite progress means that the story has no end, and, hence, the
pages (the actors or their self-understanding) cannot be so written
(by the historians or the actors) that they anticipate and reflect the
end. Thus dignity is undermined on both counts: the Kantian actors are not able to experience dignity, nor can the Kantian historians salvage their dignity from the (endless) oblivion of history.
Yet it is to be observed that this problem also is embedded in the
idea of progress in general (at least, if Arendt's criticism is correct-and notice that she switches from one conception of progress to the other in her criticism of Kant). For the very idea of
progress, if it means more than change and improvement of the
world, as Arendt puts it, includes the idea of moral progress and,
hence, of a changing conception of ideal humanity; with the result
that the actors are seen as lacking, or falling short of, ideal humanity once a new conception evolves within history. The actors, being
aware of this, may conclude that their dignity rests on an illusion,
unable to pass the test of time. At best, they can console themselves with the idea that their time is not infinite; they may hope
that they have developed a correct, i.e., timeless, conception of
humanity, but this hope is rendered groundless by the idea of
infinite progress.
I think that all the above objections raised against Kant's notion of (infinite) progress fail to refute the tenability of this notion,
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but show instead that Kant in his historical writings did not sufficiently attempt to relate humanity as an ideal concept to humanity
as the subject of history (i.e., humanity as an empirical notion). 39
My rebuttal of Arendt will proceed in three brief steps. I will argue
first that, since the relation between morally committed individuals
and the human species as historical subject is mediated by humanity as an ideal concept, Kantian actors and historians share a common ideal, which secures the dignity of the actors irrespective of
their specific historical location, both from their own perspective
and from that of the historians. I will then show that Kant's discussion of the moral significance of the French Revolution accords
with this analysis, and, to complete my rebuttal, I will offer an
interpretation of the idea of infinite progress which encompasses
the notion of a changing conception of ideal humanity and yet
preserves human dignity.
The third formula of the categorical imperative states: "Act so
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as a means only." I have
previously stressed that this formula implies that it is our social
duty to seek the moral order, or humanity as it ought to be. Here
two others aspects need to be emphasized. First, the formula
places a constraining condition upon the manner in which we
ought to seek the moral order, in that our maxims must be consistent with the idea of this order. In other words, social actions
undertaken to bring the existing social totality closer to the moral
ideal must reflect this ideal-that is, the means must reflect the
end. To turn to one of Beiner's (Arendt's) examples, the German
councils of 191&-19, Ernst Toller, one of the leaders of the last phase
of the Munich Revolution, expressed the Kantian position quite
well when he said: "We were demanding humanity, and we had to
show humanity ourse lves."·IO Second, in acting in accordance with
the idea of the moral order, as the third formula commands us to
do, we are, as it were, participating in the idea of humanity or the
moral species. This participation is best seen as setting a task; it is
the same task as bridging the gap between the phenomenal self
and the noumenal self. On the collective and historical level, this
task consists of the duty of the human species as historical subject
to approximate the moral species-their unification is the moral
society.
Setting aside for the moment the fact that Kant's notion of
(infinite) progress includes that of a changing conception of ideal
humanity, it follows from the above observations that this notion
does not conflict with his idea of human dignity. The source of
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dignity is participation in the idea of humanity, and the constraining condition embedded in the third formula guarantees that the
Kantian actor has good grounds for dignity; it signifies his attempt
to live up to the standards of the colegislative self. Thus morally
committed persons of present and future generations, including
the historians, share a common ideal-or we may even say that
they all participate in the same idea of humanity; they are, as it
were, members of the mora l species, and, as such, they share a
common dignity. This view can also be phrased in a more nominalistic version. The task of bringing the human species closer to
the moral idea l encompasses members of many generations. All
the individuals who make this task their own share the moral
ideal, and to esteem their actions merely in terms of their effective
contribution to historical progress ("History is the judge") contradicts this ideal of universal good will. The reason is this: Kant
holds that the good will "is good only because of its willing" and
that if this wilJ after "the greatest effort should not ... achieve
anything of its end," it still "would sparkle like a jewel in its own
right" (Foundations, p. 10; IV: 250).
There is, of course, nothing to prevent a historian from putting
the efforts of morally committed agents of past generations solely
in consequentialist terms. The point is simply that such a historian
is not a Kantian historian. Kant's own discussion of the moral
meaning of the French Revolution underlines this; for we have
seen that he maintains that the expected failure of this event does
not lessen its ultimate value of demonstrating that a moral cause is
operative in the human species. Admittedly, Kant seeks to illuminate the universal in the spectators of the Revolution-their enthusiasm is comprehended as directed toward republican ideals and
even toward the moral society itself-rather than in the behavior of
the actors. But recall that this argument for progress is based on
the premise that the spectators will sooner or later act out of enthusiasm for those ideals, following the example set by the actors.
Thus Kant indirectly illuminates the universal in the actions of the
participants of the French Revolution, upholding their dignity in
the face of anticipated political failure.'" More specifically, in his
argument for progress Kant expresses the hope and trust that the
Revolution itself, even if it turns out to be without lasting political
success, will be remembered by future generations, leading to a
repetition on their side of the efforts of the participants of the
French Revolution "on any favorable occasion'' (see "An Old
Question," section 7). This remembering secures the dignity of the
actors, in that the actors and the spectators share a common vision
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and intention, namely, to realize republican ideals as setting the
stage for progress toward the moral society. To be sure, this remembering has a consequentialist dimension, but this does not
undermine dignity. The opposite is even true; for morally committed persons want to be means for bringing about progress, and
to deny this is to rob them of their dignity. After all, they see it as
their duty to bring the human species closer to the moral ideal,
and if we fail to take seriously their efforts in this direction we
neglect the source of their unconditional worth. What these persons do not want to be- and what Kant's argument for progress
does not make them- is means only.
The idea of infinite progress in Kant's practical work has three
aspects, two of which have already received adequate attention,
namely, that progress is always possible, even in the moral society,
in terms of motivation (the task of transforming the virtuous disposition into a holy will) and in terms of enhancing one another's
ends. Neither of these two forms of infinite progress poses a problem with regard to human dignity, for they do not involve the
notion of a changing conception of ideal humanity. The primary
target of Arendt's criticism seems to be the third form of infinite
progress: we can always come to a better comprehension of what
the ramifications are of the moral law, which is to say that we must
believe that we can always come to a more adequate formu lation of
what the notion of ideal humanity or the moral society exactly
encompasses. This regulative idea is insufficiently pronounced in
Kant's practical thought; for, although he describes past history as
progressing toward a better understanding of the moral ideal, with
the Enlightenment as a turning point, his discussion of future
progress focuses on the hope for progress in terms of an increasing interest in the moral ideal, i.e., progress in intention. More
emphatically than Kant did, then, we should admit to the practical
system the idea that our conception of ideal humanity always
leaves room for improvement- moral truth sets an infinite task.
The rationale of this idea is similar to that of the two other forms
of infinite progress: to prevent any premature claim that the task is
finished . Moreover, the notion that we can come to a more adequate formulation of the moral ideal is imperative from the perspective of my later argument that Cohen's socialist interpretation
of the community of colegislators is a step forward from Kant's
view. This type of change, however, must not be exaggerated, for
what appears as moral change may in reality be an application of
the same moral ideas to new sociopolitical conditions.
Accordingly, it is to be noted, in reply to Arendt's criticism,
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that the idea of humanity seems sufficiently continuous to enable
us to uphold the dignity of actors in past historical events, even
while recognizing that their conception of ideal humanity is in
some respects different from ours. A more important consideration is that sharing an ideal does not necessarily involve agreement
about all the aspects and consequences of that ideal. This is certainly so for the Kantian ideal; for disagreement may arise in the
community of colegislators, underlining the open character of this
ideal. For one thing, although each of the members of the moral
society will seek universal rules and ends, there may be disagreement about which rules and ends fit this characterization. For
another thing, there may be disagreement about the application of
rules to specific situations and about the ends that should be pursued in these situations. (The unattractive alternative is to see the
categorical imperative as a foolproof decision procedure, to be applied in mechanical fashion.) But in either case, disagreements will
be settled in a rational democratic fashion, guided by our recognition of one another as colegislators and by the intent to promote
one another's ends. Now the import of these observations is that
we can counterfactually include the morally committed actors of
past historical events in the future community of colegislators,
implying that they would share its main principles and be prepared to settle disagreements, such as what the idea of humanity
precisely involves, along its guidelines." The tenability of their
inclusion shows that the dignity of these actors can be upheld. It
also shows that these actors can uphold their dignity in the face of
the idea of a changing notion of ideal humanity. Finally, this further specification of my earlier defended contention that morally
committed persons can participate in the idea of humanity suggests that we should reverse Arendt's view concerning the respective impact of infinite progress and progress as such on human
dignity. Only the idea of infinite progress guarantees that the dialogue that aims at moral truth will always be open, creating the
continuous possibility of meaningful participation for all those who
seek to contribute to it.

The Paradox of Anamnestic Solidarity

In Wissenschaftstheorie-Handlungstheorie- Fundamentale Theo log ie,
Helmut Peukert43 argues that from the perspective of the society of
complete solidarity, i.e., the moral society, the following problem
arises:
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By definition this generation is liberated; it has reached the final happy
condition. . . . But how must we interpret its relation to preceding generations? They must live with the awareness that they have reached their
condition solely thanks to these generations and, hence, solely thanks to
the oppressed, the defeated, and the sacrifices of preceding liberation
processes. . . . Can one even imagine happiness under these conditions?
Does happiness not presuppose that the unhappiness of the predecessors
be forgotte n?. . . . However, when world-historical unawareness is the
presupposition for a happy life, is then the life of these human beings not
inhuman? (p. 281).

Peukert thinks that the last question is to be answered in the
affirmative. The outcome is what he calls the "paradox of anamnestic solidarity": the members of the moral society cannot forget
the suffering of the victims of injustice, for in doing so they would
lose their humanity, and this contradicts the idea of the moral
society; but if they remember this suffering with a feeling of compassion (anamnestic solidarity), this seems to contradict the idea
of the moral society as well, for solidarity in this form threatens
their happiness.
Peukert suggests that the paradox has a wider meaning in that
it makes the idea of "complete justice" into a mere illusion (p. 282).
Jli.rgen Habermas in "A Reply to My Critics" 14 elaborates this
suggestion:
If one does not constrict the universality of the unlimited community in
communication to one's contemporaries, but counterfactually includes
past generations in the circle of those without whose potential agreement
the claim to justice could not be vindicated, this may be sufficient for the
logic of practical discourse. But the posthumously obtained approval of the
victims remains abstract . . . it cannot later drown out the protest expressed in their lifetimes.... The contradiction that is inherent in the
idea of complete justice, owing to its principle of irredeemable universalism, cannot be dissolved. . . . Those born later can compensate for the
contradiction contained in the idea itself only by supplementing the abstract thought of universality with . . . compassionate solidarity with the
despair of the tormented who have suffered what cannot be made good
again (pp. 246-47) .

To explicate, Habermas holds that "a norm is valid only if it would
meet the approval of those involved under conditions of discursive
will-formation" (p. 246) . Now, by extending the community in
communication to past generations, he maintains that a just so-
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ciety requires that the victims of injustice of past generations give
in a counterfactual manner their approval to this society. Expecting
their approval to be forthcoming, Habermas nonetheless views
their suffering as a stain on the just society, arguing that the idea
of complete justice is internally contradictory.
This claim seems to rest on equivocation. The idea of complete
justice may be understood in two ways. The moral society is a
completely just society in the sense that every rational agent, irrespective of his historical location, would approve of its norms, or,
at least, of the manner in which its norms are established. But the
moral society as a historical ideal is not completely just in the
sense that it literally comprises all those who adhere, or would
wish to ad here, to its rules; the victims of injustice of past generations are excluded, not in principle but as a matter of historical
contingency. Equivocating on the term 'complete justice', Habermas suggests that th e moral society cannot be completely just in
the first sense. This suggestion is misguided; for the very fact that
the road toward the moral society is full of injustice does not make
this society less just-provided, of course, that the members of this
society are not responsible for these injustices.
Another objection that may be raised against Habermas is that
his discussion of the problem set by the irredeemable character of
the suffering of the victims of injustice is wrongly focused. The
same can be said of Peukert. This is remarkable, because they both
base themselves partly on the work of Max Horkheimer, citing a
passage from his work in the 1930s which shows that the problem
has more important ramifications than posing an aporia for the
idea of the moral society itself. Horkheimer wrote:
The thought that the prayers of the persecuted in direst need, that those
of the innocents who must die without clarification of their situation, that
the final hopes for a superhuman authority, are to no avail, and that the
night in which no human lig ht shines is also devoid of any divine light, is
monstrous. Without God, eternal truth has just as little a foothold as
infinite love- indeed they become unthinkable concepts. But is atrocity
ever a cogent argume nt against the assertion or denial of a state of affairs?
Does logic contain a law to the effect that a judgment is false when its
consequences would be despair?"

In his early writings Horkheimer held that we must face this monstrous thought, declaring that "[p]ast injustice has happened and
is final. The defeated are really defeated."·11• But in his later work he
somewhat modified his view, cau tiously affirming theology and
defining it as "the hope that things will not stop with this injustice
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by which our world is characterized, that injustice may not be the
last word. [It is] the expession of . .. the longing that the murderer will not triumph over the innocent victim."r1
The more comprehensive paradox of ana mnestic solida rity,
then, concerns present social action toward the moral idea l. Kant
argues that we must turn to history in order to ground the hope
for progress, but the other side of the coin is that in doing so we
are confronted with the immense sufferin g embedded in history.
Now anamnestic solidarity with the victims of injustice of past
generations may have a positive moral effect in that it m akes us
more susceptible to present socially caused suffering, strengthening our determination to eliminate this suffering. Moreover, this
kind of solidarity may also more directly affirm our conviction that
we ought to seek the moral society; fo1~ following Habermas's
counterfactual procedure, we may assume that the victims o f injustice would urge us to seek a jus t society, making their suffering
not altogether in vain. Yet the belief that their suffe ring is final and
that they died not knowing whether their outcry against repression would be answered may be too much to face and may bring
us to despair. This despair may weaken the resolve to change
society, and so the over-all result may be that the turn to history
fo r the sake of moral praxis undermines this praxis.
I have already indirectly discussed the paradox in this form in
the final section of the previous chapte 1~ so let me be brief but also
add some additional consideratio ns. Two basic answers seem to
accord with the general orientation of Kant's social ethics. The first
is practical faith. Moral faith in this context is not so much a reply
to the question: What may I-for myself- hope? as a reply to the
question: What may I-for others, in their suffering a nd deathh ope?'" Thus practical faith is an expression o f the hope that the
suffering of the victims of repression is not final; the regulative
idea that guides faith, at least for Kant, is that virtue and happiness
will somehow meet. Adherence to this idea prevents our anamnestic solidarity from leading to despair. The second basic answer is to
turn the argument around. Th e finality of human suffering does
not weaken the resolve to seek a just society, but stre ngthe ns it;
the very fact that this suffering cannot be redeem ed makes it so
much the more urgent to seek a society without suffering caused
by social conflict.
My own view tends to the second answer, because practical
faith lacks an adequate philosophical foundation. It is to be recognized, however, that this view nonetheless carries with it the danger that despair may be the outcome of compassion for the victims
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of injustice. The solution is that we can fight against despair, since
(anamnestic) solidarity is a practical feeling mediated by the moral
law. Once our co-suffering threatens to overwhelm us-and in this
respect it is immaterial whether the concern is anamnestic solidarity or solidarity wi th present suffering-the moral law demands that we turn our back on it; for despair may keep us from
fulfilling our social duties. (Kant holds for a similar reason that we
have an indirect duty to be happy.) Although this seems to involve
an element of forgetting, it does not follow that we have thus
denied our solidarity with the victims of injustice. Rather, this
forgetting is done partly for their sake, for our primary obligation
to them is not just to remember them but in their name to seek a
just society. More emphatically, the idea of anamnestic solidarity
seems to be empty if it does not comprise the resolve to erase once
and for all th e sources of their repression. We may say, then, that
the scar of despair is a scar of moral determination.
The first answer also involves an element of forgetting, albeit
for a different reason. In order that virtue and happiness may meet
for the victims of injustice, the victims must to some extent forget
what ha s been done to them, for without this forgetting they cannot be happy. The mere passing of tim e alone ca nnot heal their
wounds; what is broken can be made whole again only if the
victims of injustice engage in a deliberate effort to forget their
agony to some degree. It is this partial forgetting that enables
those who adhere to the second answer to forget to some extent as
well. Thus the two answers share a common element of forgetting;
but this is not surprising, for we are simply not able to embrace all
the suffering embedded in history without losing our sanity and
mora l determination. Yet there is this difference: the first answer
offers us a forgetting of consolation, the second, one of inner repression only.
Finally, in reply to Peukert's form of the paradox of anamnestic
solidarity, I wish to make the following observa tions. First, this
paradox does not have the great relevance Peukert ascribes to it as
long as it is not related to present social action toward the moral
society. Second, anamnestic solidarity in the moral society may be
less incong ruent with happiness than Peukert takes it to be,
provided that happiness is defined as a harmony of ends rather
than as an accumulation of pleasant feelings. But even if we grant
that an amnestic solidarity conflicts with human happiness, this
does not in itself undermine the idea of the moral society. This
society is best characterized as a community of colegislators who
seek to enhance one another's ends, and, this idea does not exclude
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all forms of human suffering as inconsistent with itself. Human
dignity and autonomy are essential to the idea of the moral society,
happiness less so. Last, it is not at all clear what the ground is for
the contention that anamnestic solidarity must be an aspect of the
moral society. The paradox has in this context relevance for present moral action, for it raises the question of why we ought to
remember the victims of injustice. I have claimed that the primary
moral significance of this remembering must be sought in increasing our susceptibility for feeling compassion tor the present
victims of injustice, in addition to giving rise to the moral determination to seek a just society in the name of those whose voices of
protest and suffering have been silenced by human terror. Once
the moral society has been firmly established, however, and morality has become second nature, as it were, guaranteeing perpetual
social peace, these grounds for the duty to remember the victims
of injustice seem no longer to apply. So should we concl ude that
there is a point at which it becomes morally permissible to forget
those victims? Our notion of gratitude revolts against the claim
that at the end of history it will become morally permissible to
forget those who have struggled for the betterment of humanity.
The pursuit of knowledge, moreover, might prevent humanity
from ever taking this step; but still (and paradoxical as this may
sound) would the forgetting of the suffering and sacrifices of morally committed persons of past generations itself not be an appropriate expression of the gratitude of the members of the moral
society? Would this forgetting not accord with the wishes of these
morally committed individuals? Would they also not hold that
their claim to dignity has been adequately satisfied once humanity
permanently realizes that which essentially mattered to them?
And would the victims of injustice in general not ask us to forget
them for the sake of our own happiness, once we have permanently eliminated the sources of their repression? Perhaps all these
questions are to be answered in the negative, but then the unhappiness derived from anamnestic solidarity will be compensated for
by the moral satisfaction arising from the fact that the duty to
remember has been fulfilled in the best possible manner in which
this duty can be fulfilled: by seeking the moral society in the name
of the uncountable victims of injustice throughout history.

CHAPTER IV

The Philosophy of History (B):
The Cunning of Nature, The Highest
Political Good, and the Moral Society

In "Universal History" Kant does not yet draw a clear distinction
between the highest politica l good (the perfect state and internationa l p eace) and the highest moral good (the mora l society or
community of colegislators). Accordingly, it remains unclear what
precisely the scope is of the cunning of nature. Can the mechanism s of self-interest alone force human beings into the condition
of political peace, or is moral action, i.e., the good will, in principle
also required to accomplish thi s end? Both answers are given in
"Universal History," although the first predominates.
judgment offers a clarification of the issue, for it draws a di stinction between the u ltimate end (der letzte Zweck) of nature and
th e fina l e nd (der Endzweck) of creation. Kant maintains that cu lture- including the legal order and internationa l peace- is the ultimate end of nature and ha s the purpose of setting the stage for
the moral society as the fina l end of creation. I will interpret this to
mea n that Kant holds that we may hope that through cultural
development the motive of self-interest alone will suffice for bringing about the high est political good as a preparatory step toward
the highest moral good, which is the exclusive domain of the good
will and moral praxis.
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An additional difference between "Universa l History" and the
third Critique is that, in th e former, lust for power and need for
recognition as aspects of un social sociabi)j ty are emphasized as
forces of historica l change, whereas, in the latter, "material" factors such as surv iva l, divi s io n o f labo r, and exp lo ita ti o n are
stressed as instrumental in pushing humanity towa rd the institutionalization of higher forms of the political state. The two analyses, however, do not conflict with each oth er, but may be seen as
compleme ntary.
To illuminate these differences, in the first section below T will
briefly discuss paragraphs 82-86 of Judgment. In the second section
I wiU argue that Ka nt's regulative thesis: that th e cunning of nature
suffices to bring about the highest political good, is mistaken, deriving my argume nt from John Rawls's A Theory of justice. I will
end the chapter with a systematic analysis of the relation between
the high est political good a nd th e high est moral good, addressing,
among other issues, the question of th e institutionalization of the
moral society itself (section 3).

1. Critique of Judgment:
The Ultimate End of Nature and
the Final End of Creation
Kant opens paragraph 82 of judgment by stating that, by external
purposiveness, as distinguished from the internal purposiven ess of
organisms, he mea ns "that by which on e thing of na ture serves
another as mea ns to a purpose." Inquiry into exte rn al purposiveness, then, raises, th e question, What is thi s n a tural thing good
for? Posing this question in reference to the "kingdom of pla nts,"
Kant argues that the external purpose of plants is to serve as food
for the herbivorous animals. The latter in turn have as their function the susten ance of carnivorous animals. Kant continues: "Finally we have the question: What are th ese last, as well as the firstmentioned na tural kingdoms, good for? For man, in refere nce to
the manifold use which his unde rstanding teach es him to make of
all these creatures" (p. 276; V: 506).
That the human kingdom is to be placed at the top of the
hierarchy of natural kingdoms is a familiar doctrine, as is th e argument Kant provides to support the claim that the huma n agent is
the master of nature: "he is the only being upon [earth] w h o can
form a concept of purposes and who can, by his rea son, ma ke out
of an aggregate of purposively form ed things a system of pur-
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poses" (ibid.). Kant, h oweve r, gives an interesting twist to thi s
doctrine by pointing out that, following Linnaeus, we can also turn
around the above order of questioning. Thus we may see the herbivorous anim als as having the purpose of preve nting the exuberant g row th of some plants fro m leading to the extinction of other
plants. The carnivora serve as a mean s of controling the voracity of
the herb ivora, and, Kant adds, "[f]inally man by his pursuit of
these and his diminution of their numbers, preserves a certain
equilibrium between the producing and the destructive powers of
nature." Thi s implies that "man, although in a certain reference he
might be esteemed a purpose, yet in another has only the rank of a
means" (p. 277; 506) . That humanity ha s too often failed in the
latter function hardly needs to be argued: mastery of nature is not
a given but a task.
The question is still open what the over-all purpose of his
connecti on with nature is for the human individual himself. (This
purpose is, of course, the ultimate purpose of nature, because the
human kingdom is the high est of all natural kingdoms). Kant
turns to this question in paragra ph 83: " [T]his purpose must either
be of a kind that can be sa tisfied by nature in its beneficence, or it
is the aptitude and skill for all kinds of purposes for which na ture
(external and internal) ca n be used by him. The first purpose of
n ature would be man's happiness, the second his culture (p. 279;
509). Kant offers two arguments to s how that happiness is not the
ultimate purpose of nature. The first is that our idea of happiness
changes so frequently that nature, whether it is our natural order
or some hypothetical one, as a system of universa l and fixed laws
ca n neve r by itself harmonize with thi s idea. Although we may
doubt that our idea of happiness is indeed so "vacillating" as Kant
claims it to be, it is to be granted that nature as such cannot
g u a rantee hum a n happiness, beca use it lacks th e freedom,
crea tivity, and spontanei ty embedded in our notion of happiness.
Mere natural mechani sms ca n provide pleasure, but not happiness,
beca use the latter presupposes self-activity. The second argument
is that our natural order offers us in fact little in term s of happiness. As Kant puts it, "[n]ature ha s not taken [the human individual] for her special darling and favored him with benefit above all
animals" (p. 280; 510). Like all other animals, we are subject to th e
des tru ctive operations of nature, such as diseases, hunger, harsh
climates, natural disas ters, and assaults by living organisms. It is
there fore implausible to hold that th e over-all purpose of our connection with nature is limited to th e happiness that nature in itself
ca n supply "in its beneficence." The sa me ca n be said of internal
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nature. O ur natural d isposition s are d isharmonious; left to th emselves, i.e., in th e absence of rational and moral control, they lead
to "self-devised torments," " oppression," and th e " barbaris m of
war" (ibid.).
It fo llows th at culture mu st be the ultim ate p urpose o f nature.
This concl usion basically accords w ith Kant's view in " Universa l
History"; fo r we have seen that h e argues there that the signifi cance of ou r lack of instinctual determination in conjunction with
our hostile natural environm ent is that we must affirm humanity
as self-crea ti on. Kant defin es culture as the hu ma n aptitude fo r
setting and pursuing p urposes in ge neral, but he also uses th e
term to refer to the p roducts of thi s aptitude. The mo ral purpose of
culture is stated at th e outset: culture is "wh at nature ca n supply
to prepare [the huma n agent] fo r what he must d o himself in order
to be a fi nal purpose" (p. 281; 511) . From this angle then: th at
cultu re has the external purpose of setting the stage fo r th e moral
society, we must understand Kant's d iscussion of the evolution of
human culture in th e remainde r o f paragraph 83.
In this discussion Ka nt draws a distinction between the cul ture of skill and the culture of di scipline, referring to two different
ways in which the aptitude to set and rea lize all kinds of end s has
gradually evolved w ithin human history. The cul ture of skill is
"positive" in characte r, fo r it involves the increasing ca pacity o f
human beings to use th e n atural a nd social environment fo r their
own purposes-skill, then, encompa sses the techni cal and pragmatic dispositions-whereas the culture of discipline is " nega tive"
in character, consisting of " the freeing of the will from the despotism of [natural] d esires," w hich, left to them selves, would render
human agents "inca pable even of choosing" (p. 282; 512).
Kant begins his analysis of th e culture o f s kill by noting that
progress in skill has been achieved through social inequality. Th e
great majority of human beings have always worked in a rathe r
m echanical fa shion, requiring no special skill s, in order to prov ide
"the necessities of life . . . for the convenience and leisure of othe rs w ho work at the less necessary elem ents of culture, science
and art" (ibid.). Thjs division of labor signifies class confli ct, fo r th e
cultured keep the masses in " an oppressed condition," in which
" they have hard work and little enjoyment." With the p rogress o f
culture this situation gradually ch anges, as much of the culture of
the upper classes (w hich includes, we m ay presume, technology
and th e skill of social control) is g radually extended to the lower
classes. But, Kant arg ues, "calamities increase equ ally in two directions": the lower classes are increasingly subject to violence fro m
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the upper classes ("violence from without"), for they no longer
accept their oppressed condition (and, we may add, they have
gradually acquired the cultural means to change it), whereas the
upper classes suffer from "internal discontent" arising from luxury and decadence. Kant claims that this culture of inequality is a
"splendid misery," even though it contributes to the development
of human capacities. The solution to the increasingly intense class
conflict is a "civil community" where there will be equality in freedom for all citizens, and, Kant maintains, only in this state "can
the greatest development of natural capacities take place" (ibid.).
Thus the hope for the future which Kant projects is that the growing discord within the state will call forth its opposite: the perfect
state as one aspect of the highest political good.
Kant's analysis here is clearly influenced by Rousseau, but we
may assume that the French Revolution made an impact as well,
with the old regime representing the luxury and decadence of the
upper classes.' Accordingly, we may interpret Kant here as "predicting" that future revolutions will occur as the result of the increasing oppression of the lower classes in the absolutist state, and
will lead to more just political arrangements. His analysis here
accords with that offered in "An Old Question." One essentia l
difference, though, is to be noted: no claim is now made that the
democratic aspirations of the lower classes signify that a moral
motive is operative within humanity. Yet, the discussion in Judgment has the merit of complementing the analysis in "Universal
History" of the causes of conflict and change within the state: the
struggle for political domination and control is seen as arising not
only from ambition and lust for power but also from economic
("material") factors such as exploitation and division of labor.
War is another impetus behind progress in skill. In agreement
with "Universal History" but contrary to his view in Peace, Kant
argues in judgment that a requisite for the civil community is a
"cosrnopolitan whole, i.e., a system of all states." Kant asserts that
this system would arise "if men were clever enough to find it out
and wise enough to submit themselves voluntarily to its constraint. . . . [ButJ failing this, and with the obstacles that ambition,
lust of dominion, and avarice, especially in those who have the
authority in their hands, present to even the possibility of such a
scheme, there is, inevitably, war" (pp. 282-83; 512- 13; translation
altered). In spite of the "dreadful afflictions" that war, and in
particular the preparation for war, impose upon humanity, we
shou ld, however, not despair and view human history as aimless
and not subject to improvement. To be sure, from the perspective
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of the human species, war is an undesigned enterprise, stirred
up by "unbridled passions," but, Kant argues, from the
perspective of "supreme wisdom" -that is, from the angle of a
praxis- and future-oriented philosophy of history-we may
perhaps see war as "designed" in that it prepares human beings
for "conformity to law amid the freedom of states" and motivates
them to develop "all talents serviceable for culture to the highest
possible pitch" (p. 283; 513). We have here, then, another instance
of Kant's regulative thesis that it is rational to hope that (growing)
discord will lead eventually to concord-now in the form of international peace, as the other aspect of the highest political good.
Kant does not tell us here how the realization of the highest
political good can facilitate or be conducive to the realization of the
moral society, but we have already encountered his answer to this
question: the external freedom guaranteed by peace within and
between the states creates room for autonomous action and
lessens the number of occasions that provoke us to immoral behavior. Another consideration is that free institutions enhance
moral dialogues which are needed to determine right action and
social policy. We may note, moreover, that progress in skill facilitates the realization of the moral society in that increased capacity
to control the natural and social environment holds promise of
diminishing the impact of two sources of human conflict, namely,
enconomic scarcity and the inability to steer social mechanisms
rationally.
Kant is more explicit about the moral significance of the culture of discipline or training. This culture involves the refinement
of crude passions and inner control of instinctual drives, creating
the possibility of freedom of choice and the pursuit of long-range
projects. Culture is a necessary preparatory step toward the good
will and must therefore be seen as an aspect of moral education,
both of the individual and of the species. Following Rousseau,
however, Kant also points out in judgment that culture may lead to
decadence, ever-increasing artificial needs, and a false pride in
refined taste as such, as if such taste without morality were anything but a "splendid misery." And elsewhere Kant lists envy,
ingratitude, and spitefulness as "vices of culture and civilization"
(Religion, pp. 22 and 29; VI: 166 and 173). More generally, it may be
observed that the inner discipline acquired through cultural development can be used to promote both moral and immoral ends.
But, contrary to Rousseau, Kant unambiguously argues that
cultural progress is nonetheless desirable because we may expect
that the pitfalls of culture will be gradually overcome by moving
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forward- through more culture-to political peace and the moral
society. Further, although this point is not stressed here, Kant
holds that culture has not only a negative disciplinary function
with regard to the life of moral autonomy, but also a more directly
supportive function. That is, esthetic contemplation and scientific
activity (the "beautiful arts and the sciences") create disinterested
pleasure, a conception of universality, and a sense of freedom
in accordance with law (positive freedom), and these experiences
are conducive to and a semblance of moral praxis and feeling. 2
Thus it can be truly said that culture "prepare[s] men for a lordship in which [moral] reason alone shall have authority" (Judgment, p. 284; V: 513).
Paragraphs 84-86 address the final end of creation, and much
of what they cover is either by now familiar ground (e.g., the
antinomy of practical reason) or not directly relevant to our present concern (e.g., the Argument from Design). We can limit our
discussion to two problems. The first is that Kant seems to waver
here between saying that the good will is the final purpose of
creation and claiming that the moral society, or highest good, is
that purpose. There is, however, no real inconsistency here; rather,
the issue is imprecise terminology. Kant defines a "final purpose [as
a] purpose which needs no other as condition of its possibility"
(p. 284; § 84; 514). What distinguishes a final purpose from an
external purpose, then, is that its teleological significance is not
derived from its serving as a means to other ends. This implies
that, with respect to a fina l purpose, we can no longer legitimately
raise the question, What is it good for?, because its purposive
meaning is not determined by other ends. Kant asserts: "Now of
man (and so of every rational creature in the world) as a moral
being it can no longer be asked why (quern in finem) he exists." 3 The
reason for this is that the worth of the good will, i.e., "man . . . as
a moral being," is determined by its intention or motive, not by the
ends it might promote. Yet it is misleading to continue to state, as
Kant does, that the existence of the virtuous person "involves the
highest purpose." The individual as a moral being is certainly a
final end, but the final end of creation is the moral society. What
Kant should have said is that the individual, as a final or unconditioned end, projects the final purpose of creation and seeks
to mirror this purpose in his conduct. Kant is imprecise in the
opposite way when he states in a later paragraph that "[t]he
moral law ... determines for us . .. a final purpose toward
which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in
the world possible through freedom"(p. 301; § 87; 531). The highest
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good is not a final purpose but the final purpose of creation and
human history.
The second, more weighty, problem concerns Kant's view that
the moral society, as the highest purpose within the hierarchy of
ends in the universe, conditions the worth of all lower ends: the
purpose of the domination of nature is culture, and the purpose of
culture, in turn, is to bring about the highest political good as a
preparatory step toward the moral society. Thus it may seem that
on Kant's account, human activities such as the pursuit of knowledge or the creation and experience of beautiful objects lack intrinsic value; they are mere means toward the realization of the good
will as the only intrinsic good. Kant himself suggests this interpretation by stating, for example, in paragraph 86, that without
moral agents "the whole creation would be a mere waste" and that
it is only in reference to the good will "that the being of everything
else in the world gets its worth" (p. 293; 523). A closer look at the
text, however, makes clear that Kant adheres instead to four other
treses. First, the good will is not the only intrinsic good as such;
rather, it is the only intrinsic good that is morally good in all
circumstances. In the famous words of the Foundations (p. 9; IV:
249), "[n)othing in the world-indeed nothing even beyond the
world-can possibly be conceived which could be called good
without qualification except a good will." Second, Kant's claim that
certain human activities or ends have a contributory value in terms
of the realization of the good will does not imply that this is their
only value. Happiness, the pursuit of knowledge, culture, and so
on, may be conducive to the development or continuation of the
moral disposition, but they are also sought for their own sake.
Were this not Kant's view he would not have maintained that such
activities or ends are an intrinsic part of the good life (the individual highest good) or the good society (the social highest good or
moral society).• Third, it is only in virtue of autonomous legislation, or the final purpose of creation, that we can ascribe moral
significance to such individual or historical processes as progress
in skill and inner discipline. In this light Kant's contention is to be
understood that it is only in reference to the good will "that the
being of everything else in the world gets its worth." Fourth, Kant
holds that any given totality or whole that comprises some intrinsic good but lacks the good will is, finally, not worth being pursued. Thus he states in paragraph 86: "What does it avail . .. that
this man has so much talent, that he is so active therewith, and
that he exerts thereby a useful influence over the community, ... if he does not possess a good will? He is a contemptible
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object considered in respect of his inner self" (p. 294; 524). It is also
on this ground that Kant states that without moral beings "the
whole creation would be a mere waste." Moreover, we have noted
that he maintains for a similar reason in "Universal History" that a
possible annihilation of our civilization is ultimately to be regretted only from the perspective of the moral society. But this view
that the good will is a sine qua non for the good life or the good
society is not be equated with the claim that virtue as such suffices
for either one of them. These ideal ends encompass also a variety
of other intrinsic goods.

2. The Cunning of Nature and the
Society of Intelligent Devils
Kant contends in Judgment that culture is "what nature can supply
to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order
to be a final purpose" and that this final purpose "is not a purpose
which nature would be competent to bring about ... , because it
is unconditioned" (pp. 281 and 285; §§ 83 and 84; V: 511 and 515).
This indicates that it is Kant's view that the cunning of nature
suffices, in principle, for bringing about the highest political good
as an aspect of culture, whereas the moral society is the exclusive
domain of the good will and moral action. This is not to deny, as
Patrick Riley puts it in his Kant's Political Philosophy (p. 80), that
"Kant's culture-including legality, peace, art and science-is a
mid-way (as it were) between nature and [positive] freedom." Certainly, culture as encompassing an inner and outer control of our
natural impulses is a step forward to the moral society in that such
control facilitates the moral task. The crux of the matter is,
however, that Kant's culture, viewed as the ultimate purpose of
nature, is a bridge between mere nature and morality. That is, this
culture, as the overcoming of nature, remajns within the sphere of
nature-it is nature mediated by nature-although it creates in
cunning fashion the step beyond nature toward morality. More
specifically, what Kant suggests in judgment is that, although exploitation, avarice, ambition, lust for power, war, and the like, are
the dominant forces behind the evolution of human culture, we
are justified in hoping that sooner or later humanity will turn the
skills and discipline acquired in this process toward higher ends,
because it is to be expected that the culture of discord will at some
point exact so high a price from us that calculated self-interest
will-and thanks to the acquired skills can-bring about political
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peace so as to avoid such a disastrous result. Thus the realization
of the highest political good can be accomplished within the realm
of the natural will; i.e., it does not necessarily presuppose the
moral will, and this is a cunning process in that the motive of selfinterest, through bringing about this good, unwittingly realizes a
morally demanded condition which is conducive to the overcoming of this very same motive in the form of the moral motive.
A more detailed look at the Kantian practical corpus corroborates my interpretation that, on Kant's account, the highest political
good falls within the scope of nature alone. We have seen in the
previous chapter that Kant outlines three roads toward international peace. A brief recapitulation will make clear that each of
these is a road of self-interest. The first road is that, on the supposition that we may expect an increasing number of republican
states to emerge in the future, we may also expect that the cause of
peace will be promoted; for we may anticipate that these states will
associate together, gradually enlarging the federation of states. A
crucial premise of this hope is that the republican constitution
requires the consent of the citizens for the declaration of war, and,
Kant says, "nothing is more natural than that they would be very
cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war" (Peace, pp. 94---95; VI: 436) . The
second road is that we may expect that war will become at some
point so devastating that it will force humanity into the condition
of peace. Here again it is self-interest that motivates change, even
self-interest in its most basic form-survival. The third road is that
increasing trade between the nations will promote peace, because
war interrupts commercial transactions and is, accordingly, incompatible with the "spirit of commerce," which is a spirit of limited
self-interest. In each case, however, the qualification must be
added that, strictly speaking, self-interest alone is not enough, for
the realization of lasting peace presupposes also the capacity on
the part of humanity to find institutional forms that guarantee
peace. It is from this angle that we must interpret Kant's statement
in Judgment, cited earlier, that a "system of states" would arise "if
men were clever enough to find it out and wise enough to submit
themselves voluntarily to its constraint." And, in light of the foregoing, we may assume that this wisdom is prudential, not moral.
The realization of international peace, then, requires a natural history (self-interest and pragmatic knowledge), not necessarily a
moral or rational history (the good will).
In Peace Kant makes comparable, but more explicit, remarks
with respect to the perfect state, the republican state:
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As hars h as it may sound, the problem of organizing a state can be
solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent. The problem is:
"Given a multitude of rational beings requiring universal laws for their
preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt himself
from them, to establish a constitution in such a way that, although their
private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result that their
public conduct is the same as if they had no s uch evil intentions" (p. 112;
VI: 452- 53; translation altered).

Thus the realization of the perfect state presupposes two things
that are within the reach of the history of humanity as a natural
hi story: the motive of self-interest ("preservation") and political
technology, i.e., pragmatic knowledge. Kant emphasizes this claim
that the good will is not a sine qua non for the realization of the
idea l state by arguing that this end "does not require that we know
how to attain the moral improvement of men but only that we
should know the mechanism of nature in order to use it on men,"
adding the parenthetical remark that " [a] good constitution is not
be expected from morality, but, conversely, a good moral condition
of a people is to be expected only under a good constitution"
(pp. 112-13; 453). This permits Kant to conclude here that "[n]ature
inexorably wills that the right should finally triumph. What we
neglect to do comes about by itself, though with great inconveniences to us" (p. 113; 453) .
It is to be emphasized that Kant's contention that nature alone
can bring about the highest political good is not a dogmatic assertion about what will actually happen in the future. A claim to this
effect would conflict with the primacy of praxis in his work, since
it would invite us to watch the inevitable progressive course of
hi story from the ivory tower of contemplation. After outlining the
third road to peace between the nation s, Kant states:
In this manner nature guarantees perpetual p eace by the mechanism
of human passions. Certainly she does not do so with sufficient certainty
for us to predict the future in any theoretical sense, but adequately from a
practica l point of view, making it our duty to work toward this end, which
is not just a chime rica l one (Peace, p. 114; VI: 454-55).

Similar remarks apply to the perfect state. So Kant is not claiming
that the highest political good will be realized as a historical project in the absence of the good will. Rather, his claim is that morally
committed persons in their efforts to change society may take as
their guideline that the cunning of nature suffices to bring about
the highest political good, and their actions then will hasten the
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realization of this good. Accordingly, when confronted with the
selfish actions of humanity, these individuals do not despair, because they consider themselves justified in hoping that the negative effects of these actions w ill force humanity to seek social
arrangements in which these se lfish actions are controlled for the
benefit of all. Thus the regulative idea of the cunning of nature
stimulates moral action. Further, in accordance with the primacy of
praxis, it is to be noted that the more effective this regulative idea
is, the more superfluous it becomes; for the greater the number of
human agents who accept this idea and on this ground do not
grow discouraged from engaging in social action, the smaller the
number of human agents upon whom nature has to play its
cunning tricks.
Yet, is it plausible to hold that the cunning of nature, in principle, suffices to bring about the highest political good? Kant's thesis
that a race of intelligent devils would seek the perfect state implies
an affirmative answer to this question. For, although nature cannot
make us moral, it can make us intelligent in a pragmatic sense: we
may expect that the lessons of history will eventua lly force selfish
agents to recognize, or discover, that the perfect state is to their
mutual benefit (assuming, for the moment, that Kant is correct
about this latter point). Moreover, we can see each state as an
intelligent devil and infer that, just as intelligent devils wo uld seek
a coercive peace within the state, the individual states wou ld accept a federation of states understood as a balance of powers. 5 So
the upshot is that we shou ld subject to philosophical scrutiny the
idea that self-interested intelligent beings opt for a state that guarantees equality in freedom for all its citizens.
Before starting this enterprise, a few words need to be sa id
about the issue at stake. What makes Kant's claim concern ing the
choice of intelligent devils attractive is that it seems a minimal
assumption for supporting the hope for progress. If his claim is
correct, we undoubtedly have good reason for looking to the fuhire with morally adequate confidence. However, we have to pay a
serious price, which Kant overlooked: assuming that intelligent
devils can bring about the perfect state, we can no longer defend
the view that political progress within history signifies moral progress. That is to say, we are no longer justified in holding that
events such as the French Revolution, in conjunction with the
enthusiasm it engendered among its spectators, indicate that humanity is already moving toward a stage in w hi ch it self-consciously shapes its own destiny on the basis of moral ideals. For,
taking Kant's claim concerning the intelligent devils seriously, we
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must conclude that the spectators through their "wishful participation" in the Revolution sided with intelligent devils. We must,
moreover, conclude that the spectators are such devils when they,
in their turn, engage in revolutionary action. Or, at least, on the
basis of Kant's claim we cannot refute these conclusions. His thesis
of moral progress, then, collapses in the face of his thesis concerning the race of devils. The attractive minjmal assumption for progress weakens the hope for a rational history of humanity. Kant
cannot have it both ways. I think we can leave open the question of
which is the better way of supporting the hope for progress; for I
will now argue that Kant's view is implausible that intelligent devils can bring about a perfect state, basing myself on Rawls's A
Theory of justice.6
l assume that the main ideas of Rawls's work are known. My
concern here is with his first principle of justice, which says that
"[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all" (p. 302). Rawls contends that a good constitution
must adopt this liberty principle, and this accords with Kant's view.
Kant defines the perfect state as having "[a] constitution allowing
the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by
which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all
others. (Pure Reason, p. 312; III: 258). Rawls goes on to maintain that
the constitution of the good state must secure the following basic
liberties: "political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for
public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person
along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom
from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the
rule of law" (p. 61) . Again, this fits Kant's view, not in detail but in
general orientation. 7 Finally, both Kant and Rawls hold that their
liberty principle is compatible with the existence of significant social and economic inequalities. 8
A central thesis of Rawls's work is that the people in the original position behind the veil of ignorance will opt for the liberty
principle. Now if it can be shown that (a).Kant's intelligent devils
are the same type of persons as the Rawlsian people in the original
position and that (b) Rawls is correct in holding that several constraints, such as the veil of ignorance, are to be placed upon his
people if they are to opt for the liberty principle, then it follows
that Kant is mistaken in claiming that his devils will choose the
perfect state. For, as we have already seen, the perfect state instantiates the liberty principle, and the Kantian devils are not sub-
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ject to such constraints as Rawls imposes upon his people. So our
discussion should focus on (a) and (b).
Rawls assumes that the people in the original position seek to
maximize their own interests. This assumption is made for "strategic" reasons; i.e., it is a minimal assumption. And Rawls, accordingly, rightly claims that there is no inconsistency in supposing
that, once the parties have left the original position (the veil of
ignorance has been lifted), they "find that they have ties of sentiment and affection, and want to advance the interest of others and
to see their ends attained" (p. 129). Furthermore, self-interest must
not be confused with egoism. Rawls makes the additional assumption that "each person in the original position [will] care about the
well-being of some of those in the next generation" (p. 128). This
care is conceived of in terms of family ties, but the qualification is
added that this interpretation is not essential to the main argument for the principle(s) of social justice. The assumption warrants
the claim that each person in the original position will opt for a
conception of justice that is not only in his own interest but also in
the interest of some members of the next generation. Indeed in
this regard it does not seem to be essential whether these persons
are family members or not. The over-all result is tha.t the assumption prevents the choice of a society in which the present generation, in pursuit of its own happiness, severely curtails the material
and existential possibilities of future generations.
Thus far the Rawlsian people in the original position resemble
the Kantian devils. Both types of person are selfish, not in that
they are purely egoistic but in that they fail to take an interest in
the well-being of humanity. The truth of the matter seems to be
that both Kant and Rawls take the individual as he is molded by
our society; the "self" of self-interest is the phenomenal self, not
the noumenal self. More precisely, they both take as their point of
departure the phenomenal self, but abstract from the fact that
human agents at times attempt to live up to their ideal self. Rawls's
motive for this strategy is to make a strong case for his conception
of social justice, starting his deliberations with a minimal assumption, whereas Kant's motive is to affirm the hope for social progress. An additional similarity is that Rawls also supposes that the
people in the original position are intelligent (like the Kantian
devils): they have learned the lessons of history, as is manifest in
Rawls's claim that they are familiar with the "general facts about
human society," "political affairs," the "principles of economic theory," the "basis of social organization," and the "laws of human
psychology" (p. 137) .

148

Nature, the Highest Political Good, and the Moral Society

Granted that the Kantian and Rawlsian individuals are the
same type of person, it becomes interesting to look at some other
assumptions that Rawls makes in establishing that his people will
opt for the liberty principle. I will first briefly turn to the "mutual
disinterest" assumption and then deal more extensively with the
veil of ignorance, pointing out in each case the ramifications
for Kant's contention that devils, if intelligent, will opt for the
perfect state.
Rawls assumes that the parties in the original position are
mutually disinterested, not only in the sense that they do not seek
to promote one another's ends but also in the sense that they do
not attempt "to impose injuries on one another." Rawls continues:
"they are not moved by affection or rancor. Nor do they try to gain
relative to each other; they are not envious or vain" (p. 144). The
same cannot be said of the Kantian devils, because we may suppose that they display unsocial sociability and, hence, are engaged
in a competitive struggle, trying to outdo one another.
This difference between Kant and Rawls supports my contention that the Kantian devils will not, or are not able to, organize a
society that secures equal liberty for all. For, although unsocial
sociability may force human beings into society, it is at the same
time an impediment to the realization of a just society. After all,
lust for power can be satisfied only in a society of economic, social,
and political inequality, and a competitive spirit seeks the same
type of society. Now it might be argued that these unsocial propensities are pragmatically irrational, not fitting for intelligent
beings. An argument to this effect, however, is unlikely to succeed;
for the attempt to outdo others violates not the canons of pragmatic reason, but those of moral reason. Also it must not be forgotten
that the Kantian devils are indeed devils who will use any opportunity and means to promote their interests. In short, Rawls seems
right in holding that the assumption of mutual disinterest in its
non-envy and noncompetitiveness aspects is required if the liberty
principle is to be chosen.
A much stronger case against Kant, however, can be built on
the rationale for the veil-of-ignorance procedure. Rawls believes
that this veil must be lowered so that his people will opt for equal
liberty for all. The effect of this procedure is that the people in the
original position momentarily do not know their places in society,
their class position or social status, their fortunes in the nahual
lottery of assets and abilities, their special psychological features
(such as their aversion to risk), their intelligence, strength, and
other natural characteristics. Rawls adds that the veil of ignorance
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also brings it about that the people in the original position do not
know their specific conception of the good, the particulars of their
plans of life, the generation to which they belong, and the particular circumstances of their society (seep. 137).
Perhaps the veil of ignorance is an internally inconsistent procedural device. It asks us to forget about particulars, while we
must retain generalized knowledge, as if such knowledge about
society and human beings were not historically dated and variant
with class position. (Apparently, Rawls thinks that ideological distortion of social knowledge does not pose a problem. 9 ) Be this as it
may, what is crucial to notice is that the over-all effect of the veil of
ignorance is to guarantee impartiality. For, once this procedure has
been followed, one does not know whether one is person A or B,
etc., and hence, any motive is taken away for choosing a principle
of justice that suits the particular interests of A or B, etc. Or,
presumably more in accordance with Rawls's view, the effect of the
veil of ignorance is that in some sense we still know who we are,
but do not know how we are going to fare, 10 for we lack specific
knowledge about ourselves and the society we shall enter. In both
cases, however, the result is that we are forced by the veil of
ignorance to consider the interests of others, because we may turn
out to be these others, as it were. That is to say, their interests may
well turn out to be our own interests, and, hence, in considering
our own interests and the maximization thereof, we are considering the interests of others.
"Forced" impartiality is a crucial premise of Rawls's argument
for the liberty principle. He argues in some detail for equal liberty
of conscience, maintaining that "[t]he reasoning in this case can be
generalized to apply to other freedoms, although not always with
the same force" (p. 206) . I will not sketch all the aspects of Rawls's
reasoning for equality in freedom of conscience, since a rough
outline suffices for my purposes. I will add, however, some additional considerations.
Freedom of conscience is important for the fulfillment of certain religious and moral obligations, and the parties in the original
position are aware that such obligations play a significant role in
their lives. (These obligations are here best understood as personal
obligations; they are, of course, not obligations laid down by the
principles of social justice.) More generally, freedom of conscience
is important in that it safeguards the possibility of exploring and
examining one's own personal convictions.
Rawls presents the people in the original position with three
principles of justice that regulate the distribution of the liberty of
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conscience, namely, majority rule, the utility principle, and the
liberty principle. Limiting the discussion to religious obligations,
we can make the following observations. Provided that one belongs to the majority religion of a certain society, majority rule is a
better option than the liberty principle, which requires equa lity in
freedom of conscience. Consider, for example, education. Religious
education is an important parental obligation, and it is, therefore,
in the interest of the majority of parents to have a school system
that makes the majority religion part of its curriculum. This would
violate the liberty principle, assuming that our concern is with the
public school system . Other examples to the same effect can easily
be given, and so we may conclud e that majority rule is the preferred option, at least for the majority. The veil of ignorance,
however, excludes the knowledge that one will enter a society with
a majority religion. More importantly, this vei l prevents one from
knowing w hether one belongs to the majority. Hence, one is forced
to look at th e si tuation from the perspective of being a member of
the minority. The outcome is that the liberty principle becomes the
preferred option. For, as Rawls states with respect to the various
treasured aspects of the liberty of conscience, "[ e Jven granting
(what may be questioned) that it is more probable than not that
one will turn out to belong to [some] majority . . . , to gamble in
thi s way [i.e., to choose for majority rule] would show that one did
not take one's religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly
value the liberty to examine one's beliefs" (p. 207) . I may add, since
Rawls fails to do so here, that the veil of ignorance also forces one
to become a conservative risk taker: daring gamblers seem to be a
minority, and, since the veil blocks out one's knowledge concerning one's own aversion to risk, it is rationa l to consider oneself to
be a conservative gambler. Certainly, conservative gamblers who
treasure liberty of conscience will not opt for majority rule.
The analysis of the utility principle can proceed along similar
lines. Consider agai n the above example concerning religious education. It might well be the case that the satisfaction the majority
derives from having their religion taught in the public school system outweighs the dissatisfaction of the minority. If so, the utility
principle is in the interest of the majority, but conflicts with the
interest of the minority. Now, in the original position behind the
vei l of ignorance, one must take into account the uncertainties
embedded in the utilitarian calculus (ib id., pp. 160-61). Perhaps the
utility principle leads to the same results as the liberty principle,
but it might also be the case that the utility principle favors the
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majority. In the absence of the veil of ignorance, this would make
the utility principle the better of the two options (for the majority),
but, once the veil has been lowered, the liberty principle becomes
the preferable option, because one does not wish to gamble with
one's moral and religious obligations.
The mutual-disinterest assumption (as including non-envy
and noncompetitiveness) and the veil-of-ignorance procedure
place moral constraints upon the self-interested agents in the original position. The Kantian devils lack these constraints, and the
consequence is that they will not opt for the perfect state. The
unsocial nature of the Kantian devils points to this conclusion; the
rationale for the veil-of-ignorance procedure strongly affirms it.
For, as we have seen in the above example of liberty of conscience,
this procedure is crucial for making the liberty principle the preferred choice. It is only when a dominant religion is absent in their
society that it is rational for Kantian devils to choose equality in
freedom of conscience, although even in this case it might be
better to form a coalition of minority groups, constituting together
a majority and repressing the resulting minority. Moreover, societies with a dominant religion are common, and the same can be
said of moral doctrines, styles of living, personal convictions, and
the like. So the prevailing choice of the Kantian devils will be not
the liberty principle as regulating freedom of conscience but rather
the majority principle (or perhaps the utility principle). Similar
observations can be made with respect to other basic liberties. We
might, for example, expect that the Kantian devils will opt for
limiting political liberties to an ethnic majority and that they will
wish to curtail the freedom of speech and assembly of the minority, preventing their challenge to the rule of the majority."
Until now I have deliberately neglected the fact that the minority is not prepared to accept majority rule (or, alternatively, the
utility principle). Rawls requires that any principle of justice that is
chosen in the original position is to be adopted in a unanimous
manner. On these terms, the Kantian devils will not be able
to come to a principle of justice governing the distribution of
basic liberties within society. There are two possible solutions: the
Kantian devils can stop being devils, take into account moral principles which lead them to recognize the interests of all (as Rawls is
doing in an indirect fashion for the people in the original position), and in this way come to a unanimous acceptance of a certain
conception of social justice, or these devils can supplement their
deliberations with force. From the angle of maximizing individual
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interests, the use of force is rational, if successful. Faced with the
force employed by the majority, the minority devils may come to
the conclusion that acceptance of majority rule is after all in their
best interest. So either solution shows that Kant's contention is
mistaken that intelligent devils can organize a perfect state.
Nonetheless, Kant's view has a rational core. It wou ld be naive
to deny that self-interest (the cunning of nature) plays an important role in progressive political change. It might be in the interest
of the rulers gradually to extend basic liberties to their subjects,
because the power of force is not unlimited and might be too high
a price to pay. Or, alternatively, as Kant suggests, the rulers may
take such measures for the sake of increasing economic activity,
strengthening the position of their state vis-a-vis other nations.
Likewise, we may suppose that those who struggle for the extension or effective implementation of basic liberties are at times
guided by prudential rather than moral concerns. What the above
observations and arguments concerning social justice, however, do
show is that the cunning of nature is ultimately an insurmountable
impediment to the realization of the perfect state. In order that the
fateful circle of the oppressed who become oppressors be broken,
morality in its directive function (i.e., the recognition of universal
rights) is required. The same pattern holds for international relations. Moreover, it seems that morality in its corrective function is
needed to bring about the highest political good. Intelligent devils
will fail to place moral constraints upon social action, and this
darkens the prospect of a universal legal order. In Part Two I will
argue, further, that, even if we assume that both self-interest and
morality call for the realization of some ideal institution (such as
the perfect state), morality still has an indispensable motivation.a/
role to play in bringing about such an institution. This argument, if
correct, underscores the claim that intelligent devils will not engage in social action toward ideal institutions. Morally committed
persons, then, cannot base their hope for progress on the cunning
of nature alone. What needs to be shown is that we are justified in
hoping that humanity is making moral progress as well. Kant says
that the French Revolution is a historical sign that supports this
latter hope. Thus, on my account, such signs must-and consistently can-play a greater role in an adequate Kantian philosophy
of history than Kant ascribed to them.
Finally, these considerations point to the conclusion that legal
progress and moral progress are best understood as feedback processes with regard to each other-that is, legal progress facilitates
moral progress, which, in turn, stimulates further legal progress.
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Although this insight is not altogether lacking in Kant's work, it is
certainly understressed. Kant tends to sketch the history of humanity as a mere natural history in which the evolution of moral
reason disappears in the background. This, in conjunction with his
thesis concerning intelligent devils, leads Kant to make the unmediated claim that "[a] good constitution is not to be expected
from morality, but conversely, a good moral condition of a people
is to be expected only under a good constitution."

3. The Highest Political Good and
the Highest Moral Good:
Systematic Analysis and Critique
Kant's contention that devils can organize a perfect state and, we
may assume, international peace, highlights the question of how
he sees the relation between the highest political good and the
moral society. Yirmiahu Yovel draws from Kant's claim the conclusion that "even to the best of states cannot be attributed a moral value
per se, and it is not in any political organization that the end of history
is to be placed." 12 I think that Yovel somewhat overstates his case
here, but I also will argue that Kant's view in this regard is far from
satisfactory. I will begin by briefly expounding Kant's discussion in
Religion of the relation between the ethical commonwealth and the
political commonwealth.
This discussion clarifies Kant's view of the relation between
the perfect state and the highest moral good, although the caveat is
to be added that the political commonwealth is not to be equated
with the perfect state; rather, Kant uses this term to refer to any
political state. Moreover, it is to be noted at the outset that he uses
the term 'ethical commonwealth' to refer both to the moral society
and to any moral organization that harmonizes with this ideal.
Kant puts the matter more precisely when he says that such an
organization is only a "representation" or "schema" of the ethical
commonwealth (Religion, p. 88; VI: 240).
There are some important simila rities between the ethical
commonwealth and the political commonwealth. Both are entered
from a state of nature-that is, a hypothetical state in which there
is no rule of law-and their citizens are united under (public) laws.
But there also are important differences: the juridical state of nature is a condition in which there is no legal authority, whereas the
ethical state of nature is a situation in which there is no shared set
of moral rules that guide and inspire the behavior of human
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beings; moreover, the laws of the political commonwealth are coercive laws imposed by the legal authority, whereas the laws of the
ethical commonwealth are noncoercive, i.e., they are self-imposed,
or autonomous laws.
The juridical state of nature is by definition an ethical state of
nature, because it is a moral duty to obey and seek the rule of law.
Kant maintains that there is an empirical relation between the two:
the juridical commonwealth is a precondition for the emergence of
the ethical commonwealth, because one can expect autonomy to
arise only in a situation in which external freedom is guaranteed
by the law. This development toward autonomy is to be hoped for,
but it cannot be enforced. Kant states:
In an already existing political commonwealth all the political citizens,
as such, are in an ethical state of nature and are entitled to remain therein;
for it would be a contradiction (in adjecto) for the political commonwealth
to compel its citizens to enter into an ethical commonwealth, si nce
the very concept of the latter involves freedom from coercion (ibid.,
p. 87; 240) .
Kant adds that every political commonwealth may indeed wish
that its citizens be united under moral laws, i.e., have joined an
ethical commonwealth, "for then, when its methods of compulsion do not avail (for the human judge cannot penetrate into the
depths of other men) their dispositions to virtue would bring
about what was required." But, again, it would violate the dictates
of moral reason to force the citizens in this direction. Besides, it
would conflict with political prudence in that it would threaten the
stability of the state. Thus Kant comes to say: "woe to the legislator
who wishes to establish through force a polity directed to ethical
ends!" More specifically, Kant seems to argue here for two things:
the legislator may not force us to actively promote the private ends
of others, and he may not force us to join any religious organization (as an instance of a moral organization, anticipating the ethical commonwealth).
The primary need for leaving the ethical state of nature and
joining an ethical commonwealth arises from the social nature of
moral evil. In Kant's own words, "[e]nvy, the lust for power, greed,
and the malignant inclinations bound up with these, besiege [the
individual's] nature ... as soon as he is among men." Accordingly,
[i] f no means could be discovered ... for the forming of a society
which seeks to preserve morality and to work with united forces
against evil, then, no matter how much the individual may have
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done to free himself from evil, he will be constantly in danger of
falling back under its dominion" (ibid., pp. 85--86; 238; translation
altered). Cooperation from others, then, which goes beyond the
legal guarantee of external freedom is required so as to overcome
vice, for this enforcement of external freedom, although it lessens
the number of immoral actions, still leaves room for immoral behavior, calling forward a similar response from oneself. The virtuous person will, therefore, seek to join with others in a society
"in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in
all their scope upon the entire human race." Or, as Kant also puts
it, "[i]n addition to prescribing laws to each individual, morally
legislative reason also unfurls a banner of virtue as a rallying point
for all who love the good, that they may gather beneath it and thus
at the very start gain the upper hand over the evil which is attacking them without rest" (p. 86; 238).
The only example of a moral society or organization which
Kant provides is the church. The existing church, however, falls far
short of this ideal of an ethical commonwealth, which Kant also
calls the "true church." The true church is characterized by universality, purity, freedom, and unchangeableness. It is universal and
unchangeable because it is a single (i.e., without sectarian divisions) church unified under moral laws that are seen as divine and
holy. The true church is, moreover, pure because it is guided by no
other motives than moral ones-that is, it is "purified of the stupidity of superstition and the madness of fanaticism." Last, since
the true church is entered voluntarily, it is free, both internally and
in relation to the political commonwealth (see p. 93; 246-47). The
difference between the existing church and the true church corresponds to the difference between (ecclesiastical) faith and pure
(rational, moral) religion. Kant writes:
There is only one (true) religion; but there can be faiths of several
kinds. We can say further that even in the various churches, severed from
one another by reason of the diversity of their modes of belief, one and
the same true religion can yet be found (p. 98; 253) .

Thus we may also see the true church as the rational (moral) core
of existing religious institutions. The implication is that these
institutions must gradually cast off their historically rooted nonrational shell (which has been in the past a source of religious
conflict), 13 leaving behind one final true church embracing all of
humanity-the moral society. It is presumably from this angle that
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Kant argues that even a large number of human agents united in a
virtuous order "can be called not the ethical commonwealth itself
but only a particular society which strives towards harmony with
all men . . . ; for each of these societies in turn, in its relation to
others of the same kind, can be represented as in the ethical state
of nature and subject to all the defects thereof" (p. 88; 240-41).
Kant stresses that an ethical commonwealth, although bounded
by civil laws, is a politically independent organization. Those who
form an ethical commonwealth and shape its constitution must be
free from any political interference as long as "this constitution
.. . contain[s] nothing which contradicts the duty of its members
as citizens of the state." Kant adds: "[W]hen the ethical pledge is of
the genuine sort the political limitation need cause no anxiety"
(p. 88; 240). His reason for this claim is that the constitution of a
true ethical commonwealth is based on the duties of virtue. These
ethical duties are duties of inner legislation, i.e., self-imposed
duties, as opposed to duties of justice, which can be imposed upon
us by an appropriate legal authority (external legislation). Now it is
a duty of virtue to fulfill one's juridical duties in the absence of
outer coercion-Kant therefore calls these duties "indirectly ethical" (see Virtue, p. 19; VII: 21)-and so we may expect, Kant argues,
that those who have committed themselves to an ethical commonwealth will obey the laws of the political commonwealth. It seems
that the qualification should be added that these laws should not
be blatantly unjust, but, as we will see in the next chapter, Kant is
hardly prepared to accept this qualification.
A final issue which deserves further elaboration is that Kant
holds that the rationalization or ethicization of religious institutions implies, in effect, their being overcome as religious institutions. The visible church must eventually become invisible:
[I]n the end religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining
grounds and from all statutes which rest on history and which through
the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule
over all. . . . The leading-string of holy tradition with its appendages of
statutes and observances ... becomes bit by bit dispensable, yea, finally,
when man enters upon his adolescence, it becomes a fetter. . . . The
humiliating distinction between laity and clergy disappears, and equality
arises from true freedom, yet without anarchy, because, though each
obeys the (non-statutory) law which he prescribes to himself, he must at
the same time regard this law as the will of a World-Ruler revealed to him
through reason, a will which by invisible means unites all under one
common government into one state-a state previously and inadequately
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represented and prepared for by the visible church (Rel igion, p. U2;
Vl: 267-68).

This future "state" is the moral society, and, as this passage makes
clear, this society is an "inner" unification of good wills through
the moral law. It is, moreover, a state of universal autonomy; for
Kant's statement that we must regard the moral law as representing the will of God must not be interpreted as saying that this law
is "valid" because it represents the will of God. We must first know
our duty before we can describe it as "divine" or "holy." The
nonrational shell of (ecclesiastical) faith is heteronomous, whereas
its rational core-i.e., the religion of reason-is autonomous, a
point which Kant underscores by stating that his moral religion
"obviates the erroneous representation of religion as an aggregate
of special duties having reference directly to God; thus it prevents
our taking on . .. courtly obligations over and above the ethico-civil
duties of humanity (of man to man)" (ibid., p. 142n; 302n). Further,
the above passage shows that Kant views as provisional the need
to join an ethical commonwealth so as to combat evil collectively:
this is a step that is necessitated only by moral "immaturity." Once
humanity has reached "adolescence" -and we may assume that
the Enlightenment corresponds to this stage of moral evolutionsuch collective efforts to overcome evil become dispensable and
even a fetter upon moral progress. In further explicating his view
along these lines, Kant presents us, I think, with both a gain and a
loss. Considering the role of religious institutions in his own time,
there is a gain: Kant was right in holding that the emancipation of
humanity was bound up with emancipation from (ecclesiastical)
faith. What is a loss, however, is that Kant in this way turns another correct insight into its opposite: social change requires collective and cooperative efforts, not actions undertaken by atomic (i.e.,
isolated or unorganized) moral individuals. 14 The failure to recognize the possibility of ethical organizations other than the church
points to the historical limits of Kant's practical philosophy.
The different strands of Kant's view concerning the relation
between the highest political good and the highest moral good, as
we have encountered them up to this point, can now be pulled
together. I will list my conclusions in several points and end this
section with some brief critical comments on Kant's view.
(a) The perfect state is a state with a constitution that guarantees equa l external liberty for all its citizens, and all its laws accord
with this ideal. Or, to put it otherwise, the laws of the perfect state
seek to enforce what Kant in justice calls the "universal principle of
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justice" -that is, "act externally in such a way that the free use of
your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to
a universal Jaw."" This enforcement of juridica l duties makes it
possible for each citizen of the perfect state to pursue his personal
ends in freedom. These ends may be obligatory ends, moraJly
permissible ends, or ends that are immoral but not illegal.
(b) The cunning of nature suffices, in principle, to bring about
the perfect state. This state as a cultural end is a purpose of nature,
and, as Kant says so strikingly, intelligent devils can organize a
perfect state. His basic reason for this claim is that intelligent selfinterested agents will seek to avoid the negative effects of lawless
freedom or unrestrained competition, creating a legally enforced
equality in freedom so that each agent can pursue his personal
ends. What makes coercion necessary, Kant notes, is that there are
occasions in which it is in the interest of individual devils to violate
Jaw. Coercion is, moreover, from their perspective rational in that
each devil wishes to avoid the curtailment of his freedom through
violation of the law by others. A more fundamental consideration
is that intelligent devils realize that coercion is a rational response
to the fact that the dictates of self-interest push each of them to
pursue a policy that would undermine the perfect state if it were
followed by all, namely, to exempt oneself from the law if it is in
one's interest to do so.
(c) Nonetheless, it is misleading to claim, as Yovel does, that
for Kant the perfect state lacks moral value per se. To be sure, Kant
holds that a good organization of the state forces the human agent
"to be a good citizen even if not a morally good person" (Peace,
p. 112; VI: 452), but a good legal system facilitates the development
of the moral disposition and prevents, moreover, a wide variety of
wrong actions. More emphatica lly, the ethical commonwealth can
arise only within the legal state. Fear of the unlawful behavior of
others is an obstacle to the fulfillment of one's duties of virtue, and
the realization of civil liberties creates a climate in which practical
reason can flourish-for example, moral dialogue presupposes
freedom of thought.
(d) This emphasis on the moral-preparatory function of the
state sets Kant's political philosophy apart from the dominant orientation within the liberal tradition. This is not to deny that Kant
also maintains that the ideal state must uphold such classical libera l ends as the protection of private property and the individual
pursuit of happiness. Yet, even these ends must be placed within a
moral context: the final yardstick is whether these ends contribute
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to, or can become an aspect of, the life of moral autonomy and the
moral society.
(e) We may assume that it is particularly in view of this ethical
significance of the ideal state that morally committed persons see it
as their duty to pursue this state. This duty can be fu lfilled in
various ways, such as through direct political action, educational
reform, and progressive intellectual labor. The perfect state sets, in
other word s, an end that is a wide duty.'" This duty is one aspect of
the duty to promote the highest good. Furthermore, virtuous persons obey the laws of the perfect state because these laws are just,
not because they may be enforced by a coercive (external) power.
(Juridical duties are indirectly ethical.)
(f) This implies that in the moral society the perfect state will
have lost its repressive character. Presumably, Kant's contention
(discussed in Chapter I, section 1, above) that the more existing
states approach the perfect state the rarer punishment will become
must be interpreted from this angle, although not exclusively. Better laws give rise to fewer violations of the laws, irrespective of the
citizens' motives for obeying these laws, but it seems that the
perfect state will lead to the disappearance of all punishment only
if it is based on a purely moral foundation, i.e., when it is part of
the mora l society. (We cannot exclude the possibility of unintentiona I rule violations in the moral society, but the appropriate legal
response in such cases would be education and information rather
than punishment proper. '7)
(g) A similar distinction between the political institutions of
intelligent devils and those of virtuous agents can also be drawn
with respect to peace between the nations, although less clearly
and convincingly, because, on Kant's account, international law ha s
no coercive agency, and, hence, obedience to this law must be
voluntary. Yet the logic of his argument points to two kinds of
peace: the first is based on "state-interests," such as commercial
interests, and may be thought of as a balance of powers; the second rests on a purely moral foundation and involves the recognition by each state of the rights of others irrespective of prudential
considerations. The first kind of peace is a prudential peace; it is a
peace of intelligent devils who have come to the conclusion that
war is too high a price to pay. The second kind of peace is a moral
peace and presupposes the realization of the community of colegislators. Further, it is to be noted that Kant sees the federation
of states as a compromise: he argues that although a world government is a more secure basis for lasting peace, a league of nations is
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nonetheless to be preferred in our present world of powe r politics
because it does not carry with it the danger of universal despotism.18 In the moral society there is no reason for this worry, and so
we may expect that within this society national boundaries will
gradually lose their significance or be abandoned altogether.
(h) The federation of states is conducive to the emergence of
the moral society and sets an end that is a wide duty. This duty is
another aspect of the duty to promote the highest good.
(i) The above observations point to the condusion that the
highest political good-minimally understood as a moral union of
nonrepressive states--is a partial instantiation of the highest moral
good. This conclusion also follows from Kant's notion of the realm
of ends. Recall that this realm has two aspects: its members respect
the conditions of autonomy, such as freedom for all, and actively
seek to promote one another's ends. The highest political good
comprises universal external freedom and thus is an institutional
realization of the first aspect of the realm of ends.
(j) Kant, however, does not draw this conclusion in an explicit
manner. Rather, the conclusion follows because I have extrapolated
from the logic of his argument some distinctions between the
political institutions of intelligent devils and those of virtuous
agents. Emphasizing that the cunning of nature suffices to bring
about the republican state and lasting peace, Kant is pulled in a
different direction, namely, toward the view that morality cannot
really become visible in ideal political institutions. Thus he comes
to speak of two commonwealths, the political and the moral. The
virtuous person is a member of both commonwealths, but only his
joining of the ethical commonwealth signifies his virtue.
(k) The act of joining the ethical commonwealth may involve
becoming a member of a religious organization. Considering the
fact that Kant is highly critical of the dominant religious institutions of his day and argues that they are to be changed into a
church invisible, the act of joining the ethical commonwealth is,
however, best interpreted as a metaphor, expressing the inner resolve to commjt oneself to the virtuous life, i.e., the adoption of the
maxim of holiness as one's supreme maxim. The moral society,
then, emerges when all human agents have made this resolve and
abide by it.
(1) In conclusion, in the moral society humanity will be united
through a federation of perfect states, but for Kant this unification
does not express the essence of the moral society. Rathe1~ it is a
pragmatic framework needed to make this society possible. In essence, the moral society is an "inner" unification of humanity; all
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human beings will be unified in this society through the moral
disposition. They will all obey the moral law with a virtuous motive and promote one another's ends.
My analysis in (d)-(i), above, shows that, even within the circle
of Kant's own thought, we can infer that the highest political good
is to be seen not as a mere pragmatic framework for the realization
of the highest moral good but rather as a partial instantiation of
this good. The basic argument is that, since juridical duties are
indirectly ethical, we can envision a moral union of nonrepressive
states, or even a noncoercive world society, as an institutional expression of the moral society. However, this kind of link between
the highest political good and the highest moral good and, more
broadly, between the moral society and ideal instih1tions in general, can and should be strengthened on several grounds. I will develop my criticisms of Kant's view here in three progressive steps.
The first step I have already discussed in some detail. Kant's
contention that intelligent devils can organize a perfect state is
implausible, and the same holds with respect to the federation of
states. My discussion of Rawls has shown that morality is needed
for the realization of the perfect state, and we may apply this
conclusion to international peace, for we may treat states that lack
a moral foundation as devilish persons. Again, this is not to deny
that the dictates of self-interest also play a role in bringing about
political progress. Nor is it to deny that the threat of punishment
contributes to general law-abidingness.'9 Rather, the point is that
the republican state and perpetual peace cannot be based on such
nonmoral motives alone. Thus we can conclude that political progress and moral progress are interrelated processes, and this further
strengthens the notion of the ideal political order as a moral order.
The second step concerns the fact that Kant insufficiently recognized that the realization of the highest political good also
requires fundamental economic change. Kant's peace proposal suffers from this defect. We have seen that his response to colonialism
(imperialism) is basically a political one: the autonomy of all nations must be upheld, as stipulated by the limits to the right of
world citizenship. Certainly, this article for perpetual peace falls
short of what is needed for our own time; for it is unlikely that
international peace will ever be established, or be stable, as long as
the wealth of some nations is accumulated at the cost of most
others. Substantial international aid and economic cooperation are
necessary, not only for the sake of international peace, but also for
the sake of overcoming hunger and structural poverty in the less
developed nations. This development is not to be expected as long

162

Nature, the Highest Politica l Good, and the Mora l Society

as the upper classes in the rich nations determine the manner in
which our needs can be satisfied and set the model for the good
life. Furthermore, the present exploitative international economic
order is reinforced by the existence of small economic elites within
most Third World countries, who profit from the development of
capital- and import-intensive industries, worsening the condition
of the rural and urban poor. 20 Thus the realization of a just international economic order as a precondition for lasting peace requires
that economic (and, hence, social) inequalities be lessened and that
economic policies be subjected to popular control, both in the
developed and less developed nations. Similar remarks apply to
the possibility of the perfect state. The political history of the past
two centuries has made clear that Kant was mistaken in claiming
that significant social and economic inequalities are compatible
with the ideal of the perfect state, provided that we assume that
this ideal requires that a ll citizens enjoy a variety of basic liberties
not merely in a formal way but substantially. We shou ld, however~
make this assumption; for it is only in this manner that the perfect
state can fulfill what Kant sees as its ultimate purpose, namely, to
contribute to the realization of the conditions of autonomy for all
citizens, setting the stage for the moral society. Thus Kant's socia l
ethics implies that social and economic inequalities must be reduced so that they become consistent with the demand for substantial basic liberties. The upshot of these observations is that it
becomes even less plausible to maintain that intelligent devils can
organize a perfect state and international peace. The moral connection between the highest political good and the moral society,
then, is further strengthened, as compared with my first step of
criticism, once it is realized, as Kant realized on ly insufficiently,
that true political peace within and between the states is not to be
expected as long as the war of all against all continues in the
socioeconomic realm.
The third step is based on the fact that Kant fails to mention
institutions that have as their primary task to promote the ends
that individuals set for themselves in the moral society. Religious
institutions have only a limited function in this regard, and, moreover, Kant argues that religious institutions as we know them will
have changed into an invisible church. Further, although Kant accepted the emerging capitalist economy, he did not claim that such
an economy seeks to fulfill the task of promoting universal happiness. Last, Kant excludes the state from directly contributing to the
common good, arguing that the legislator cannot force us to promote ethical ends. Thus Kant arrives at the view that the mutual
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promotion of personal ends is a question of individual morality.
This view is unsatisfactory on at least two grounds. First, even if
we grant Kant that the mutual promotion of individual ends must
take place within the constraints set by the minimal state and a
private economy, it does not follow that the moral ideal must remain an "inner" state of affairs. Altruistic agents, if rational, wiU
opt not only for the individual expression of beneficence but also
for its social expression-that is, they will establish institutions so
as to coordinate and optimize their efforts. Kant's failure to explore
this possibility seems to reflect a certain "institutional alienation"
in his work, which resulted from extending the alienation we now
often experience in our participation in institutions to institutional
participation as such. His viewpoint seems to be that practices
regulated by "outer" rules are somehow intrinsically morally inferior to those based on "inner" rules. The misguided suggestion
is that the main issue at stake is the origin of rules rather than the
question whether they are just (i.e., accord with the moral law, or
unified will of colegislators) and thus can be autonomously affirmed. Besides, this distinction between "inner" and "outer"
rules is a relative matter in that "inner" rules are also a social and
historical product. As Kant himself notes, practical reason evolved
in response to social conflict and the struggle with external nature,
and it needs communication so as to flourish. At any rate, Kant
holds that the human person is a social being. So why would the
human agent in the moral society not wish to express his social
nature in a wide variety of universal institutions (besides the
state)? Why would he not wish that his conduct be guided by rules
that are the product of rational collective deliberation and decision
making? Second, it is not at all clear why virtuous agents who take
seriously their duty to promote the ends of others would wish to
opt for the institutional constraints outlined by Kant. More affirmatively, the moral idea l of the realm of ends seems to imply the
demand that our present economic institutions be transformed so
that they aim directly at promoting universal happiness. (We can
hardly blame Kant for failing to foresee that the capitalist economic
system would leave behind a trail of immense human suffering,
but my point here is to develop the ramifications of his thought for
our present condition.) And, since our ends are not only economic
(material) in nature, a wide variety of cultural institutions must be
changed as well. This requires political cooperation that goes
beyond Kant's vision of the perfect state and international peace.
In (tentative) conclusion, then-and this is my third step of criticism-the moral ideal of the community of colegislators requires
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that all our institutions, whether political, economic, or cultural, be
changed in light of this ideal, not only so as to set the stage for a
unified humanity but also so as to instantiate the ideal and be a
hallmark of a moral humanity.
In Part Two I will elaborate some of the arguments in my last
two steps of criticism. It will then become clear that these two
steps are so many roads from Kant's social ethics to a Kantian
socialist ethics. In short, I will argue that since socialism overcomes
significant social and economic inequalities which arise from private ownership of the means of production, it makes possible
substantial basic liberties and effective political democracy in general. By the same token, socialism is conducive to the cause of
peace, but I will pay less attention to this argument. Moreover, I
will argue that socialist economic institutions instantiate the moral
ideal, because they are to be defined as democratic institutions
which aim at the satisfaction of the needs of all human beings.
Finally, as we will see in Part Two, these arguments essentially
accord with Hermann Cohen's view. Cohen eliminates the distinction between the highest political good and the highest moral
good and puts in their place one highest good, a peaceful international order of democratic socialist societies.

CHAPTERV

The Philosophy of History (C):
Moral Progress and Revolution

In the preceding chapters we have seen that the French Revolution
plays an important role in Kant's practical philosophy. To recapitulate, Kant views the Fre nch sta te after the Revolution as an
example of a political order that resembles the natural order as a
teleological order; this state s hows that, within a good politica l
society, " eve ry member should surely be purpose as well as
means, ... while a ll work together toward the possibility of th e
whole" (judgment, p. 221n.; § 65; VI: 453n.). We have also seen th at
the French Revolution may have influenced Kant's description of
the culture of skill as encompassing an increasingly intense class
struggle which, we may hope, will lead to a more just state. Last,
we have noted that the French Revolution and the enthusiasm it
engendered among its spectators supported Kant's hop e fo r moral
progress, because th is enthusia sm sign ifi es that, when su itable circumstances arise, the specta tors, like the revolutionaries, will
engage in political action based on republican ideals.
Or, more precisely, I have claimed that Kant is to be interpreted along these lines. I will now argue in more detail for this
claim in the first section below, while also con sidering an opposite
interpretation. The issue at stake for social ethics may once more
be stressed : the cunning of nature does not suffi ce to nurture the
hope of morally committed persons for progress, and, although
165
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the enthusiasm engendered by progressive epochal political events
is in itself supportive of this hope, it needs to be supplemented
with the hope that people in appropriate circumstances will act
upon their moral ideals.
In the first section I will address as well Kant's notion of what
constitutes moral progress; I will then turn in the second section
to his moral condemnation of revolution and other forms of political revolt and resistance. This condemnation weakens Kant's social
ethics; for it leaves little or no room for progressive political action
under oppressive conditions. I will examine some attempts to reconci Je Kant's view here with his apparent approval of the French
Revolution, but, since my primary concern is to develop a viable
Kantian social(ist) ethics, I will focus on analyzing his reasons for
holding this view in the first place. My conclusion will be that
these reasons are inadequate. Finally, in the third section I will
offer a summary of Kant's philosophical reconstruction of history
and end by briefly assessing his hope for progress from the perspective of the present day.

1. The French Revolution as
a Sign of Moral Progress
Kant's discussion of the moral significance of the French Revolution takes place within the context of his addressing the question
whether the human race is steadily making moral progress. Kant
argues in "An Old Question" that three answers are to be rejected:
terrorism, eudaemonism, and abderitism. The terrorist holds that
the history of humanity is a constant decline into wickedness until
annihilation is our fate. Kant replies with sarcasm: "Doomsday is
at our doorstep; and the pious enthusiast by this time is already
dreaming of the restoration of all things and a renovated world
after the time that this one will have perished in flames" (pp. 13940; VII: 393-94). The eudaemonist maintains that the future will
bring progress because humanity is gradually developing a better
moral disposition. The problem with this view is, Kant says, that
"[i]t may always be conceded that the proportion of good and evil
elements inherent in our predisposition remains constant." Thus,
on the supposition that "[t]he effects cannot surpass the power of
the efficient cause," we must conclude that "the quantity of good
mixed in man with the evil cannot exceed a certain measure
beyond which it would be able to work its way up and thus ever
proceed toward the better" (p. 140; 394). The last view that Kant
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opposes is the abderitic hypothesis that humanity moves toward th e
good only to fall back later into evil.' This is the Sisyphean view of
Moses Mendelssohn ana lyzed in On the Old Saw; it presents the
history of humanity as a "mere farcical comedy" (p. 141; 395).
Kant continues to argue for what may be seen as a mod ifi ed
eudaemonistic manner of representing history. He holds that the
eudaemonist is mistaken in basing hope for moral progress on th e
alleged fact that humanity becomes less inclined to evil as history
proceeds, but that we can nonetheless affirm this hope; for all that
is needed to defend the thesis of mora l progress is that "we [are]
able to attribute to man an inherent and unalterably good, albeit
limited, will" (p. 142; 396). The French Revolution as a "historical
sign" must show that humanity has such a limited good will.
The general structure of Kant's argument for moral progress is
as follows. Once it can be shown that a certain progressive politica l
event in history indicates that a moral cause (i.e., a bmited good
will) is operative in humanity, we can with confidence look to th e
future, because we can predict that circumstances similar to those
which gave rise to this event in the first place will again prevail,
and we can expect that in such circumstances this moral cause wi ll
again lead to a progressive political event. Compensating for our
lack of historical and sociological knowledge with philosophical
ingenuity, Kant states his argum ent somewhat obsc urely in thi s
passage from "An Old Question":
There must be some experience in the human race which, as an
event, points to the disposition and capacity of the human race to be the
cause of its own advance toward the better.... But from a given cause an
event as an effect can be predicted if the circumstances prevail which
contribute to it. That these conditions must come to pass some time or
other can, of course, be predicted in general, as in the calcu lation of
probability in games of chance; but that prediction cannot enable us to
know whether what is predicted is to happen in my life .. .. Therefore,
an event must be sought which points to the existence of such a cause and
to its effectiveness in the human race, undetermined with regard to time,
and which would allow progress toward th e better to be concluded as nn
inevitable consequence (pp. 142-43; 396--97).

Kant furth er explicates his argument by concluding that the eve nt
searched for must not be considered itself "as the cause of historical progress, but only as an intimation or historical sign (sig1111111
rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognostikon). Thus it can prove
the [moral] tendency of the human race viewed in its entire ty,
that is, seen not as [a sum of] individuals . .. , but rather as divided
into nations and states" (p. 143; 397; translation altered).
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At first sight, it seems that the French Revolution as the
sought-after historical sign is relevant only for the reason that the
enthusiasm of its spectators sh ows that a moral cause is operative
in humanity, and not because it also signifies that the moral disposition is to be found in the revolutionaries as well. (Recall that
the moral cause here takes the form of a moral interest in the
republican state and in the international peace this state enhances.) This cannot, however, be Kant's only meaning, for, as his
argument for progress shows, the importance of claiming that the
enthusiasm of the spectators indicates that a moral cause is working in humanity is that the spectators (including those of future
generations, reliving the revolutionary past) will act like the revolutionaries in similar circumstances. Thus the French Revolution
itself is a sign of moral progress in that it makes clear that human
agents will act upon their ideals, and the enthusiasm of its spectators is relevant in that it supports the hope that we may expect
events like this revolution to happen in the future.
ln Chapter II I emphasized one explanation for the fact that
Kant directly addresses the enthusiasm of the spectators rather
than that of the revolutionaries, namely, to avoid the suspicion that
such enthusiasm is based on heteronomous grounds. Now the
other explanation there offered may be stressed : most human
agents are spectators, and attention to their enthusiasm better supports the hope for many fundamental political changes to come
than could attention limited to the revolutionaries alone. The
Kantian text corroborates this point. After observing that we cannot exclude the possibility that the French Revolution will finally
miscarry and not fulfill the republican promise ("An Old Question" was written in 1798), Kant argues that, even if this happened,
his prediction of progress would lose none of its force:
For that event [the Revolution] is too important, too much interwoven
with the interest of humanity, and its influence too widely propagated in
all areas of the world to not be recalled on any favorable occasion by the
nations which would then be roused to a repetition of new efforts of this kind;
because then, in an affair so important for humanity, the intended constitution, at a certain time, must finally attain that constancy which instruction by repeated experience suffices to establish in the minds of all men
(p. 147; 401; italics added).

Kant, then, presents here a good systematic reason for turning
primarily to the spectators. The fate of the Revolution itself was
uncertain, and, as Kant must have been painfully aware, the early
support of the spectators of the French Revolution had signifi-
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cantly dwindled. 2 Yet hope for progress can be upheld, because we
may anticipate that, when suitable conditions arise, the enthusiasm of these spectators for republican ideals will be aroused once
again, and will lead to political progress; or, more likely, we may
expect that spectators of future generations will make attempts in
this direction. But there is no certainty here. For Kant there is a
thin line between saying that the French Revolution will not be
forgotten and claiming that it ought not to be forgotten. At a later
point in "An Old Question" he declares that his thesis that the
negative effects of war will eventually bring peace is "heroic medicine" for a humanity which is "dying from pure improvement!"
(p. 153; 407; translation altered). The same can be said of his "philosophical prophesy" here. And we may add that the hope for
progress supported by the "prediction" of future revolutionary
change must bring about the real cure and certainty: moral and
political action, now. Further, the passage just cited is important in
that it states that growing historical experience is also an aspect of
the hope for progress. That is, progress is to be expected from the
conjunction of the moral cause operative in humanity and an increasing understanding of society, human interaction, and the
mechanisms of social change.
Kant continues this passage by offering the final conclusion
that "[t]he human race has always been in progress toward the
better and will continue to be so henceforth." He adds that if one
considers not merely what is taking place in some one nation but
rather the participation of all people in such progress, the prospect
of an "immeasurable time" is revealed-"provided at least that the
first epoch of natural revolution [which took place] before the
existence of human beings is not followed by a second one that
will push humanity aside to clear the stage for other creatures"
(translation altered). This might quite well happen, because "in
the face of the omnipotence of nature, or rather its supreme cause
which is inaccessible to us, the human being is ... but a trifle." In
an apparent reference to the old regime, but not only to this regime, Kant ends his comments here on the French Revolution with
the following inflammatory words: "But for the sovereigns of his
own species also to consider and treat him as such [i.e., as a trifle],
whether by burdening him as an animal, regarding him as a mere
tool of their designs, or exposing him in their conflicts with one
another in order to have him massacred-that is no trifle, but a
subversion of the ultimate purpose of creation itself" (p. 148; 402).
Recently a different explanation has been offered for Kant's emphasis on the enthusiasm of the spectators rather than on that of
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th e revolutionaries. Peter Nicholson, in ''Kant on the Duty Never
to Resist th e Sovereign," argues that Kant focused on the spectators because he, like them, was enthusiastic on ly about the republican ideals upheld by the revolutionaries, but condemned their
mea ns of promoting these ideals (in Ethics 86; 1976: 214-30, p. 226).
The strength of this interpretation is that Kant did, indeed, conde mn revolutionary activity (a p roblem which will be our direct
conce rn in the next section). But its weaknesses seem to be overriding. For one thing, Kant's undying pe rsonal support for the
French Revolution itself is a well-established historical fact (see
note 2, above; note 16 below). For another thing, Kant spea ks of
"wishful participation" of the spectators in the Revolution. But,
most importantly, the interpretatio n does not satisfactorily address
th e fact th at Kant bases hi s argument for prog ress on the expectation that present or future spectators of the French Revolution will
come "to a repetition of new efforts of this kind." Nicholson's only
respo nse in this rega rd is that Kant hoped for progress through
m ea ns that re main within th e limits set by th e (legal) law, in
particu lar, through reform initiated by the rulers themselves (see
ibid., p. 227) .
Now it is true that Kant at some points expresses the hope for
reform from above (which is unobjectionable in itself) 3- but to
interpre t his argument for progress as primarily from this source
is implausi ble. After all, Kant did not say that we may anticipate
progress because the rulers of his day were enthusiastic about the
Revolution. On the contrary: what proved to him that th e enthusiasm of the spectators was moral in nature was that its expression
was " fraught with danger" ("An Old Question," p. 144; VII: 398).
These spectators, in other words, were living under oppressive
co nditions in which expression of their democratic aspirations wa s
not tol era ted by th e prevailing powers, and the logic of Kant's
argument is th at these aspirations-through political action-wil l
be the ma in vehicle of progress. Moreover, it is implausi ble in itself
to hold th at, under oppressive conditions, progress can in general
take place through mere "lega l" m ean s. Were we to conclude that
Kant's argument was based on this expectation, we should also
conclude that it was a weak argument.
All thi s is not to say that Kant is not best understood as a
gradualist, both in hi s ethical and in his political thought. In Religion (p. 43; VI: 187-88) Kant describes the adoption of the maxim
of holiness as "a revolution in [our] disposition," but he consistently continues to argue that the road toward holiness must be
seen as a "path of continual progress"; that is, it " must be rega rded
as nothing but an ever-enduring struggle toward the better, hence
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as a gradual reformation of the propensity to evil." Likewise,
Kant's thesis of progress points to the need for revolutions as the
only way to change some oppressive regimes-reform, if possible,
is the morally preferred option-but we still should see the overall path of historical progress as gradualist. To explicate this latter
point, it is helpful to turn briefly to Kant's discussion in Peace of
three types of politicians: the political moralist, the despotic moralist, and the moral politician.
What characterizes the political rnoralist is that "he forges a
morality in such a way that it conforms to the stateman's advantage" (p. 119; VI: 458-59). This "advantage" typically concerns the
personal ends of the political moralist, but Kant also seems to
consider the possibility of a political moralist who uses immoral
means to bring about moral ends (see pp. 124-25; 463-64). More
specifically, such a political moralist maintains that, since the citizens are not yet ripe for higher ends, force and other expedient
means of political technology may be used to "help" them along.
The danger of this policy is that the ends might not be realized or
that the means might even become the end. The despotic moralist
makes a similar mistake, but not because he thinks that the ends
justify the means; rather, his immoral actions result from overenthusiasm for the moral ends and from political naivete. Accordingly, Kant states with respect to the despotic moralists "experience will gradually retrieve them from their infringement of
[human] nature and lead them on to a better course" (p. 120- 21;
460). The moral politician provides the proper alternative in that he
"so chooses political principles that they are consistent with those
of morality" (p. 119; 458). That is, the moral politician does not
adapt morality to politics, as the political moralist does; rathe1~ his
politics follow from his moral principles. Or we may say that his
ends follow from the means, rather than the other way around.
Thus the moral politician proceeds in a cautious manne1~ adhering
to the principle of gradualism without losing sight of his ultimate
aim. He may be painfully aware that the existing constitution is
still far from the ideal, but he also realizes that to push change too
strongly might be counterproductive as well as unjust, leading to
repression and a worse constitution. Kant concludes: "All politics
must bend its knee before the right. But by this it can hope slowly
to reach the stage where it will shine with an immortal glory"
(p. 128; 468).
Kant's personal view of the morally required rate of change
may well have been too cautious,·1 but this should not prevent us
from seeing that his ideas developed along sound lines. Moral
terrorism has a long history, whether it is rooted in the idea that
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we must-and can-be forced to become morally good, socialist,
and so on, or in the mistaken view that a political revolution by
itself can bring about a complete change in human nature and
expectations. We will see in Part Two that both forms of moral
terroris m can be found in-or are the outcome of- Karl Marx's
work, and that the gradualism of Kantian socialism involves not
condemnation of revolution under all circumstances but rather a
rejection of the revolution of moral terrorism. Further, it is interesting to note that Peace (1795) was written during the Reign of Terror.
Accordingly, we may interpret Kant's criticism of moral terrorism
as an implicit criticism of the Jacobin Republic. (Such criticism
shou ld not be equated with total rejection of the French Revolution, nor should it be confused with the kind of condemnation to
which Nicholson is referring, i.e., the a priori condemnation of
revolutionary activity in genera l. ) More speculatively, we may assume that Robespierre was Kant's model for the political moralist
(at least, in the variant I have discussed), whereas Danton represented the despotic moralist. Certainly, they seem to fit these categories in some respects.
The question is s till open how from Kant's claim that a limited
good will is operative in humanity it follows that " [t]he human
race has always been in progress." Remarkably enough, although
the idea of past mora l progress is an aspect of his final conclusion
in "An Old Question," Kant neglects to address this question. His
only suggestion is that we can extend the thesis of progress to the
past because the moral cause is "undetermined with regard to
time" (p. 143; VU: 397). My explanation will take this as its starting
point. I will also say a few words about the idea of moral progress
and its relation to other levels of progress.
We may see the hjstory of humanity, after the awakening of
reason, as a gradual overcoming of impediments that block the
fulfillment of duties. Poverty, the struggle for survival, unjust legal
systems, and war all create conditions unfavorable to obedience to
the moral law. So, on the assumption that the moral efforts of
humanity are constant, we can expect mora l improvement to take
place once there is increasing success in the domination of nature,
less poverty, a better legal system, and fewer occurrences of war.
Kant holds that the French Revolution as a h istorical sign warrants
this assumption, and that, since history shows improvement in
these areas-the notable exception being war-the thesis of moral
progress is substantiated. Like the eudaemonist, then, Kant sees
humanity as making mora l improvement, bu t, unlike the
eudaemonist, he does not view this as the result of an increase in
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the proportion of good over evil in the human person (or lessened
inclination to violate the moral law when it is in the agent's interest
to do so); rather, moral improvement occurs because there are
fewer occasions and conditions that give rise to immoral behavior.
In others words, on the assumption that the human agent has a
limited constant good will, he will more often fulfill his duties once
progress takes place on the technological level (the domination of
nature) and the pragmatic level (society) . But the opposite also
holds: improvement on the moral level induces, or fac ilitates,
improvement on the pragmatic and technological levels.
Learning processes are an important aspect of the idea of
moral progress. We have come to a better understanding of the
pragmatic cond itions that facilitate moral improvement-that is, an
improved understanding of the causes of social unrest, oppression,
and war-but we may also assume progress in explicating the
requirements set by the moral law. (It is in this vein that Kant in
Religion traces the evoluti on of the Judeo-Christian tradition, viewing it as a gradual unfolding of pure religion and, hence, of pure
practical reason. 5) This last point is crucial; for what made the
French Revolution and the enthu siasm it produced so significant
for Kant was not merely that it indicated a moral disposition in
humanity but that this disposition was at last directed toward
proper ideals. H is formal argument for progress conceals rather
than reveals this, since it focuses attention on the hope for future
recurrences of proper conditions for collective action toward the
republican state (and international peace).
The assumption of an unalterably limited good will in humanity may be interpreted as a minimal assumption; for Kant actually
concedes more to the eudaemonist than is suggested in "An O ld
Question." The culture of discipline makes human agents more
susceptible to the demands of the moral law, and we may expect
that, once the voice of duty speaks louder, as it were, these agents
will increase their moral efforts. This process may be seen as preparation for, or an early stage of, the ethicization of human nature.
This ethicization means that the performance of duty will gradually lose its compul sory aspect and be guided by such moral
feelings as moral indignation, enthusiasm, solidarity, moral satisfaction, and dignity, depending on the occasion and situation.
Moral education, a climate of free discussion, and a free flow of
information are factors conducive to the development of such feelings and, hence, to an increase in moral determination. It does not
seem mistaken to see history as making progress in these areas,
and certainly a moral task lies here.
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Whether moral progress or some other kind of progress is the
main impetus for historical progress seems to vary with the historical period in question. This insight, I think, is not adequately
expressed is Kant's philosophy of history. Any philosophy of history must deal with the following problem: it approaches the past
and future progress of humanity from a particular vantage point,
which needs to be justified, or at least made plausible. One way of
doing this is to ground one's vantage point in certain fundamental
historical changes that take place in one's own time. Thus one
interprets the significance of the past and the expectation of the
future in terms of the present. To live in a time of fundamental
historical developments is to live in a privileged present, enabling
one to make a reasonable prediction of the future. Kant lived in
such a privileged present; his time was a period of fundamental
political change, and his prediction that the republican state wou ld
gradually be realized has, at least partly, proved to be correct, since
this state may be equ ated with representative democracy. The
French Revolution was a highlight of Kant's privileged present.
Marx, despite his misinterpretation of the good will as "otherworldly," put the matter succinctly when he said that Kant's philosophy must be seen as the German th eory of the French
Revolution. 6
A privileged present is a present (historical moment) nonetheless, and herein lies its limitation. Kant's philosophy of history overemphasizes political change (as against moral, economic, or other
changes) as the force behind historical progress. To be sure, Kant
somewhat softens this defect by maintaining, at least in "An Old
Question," that political progress signifies moral progress and by
arguing in general that economic progress contributes to fundamental political change. Yet, it remains the case that his philosophical reconstruction of history treats the history of humanity too
narrowly as political history, in particular as the history of the
state. What might h ave been true of his own time is not necessarily
true of the past and the future. Here a brief look at Marx's work is
in structive. Marx also lived in a privileged present: his was a
period of rapid technological and economic change, and some of
his predictions have proved to be correct and may still tum out to
be correct. But Marx made a mistake similar to Kant's in claiming
that in general changes on the technological level (the economic
basis of society) determine and condition changes on the pragmatic and moral levels. Marx's mistake seems even greater; for it often
seems that mediation between the levels is altogether lacking in
his theoretical discussion of historical progress. The lesson, then,
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is that the predominance of one level over the others is a hi storical
variable: it is only at the end of history- that is, in the moral
society- that one level will be enduringly the main impetus of a!J
progress; that level will be, of course, the mora l level.

2. The Right to Revolution and
Resistance
Although Kant wa s enthusiastic about the French Revolution and
although the logic of his argument for progress in thi s context
might lead one to expect him to support revolutionary activity, he
actually condemned such activity as violating the moral law. Even
in "An Old Question," Kant writes in a footnote that the rea li zation of the republican state "may not come to pass through revolution which is always unjust" (p. 146n. ; VII: 400n.) . He expresses
this view in less restrained fashion in On the Old Saw:
[A]ny resistance to the supreme lawma king powe 1~ any incite me nt of
dissa tis fi ed subjects to action, any upri sing that bursts into rebellion- that
all .. . is the worst, most punishable crime in a community. ... And this
ban is absolute, so unconditional that eve n though that supreme powe r or
its agent, the head of the s tate, may have broken the original co ntract,
even thoug h in the subject's eyes h e may have forfeited the right to legislate by empowe ring the government to rule tyrannically by sh eer violence,
even th en the subject is allowed no resistance, no violent counteraction
(p. 67; VI: 383).

In this vein Kant also declares in justice that th e citizen should not
be "overly curious" about the origin of supreme authority, lest he
infer that it is not "the people's duty to endure even th e most
intole rable abuse of supreme authority" (pp. 84 and 86; VII: pp. 125
and 127). Apparently, then, Kant holds that, although th e ru ler
who treats his subjects as a trifle subverts the ultimate purpose of
creation, it is nonetheless the duty of the subj ects to obey.
This surprising and objectionable picture mu st be modifi ed
somewhat if we are to do justice to Kant's over-all view. The claim
that the citizen must not be too curious about the origin of the
supreme authority, since he may come to think of disobedience, is
counterbalanced by Kant's strong plea, in "What ls Enlightenment?" for the unrestricted public use of reason, which entai ls that
the citizen as scholar may openly express his misgivings about th e
injustices committed by the ruling power (see On History, p. 6; IV:
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172). This qualification also is added in Justice, where Kant states
that "if the organ of the sovereign, the ruler, proceeds contrary to
the laws . .. the subject may lodge a complaint (gravamina) about
this injustice" (p. 85; VII: 126). Further, in this same work we find
the specification that the supreme power cannot force us lo do
certain immoral things. As Kant puts it, "a categorical imperative
says: 'Obey the suzerain (in everything that does not conflict with
internal morality) who has authority over you!"' (p. 139; 179; see
also I<eligion, p. 90n.; VI: 244n.). What Kant seems to have had in
mind is that passive disobedience or resistance is justified if the
ruler seeks to enforce religious beliefs against our will or commands us to perform such blatant violations of the moral Jaw as
assassinations. 7 Last, it is to be noted that Kant states in Justice that
"the people might have at least some excuse for forcibly [dethroning a monarch] by appealing to the right of necessity" (p. 87n; VII:
127n.). 8 An "excuse," however, is at best a halfhearted endorsement; it is certainly not a justification.
Kant's enthusiasm for the French Revolution, on the one hand,
and his moral condemnation of virtually all forms of political revolt
and resistance, on the other hand, have puzzled many Kant commentators. A brief discussion of some suggested (partial) solutions
of this paradox is in order. It has been suggested that (a) Kant's
condemnation of revolution was deceptive, made in order to avoid
censorship of his work. 9 This thesis is indefensible in the light of
what we know about Kant, and it is implausible as well, fo1~ were
it true, it would have most likely become apparent in his correspondence and Reflexionen . The following suggestion is to be rejected for similar reasons: (b) Kant's emphatic denial of the right to
revolution is formulated for "strategic" reasons, in that it is directed against counterrevolution and restoration of the Bourbons. 10
We should hesitate to ascribe such an expedient argument to Kant.
Also, if Kant did hold that a distinction is to be made between just
and unjust revolutions, why would he not have said so and defended his view? Likewise, we can reject the claim (c) that Kant
condemned revolutionary activity because he believed that Prussia, as opposed to France, was not yet ripe for a liberal revolution."
This would have been an accurate historical observation; but,
again, if Kant held this view, why would he not have limited himself to expressing the point rather than arguing in detail that revolution is always immoral?
A more important proposal is (d) that Kant's enthusiasm for
the French Revolution and his condemnation of revolution in genera l are consistent because he approved on ly retrospectively of
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those revolutions which led to closer approximations of the republican state, but viewed as immoral all present or future revolutionary action. 12 This proposal, however, faces the sa me prob lem as
solution (e) that Kant ad hered to the doctrine that revolution is to
be condemned as evil before the fact, but may be applauded as
good after the fact. Th is doctrine was well entrenched before
Kant's time, and Kant did indeed hold that the revolutionary origin
of a regime does not in the least undermine its Jegitimacy. '3 The
problem with both of these proposals is that Kant declared not
merely that the effects of the French Revolution a re to be applauded but also that the event itself was the praiseworthy product
of "a gifted people" ("An Old Q uestion," p. 144; VII : 398). The
former claim is con sistent with the a priori condemn ation of revolution, the latter not. Now if we assume that both proposals address on ly the first claim, they do not really deal with the paradox
of Kant's enthusiasm for the French Revolution; but if we assum e
that they also address th e second claim, then they only reformulate the paradox, as consisting of a conflict between historical judgment and moral judgment. To further clarify my argument, it is to
be noted that Kant's moral conde mnation of war is consistent w ith
his hi storical judgm ent that war has been a driving force behind
the development of human ca pacities; the claim here is merely that
good ca n result from evi l. 14 (The broader regulative principle is that
we may hope that evil is self-destructive, leading to the good.)
Likewise, Kant's moral condemnation of revolution is con sistent
with approving the progressive political results of the Fre nch Revolution. The problem, however, is that in this particula r case it
seems that Kant in his historical judgment also declares that the
"evil" itself (i. e., the French Revolution) is good as well. [I wi ll
soon raise another objection to solutions (d) and (e).J
A final solution (f) is that Kant could consistently be enthusiastic about the French Revolution, because he did not see this revolution as a revolution proper. '5 Or, more precisely, Louis XVI was the
only revolutionary. Kant writes:
As soon ... as the chief of sta te in person ... also allows himse lf to be
represented, then the united people do not merely represent the sovereign, but they themselves are the sovereign ....
Thus, a great error in judgment was made by one of th e powerful
sovereigns of our time [Louis XV I] when he attempted to extrica te him self
from the embarrassment ca used by large state debts by leav ing it to the
people to take over this burden and to distribute it as they saw fit. The
natural result was that he handed over to the people legislative authority
[after the calling of the Estates General, May 5, 1789], not on ly over taxa-
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tio n, but also over the gove rnm en t. . . . As a con sequence, th e sove reignty of the monarch d isa ppeared comple tely (it was not just suspended) and passed over to the people (Ju stice, pp. 113-14; VII: 149).

Kant con tinues hi s analysis by arguing that the Estates General
could not have made the tacit pro mise to take care only temporarily of the ki ng's business (the large state debts) and to relinquish sovereign power after it had finished this business; for, "to
hold that such a contract has any binding force is self-contradictory by the principle: 'No m an can serve two masters"' (ibid., p.
114; 149-50). Following Ka nt, then, all the steps that the Estates
General took after May 5, 1789, were legally justified, including th e
adoption of a new constitution on September 3, 1791. He argues
inconsistently, however, that the execution of Louis XVI wa s a
crime more heinous than murder, for it is an instance of " state
suicide" (ibid., p. 88n.; 129n.); after all, in Kant's interpretation
Louis XVI no longer represen ted the state, and, moreover, he engaged in what Kant him self saw as the most punishable crime in
th e community, resistance to legitimate authority.
Kant's view of Louis XVI as the only revolutionary is implausible. Kant argues that it is the duty of the sovereign to gradually
and continually change the existing constitution toward a republican one-rather than to bring about such a change suddenly without consulting the people (see ibid., par. 52)-but was such incremental change not precisely the route which Louis XVI had
planned (to be sure, for hi s own purposes)? Moreover, should we
see th e pressure that the Estates General put on the monarch as a
mere lega l pressure, exe rcised in order to obtain th e sovereign
power it had alrea dy had from a legal point of view? And sh ould
we interpret the storming of the Bastille and other collective actions of the Parisian populace in the sa me terms? In short, Kant's
attempt here to reconcile hi s enthusiasm for the French Revolution
with his equally vehement condemnation of revolutionary action
raises more questions than it answers; it is difficult to see it as
much mo re than an ingenu ous rationa lization.
Still, solutio n (f) is a good explanation for the fact thai:' Kant
was enthusiastic about the French Revolution (that is, the Estates
Ge nera l and its legal efforts supported by the Parisian populace),
although he denied that there is a right to revolution and active
resista nce. Certainly, this solution reflects at least part of Kant's
th o ught co ncerning the issue at s take. Two broader problems,
however, remain. First, Kant was supportive not only of the French
Revolution but also of the American Revolution and the Irish resis-
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tance against English domination.'" Solution (£) seems of little help
here. Second, this solution fits badly with the manner in which
Kant grounds his thesis of progress in "An Old Question." 17 [The
same applies to solutions (d) and (e) .] This thesis derives its credibility from the expectation and prediction that the future will
bring popular struggle toward the realization of the republican
state. Accepting solution (£) as the whole story, we must, however,
draw the conclusion that Kant's thesis of progress consists merely
of the expectation and prediction that the existing authorities will
voluntarily change their governments into republican forms. And
even then there would be, strictly speaking, no moral progress; for
taking Kant's analysis in the above of the French Revolution seriously, we must infer that such change consists of a revolutionary
and, hence, immoral, act. But, be this as it may, the hope that
progress in general can take place through reform from above is a
hope against all odds. Kant's condemnation of revolution and active resistance and his thesis of progress are at loggerheads, if not
textually, then certainly in effect.
There seem to be two major ways of making Kant's practical
thought consistent. The first is to place the emphasis on his moral
condemnation of revolution and other forms of active revolt and
resistance. We must then give less content to the thesis of progress
than Kant seems to have given it. Moreover, we must conclude that
his enthusiasm for liberal revolutions was merely personal; it has
no place within his practical system. And, more broadly, we must
conclude that the primary actual duty formulated by Kant's social
ethics is to protest against injustice from behind the lectern. Hope
for fundamental change, then, becomes mainly a question of the
cunning of nature. The second way is to reject Kant's condemnation of active opposition to unjust political conditions. Then we
can give full credit to Kant's enthusiasm for the French Revolution
and other struggles for freedom, as pointing in the same direction
marked out by the logic of his social ethics and his argument for
progress: moral and political action in a variety of forms is not only
morally permissible but our duty. Also, hope can now reach
beyond the dialectic of self-interest and become one of praxis. I
have tried to show that, all in all, the second way fits best with
Kant's over-all view, but ultimately it is to be conceded that such an
issue cannot be definitively settled. For my purpose of developing
a viable Kantian social(ist) ethics, however, the second alternative
is clearly the more promising. So our next concern is to subject to
philosophical scrutiny Kant's reasons for maintaining that revolution and active resistance are against the moral law.
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Kant's first reason for condemning revolution and active resistance is expressed in the following passage from Justice:
[R]esistance to the supreme legislation can itself on ly be unlawful; indeed
it must be conceived as destroying the entire lawful constitution, beca use,
in order for it to be authorized, there would have to be a public Jaw that
would permit the resistance. That is, the supreme legislation would have
to contain a stipulation that it is not supreme and that in one and the
same judgment the people as subjects should be made sovereign ove r him
to whom they are subject; this is self-contradictory. The self-contradiction
involved here is immediately evident if we ask who wou ld act as judge in
this controversy between the people and the sovereign. . . . [I]t is plain
that the people want to act as judge of their own cause [and that is absurd]
(pp. 86-87; VII: 127; translator's addition).

At first sight, it seems that Kant is here making the point that there
cannot be a positive or legal right to revolution or resistance. lf so,
his argument need not, and will not, disturb the resister; for the
resister appeals not to a legal right to revolt in certain circumstances, but to a moral or natural right. More, however seems to be
at stake. Kant argues that sovereign power finds its legitimacy in
the idea of the state as a social contract. In this contract the people
give up their right to be their own judge and install the rule of law
as encompassing the sovereign power, its executive organ, and the
judicial authority. Thus the above passage is to be understood as
follows. To claim that the people have a right to resist the sovereign
power is self-contradictory in that the people have voluntarily replaced arbitrary coercion (in the state of nature each is his own
judge) by legitimate and rational coercion (the rule of Jaw) and,
yet, they wish to act as judges of their own cause, which is absurd.
A closer look at the idea of the social contract makes clear that
Kant is mistaken, even on his own terms. His notion of the social
contract is an ideal concept (i.e., an Idea of reason) in that the
sovereign power arising from, and legitimated by, this contract
expresses the united wi ll. This will is identical with one's own
rational or moral will, adhering to the universal principle of justice. In accordance with this, Kant argues that the hypothetical
"move" from the state of nature to the rule of law (the "original
contract") cannot be seen as a sacrifice by the individual of "his
inborn external freedom ." Kant continues: "[R]ather, we must say
that he has completely abandoned his wild, lawless freedom in
order to find his whole freedom again undiminished in a lawful
dependency, that it, in a juridical state of society, since this dependency comes from his own legislative Will" (Justice, pp. 80-81; VII:
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122). Now if the existing state indeed approximates the idea of the
social contract, it would be irrational and immoral to resist the
sovereign power. But what if the legislative authority designs laws
that clearly conflict with the united will and, hence, with the universal principle of justice? Following Kant's justification of the
state, we must infer that the more the legislative authority deviates
from the idea of the social contract the less legitimacy it has-that
is, the coercion it exercises via its executive organ becomes increasingly arbitrary. This constitutes a prima facie ground for holding that, in such situations, various forms of resistance are justified
and may be indeed our duty, for we ought to depart from a state of
arbitrary coercion and seek the rule of law, i.e., the rule of the
united will. In cases of extreme legal/political injustice, this duty
may even be seen as absolute, on the logic of Kant's account; for
such cases are comparable to the state of nature in terms of violation of individual rights, human suffering, and arbitrary coercion,
and Kant himself maintains that to leave the state of nature and
create the civil union is "the first and unconditioned duty in each
external relationship of human beings who cannot avoid influencing one another" (On the Old Saw, p. 57; VI: 372). The same claim
is made in Justice, but Kant adds here even that "everyone may use
violent means to compel another to enter a juridical state of
society" (pp. 76-77; VII: 118-19).
Kant obviously is not prepared to draw these radical implications from his idea of the state as a social contract. He starts out on
a radical road, rightly claiming that this idea implies that "only the
united and consenting Will of all-that is, a general united Will of
the people by which each decides the same for all and all decide
the same for each-can legislate" (Justice, p. 78; VII: 120). Thus a
good justification is given for the state and legal/political obligation. But then, suddenly, when it turns out that, in the existing
state of affairs, the sovereign power is located in an empirical
person, who legislates in terms of his particular will, we must
accept this and apparently act as if this sovereign power were an
expression of the united will. Moreover, we are asked to leave it up
to this particular will to bring the legal system closer to the ideal.
This is paradoxical. In a critical review of Justice, published in
Kant's own time, the matter is succinctly formulated:
To our knowledge, no philosopher has admitted the most paradoxical
of all paradoxes [except Kant], namely, the proposition that the mere Idea
of sovereignty should necessitate me to obey as my lord anyone who has
imposed himself upon me as a lord, without my asking who has given
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him the right to issue commands to me. [This is an apparent reference to
Kant's claim that the origin of the su preme authority is not open to scrutiny by the people.] ls there to be no difference between saying that one
ought to recognize sovereignty and a chief of state and that one ought to
hold a priori that this or that person, whose existence is not even given a
priori, is one's lord? 8
1

The qu estion is clearly rh e torical, and Kant's obliteration of
this distinction implies that reason is abandoned, as it were, between the original socia l contract (which is at the same time an
ideal) and the ex isting legal/political reality. 19 Despite its critical
potential, then, Kant's transcendental justification of the state and
legal/political obligation-the social contract is the transcendental
precondition of the state and of this kind of obligation-in e ffect
turns out to be a tran scendental bow to the prevailing power
structure.
Kant's second reason for claiming that revolt and resistance are
immoral is that if everyo ne adopted as a maxim that such actions
are permitted in order to seek justice, it "would render every legal
constitution insecure and introduce a state of utter lawlessness
(statu s naturalis) in which all rights would lose at least their effectiveness" (On the Old Saw, p. 69; VI: 385). In other words, Kant
argues that the maxim of revolt and resistance for the sa ke of
justice cannot pass the universality test of the categorical imperative, for it contains a self-contradictory policy: one wishes to resist
the sovereign for the sake of justice, but, if everyone adopted this
policy, it would undermine the conditions of justice because it
would lead to legal anarchy (the state of nature) .
This argument is in adequate for several reasons. To begin
with, it assumes that extremely unjust legal/political systems are
essentially different from the state of nature. Granted that this
view is implausible, as I have just maintained, it follows that there
are some conditions under which Kant's argument does not apply.
Or, alternatively, it can be argued that organized oppressive power
is actually much worse than legal anarchy and that, therefore, a
temporary return to the state of nature (in Kant's sense) is justified
(assuming for the moment that Kant is correct in his view that this
state is th e logical outcome of the maxim of revolt and resistance) .
Further, the universality argument fails in that it puts all forms of
resistance on one line, as if there were no important di stinction to
be drawn between revolution and, say, civil disobedience. 20 The
argument does not s how that civil disobedience is to be condemned. For, although actions of civil resistance involve the break-
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ing of the law, they do not undermine the rule of Jaw as such. To
the contrary, their nonviolent nature expresses an affirmation of
the idea of the rule of law, and the fact that the civil resister accepts
the legal consequences of his conduct points in the same direction. 21 Also, the maxim of civil disobedience, if universalized, does
not logically lead to the state of nature, provided that limitations
are placed upon the scope of this form of resistance (or if civil
disobedience is so defined that these limitations are taken into
account). For instance, the civil resister can operate on the maxim
that civil disobedience may be undertaken-after legal means of
change have been exhausted-in order to secure for a minority
group a constitutional right that the majority already effectively
enjoys. Since the aim of the resister is the consistent execution of
the Jaw, the claim of self-contradiction does not hold up.22 Thus
Kant's mistake is to base his argument on an application of the
categorical imperative that paints everything gray. Kant recognizes
(albeit insufficiently, as we will soon see) that there are different
forms of resistance and that resistance may or may not be guided
and motivated by the idea of justice, but, as soon as he turns to
apply the universality test, these distinctions are neglected. Selective disobedience to certain laws is transformed into a logical commitment to indiscriminate disobedience to all laws- and, of
course, few would wish to argue that the latter is defensible. 23
Given a suitable definition (or limitation) of civil disobedience,
then, a policy of protest of this kind is not a self-contradictory
policy, in that it seeks justice while logically (but not necessarily
factually) undermining the conditions of justice. Comparable arguments can be developed with respect to such forms of nonviolent
protest as political demonstrations and conscientious refusal based
on political principles. In short, as long as these forms of protest
are reformative in character-that is, directed against certain decisions made by the sovereign but without denying his right to
punish-they do not logically lead us back to legal anarchy.
Reformative actions, however, presuppose that the existing
power structure upholds at least minimally decent standards of
justice. Once this condition is not satisfied, civil disobedience,
demonstrations, and political conscientious refusal may lead to, or
become part of, revolutionary struggle. Kant holds that the maxim
of revolution for the sake of justice cannot consistently be universalized, but, again, it seems that his argument is based on neglecting important distinctions as soon as the maxim is universalized.
The following remark from Justice illustrates this point: "If the
people were to hold that they were justified in using violence
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against a constitution, however defective it might be, and against
the supreme authority, they would be supposing that they had a
right to put violence as the supreme prescriptive act of legislation
in the place of every right and Law" (p. 140; VII: 179-80; my emphasis). This inference is incorrect; for in the premise the legitimacy of
violence is conditioned by considerations of justice, whereas in the
conclusion violence is unrestricted and arbitrary. But perhaps Kant
is making here not a logical point concerning the consistent universalization of the maxim of revolution but rather a causal or
factual point: he sees an opening wedge; once revolution is justified in a good cause, there will be no way to prevent it from being
seen as justified in any cause whatsoever. This does indeed pose a
problem, even for reformative protest, but especially for revolutionary action. Revolution, therefore, seems to be justifiable only
as a last resort in a situation of extreme oppression. Moreover, the
problem indicates that a variety of limiting constraints must be
placed upon revolutionary struggle: the moral and political aims of
this struggle must be continuously questioned, and the struggle
must be undertaken only if there is a reasonable chance that, both
in process and in product, it can avoid the arbitrary violence it
seeks to overcome.
Kant's final argument against the right to revolution and resistance also rests upon the categorical imperative. We have seen that
one aspect of the typic of the universal-law formula, the naturallaw formula, is that the laws of nature are in principle public, the
analogical value being that maxims, governmental policies, and
juridical laws that cannot become public are unjust. Thus Kant
comes to state in Peace:
The illegitimacy of rebellion is thus clear from the fact that its maxim, if
openly acknowledged, would make its own purpose impossible. Therefore, it would have to be kept secret.
This secrecy, however, is not incumbent upon the chief of the state.
He can openly say that he will punish every rebellion with the death of
the ringleaders . . . i for when he knows he possesses irresistible power
(which must be assumed to be the case in every civil constitution . . . ),
he need not fear vitiating his own purpose by publishing his maxims
(pp. 130-31; VI: 470).

Again, Kant's view here is mistaken, in that sheer brute force is
made into a factor determining whether certain maxims and,
hence, actions, can pass the publicity criterion. On this view, we
must, for example, conclude that the resistance against the German
occupation in the Second World War was wrong, whereas, accord-
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ing to the same criterion the occupation itself was not to be condemned, because the Nazis could, thanks to their "irresistible
power," divulge their maxims of repression. Further, even if we
grant for the moment that the publicity criterion determines
whether an action is unjust, it does not follow that rebellion as
such is to be condemned. Conspiratorial activity is characteristic of
coups d'etat rather than revolutions. Revolutionary parties and
groups have typically made their goals public in order to seek
public support. Thus it seems that Kant's rejection of revolution is
partly rooted in his limited understanding of the revolutionary
process. 2•
This conclusion can presumably be extended to Kant's rejection of active resistance as such. In the context of his argument
that the universalized maxim of resistance and revolt is self-contradictory, Kant writes:
No matter how the people's real contract with their sovereign may be
violated, they cannot immediately react ns a communit.y, but only as a mob.
For the former constitution has been torn up by the people, while their
organization as a new community is still to occur. This is when the state of
anarchy arises with all its at least potential horrors (On the Old Saw,
p. 70n.; VI: 386n.).

Now Kant is surely correct here if his only meaning is that revolution involves the momentary suspension of the legal community.
But more seems to be at stake. Kant poses here a false dichotomy,
for he seems to claim that anarchy is the only factual alternative to
general obedience to the sovereign. This indicates that Kant was
insufficiently aware of the possibility of collective and organized
reformative action. It also supports the previous point that his
view of revolution is historically limited, in that it does not comprehend the possibility of revolution as initiated or guided by the
revolutionary party, imposing discipline upon the revolutionary
process. Last, it may be noted that such revolutionary mob action
as took place in Paris on July 14, 1789, cannot be properly described
in terms of "anarchy." What characterizes such mob action is that
it is an organized unity, acting toward a common purpose. This
unity is not the result of some formal decision procedure, but
rather is created by solidarity and a common opponent and threat
(in this case the troops of Louis XVI). 25 Granted, "horrors"
and popular revolt are not mutually exclusive, but, contra
Kant, the revolutionary past has made clear that the greatest
"horrors" of revolution typically occur not through mob action
but through structured violence from above, whether it comes
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from counterrevolutionary forces or from the new revolutionary
regime.
To return to the publicity criterion, it fails not only as a standard for judging the legitimacy of legal and political action, but
also as a general moral standard. The criterion leads, for example,
to too easy moral condemnation of all forms of deception and
lying for the sake of humanitarian goals. In general, the criterion
invites us to walk with seemingly clean hands through life-but
then we must not look back to see all the disasters that our "clean
hands" have left behind. The basic problem with the publicity
criterion is that it presupposes a world in which all human beings
are fully rational in a moral sense. This raises a broader issue.
Thomas Hill writes in "The Kingdom of Ends":
In a world of perfectly rational rule-followers perhaps the imperative
'Never lie' would make sense; but not in our world. Once I know that an
act is my duty, I should do it regardless of how irrationally others behave;
but it does not follow that I should disregard their irrationality when I am
trying to determine what my duty is. To adopt our principles as ideal
legislators seems a good idea; but to make them for ideal law-followers
does not."'
This dilemma can be solved as follows: the community of colegislators is the logical point from which we can derive our rules
(and in that sense we legislate for-and with- colegislators), but
in the application of these rules we must not neglect the factual
situation in which we are to act. A conflict between rules may
arise, and in that case we must determine which rule is overriding.
Alternatively, we may solve the dilemma by further specification
and determination of the maxim we wish to act upon, taking into
account the fact that we live in a world with immoral agents. Along
either line, we can establish that most moral rules have rational
exceptions, provided that the clause is added that the immoral
behavior of others is not the only ground for such exceptions.
That Kant holds that most moral rules allow for rational exceptions is clear from his "casuistical questions" in Virtue, although it
is less clear which of the two procedures sketched above for
grounding such exceptions best accords with his view. 27 Kant,
however, wrongly argues that the duty to tell the truth and the
duty to obey the sovereign must be seen as absolute. 28 His rationale
for this standpoint is not difficult to guess: telling the truth is a
precondition for any viable human community, whereas obeying
the sovereign is a precondition for any viable legal community.
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The latter claim, however, is partly based on a confusion; for, as we
have suggested above, what is essential to the possibility of a legal
community is not that we accept all its laws, but that we recognize
the right of the sovereign to punish. 29 But, considering all this,
under what circumstances, if any, are lying or general political
disobedience (i.e., revolution) justified? A good guiding principle
is that such actions are justified in order to preserve the conditions
of morality-that is, the very possibility of autonomy and colegislatorship. What supports this idea is that the personal policy
of telling the truth at the cost of upholding the conditions of morality is a self-contradictory policy, if universalized. Most clearly, if
we must lie in order to save the life of an innocent person, then it
is our duty to lie; for the universalized maxim of telling the truth
in such a case logically undermines the very possibility of acting
on this maxim in the first place. We opt for morality, but we logically fail to act so as to safeguard a necessary condition of morality: human life. Likewise, if revolution is the only effective response left in a social/political situation in which the conditions of
morality are systematically violated or eliminated, this response is
not only morally permissible but our duty. When reason is beaten
back into subterranean areas revolt has to start from there, and a
major task of reason, then, is to prevent that revolt from turning
into a revenge of oppressed human nature. 30

3. Summary and Present
Perspective
In his philosophy of history Kant distinguishes four stages of historical development: 3 '
(a) The pre-political life: this is the life of instinct and unmediated unity with nature. The sketch of the Garden of Eden in Genesis is a symbolic representation of this stage. The awakening of
reason, that is, the development of the technical, pragmatic, and
moral dispositions, tears the human agent away from this imagined state of bliss and leads to a new stage of human evolution.
(b) The state of political conflict and cultural progress: this is the
stage of unsocial sociability. The social aspect of human nature
forces the human agent to organize social and political institutions,
whereas his unsocial dimension causes these institutions to reflect
a particular rather than a universal will. The over-aJJ outcome is
conflict, relentless competition, socioeconomic inequality, and war,
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forcing humanity to develop all its capacities. That is to say, unsocial sociability leads to cultural progress, including science, technology, social control, and art. Initially, only the upper classes
enjoy the fruits of cultural progress, but later some of the culture
of the upper classes gradually spreads to the lower classes. Yet
class conflict remains and even intensifies, for the lower classes
no longer accept their oppressed condition and have slowly acquired the means to change it. Moreover, war between the nations
continues from time to time to shake all political and cultural
foundations, even increasingly so, as technological and economic
progress point to wars of larger scale and greater intensity. Also,
progress in these areas makes it possible for preparation for war to
become an important social factor during times of peace. Thus we
may hope that the hard lessons of history will gradually teach
humanity, notwithstanding its foolishness, that it is in its selfinterest to move to the next stage of human evolution, while
cultural progress provides the means for doing so.
(c) The state of political peace: this is the realization of the republican state and peace between the nations, the ultimate end of
nature. The unsocial proclivities of the human person are now
curbed through the rule of law (the universal principle of justice),
guaranteeing the most extensive freedom for each that is possible
for all. Universal hospitality, instead of war and colonialism, is the
standard of international relations. Political peace facilitates the
development of the moral disposition. It also makes possible further progress in the arts and sciences, which, in turn, contributes
to moral autonomy through the culture of discipline. Thus political
peace prepares us for the final stage of the evolution of the species.
(d) The state of moral peace: this is the realization of the final
end of creation, the moral society. Political peace is now internalized; it is the product of moral motives rather than of
self-interest and coercion-that is, political peace is autonomously
affirmed. Further, human agents now not only leave one another
free to pursue their personal ends, as they do in the previous
stage, but also actively seek to promote one another's ends. Diversity develops no longer through discord but through concord;
humanity has at la st become a morally unified plurality, a
moral totality.
These stages of historical development are also to be understood as stages of social evolution and display in this regard a certain
developmental logic, although Kant did not explicitly draw this
distinction. Thus we can come to recognize, as Kant did, that history is not simply a process of linear progress and that at a given
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point in time different institutions are to be located on, or display
features of, different levels of social evolution. This insight guides
Kant's discussion of the French Revolution (and its historical and
moral significance) as well as his analysis of the church and its
moral task. The French state after the Revolution moved in the
direction of stage (c), and to the extent that political peace here
was based on moral motives, we may say that this state offered a
glimpse of how the state will be under stage (d), but Kant did not
exclude the possibility that everything would fall back into its "former rut," i.e., stage (b). But even if this should happen, the moral
and historical significance of the French Revolution would not diminish; for this Revolution has shown that a state along the lines
of stages (c) and (d) is a tenable historical ideal. The church, in
particular the Protestant church with its emphasis on human autonomy, anticipates some features of stage (d), notwithstanding
the fact that it exists in the context of political institutions that
reflect stage (b). And, considering Kant's denunciation of standing
armies, we may speculate that he saw the military as an institution
typical of stage (b) [see Peace, Third Preliminary Article for Perpetual Peace]. The stages of historical development approached as
stages of social evolution are in need of further explication and
more precise description; yet, Kant's general orientation is sufficiently clear to be fruitful for new endeavors in this direction. 32
Kant distinguishes, in addition, three levels of progress, corresponding to the capacities that set us apart from other animals:
(a) The technological level: progress here involves an increasing
domination of nature in order to satisy a wide variety of human
needs.
(b) The pragmatic level: progress on this level concerns the increasing capacity to organize human beings in a skillful manner to
realize any purpose whatsoever. Kant thinks particularly here of
political organizations. Culture and science are an aspect of this
level, because progress in this respect makes the human agent
more susceptible to rule-governed behavior (of which moral behavior is just one aspect). In our time we would, of course, place
science also, and primarily, on the technological level.
(c) The moral level: progress here implies that just juridical laws
are more often obeyed on the basis of autonomous motives and
that human beings seek to promote one another's ends, provided
that these ends conform to universal law as such. Progress on this
level also means that more and more human agents fulfill the duty
to seek just institutions, i.e., the duty to promote the highest good.
All three levels of progress have corresponding ]earning pro-
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cesses. This needs to be stressed above all with respect to the
moral level, which Kant failed to do. Moral progress is not only a
question of willing to do what the moral law demands (intention)
but also encompasses a better understanding of its requirements.
Further, progress on each level takes place in stages (b) through (d)
of historical development. Kant, however, emphasizes progress on
the pragmatic level in stages (b) and (c), viewing this kind of
progress as the impetus of moral progress, which then leads humanity gradually into stage (d) . Even the state of moral peace
displays moral progress, for holiness and the complete elucidation
of the moral law set infinite tasks.
Kant draws a final distinction between two vehicles of progress:
(a) The cunning of nature: human agents in the pursuit of their
selfish ends come to set up social and political arrangements that
are also demanded by the moral law, notably civil society, and
eventually the republican state and international peace. The fools
are fooled in that they unwittingly promote the realization of
moral ends and the plan of history; and, even if they knew what
they were doing, they would show no interest, because their
motive is self-interest, not dignity and respect for the moral law.
(b) Moral action: political and social ends are pursued as moral
ends. The moral activist is guided by feelings of hope, solidarity,
indignation, and moral enthusiasm; the primacy of praxis is the
point from which all his endeavors are undertaken, including his
understanding of history.
Kant interprets his own time as located between stages (b) and
(c). He sees the French Revolution and the enthusiasm it created
among its spectators as the highlight of an increasing political
enlightenment. The spirit of the Enlightenment, as hinted at in
"Universal History," was here at last displayed-both in practice
and in wishful participation. Further, Kant argues that these
events constitute a turning point in history, setting the stage for
more republican constitutions to come, and signify, moreover, that
a moral cause is operative in humanity. Nonetheless, in most of
Kant's historical writings the emphasis is put on the cunning of
nature as the main vehicle of progress, and this instrument of
progress is seen as sufficient for reaching stage (c). This thesis,
however, is a regulative one, intended as an antidote to despair
and moral defeatism. There is only one way in which we can
definitively assert future progress, and that is for humanity to act
upon moral ideals; it is also only in this way that stage (d), or any
institutional approximation thereof, can be reached.
I have launched four main criticisms against Kant's philosophi-
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cal reconstruction of history. First, he overestimates the scope of
the cunning of nature as a medium of progress. To be sure, it is
rational to believe and hope that mere self-interest is a factor that
pushes humanity toward better political institutions, and it would
be misguided to see all past political improvements as derived
solely from moral motives. Also, it may be noted that calculated
self-interest is in some respects a progressive force as compared to
action guided by nationalistic dreams and religious fanaticism.
However, as I have argued in some detail, nature alone does not
suffice to bring about the highest political good: a society of devils
will not opt for the republican state and international peacealthough it would be equally mistaken to hold that only a world
of saints can realize political peace (as it is defined by Kant). Second, the implication of my first criticism is that more emphasis
must be placed upon moral action as a vehicle of progress and
hope. The thesis of moral progress based on the French Revolution
and the enthusiasm it engendered is here supportive, although it
conflicts with Kant's claim concerning the race of devils. A more
serious problem is that he, in effect, cuts off the road of moral
action in declaring that revolution and active resistance are always
morally wrong. Kant fails to draw the conclusion that his idea of
the state as an original contract undermines in various degrees the
legitimacy of most states of his own time, making nonviolent action, and in some cases even revolution toward the republican
state, a prima facie duty. Kant's condemnation of the right to revolt
or resist for the sake of justice arises from a faulty application of
the categorical imperative; a less important factor is his inadequate
understanding of processes of change initiated from "below."
Third, I have criticized Kant for describing the history of humanity
primarily in terms of political developments-that is, the main
impetus of historical progress as such is political progress. A
minor related problem is that Kant does not always make sufficiently clear that developments on the different levels of progress
are best understood as feedback processes---for example, legal progress stimulates and presupposes moral progress, and vice versa. A
more important related problem is that Kant neglects the need for
fundamental economic changes (beyond the evolving capitalist
market economy), not only for the realization of political peace but
also for moral peace. Fourth, I have criticized Kant for viewing the
ultimate aim of history as a mere ideational union of good wills.
This is implausible, not only because of the social nature of human
beings but also because the optimal realization and coordination of
individual ends require institutional efforts. The proper alternative
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is to define the moral society as a society of autonomous or colegislative institutions, aiming at universal happiness.
The whole point of my criticisms has been not to argue that
Kant's conception of history is antiquated and is to be studied as a
mere piece of intellectual history, interesting in itself yet irrelevant
for an understanding of our own time, but to show and further
develop its importance for coming to terms with our own historical
predicament. It is from this angle that I have discussed the paradox of anarnnestic solidarity and the problem that the very idea of
moral progress seems to undermine human dignity. Kant's philosophy of history invites us to think about these questions, and it
offers a conceptual apparatus that is helpful in the search for adequate answers. It is also in this spirit that I wish to end my discussion of Kant's philosophy of history by briefly looking back to his
hopes from the perspective of our own time.
Some of Kant's hopes have materialized, and it does not seem
unreasonable to expect that others will eventually be realized as
well. In the past century more and more nations have accepted the
republican ideal, political participation has increased, and education, of which Kant emphasized the political-emancipatory potential in his early work, 33 is no longer everywhere the prerogative of
the upper classes. It is true that much remains to be done in these
areas, but the very fact that there is increasing acceptance of the
fact that forms of action such as civil disobedience are appropriate
to induce such improvements is itself a sign of progress, morally
and politically. Further, the United Nations seems to be a step
forward toward the cosmopolitan condition, and its Charter and
Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be seen as an explication of Kant's definitive articles for perpetual peace. J.• Undoubtedly,
much talk about human rights and the rights of nations is a facade
behind which policies of repression, imperialism, and nationalism
are to be found, but, as Leszek Kolakowski notes, "[g]enerally
speaking, the growth of hypocrisy is proof of moral progress, for it
indicates that what used to be done openly and without fear of
censure can no longer be done without incurring that risk." 35 And
we may add as a regulative idea, and in accordance with
Kolakowski's view, that in the future more and more people will
take seriously the standards pronounced in the hypocritical talk;
thus an increasing contradiction will develop between the facade
and the content of the political system, leading to the system's
transformation along the lines of these standards.
These notes of hope may appear misguided and even shallow
and banal in light of the fact that our century has seen World Wars,
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the Gulag, and the Holocaust, not to speak of other genocides.
Moreover, they may seem to be mistaken in light of the current
nuclear arms race, making Kant's implicit suggestion more apt than
ever that it might quite well be the case that the only perpetual
peace that humanity will ever "know" is that of the burial ground
(see the openings words of Peace) . What Ernst Bloch noted two
decades ago still seems to be correct: "[T]he category 'progress' is
nowadays in disrepute." 36 Admittedly, Bloch also notes, as Kant did
for his own time, "that history is [often] called a mere dung-heap
because one likes to be unable to make history with respect to
nearby goals-nearby goals as mediation precisely of distant
goals," but the rebuttal of this kind of pessimism, which hides our
unpreparedness to engage in social action, does not refute the idea
that despair may seem the only sign of moral sensitivity. How can
we talk about progress after we have seen hell over and over again
in the past eighty years? And what can hope mean in the face of
the possibility of a nuclear burial ground for humanity?
From a Kantian perspective, the following five brief comments
are appropriate as a response. First, historical progress is not to be
understood as a linear process. Kant held that "progress will be
interrupted now and then, but never broken off' (On the Old Saw,
p. 77; VI: 393). As a regulative idea we may see our century as
displaying periods of interruption and so we can still defend the
thesis of progress. In this context, it is also to be observed that this
thesis does not imply that progress develops uniformly on all levels. Second, the future is always to some extent open, and thus we
are justified in hoping that humanity will make progress, even
if the odds are against it. The best way to ground this hope is
to engage in social action inspired by the ideal of a cooperative
society. Third, we can derive hope from the fact that the periods of
terror in our century also have been periods of resistance and
struggle against all odds. Or, more recently, we can derive hope
from such events as the resistance by Polish Solidarity and the
popular support it received in at least some countries. In our time,
then, no less than in Kant's, there are events of which it can be said
that they "give us hope, warm even though small" (Lectures on
Ethics, p. 253). Fourth, we can always fight against despair. We
cannot embrace all the suffering embedded in history, the uncountable nameless victims of oppression, not only in our century
but throughout history. But what we can attempt to do is to forget
no more and no less than is needed to act in their name, in the
name of humanity, toward a better future. This means that we
ought to believe in the possibility of progress insofar as this is
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necessary for engaging in praxis. Fifth, it is a mistake to interpret
the social disasters of our century as signifying a moral degeneration hitherto unknown in human history. What has happened is
that progress on the moral level has not kept pace with progress
on the technological and pragmatic levels. The over-all result has
been that the suffering caused by social conflict has offset much of
the tremendous gains made in reducing the suffering caused by
the human body and external nature. History always has been a
slaughterhouse, but our century has seen an increasing perfection
of the tools of oppression: ingenious weapons of destruction, and
a hitherto unknown capacity to organize human beings for any
purpose whatsoever. 37 Evil has not increased; to the contrary, it has
only become much more effective. This is also the picture of the
future. All in all, we can cautiously affirm that our moral, social,
and political situation has not worsened and that further gradual
improvements in these areas are to be expected. This might,
however, not be enough. The ever-increasing capacity for technological and pragmatic control ho lds a great promjse for the cooperative world community, but presently also points to the rea l
possibility of its total negation. The moral task, then, has not become more hopeless since Kant's time, but it has become more
urgent than ever before.

PART TWO

Kantian Socialist
Ethics and the Problem
of Morality in Marx

CHAPTER VI

Hermann Cohen: From Social
Ethics to Socialist Ethics

Althou g h Kant launched some criticisms aga inst the emergi ng
ca pitalist economy of his own time, he saw this economy in general as a progressive force and was a fierce defender of the right to
own private (productive) property.' Through a short critique of
some of Kant's more detailed proposals concerning the state, I will
argue in the first section below that such support for capitalism is
incompatible with his own republican idea l. Thus a first basic logica l link emerges between Kant's social ethics and socia lism: socialist economic institutions are more harmonious with the republican
ideal than capitalist ones. A second, and more important, such link
is that (properly defined) socialist econom ic institutions in stantiate
the moral ideal of the community of colegislators, in that they are
fully democratic institutions which aim at the satisfaction of the
needs of all human beings.
Both these links, particularly the latter, are elucidated in the
work of Hermann Cohen, to which I turn in the second and third
sections below. The merit of Cohen's practical philosophy is not
limited, however, to this socia li st transformation of Kant's ethics.
What also deserves attention is that Cohen explores ethics as socia l in nature more consistently than did Kant. Finally, my concern
in the rest of this study is to show the relevance of Kantian socialist ethics to socialist theory and praxis. For this purpose 1 offer in
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Chapter VII a Kantian analysis and critique of Marx's view of morality. My over-all thesis is that certain profound weaknesses in
Marx's social thought can be overcome by infusing Kantian socialist ethics into the Marxian system.

1. Kant, the Republican Ideal,
and Capitalism
A closer look at Kant's conception of the good state shows that he
severely restricts political participation. The right to vote is limited
to a rather small group of citizens, the active citizens. Kant states:
Every man who h as the right to vote . . . is termed a citizen ... The
only necessary qualification, aside from the natural one of not being a
ch ild or a woman, is that he be his own master (sui iuris): that he own some
sort of property-among which may be counted any skill, craft, fine art, or
science that supports him. This is to say that whenever he needs to acquire things from others in order to live, he will acquire them only by
disposing of what is his own, not by allowing others to use his services, so
that he will not . . . be anyone's servant but the community's (On the Old
Saw, pp. 63-64; VI: 378-79).

Thus, self-employment, besides sex, is the main criterion of active
citizenship, although Kant also includes servants of the state, such
as university teachers, in the class of active citizens (see Justice,
p. 79; VII: 121).
To make a natural property (sex) into a criterion of colegislatorship, i.e., active citizenship, contradicts the view that reason is the
mark of autonomy. We may assume that historical limitations and
bias also play a role in Kant's claim that wage-earners cannot be
active citizens, and, yet, his view in this regard is not altogether
mjstaken and has, moreover, a critical implication. Kant holds that
the attribute of civil independence cannot be ascribed to the laborer because he does not own the products of his labor and is
therefore radically dependent on the will of others. 2 This claim is
more reasonable than the contrary contention that such economic
dependence on others does not at all undermine the possibility
of an informed and independent political choice, certainly if we
consider the situation of the laborer in Kant's time. The critical
implication is that the economic basis of society must be so restructured that it eliminates the dependence of the worker. Kant,
however, does not take this step, but rather offers a critique of the
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feudal aspects of his own society as well as a plea for its liberalcapitalistic transformation. Kant proposes as a consolation to the
passive citizen that
[e]ach member of the community must be permitted to rise in it to any
status or class ... to which his talent, industry, and luck may take him.
And his fellow subjects may not block his way by any hereditary prerogative, as members of some specific privileged class, to keep him and his
heirs beneath that class forever (On the Old Saw, p. 60; VI: 375-76; cf.
p. 64; 380).

Careers, then, must be open to talents, and, in general, hereditary
privileges that run counter to a "fair" competitive struggle for
economic success must be eliminated, not only for the sake of
economic well-being but also for the sake of active citizenship. It is
in this same liberal-capitalistic spirit that Kant says that the law
should not so protect the large land-owning class that their estates
always remain in the hands of their descendants or any other
given segment of society (see ibid., p. 64; 380). The farm laborer
must have the possibility of becoming a small landowner and thus
acquiring the right to vote. We may interpret Kant's rejection of
permanent ownership of land by the church or the state in the
same terms (see ibid., and Justice, pp. 91and136; VII: 131and175) .
The limitation of political rights to economically independent
male citizens is another example of the fact that reason is abandoned, as it were, between the original social contract and the
existing legal/political reality. Or, more precisely, this is to a la rge
extent the case; for the state and political obligation are justified in
terms of a radical and fully democratic act, encompassing all
the members of the commonwealth, whereas the status quo on
Kant's account needs to be transformed only so that self-employed
males and servants of the state become truly members of the
commonwealth.
Here the additional problem arises that the idea of the social
contract points to direct democracy rather than to representative
democracy. Kant maintains that in the republican state the people
rule themselves through representatives whom they have chosen
in free elections (see On the Old Saw, p. 64; VI: 380). Now,
provided that the representatives indeed represent the w ill of the
people, representative democracy may well be the best pragmatic
solution to the problem that large-scale direct democracy is a practical impossibility. But there is, of course, no guarantee that the
representatives in the republican state will not so legislate as to
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benefit limited interests, even though their legislative activity must
proceed within a constitutional framework that embodies the universal principle of justice.3 This means that the republican ideal
requires more political measures than Kant envisioned: perhaps a
recall system of elected citizens or referendums, and certainly the
possibility of active participation of all citizens in a variety of intermediate political organizations and institutions. It also means that
the republican ideal and capitalism conflict with each other; for
capitalism operates on the principle that social issues directly related to the economic realm, such as industrial policy, employment, and pollution, are essentially private questions, to be settled
by those who own the productive assets of society. To be sure,
governmental economic interference does take place in present
capitalist societies, but this is seen as a necessary evil to straighten
out the irrationalities of the market, and the interests of capitalists
are best served by a system of overlapping political and economic
elites. Capitalism, then, has the inherent tendency to privatize and
depoliticize the public realm, 1 and is, therefore, antithetical to the
republican ideal of universal political participation as a crucial step
toward the formation of laws that reflect the will of all.
An even more serious problem with Kant's political analysis is
that he holds that legal equality and great economic inequality are
compatible. He asserts in On the Old Saw:
The equality of subjects may be phrased as follows: Each member of
the community has rights that entitle him to coerce every other
member....
But this thorough equality of persons as the subjects of a state is quite
consistent with the greatest inequality in the quantity and degree of their
possessions.... Thus [if] the welfare of one person is greatly dependent
on the will of another (the poor depending on the rich), one must
obey . . . when the other commands.... Nonetheless, they are equal as
subjects before the law (pp. 59-60; VI: 374-75; translation altered).

We have already noted that Kant undermines legal equality in the
proper sense of the word by placing restrictions upon political
rights, a problem which he seeks to sidestep here by arguing that
legal equality involves that "all men are free and equal under public
law as already enacted, though they are not equal with respect to
the right to enact that law" (ibid., p. 62; 378). But even if we set
aside this issue, Kant's view is still untenable. For one thing, great
inequalities in income and wealth conflict with the equal right to a
fair trial; for the rich and the poor do not have equal access to legal
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advice and representation. For another thing, the wealthy can disproportionately influence the judicial process, and, hence, it is to
be expected that in a society of great economic inequality the laws
will be so framed that they favor the rich in terms of the allocation
of legal penalties. And, more broadly, a legal system that upholds
significant economic inequality arising from private property
ownership also weakens equality with regard to such liberties as
freedom of speech and press; for the wealthy have a greater possibility of expressing their views than the poor and can, moreove1~
through their control of the means of communication largely prevent views opposed to their interests from reaching the realm of
public debate. 5
These mechanisms for creating civil and political inequality,
however, are nowadays widely acknowledged, as is exemplified by
such recent governmental programs within capitalist society as
free legal counsel and public funding of political debates and elections. What remains to be seen is their long-term effectiveness. It
seems a mistake to deny that such programs can considerably
improve the legal and political condition of the poor, but it also
seems that it would be stretching the matter too far to maintain
that they can make the legal and political process equally accessible to everyone. After all, the root of the problem is capitalism
itself. Add to this our previous observation that capitalism by its
very nature discourages the effective exercise of our political
rights, and we can draw the conclusion that Kant's republican ideal
cannot be fully realized within a capitalist economy. Or, at least,
this conclusion follows if we take Kant's claim seriously that the
republican state is to be defined as a state that guarantees the most
extensive liberty for each that is possible for all.
Considering Kant's more specific recommendations concerning the state, it might be objected that the republican ideal does not
mean that the state must strive for equality with regard to the
possibility of effectively exercising our freedoms, but rather that it
must only prevent arbitrary intrusions upon our liberties. This
objection is subject to three problems. First, it is difficult to see
how such nominal rights can ever bring about the republican ideal
of laws that reflect the will of all. Second, the objection is hard to
reconcile with Kant's justification of political obligation and the
state in terms of the original social contract. Why would rational
agents opt for a legal system that safeguards their liberties only in
formal fashion? This choice becomes particularly unlikely once
these agents are aware of the fact that the idea of working one's
way up in capitalist society through "talent, industry, and luck" is
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mainly an illusion. Admittedly, this idea may h ave seemed more
plausible in Ka nt's own time, but this only underlines the historical
limitations of his politica l thought and helps to explain why he did
not come to a rejection of capitalism in the name of the republican
idea l. Third, and most importantly, the objection clearly conflicts
with Kant's view that the major moral function of the state is to
contribute to th e rea lization of the conditions of autono my, setting
the stage fo r the mora l society. This function presupposes substantial equal liberties, not formal ones. Such liberties as freedom of
speech and press can serve here again as examples; for these liberties are conducive to legislative activity (autonomy) as a dialogical
activity only if all different mora l views and arguments can be
effectively expressed. Also, an important aspect of Ka nt's notion of
autonomy is that the rule of law is seen as self-rule, but we can
hardly expect such a moral attitude in general to develop within a
legal system that is not accessible to all and favors some in terms of
the allocatio n of legal punishment.
Espec ially the moral-preparatory function of the republican
state, then, fits ill with the idea of this state as a minimal state; for
the effective fulfillm ent of this function requires that the state take
such measures as gua ranteeing equ al access to the med ia and legal
counsel. Note, moreover, that Kant holds that education is crucial
to autonomy, and so aga in it seems that the logic of his view of the
good state points beyond the minimal state, in that the moralpreparatory fun ction of the republican state indicates the need for
public educa tion available to all. Even Kant him self, however, does
not specify the republica n ideal as a pure minimal state, because
he claims th at th e state must play a role in social welfare:
The gene ra l Will of the people has united itself into a society in o rde r
to maintai n itself continually, a nd fo r this purpose it has subjected itself to
the internal a utho ri ty of the state in order to suppo rt th ose membe rs of
the society who a re not able to support themselves (Justice, p. 93; Vil: 133).

Mo re specifically, Ka nt argues here that, since the existence of the
wealthy "depends on the act of subjecting them selves to th e comm onwea lth fo r th e protection and ca re required in order to stay
alive, they have bound the mselves to contribute to the support of
their fellow citizen s." Thus Kant concludes that taxation of the
wea lthy is justified in order to establish such public institutions as
"widow 's homes" and "foundling hospitals," as well as fo r the
sake of such welfare programs as "relief to the poor."
It is debatable whethe r this argument fo r public welfare is
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compatible with Kant's view that the state may not enforce direct
ethical duties, although Kant could appea l to the fact that there is a
distinction to be drawn between actively promoting the ends of
others and helping people in severe or even life-threatening distress. 6 It is even more debatable whether Kant's proposal of taxation of the wealthy for the sake of public welfare can be reconciled
with his specific defense of private property ownership. Once it is
granted that the purpose of the social contract is not merely to
prevent arbitrary intrusions upon our basic liberties (among which
the right to own private productive property is not to be counted)
but rather to guarantee that everyone can effectively en joy such
liberties, the argument for public welfare however, no longer poses
a problem. After all, the satisfaction of the most basic material
human needs is a necessary condition for the effective exercise of
basic liberties, whether in the present or in th e future. The same
can be said of the need for medical care. More generally, if the task
of the state is to promote the conditions of autonomy, it must
sustain the material conditions of human life. It may be noted,
however, that rational moral decency itself offers a good ground
for social welfare provided by the state; for charitable institutions
can neither guarantee nor efficiently realize social welfare/ and, as
Kant observed in one of his Reff.exionen, such welfare is, indeed, a
question of moral decency. He wrote: "The helpless poor must be
fed, and, if they are children, they must be cared for. Why? Because we are human beings and not beasts." 8
In sum, there are good reasons for interpreting the republican
ideal as a state that seeks to uphold substantial equal liberties and
the conditions of autonomy in general. And again, this means that
the republican ideal and capitalism are incompatible. Or, to put it
otherwise, the republican state requires for its complete rea lization
a re-socialization of private productive property. That Kant nonetheless offered a defense of the institution of private property, thus
both factually and by implication compromising his republican
ideal, is hardly surprising considering his time. The institution of
private property was the rule within Kant's historical horizon," and
he was not altogether mistaken in hoping that capitalism would be
conducive to the realization of civil and political liberties. In addition, Kant's support of capitalism and a ra ther minimal state can be
explained on the basis of his hatred of the paternalism of feudalism, while his belief in the "moral necessity" of the institution of
private property as such seems to be partly rooted in his failure to
draw a clear distinction between personal and productive property.10 For our purpose of developing a viable Kantian socialist ethics,
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howeve 1~ it is not esse ntial to analyze here the factors that account
for Kant's commitment to capitalism and the individual right to
own (virtually unlimited) productive property. Rather, we must
conclude our discussion of Kant by briefly addressing the question
of whether a socialist transformation of his ethics is at all compatible with his justification (deduction) of this right. 11
Kant begins his legitimation of th e institution of private property by distingui shing between two modes of possession: " sensible possession" and "intelligible possession ." The firs t mode
signifies the physical possession of an object, whereas the seco nd
mode involves th e "purely de Jure possession of the sam e object"
(Justice, p. 51; VII: 47). His point is that ownership is distinct from
m ere physical possession. Accordingly, Kant defines ownership as
follows: " A thing is externally mine if it is such that any prevention
of my use of it would constitute an injury to m e even if it is not
in my possession (that is, l am not the holder of the object)"
(ibid., pp. 55-56; 51). He further states: "The question of how it is
poss ib le for so mething to be externa lly yours or mine is now
tran sformed into the question: How is purely de Jure (intelligible)
possession possible?" (p. 56; 52). Our present concern, then, is
Kant's answer to this question.
For Kant any legal right and claim, if valid, must be seen as an
ex pression of the united will. This means that the right to private
property must be conceived of as arising from thi s will. In other
words, private property is justified only on th e condition that the
united will via the social contract permits private property. Now, if
th e united will is to be able to institutionalize property along these
lines it must possess in the first place that which it p ermits to be
privately appropriated: the earth and al l its products. Kant calls
this original common possession the "original community of the
land" or the "innate common possession of th e earth's surface"
(ibid., pp. 57 and 58; 52 and 53). Thus the possibibty of private de
Jure possession is based on two practical postulates: original common ownership, and a social contract permitting private ownership. In co ntrast to s uch liberal contract theorists as John Locke,
the n, Kant does not hold that there is a natural right to property
which precedes the social contract and can on ly be affirmed by it. 12
This is not to say that Kant views all acts of physical appropriation
in th e state of nature as arbitrary usurpation. Rather, he holds that
such acts, if performed under the presumption of the two postulates, result in "provisional de Jure possession." Civil society then
tran sform s such possession into "peremptory possession" (Justice,
p. 66; VII: 59).
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We have here again an instance of the fact that Kant's justification of a certain social institution has ramifications that point
beyond this institution or even to its opposite: private property is
rooted in a decision of the united will to give up the common
possession of the earth and its products. '1 Now precisely because
Kant grounds the right to private property in this manner, rather
than seeing it as a natural right, his practical philosophy permits
the conclusion that a re-socialization of private productive property is required for the sake of the only innate or natural right
that Kant recognizes: "[f]reedom (independence from the constraint of another's will), insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law" (justice,
pp. 43-44; VII: 39) . l have argued that we also should draw this
conclusion, because Kant holds that this innate freedom comprises
"innate equality" (i.e., legal equality) and "a human person being
his own master" (i.e., civil independence), and we have seen that
equal freedom for all in these respects cannot be reconciled with
great economic inequality. A re-socialization of private productive
property is, in other words, needed for the sake of the full realization of the republican ideal. This also is required in order that
economic institutions reflect the moral ideal. Finally, both theses
are set forth in Cohen's work. It shou ld be noted at the outset,
however, that Cohen fuses the two theses together into one basic
imperative of Kantian socialism: all our social institutions should
be so changed that they mirror the moral ideal of the community
of colegislators who seek to promote one another's ends.

2. The Basic Premises of Cohen's
Practical Philosophy
Cohen's work may be divided into three major stages. In the first
stage his intellectual labor was focused on writing commentaries
on Kant's three Critiques."' In the second stage Cohen developed
his own system of pure philosophy, mirroring Kant's search for the
transcendental conditions of (rational) thinking, willing, and judging: Logic of Pure Cognition (1902, 1914), Ethics of the Pure Will (1904,
1907), and Aesthetics of Pure Feeling (1912). The third stage runs
from Cohen's resignation at the University of Marburg in 1912 until
his death (April 4, 1918) . During this period he taught at a rabbinical seminary in Berlin, and, although he wrote various moral and
political studies, his major intellectual efforts at this time were
invested in exposing, and further developing, the progressive

206

Hermann Cohen: From Social Ethics to Socialist Ethics

moral dim ension s in Judaism, culminating in his posthumously
published Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism (1919) .'5
My concern in this study is Cohen's ethics and political philosophy as developed in the second stage, notably in Ethics of the
Pure Will and in the closing sections of "Introduction and Critical
Epilogue to Lange's History of Materialism" (1896, 1902, 1914). 16 In
the prese nt section I will outline the basic premises of Cohen's
moral and political thought; in the next section l will discuss in
some detail hi s argument that the moral society or high est good is
a cooperative socialist society. I will deal with Cohen's critique of
the his torical materialism of Marx in Chapter VII.

Individual and Totality
Cohen opens the Ethics of the Pure Will by stating that ethics constitutes the most truly philosophical discipline- the sciences cannot take the moral question away from philosophy-and that the
concept of th e human person (Men sch) is its subject matter. But
how is this concept to be understood? Cohen states:
How about the human person; is he an individual? By no means is he
this alone; he also stands as rank and file within a plurality (Mehrheit) , or
better, wit hin many pluralities. And he is not on ly this; in the tota lity
(Allheit) he first completes the circle of his being. And this totality also has
ma ny degrees a nd levels until its completion in a true unity, na me ly, in
humanity, w hich is at the sa me time an ete rnal new beginning (ibid., p. 8).

Cohen adds: "This insight must become the basic idea of the construction of our ethics." 11
This basic idea encompasses at least five related claims, which
will be further explicated in the course of this section. The first is
that the individual always function s in a variety of collectives and
that morality, therefore, is intrinsically social. The second claim is
that the individual who takes his own particularity, or that of the
group he is part of, as sole guide of his willing and actions cannot
come to truly moral actions; for morality aims at coherence or
unity of individual wills and, ultimately, at a unified humanity.
(Like Kant, Cohen defines a totality as a unified plurality and
holds that existing pluralities lack unity because they are determined by particular wills.) Thus the third claim .is that the individual can "complete the circle of his being" -his autonomy-only
through making ideal humanity at the highest level of totality into
the mirror and goa l of his willing and actions. This claim implies a

Kantian Socia lis t Ethics a nd the Proble m of Mo ra lity in Marx

207

fourth : autonomy sets a task, and its ultima te rea liza tion requires
the realization of huma nity, th e tra nsforma tion of existing pluralities into totalities. To sum up the last three cla ims, on Co hen's
account, the idea of humanity-and, hence, that of the ideal se lfis both the beginning (o rigin) and the e nd of truly m oral acti ons.
(That Cohen sp ea ks of "an ete rnal new beginning" refl ects his
view that morality sets an infi nite task.) The fifth and fin al cl aim is
that the subject of morality and hi story is not th e ind ividual qu a
indiv idu al but th e individu a l as pa rt of collec tives. Th e problem that ethics faces is th e conflict between the individual a nd
the collectives; its task is to reconcile the two, both in theory and
in p raxis.
Cohen's view of the re lation between individual a nd totality
implies cr iticism of both liberalism and totalitarianism as the two
dominant political ideologies of our century. In " Critica l Epilogue,"
Co hen writes that " every commun ity [or, better, society '"] has th e
purpose of crea ting th e true individual, for this indiv idu al can
arise o nly from a real, hea lthy, a nd developed community; that
this individual be created is, and remain s, the true goal of all
forma tions of communiti es" (p. 272). Coh en adds a little fu rth er
on : " Ethics has as its ta sk both proble ms, th e community a nd th e
individu al, and these concepts are to be seen n ot as sta nding besid e each other or as on e a fte r the other, but as requiring and
determining each other, as reciprocal concepts (Wechselbeg riffe)."
Co hen and liberalism, th en, proclaim the intrin sic value of th e
individual, but Cohen repudia tes th e liberal conte nti o n that this
implies tha t politica l society must be seen as a mere instrume nt for
the realization of individual purposes. Libe ra lism fail s to recognize
tha t the realization of the individual requires the rea lizati on o f
the community; it places th e concepts of individual and commu nity " one afte r the oth er." (Libe ralism in its domina nt fo rm is not
m e rely an individualism but also a possessive individua lism ; I
will later discuss Cohen's critique of liberalism's twin, the market
economy with private ownership of the m eans of production.)19
In a similar fa shion we may inte rpret Coh e n as rejecting totalitarian thought. He emphasizes the collective as moral, politica l,
and historical subject (see Pure Will, pp. 33-34), and this might
lead one to believe that his view has totalitarian ove rtones. Con trary to totalitarianism, however, Cohe n does not place the collective before and above the individual, but sees them as "requiring
and determining each othe r." The final rationale of a ny totality is
the individual, and not vice versa, as in th e totalitaria n view. The
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latter view entails not the promise of the realization of the autonomous individual, but rather the threat of his complete negation. In
short, Cohen seeks an alternative to both liberalism and totalitarianism which is in some sense located above them. This alternative is democratic and cooperative socialism as the true unity of
individual and society.
Thus far there are some important affinities between the social
ethics of Kant and Cohen, although the latter's view is, of course,
geared more toward our present political condition. Cohen's claim
that pluralities must be transformed into totalities conforms with
Kant's contention that existing social and political institutions must
be brought into accord with the realm of ends or moral society
(and note once more that Kant defines this society as a unified
plurality). Moreover, Cohen's idea that the individual must make
the totality, which is in its highest form a unified humanity, the
gu ideline for his willing and actions accords with Kant's view that
one ought to act only on those maxims which are consistent with
universal law as such or accord with the idea of humanity. Last,
both Cohen and Kant hold that practical reason (the pure will) in
projecting humanity as it ought to be also posits the ideal self, and
vice versa.
Yet there are important differences between their respective
views, as well. Cohen stresses to a greater degree the social nature
of morality and praxis. The praxis of the individual is situated in
social groups and, hence, understood as cooperative and colle(:tive
praxis. This insight is not clearly manifest in Kant's work. As Goldmann observes in Immanuel Kant (pp. 172 and 178), the "I" rather
than "We" is emphasized in Kant, and the effect of this neglect of
collective praxis is that the prospect of fundamental social change
is darkened. (Goldmann argues that Kant's view that the existing
church is to be changed into a "true church" constitutes a notable
exception, but we have seen that Kant holds that collective praxis
within the framework of religious institutions is a sign of moral
immaturity, to be left behind by the truly autonomous individual.
Kant's comments on the French Revolution constitute a more convincing exception.) An additional difference between Cohen and
Kant is that Cohen rejects Kant's contention that the moral ideal
cannot, in the final instance, be expressed in institutional arrangements, but must be thought of as an "inner" unification of good
wills. We will see later that Cohen holds that there are various
instantiations of the moral totality, notably, the legal state, peace
between the nations, and the producer cooperatives.
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The Transcendental Method and the Not ion
of the Legal Person
The decisive, albeit related, difference between Kant and Cohen,
however, must be sought in the manner in which Cohen applies
the transcendental method, leading to the moral law and the ideal
moral subject. In a nutshell, this method proceeds as follows: it
searches for, and starts with, an X; it looks for the rational presuppositions of the X; and it argues that without these presuppositions the X is unintelligible. The second step is regressive and
analytic in form; the third step is synthetic and provides a justification (deduction) for the right to use th e presuppositions in question as well as all their logical consequences. For Cohen the X must
be the sciences. Thus he maintains that "all philosophy is directed
toward the fact of the sciences (das Faktum der Wi ssenschaften)" and
that this view is what "counts for us as what is eternal in Kant's
system" (Pure Will, p. 65).
Cohen argues that the critique of knowledge in Kant seeks to
expose the a priori structure of the natural sciences. Thi s means
that critique of knowledge, i.e., epistemic logic (Logik der Erkenn tnis), mus t be developed on the bas is of the foundations and
methods of the natural sciences. Or, as Cohen puts it, epistemic
logic must be seen as a construction and elaboration of mathematical assumptions as they operate in the natural sciences; that is,
epistemic logic must, in a methodological sense, orient itself toward mathematics. By analogy, we would expect Kant's ethics to
orien t itself toward the sciences dealing with human actions and
prescriptive rules, the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften). Cohen
comments:
In general, one sees the weakness of ethics in the fact that it is not
backed up by a science. The expression of moral certainty ha s, the refore, a
derogatory meaning. O ne gives up on th e possibility of basing ethics on a
science. Accord ingly, when one does not in a fundamental way fa ll back
on religion, one takes refuge in a psychology of moral sense or an esthetics of moral feeling . ... Even Kant, who looked for and demanded a fact
analogous to mathematics, did not find it in a science. He separated jurisprudence from moral theory, and laid down different metaphysica l elements (Anfangsgriinde) for each of them (Pure Will, p. 67).

In other words, Cohen holds that Kant recognized the need for a
moral philosophy as the logic of the humanities but failed to find a
science that (by analogy) could serve as the mathematics of th e
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humanities. Thus Cohen sets for eth ics th e task of findin g a humani stic science, from which it ca n construct and explicate th e
moral law and th e ideal moral subject (just as epistemic logic is
developed from the math ematics of th e natural sciences). In s hort,
the ta sk is to apply the transcendenta l method to an appropriate
humanistic scie nce.
In his long Introduction to Pure Will, Cohen discusses several
humanistic sciences, such as psychology and sociology, that possibly could function as the mathem ati cs of the humanities. For our
purposes it suffices to present his conclusion, which is already
intimated in th e passage cited above: "Jurisprudence is the analogue of math ematics. It may be characterized as the mathematics
of the humaniti es, and for ethics, in particular, jurisprudence may
be characterized as its mathematics" (p. 66). More specifically,
Cohen argues that the ideal moral subject and the corresponding
moral law ca n be constructed through an analysis of the tran scendental conditions of the notion of the legal person, claiming that
the cooperative (Geno ssenschaft) provides us with the best model
for th e lega l person.
There are three distinct reasons why Cohen thinks that the
notion of the legal p erson constitutes an important concept for
ethics. First, the notion of a legal person is nonnaturalistic- that is,
the legal person is not to be identified with a physical person, but
must be understood as a rational construct. In Cohen's own words,
"[i]t would be a basic mistake to equate a person with a human
being. . . . Th e individu al may be given as a particular being
(Einzelwesen); th e person, however, is an abstraction of the law"
(p. 230) . Now, in agreement with Kant's view, Cohen argues that
the moral subject, the individual person or humanity, must be seen
as a rational construct that sets a ta sk and is not to be equated with
the physical individual (the phenomenal self) or with humanity as
an anthropological notion . Thus the legal person can function as a
model for the moral subject. Second, Cohen holds that it is a positive aspect of the legal person that "emotions do not play a role;
the conce rn is on ly action of the will . . . as legal action" (p. 236).
Here again Kant's view is manifest, in that the contention is that
emotion s are irreleva nt, and even may misguide us, in the determination of our duties. Moral reason must not be adapted to our
fee lings; rather~ the opposite mu st take place. Cohen illustrates this
point in his di sc ussion of patriotis m, an emotion that is all too
often a so urce of human conflict.
Although Cohen thinks that it is not altogether mi splaced to
praise patriotis m as a feeling which promotes the overcoming of
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egoism and whjch helps to break down the barriers of self-love, he
also maintain s that patriotism involves the " serious dangers" of
" one-sidedness" and "pettiness" which conflict with cosmopolitanism (p. 235). The antidote is the notion of the legal person.
Cohen writes in the context of his discussion of patriotism :
The jurisprudential exposition and grounding of the ideal subject in
the legal subject is more instructive, mo re convincing, and at the same
time more precise a nd to the p oint than all the other expan sion s of selffeeling, with which one loves to liberate and save the individual from the
limitations of stubbornness and selfishness (p. 235) .

Yet Cohen does not completely reject the feeling of patriotism;
rather, his "strategy" is typica lly Kantian in that he argues that
this feelin g must be ethicized. Patriotism must be transformed into
love for a people that seeks the perfect state and the cosmopolitan
condition. 20 And this, we may assume, can be accomplished in the
process of enlarging the self on the basis of the notion of the
totality as legal person; for this notion points to the idea of a
unified people and, ultimately, to that of a unified humanity, as the
horizon of one's emotive and moral identification.
The final reason for the importance of the notion of the legal
person for ethics is that the rational presuppositions of this notion
explicate the idea of the totality as a unified plurality, and with it
the moral law and the idea l moral subject. Cohen sets forth these
presuppositions in the following passage concerned with the cooperative as legal person :
[l]n the concept of the cooperative the issue at stake is no lo nger the
individual will ... but rather the real unity of wills ....
These wills unite into a common will, because the various persons
unite into a whole. Which concept represents this whole? Which concept
justifies it? Plurality or totality? . . . The difference between totality a nd
plura lity lies in the logica l power o f the infinite concentration of single
membe rs, w hich as a resu lt no longer com e into question as singulars.
When the coopera tive as a whole becom es qualified to take on this
logical character of totality, this ca n on ly be on the basis of an action of the
wiU through which the cooperative becomes a legal activity and entity.
This lega l action is formed through the decision . ... The decision is the
unificatio n of individu al wills into a unified will. This unified will does not
belong to a ny of th e individual wi ll s; it is a co mm o n will
(Gesm11twille). . ..
From the legal point of view, it is said that this com mon will does not
rep resent the sum of the still existing w ill s but that it annihilates these
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and puts itself in their place. Nonetheless this representative will is the
true real will. .. . This representative unified ideal will forms the unity of
intention and the unity of the person- the concept of the legal person
(Pure Will, pp. 230-31).

In this manner, then Cohen applies the transcendental method to
the notion of the legal person: this notion presupposes that the
divided and antagonistic wills of the plurality are overcome
through a common decision, the by-laws of the cooperative, expressing a unified intention, action, and willing. The cooperative
as legal person, in turn, can serve (and is justified) as the model
for other totalities, such as the perfect state arising from the social
contract, and the federation of states. Moreover, a model is presented for the ideal moral subject: the individual must become a
colegislator in the various totalities, and the collective subject must
become a unified will. All these notions set, of course, moral tasks;
they are regulative notions. Finally, the moral law is explicated in
that it must be understood as demanding that all our actions be
consistent with, and reflect, the ideal of the totality on its various
levels. This also means that it is our duty to realize the different
levels of this ideal.
In a long review essay on ethics and socialism, published in
1909, the sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies offered a critical but sympathetic discussion of Ethics of the Pure Will. One of his major
objections is that "[t]he legal person has totally nothing to do with
morality, except insofar as the existence of a legal order has as such
moral significance." 21 Tonnies adds: "Cohen nonetheless tries hard
to force upon the legal person a direct moral value." Presumably,
the crux of this criticism is that in legal practice the legal person
lacks the moral aspects that Cohen ascribes to it. This is to be
admitted. A private enterprise, for example, is dealt with as a legal
person, and in this instance the legal person reflects not a unified
will but rather the will of some of those who are working in the
enterprise. Likewise, the cooperative does not always take on the
form expounded by Cohen; the cooperative may be a collaboration
of privat~ enterprises that share a common interest. 22 Jt also may
be objected that the notion of the legal person carries with it the
danger that individuals may abdicate their responsibility and place
it on the shoulders of a fictional person, the legal person. The
hands of the concrete individuals are clean; only the fictional per"
son has dirty hands.
These objections, however, rest upon a misunderstanding
of what the transcendental method seeks to accomplish. One
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rationale for Cohen's turn to positive law is that ethics must provide a "systematic critique" of the legal system, contributing to its
moral improvement (see Pure Will, p. 270). So the question is not
whether in legal practice the legal person has the moral significance Cohen ascribes to it but whether it ought to have this meaning. Undoubtedly, Cohen's view is that, if the notion of the legal
person is to be a coherent notion, it must satisfy the transcendental conditions he has exposed-notably, it must display a unified
will arising from the wills of its constituents. This implies that the
idea of a private enterprise as legal person is self-contradictory;
this enterprise is a plurality in reality, but in nam e a totality. The
issue of corporate responsibility underlines the problem and also
signifies its practical import. It seems reasonable to hold the private corporation as a whole responsible for its actions, and yet the
conditions for this are lacking; for, in holding it responsible, we
make, in effect, all its participants responsible, whereas in reality
only some members are directly responsible, namely, those who
determine the policy of the corporation. In the next section I will
argue that this internal inconsistency is one of the reasons why
private enterprise must be socialized and take a form similar to
that of Cohen's cooperative. This tran sformation also avoids the
problem of the legal person's becoming the mask behind which
"dirty hands" are hidden; for in the cooperative all the individual
wills contribute to the formation of the unified will and ideally
merge with it.
The transcendental method, then, has a critical edge. This is
no different in Kant's work; for we have seen that his transcendental analyses of legitimate legal authority and of private property
logically lead to a justification of social action toward the perfect
state and to the possibility of socialized productive property. The
issue is more complex with regard to the moral law. Kant argues in
Practical Reason that the moral law does not need a transcendental
justification, but is a "fact of reason." Instead he deduces the practical reality of freedom from the moral law (see ibid., p. 49; V: 54).
Nonetheless, a case can be made that the moral law in Kant receives a transcendental justification in that it constitutes the necessary presupposition for making "moral experience" - that is, the
sense of duty and moral necessity as discussed in the Foundations-intelligible. Or we may see the right to use the categorical
imperative as based on the fact that it is precisely this principle
that leads to som e of our most deep-seated moral convictions. But,
in either case, once the moral law is establish ed and defended, this
law pushes our moral experience and conviction to higher levels.
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Purity (the a priori) leads to purification, i.e., idealization and
ethicization.
The limitations of the transcendental method are the limitations of the "facts" toward which it orients itself. We always are in
some sense free to reject these "facts" and with them the results
obtained by the method. As Beck puts it with respect to the argument that the moral law is needed to make our moral experience
intelligible: "The argument would have made no headway against
a critic who stubbornly refused to concern himself with moral
phenomena, just as the Critique of Pure Reason would make no dent
in the armor of a silent skeptic who refused to assert or deny that
7+5 = 12" (Commentary, p. 172). (Beck uses the word 'would'
because he says that, although one would expect Kant to apply the
transcendental method to our moral experience, he did not in fact
follow this road.) Now from this angle it may seem that Kant's
transcendental procedure, as hypothetically projected here, is to be
preferred to Cohen's, because it "appeals" to a wider and more
generally accepted "fact." This conclusion, however, is mistaken on
several grounds. First, Cohen also "appeals" to a wide range of
human experience, to wit, our functioning, or, better, dysfunctioning, in social organizations and institutions. Second, Kant's
orientation toward the sense of duty and moral necessity is an
orientation toward an inner and subjective feeling. Cohen, to the
contrary, takes as his staring point an objective fact that is, in
principle, accessible to all. What if one lacks the feeling to which
Kant is making an "appeal"? Moreover, Kant's point of departure
is reflected in the end product inasmuch as the moral society is, in
the final instance, an "inner" unification of good wills. Cohen,
however, begins and ends with an institutional arrangement. This,
as well as Cohen's reasoning from the collective ideal moral subject
to the individual ideal moral subject (whereas Kant traverses the
opposite road), is more fitting to the task of developing a social
ethics. Third, Cohen overcomes the "institutional alienation" embedded in Kant and sets forth the ideal of the totality as regulative
for all human institutions. The great gain in turning to the legal
person as exemplified in the cooperative is that the socioeconomic
realm is subjected to moral analysis and critique. Last, Cohen's
procedure leads to the elimination of Kant's bifurcation of law (the
doctrine of justice) and morality (the doctrine of virtue) in that
both receive the same philosophical grounding in a radical contractarianism. 23 This not only is elegant from a methodological point of
view, but also opens up, more clearly than in Kant, the road toward ethicization of the law.
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The (Ideal) State
What still needs to be discussed is Cohen's more detailed view of
the totality on its various levels. [n the rest of this section I will
focus on the (ideal) state as a mediating form between the individual and humanity, although I will also say a few words about
Cohen's view of the federation of states. I will deal with the producer cooperative in the next section.
For Cohen the state must be seen as "a legal concept, as the
concept of a legal person," and it is only in this fashion that "in the
concept of the state the unity of a totality is created" (Pure Will,
pp. 80 and 79, respectively). The implication is that universal suffrage is a necessary condition for the very existence of the legal
state. Cohen writes in his short essay "The General, Equal and
Direct Right to Vote" (1904):
The state is also a person. Only as a person has it unity. ... The person
of the state must be based on the will of the state.... The right to vote is
the fundamental right in which the will of the state originates. This right
constitutes the state .
. . . . lf the execution of the right to vote falls short, then the foundation of the state fails; it may be a power state (Machtstaat), but it has not
become a legal state. The will of the state has become silenced; the state
has failed to become a person and unity. 2•1

Thus Cohen opposed the autocratic German nation of around the
turn of the century, and declared (indirectly) his sympathy with
the German Social Democratic Party as the frontrunner of the
movement toward full democracy. (Although Cohen's comments
here seem to be particularly addressed to the Prussian constitution
with its indirect three-class voting system, they also apply to the
Imperial constitution; for in either case only the almost powerless
lower chamber was elected. )'5
It is in the context of this struggle for full democracy that
Cohen's other remarks in the essay cited above are to be situated.
He dismisses, for example, such standard arguments against
(representative) democracy as that it leads to the oppression of the
"more qualified" by the "less qualified" masses, by observing
the hypocrisy embedded in this view: as soon as the concern is national defense, these distinctions disappear like snow before the
sun; then everyone seems to be good enough to represent the
nation. Most interesting is his rebuttal of the claim that the majority of the people are not yet "ripe" for the right to vote and will use
this right to promote their own limited interests rather than to seek
true freedom for all. Cohen replies:
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It is a fundamental mistake to think that th e individual can become
mature and independent any other way than by his independent cooperation with regard to the state-that is, in the first place through his cofoundation of the will of the s tate. This is the greatest danger that is
created by th e common conception of religion, as if religion, without law
and state, were able to bring human beings to moral emancipation. The
direct right to vote is the precise instrument for the moral education of the
people (ibid., pp. 333---34).

Here again, we see that Cohen adheres to one of the basic premises of Kant's social ethics: structural political change is a precondition for human emancipation rather than the other way around.
But Cohen proceeds in a more consistent manner than Kant in
upholding this primacy of the "structural"; for Kant limits the
right to vote to economically independent male citizens, apparently assuming that the vast majority of the population can become morally emancipated without fundamental change of their
political condition. An additional difference is that Cohen does not
seek moral emancipation beyond the political realm, as Kant does
inasmuch as he sees the perfect state as a preparation for the
moral society; rather, Cohen views political emancipation as moral
emancipation.
Cohen holds that compulsory education is a building block of
the modern state and that this state should provide for public
education for all (see Pure Will, p. 515). One of his arguments for
this view runs as follows: "The state should never entrust the
responsibility for education to other institutions; for this responsibility is a responsibility for morality. And the sovereignty of the
state is rooted in morality" (ibid., p. 517) . To this it might be objected that the state should guarantee only that some political
education be part of the curriculum of public schools, with the aim
of cultivating or strengthening the individual commitment to uphold and improve the laws of the state. In other words, one may
wish to leave moral education in the hands of such institutions as
the family and religious organizations. This objection is, however,
partly misguided; for the concern here is social ethics, and social
ethics and political education are intrinsically related. Cohen offers
the additional consideration that such institutions as the family
and religious organizations are "relative communities," since they
display particularity, whereas the state is ideally a universal institution (see ibid., pp. 63, 78, and 588). Accordingly, a moral education that seeks to represent the interest of all citizens (and,
ultimately, the interest of humanity) cannot be the responsibility
of such institutions as the family and religious organizations alone.
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Nonetheless, an important worry remains, and perhaps this
last argument even adds to it: Does Cohen not put too much
emphasis on the state at the cost of smaller human organizations?
This question may be further explicated in two different ways; so
there are two questions. The first is whether Cohen, although he
avoids and repudiates totalitarian thought on the conceptual level,
does not in effect move closely to this kind of thought, or, at least,
to its dangers, since he fails to stress the importance of institutions
that can prevent the dissolution, as it were, of the individual into
the state. This question gains urgency in light of his (well-known)
unrestrained enthusiasm for the state. The second question is
whether Cohen did not expect too much from the state as a source
of moral/political education and emancipation at the cost of, say,
the family, local democratic political bodies, and even the
cooperative.
Although Cohen suggests that some claims made by the state
have a certain priority above those made by the family-a view
which he does not further explicate26-he does not deny the significance of the fami ly as a mediating institution between the individua l and the state. This is clear from his critique of Plato's
proposal to abolish marriage among the members of the ruling
class and to regulate their reproduction through the community
of women. Cohen argues that this proposal is to be rejected not
because it violates some sexual moral code or because it may be
detrimental to human reproduction (to name just a few standard
objections to Plato's proposal); rather, Plato's main mistake here is
to be sought in the fact that "although he orients the I to the state,
he at the same time also dissolves the I into the state; he does not
hold up against each other the poles of the I and the totality." 27
Cohen adds that Plato fails to recognize that loyalty or faithfulness
(Treue) is the essence of love-that is, through faithfulness mutual
physical attraction is brought to a higher plane in the form of a
mutual concern for "spiritual well-being." The "meaning of marr iage" and the family as a whole is "education and habituation to
faithfulness," and, accordingly, Cohen deplores the situation already arising in his time in which the elderly are seen as a nuisance. 28 Moral poverty in this regard signifies general moral (and
political) poverty. Cohen also views faithfulness as a political virtue directed toward the community and ideal humanity, and, thus
understood, this disposition has close affinities with what I have
called the moral commitment to change the world in light of some
moral ideal. 29 All things considered, then, we may interpret Cohen
as holding that moral education within the family and through the
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state are ideally complementary, each in their own way aiming at
the formation of morally committed individuals. Certainly, the
foregoing observations make clea r that Cohen is far from denying
that the family has some independent role to play in the moral
education of the individual. 30 And this means again that, on his
account, the family is to be treasured as a barrier against possible
"dissolution'' o( the individual into the state.
It also is to be noted that Cohen places the cooperative between the individual and the state. As compared to Kant, Cohen
says little about the possible mediating and emancipatory functions that may under certain circumstances be ascribed to religious
institutions. His concern is rather the moral significance of religion
as such. What needs above all to be stressed, however, is that the
state in Cohen's work stands for the ideal state, the law (justice),
and the rights of the individual. Cohen proposes not that we uncritically embrace the existing state but rather that we identify
ourselves with the ideal state which represents the will of all and
that we seek to transform the empirical state from this angle. The
following passage from Pure Will illustrates the point. It also shows
that Cohen was weJJ aware of the worry embedded in the first of
the above questions, and, together with his remarks on the family,
it should lay to rest this worry:
Our ethics may perhaps be regarded as being infected with the oppressive
odium of orienting the consciousness of the self by the state, whereas in
fact the empirical state corresponds so little to this ideal and so frequently
and emphatically makes a mockery of it. Nonetheless, even this state
must, in the logic of its own impulsion and however unwillingly, tend and
serve that ideal. . . . It is true that the empirical state is the state of the estates
and of the ruling class-not the Legal state. The power state can become the
legal state only by developing the law in accord with the idea of the state
rather than in the interest of the estates and classes. The latter are relative
communities . . . .
The state of justice, to the contrary, has only one goal: moral selfconsciousness .. . . The self-consciousness of the state is the self-consciousness
of all its members (p. 615). 31

And, to stress the issue perhaps more than is necessary, we may
observe that Cohen writes a little further on that the right of the
individual (Men schenrecht) is a precondition for the state, adding
that without this right "the state is a shadow of the state" (p. 616).
Yet the problem posed by the second question remains, and
the passage cited above even reaffirms it. What is the logic inherent to the actual state which pushes it toward the idea l? The
dialectical logic of self-interest (the cunning of nature), as in
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Kant's historical writings? My guess is that Cohen's logic of
hope must be sought elsewhere, namely, in the struggle for the
right to vote and effective democracy. At the time that Cohen
wrote these words there were at least some, albeit faint, indications that this struggle was paying off and that Germany was
moving toward a parliamentary system. In this sense Cohen's logic
was well taken. To be sure, democracy came too late in Germany,
to the extent that it came at all, to prevent the totalitarian and racist
tide that soon destroyed it, but we must not forget that, for Cohen
(like Kant), the logic of hope is at the same time a logic of social
action. What is the problem, however, is that it seems that Cohen
had too high an expectation of the possible moral and political
educational effects of universal suffrage. Or, to put it otherwise,
Cohen may have underestimated the gap that exists between representative democracy and the ideal state of informed citizens who
actively contribute to the formation of universal laws.
Consider again his claim in "The General, Equal and Direct
Right to Vote" that "[t]he direct right to vote is the precise instrument for the moral [and, hence, political] education of the people."
Recent political history supports the more modest claim that representative democracy has some emancipatory effects but also poses
the problem of genuine political participation. Cohen rightly holds
that moral/political maturity and independence can be reached
only through participation, but the question is, How can democracy mean more than voting for political elites? It seems that
Cohen's hope concerning the emancipatory effects of democracy is
justified only if democracy involves the active participation of all
citizens on a wide variety of political levels. Additionally, referendums, the possibility of recalling representatives, and active participation in cultural and educational institutions may be needed
as well. Thus it seems fair to say that Cohen puts too much emphasis on the state as such as a source of emancipation. In his
defense, however, it is to noted once more that he also views the
family as a possible source of moral emancipation. And, more
importantly, Cohen holds that not only public education for all is a
precondition for the ideal state but also the limitation of property
(see Pure Will, p. 615). This latter claim involves the dual claim that
a well-functioning democracy requires the elimination of great socioeconomic inequality as well as the creation of the cooperative as
a mediating institution between the individual and the state. The
cooperative in Cohen's writings is a fully democractic institution
and, we may assume, also a platform for political participation in
the state.
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A final criticism that I wish to direct at Cohen's view of the
state is that he offers few specifics concerning the proper goal and
limits of the state (the law). Kant, to the contrary, places definite
limits upon the state; he sees the state as guarantor of "negative"
rights, not of "positive" (i.e., human) rights. It is clear from
Cohen's notion of the state as legal person that he rejects these
limits, and the same follows from his professed socialism. For
Cohen the state must not only play a role in creating conditions
that make possible the pursuit of individual ends, as for Kant,
but must also directly contribute to the realization of these ends.
Likewise, the state must not only remove the obstacles to autonomy, but also create conditions that directly favor autonomy. Thus
we may, for example, assume that Cohen supported the socialist
demand at the time that the state make funds available for starting
cooperatives. 32 Such programmatic specifics, however, can seldom
be found in his work, and this is a weakness in his political analysis and proposals.
To avoid misunderstanding, let me add that I do not think it is
the primary task of the moral philosopher- although it may be a
task-to develop all the practical ramifications of his ideal model.
Also, Cohen's model implies that it is up to the people to spell out
the terms of their legal contracts-both on the level of the cooperative and of the state-and this is undoubtedly a sign of the moral
strength of his model. Yet, it seems appropriate that the philosopher provide some practical guidelines based on his model, even if
only because this would facilitate our understanding of his model.
To give another example, we may assume that Cohen held that the
state must provide a wide variety of welfare programs. (The ideal,
of course, is that the need for most of these programs will disappear, but we must also be concerned with the road toward the
ideal.) These programs are often thought of as involving conflicting rights claims, and hence it does not suffice that Cohen merely
argues that the good state must protect individual rights. This
problem of a lack of specifics indicates another difficulty, namely
that it never becomes clear in his work precisely how he sees the
relation between the family, religious institutions, the cooperative,
and the state. Cohen definitely does not wish to sacrifice the independence of these institutions for the sake of the state, but, in
order to evaluate his contention that a certain priority must be
ascribed to the state, we must know specifics of his view that
cannot be found in his work.
The highest legal expression of the totality is the federation of
states. Cohen argues that the ideal state must aim at this end and
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even presupposes its realization, thus constituting a link between
the individual and a unified humanity:
[I]n spite of all the sovereignty due to the state, international law from of
old holds before it the notion of a federation of states and makes it an ideal
for the state; it prescribes to the state the great teaching: the state is unable
to fulfill its concept unless it is able to elevate and to purify its individuality in a federation of states. Hence, in the state, also, man becomes the
carrier of humanity (Religion of Reason, p. 14).

This view largely accords with Kant's, although there is the usual
difference that Cohen sees the political ideal itself as an instantiation of the moral ideal. Programmatically, Cohen goes only one
step beyond Kant in that he gives more content to the third definitive article for perpetual peace, the right of hospitality. Kant says
that the stranger has the right to be treated in a peaceful manner,
provided that he fulfills the duty to come in peace, and adds the
qualification that "[ o ]ne may refuse to receive him when this can
be done without causing his destruction" (Peace, p. 102; VI: 443). It
is this latter point that Cohen elaborates:
It is the duty of any government, from both an ethical and a religious
point of view, to grant protection to the stranger oppressed in his own
country. Probably no political measure ever taken by England has so enhanced its standing among the nations as its introduction of the right of
political asylum (though this act might quite possibly lead to conflicts with
other countries). 33

Cohen wrote these words in a passionate plea for admitting the
oppressed East European Jews to the German Reich, which is also
a plea for the German nation to embrace the moral tradition of
Kant and, we may add, of Cohen himself. In retrospect, the urgency of this plea for cosmopolitanism and the rights of the individual cannot escape us.

3. The Cooperative and
Worker-control Socialism
Cohen's claim that capitalist private enterprise must be transformed into the cooperative is common to the German socialist
tradition of the 19th century. We can find, for example, this claim
in the work of Ferdinand Lassalle, who played a crucial role in the
shaping of the first German working-class socialist party, the Gen-
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eral German Workers Association (1863), as well as in the work of
Friedrich A. Lange, who initiated Kantian socialism. 34 Within this
tradition a distinction is drawn between consumer and producer
cooperatives (associations). Only the latter type of cooperative requires for its realization a fundamental overhaul of the capitalist
economic system, and, following Cohen, I will continue to use the
term 'cooperative' to refer to the producer cooperative.
Cohen's main contribution to the cooperative movement is his
philosophical explication and defense of the cooperative as legal
person. Cohen presents an alternative "logic" to the logic of capitalism. The logic of capitalism is naturalistic, whereas the logic of
socialism, as propounded by Kantian ethics, is constructive-that
is, ideal entities must overcome the limitations of natural entities.
More specifically, within the capitalistic-liberal tradition, ownership of the means of production is wedded to the natural person,
whereas Cohen proposes that this type of ownership be placed in
the hands of a constructed person, a legal fiction, namely, the legal
person. Cohen's notion of the cooperative suggests that he
held that this legal person must own the means of production; but
I will later consider the possiblity that his view was that the socialization of the means of production requires that the state as legal
person fulfill this role. In either case, private property is limited to
personal property, and, Cohen suggests, we may then hope that
the "eternal" human obsession with property will come to an end
(see Pure Will, p. 615).
Two other aspects of Cohen's view of the cooperative may be
mentioned at the outset: economic democracy and the overcoming
of the division of labor. The cooperative is a thoroughly democratic
institution; its bylaws reflect the will of its members and set forth
the general policy and purpose of the cooperative. Also, on
Cohen's account, the cooperative can act as a legal person only if its
actions are determined in a democratic fashion within the limits
set by its bylaws. The equal right to vote (one person, one vote),
then, is a sine qua non of the cooperative as legal person, just as it is
for the state as legal person. Thus the production of economic
goods becomes a truly collective task and responsibility. Furthermore, we will soon see that the cooperative must seek to overcome
the intellectual and moral deprivation resulting from the division
of labor within capitalist private enterprise. Most radically, Cohen
suggests that all members of the cooperative should become scientific producers, engaging in the infinite task of uniting scientific
and moral laws.
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The Critique of Capitalism
Cohen's argument for the cooperative must at least partly be placed
and judged in the context of his critique of capitalist private enterprise. Thus three questions arise: Which are his major points of
criticism of the capitalist economy? Are these points of criticism
well taken? And, finally, does the cooperative provide an adequate
answer to all the problems embedded in these points of criticism? I
will initially focus on the first two questions and end this chapter
by systematically addressing the third. My discussion will be
based not only on Cohen's text per se but also on its ramifications.
In addition, I will turn to some recent writings which offer a further analysis of the same issue which essentially mattered to him:
worker-control socialism. I will mean by 'capitalism' an economic
system in which labor power is a commodity, most economic activity is directed toward producing goods and services to sell on a
free market, and the means of production are in general in private
hands. 35 Thus my use of the term 'capitalist private enterprise'
refers to both family-run businesses and corporations that are
"publicly owned." 'Private' is to be conh·asted not with 'publicly
owned' but with 'socialized.'
In Pure Will Cohen expounded a thesis which soon became
almost a slogan of neo-Kantian socialism: the third formulation of
the categorical imperative, the humanity-as-an-end-in-itself formula, expresses a clear and undeniable criticism of the capitalist
economic system and sets forth, moreover, in synoptic fashion, the
idea of socialism. In a word, Cohen contends here that capitalism
is to be condemned because in this economic system the worker is
doomed to function as a mere means for the ends of others (i.e.,
the capitalists). After citing the third formula, Cohen describes its
positive aspect: "The deepest and most powerful meaning of the
categorical imperative is expressed in those words; they contain the
moral program of a new era and the entire future world history. ...
The idea of the priority of humanity as an end becomes the idea of
socialism, which defines each human as an end in itself, as purpose
(ibid., pp. 320 and 321). Karl Vorliinder, a pupil of Cohen who made
the synthesis of Kantian ethics and Marxism into his intellectual
life-task, repeated this same idea throughout his work. In one of
his earlier essays, "Die neukantische Bewegung im Sozialismus,"
he states: "No one has yet shown me that the moral idea, which
undeniably lies at the basis of socialism, the thought of the community, can be more simple and clearly expressed than in the
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highest command of Kantian ethics, which teaches us that humanity in the person of each individual must always be seen as an end,
never as a means only." 31' And to give a more recent example, the
French neo-Marxist Lucien Goldmann writes in his Immanuel Kant
(1967): "Indeed, Kant succeeds in concentrating into a few words
the most radical condemnation of bourgeois society and in formulating the foundations for any future humanism.... Once we
realize that [the third formula] condemns any society based on
production for the market, in which other men are treated as
means with a view to creating profits, we see the exent to which
Kant's ethic is an ethic of content and constitutes a radical rejection
of existing society." He continues: "Moreover, and no less radically,
it lays the foundations for any true humanism in establishing the
only supreme value upon which all our judgments must be based.
That supreme value is humanity in the person of each individual
man-not just the individual .. . , but the human totality, the community embracing the whole of humanity and its expression in the
human person (pp. 176-77). 37
Cohen's contention met sharp criticism already in his own lifetime. The orthodox Marxist Karl Kautsky attacked his view in
Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History (1906). He launched
two basic criticisms. The first, which will be our concern in the
next chapter, is that the moral law is superfluous in the socialist
society. Kautsky states:
The programme of the "entire future world history" is conceived in
somewhat narrow fashion. The "timeless moral law, that man ought to be
an end, and at no time simply a means," has itself only an "end" in a
society in which men are used by other men simply as means to their
ends. In a communist society, this possibility disappears and with
that goes the necessity of the Kantian Programme for the "entire future
world history." 38

Kautsky's second criticism is that "the would-be 'socialist' principle which fixes the Personality and Worth of men is ... just
as consistent with Liberalism or Anarchism as with Socialism"
(ibid., p. 58).
We may suspect that Kautsky's view is colored by ideological
considerations and commitments in that he, as an orthodox Marxist, had at the outset little sympathy for Marburg socialism and
its revisionist leanings (see Appendix, below). However, even
Tonnies, who was sympathetic to the political program of the
neo-Kantian socialists, affirmed Kautsky's second criticism in
the review essay cited earlier. After quoting Kautsky's remark on

Kantian Socialist Ethics and the Problem of Morality in Marx

225

the "would-be 'socialist' principle," Teinnies states: "This is not
only correct, but Kant himself thought, no doubt, about [this principle] only along the lines of liberalism." Tonnies then continues to
argue that the "humane employer" is justified in claiming that he
does not treat his workers as mere means because his end-the
economic success of the company-is also their end in that their
livelihood depends on this success. Moreover, the humane employer may, for the sake of the worker and not for his own sake,
make a yearly contribution to the local employment office, which
again shows that the Kantian imperative can be satisfied within
capitalist society ("Ethik und Sozialismus," p. 924).
The critiques of Kautsky and Tonnies can partly be dismissed
as irrelevant. The very fact that Kant himself adhered to liberalism
is not the issue at stake; rather, the question is whether socialism
can be convincingly extrapolated from his ethics. Furthermore,
their criticism rests on the common misunderstanding that Kant's
ethics is an individualistic or private ethics. The target of neoKantian social and moral critique is not the individual capitalist but
the class of capitalists or, better, the capitalist economic system. We
may grant that some capitalists are more humane than others,
which is of little interest in itself, but the real issue is the question
whether the capitalist economic system as such implies that the
working class is in some sense forced into the position of "means
only." In what sense? The answer to this question may be intuitively clear, but it needs to be explicated and defended. Perhaps
we should criticize Marburg socialism for holding that this sense is
undeniably clear; yet Cohen certainly gives a definite meaning to
the third formula of the categorical imperative. His meaning accords with my exposition in Chapter I: the humanity-as-an-end-initself formula demands that all individuals become colegislators in
the social, economic, and political institutions in which they participate. The cooperative fulfills this command, whereas the capitalist private enterprise violates it. The worker joins this latter
enterprise, but not because he agrees with its objectives or because
he hopes that through a common decision he can determine its
objectives and policies (as in the cooperative); rather, he works out
of necessity. Entering through the gate of the factory, he is not his
own lawgiver, he is not an autonomous being or colegislator; his
will is determined by another will-the will of the capital owner.
Or we may say that the will of the worker in the socioeconomic
realm is determined by the principle of capital accumulation. Heteronomy, then, is the fate of the worker under capitalism, and this
is just another way of saying that the core of capitalism is the
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domination of the worker. As Cohen puts it: "The meaning of the
labor contract is domination. . . . The owner wants to be ruler in
his own house, and he means by his house not [only] the four
walls of the factory but [also] the labor community, which he may
dominate through legal transaction" (Pure Will, p. 605). It is precisely this domination which signifies that under capitalism the
working class is treated as means only; the workers serve as instruments for capital accumulation.
Cohen underscores this condemnation of capitalism by arguing that the labor contract implies that the capitalist has control
over the "single action" of the worker. He sees this evidenced in
jurisprudence, citing the following definition by the legal theorist
Carl Friedrich von Savigny: "We call obligation [as, for example,
imposed by the labor contract] the relation of domination of a
single (einzelne) action of an alien person'' (ibid., p. 604). Cohen
comments:
The owner desires control over the isolated action and becomes in this
manner in fact the owner of the person. This is the legal course of the
history of obligation: the domination of the single action of the alien
person, from the position of the slaves through all steps and forms of
serfdom to the modem total worker (ibid. , p. 605) .

Here, Cohen somewhat overstates his case; for, as compared with
slavery, domination of the person under capitalism takes on a
more subtle form. This domination develops not through the
ownership of the person, as in the slave society, but through control over the labor power of the worker, as established in the labor
contract. However, this also is Cohen's meaning; for he states that
what characterizes domination is that it "isolates" the action of the
worker and thus "irresistibly tears apart the total person, the unity
of the person as such" (ibid.). That is to say, autonomous action, or
the possibility thereof, is largely limited to the private realm and
smrendered in the socioeconomic realm; the person is split into
two, as it were, in that he is master some of the time but servant
most of the time.
Under capitalism we see not only depersonification of subjects
but also a personification of objects. Cohen provides two examples. The first is the "illusion of the personification of capital" as
embedded in the idea that capital as such creates interest- that is,
the illusion that "capital itself becomes a worker, it labors, as the
worker does; it creates values and, hence, objects" (ibid., p. 609).
Cohen does not tell us what the ideological significance is of this
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illusion, but one such purpose can be easily discerned: the illusion
covers up the exploitation of the worker and thus helps to justify
"rewards" for capital ownership. The personification of capital,
however, is not merely an illusion; it reflects the fact that capital
accumulation is a force determining human behavior. The humane
capitalist, for example, cannot become too humane without ceasing
to be a capitalist; after all, he must defend his position on the
market. The second example concerns the idea that one can live
forever, as it were, through one's property estate. Cohen states
with regard to descent: "Here arises the appearance as if the person through his will . . . can win and eternalize the object; hence,
the illusion that the object can become the symbol of the person
and lose its own value" (ibid., p. 606; cf. p. 614). We may add that
this illusion is an aspect of a more encompassing illusion, namely,
that the value of a thing is seen not as determined by its intrinsic
properties but as formed by one's ownership of the object. Ownership becomes a precondition for the enjoyment of the object and
tends to overshadow it. Also, within capitalist society the worth of
the person tends to be equated with the market value of his possessions, and that which is not privately owned is often dealt with
in a callous manner. As noted previously, one purpose of the cooperative and the limitation of property to personal property, i.e.,
property in use, is to overcome this distorted relation between
person and object, this obsession with property, which even extends beyond the individual's lifetime. For Cohen, not ownership,
but morality is the mark of eternity.
Cohen states with a touch of irony that the "isolation of
action" is the "meaning of the famous blessing of the division of
labor" (ibid., p. 607). His claim is elucidated in the work of Marx:
the isolation of action-that is, forced heteronomy or domination
in the workplace-develops under capitalism through the division
of labor. And, recently, the issue has been argued by Harry Braverman in Labor and Monopoly Capital. Braverman shows that modern
management techniques, as initiated by Frederick Taylo1~ were designed not only to maximize profits, but also to effectively control
the worker and possible actions of protest. These techniques seek
to make the worker an "animated tool of management," and,
Braverman maintains, their practical effects have been a division of
labor to the highest pitch, as well as a degradation or "de-skilling"
of labor. 39
This (increasing) separation of manual and intellectual labor
highlights the fact that most people lack autonomy and responsibility within capitalist private enterprise; only a few people de-
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sign and control the production process. Yet there are situations in
which we must ascribe responsibility to the corporation in its totality. Consider, for example, the recent successful Nestle boycott.
The reason for this boycott was that the Nestle Company's misleading advertisements and promotions of infant formula in Third
World countries led to the illness and death of many infants. An
effective boycott implies a cutback in production, forcing the company to change its policies. The target of such a boycott is the
company as a legal and moral person, not its stockholders as such,
nor its management or production workers.4° Nonetheless, a boycott has repercussion s for each of these groups; notably, a cutback
may lead to layoff of production workers. Clearly, the production
workers at the Nestle Company were not responsible for the implementation of its immoral policy, and, considering the employment record of capitalist society, it would not even be fair to say
that they were responsible in the very minimal sense of having the
choice of working for another company. The threat of unemployment ha s always been an effective instrument of control over
workers. However, once a boycott takes place, we are forced to act
as if the workers were responsible for the policy of their company.
Or, to put it otherwise, we make them in effect liable for action s for
which they are not responsible.
My purpose in articulating this dilemma is not to argue that
boycotts against corporations with blatantly immoral policies are
wrong. To be sure, this dilemma should concern us, but is outweighed by the importance of changing immoral policies. Besides,
there is, of course, the possibility of offering the workers of the
targeted company various forms of support. Rather, my purpose is
to show that there is an inconsistency between our treatment of
corporations as moral and legal p erson s and the fact that most of
the p eople who make up the corporation lack a voice in determining its management. Another example of the dilemma and inconsiste ncy is filing s uit for damage caused by faulty products.
A successful suit on a large enough scale may have the greatest
negative effects on precisely those who are least responsible, the
workers. Cohen presents a clear solution for such capitalist
moral irrationalities: the transformation of the corporation into
the cooperative. 41
These observations point to various other harms and evils
caused by capitalism. Maximization of profit as the prime responsibility of the top of the corporate hierarchy often endangers human li fe, as the Nestle case illus trates, not to mention safety and
health in the workplace, and leads to fau lty goods (long testing
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may prevent the conquest of a great share of the market). Moreover, this maximization at least partly explains planned obsolescence and ecological damage to the environment, as well as the
increasing militarization of industr ial production. These are,
however, all familiar objections and problems, and they need not
be discussed here in any detail." 2 At any rate, they are not explicitly
mentioned in Cohen's work. What his work offe rs instead is an
important conceptual framework for analyzing and eventuaUy solving such problem s. To see this p oin t, we must turn brie fly to
Cohen's contention that both science and ethics must be guided by
one and the same law-the "basic principle o f truth."
Cohen argues that both science and ethics are ideali zing activities. The scientist searches for the idea l mathematica l description of his object; the ethicist tries to find the ideal moral subject;
they both engage in the task of bridging the gap between "data"
and ideal. The gap sets an "ought," the "ought" of the infinite
progress of science or morality.13 The most significant link between
science and ethics, however, is that both these ta sks must be seen
as aspects of one basic task- the search for truth. Cohen states:
"Epistemic logic [and, hence, science] alone does not offe r truth.
But also ethics alone cannot give truth. Truth must be sought in th e
connection between epistemic logic and ethics." That is, "[t]ruth
m ea ns the correlation and harmony of theoretical and p ractical
problems." This is "the basic principle of truth" (Pure Will, p. 89).
Cohen further explicates this principle in the following passage:
The highest fundamental law is the law of truth. Truth alone is the
law of the necessary connection between the knowledge of natu re and the
knowledge of morality. This truth is more than exactness, more than finality. Truth is the accord of theoretical causality with ethical teleology. This
accord of both kinds of lawfulness has been from of old the philosopher's
stone (Religion of Reason, p. 410).

On Cohen's account, then, a scientific praxis that is not conceived
of as moral praxis lacks truth. But, also, moral praxis must be seen
as scientific praxis. In e ith er case, the impet u s behind one's
activities must be "truthfulness" - that is, the commitm e nt to
seek to unite natural and moral Jaws.
Accordingly, Cohen condemns the division of labor under capitalism as leading to a destruction of the "unity of culture" (Pure
Will, p. 607). One aspect of thi s destruction is a separation
between "intellectual culture" (science) and "moral culture," the
former the prerogative of the few, the latter the duty of a ll.
Cohen replies:
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It ca nnot be sa id that not all human beings must have science as their
vocation, while they all must opt for morality. The vocation of morality
ca nnot be fulfilled except on the basis of scie ntific insight. Just as all
huma n beings must have morality as their vocation, so they are all called
upo n to become concerned with science (ibid. , p. 506) .

Likewise, Cohen rejects the separation between "material culture"
(the production of economic goods) and intellectual culture. After
noting that the division of labor under capitalism has led to a
si tuation in which some people are forced to spend their life
behind machines, whereas others can attend to intellectual
(s cientific) labor, Cohen states: "This distinction must end. All
human beings mus t at the same tim e participate in scientific
labor" (ibid., p. 507).
To com e back to my earlier contention that capitalist industrial
production leads to such harms and evils as faulty and dangerous
goods, environmental destruction, and an endless stream of weapons, th e general issue at stake can now be rephrased and further
explicated : capitalist industrial production lacks truth; its telos is
not to unite natural and moral laws, but to accumulate capital.
Most people within capitalist private enterprise are not in a positi on to be "truthful," and those who ca n be "truthful" are guided
by a different impera tive. The result is that we can at best attempt
to morally influence capitalist industrial production "from the outside" and "after the fact." In a recent study on Coh en's practical
philosophy, Henning Gunther forcefully expresses the Cohenian
alternative, as well as the need for this alternative:
Critique is not exercised w ith respect to the products of the productivity of the modern world, but ra ther with respect to the m anne r of its
prod uction. Critique must guide each step of the production. One can no
longer thin k of e thics and politics as able to limit the productivity of the
sciences from the outside; rather, each execution of a thought must become critica l. Ethics must become immanent to productivity, for otherwise
the modern world will destroy itself (Philosophic des Fortschritts, p. 59).

And, to complete this picture, it is to be noted that, on Cohen's
account, such immanent moral critique (scientific praxis as moral
praxis, and vice versa) is possible only if capitalist enterprise is
changed into the cooperative, which we may now further specify
as a community of colegislative scientific producers.
Finally, it should be observed that Cohen's remarks on the
"basic principle of truth" and its critical significance underline two
of his arguments discussed earlier. The first is his contention that
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moral education must be an aspect of public education. The point
is obvious: Cohen holds that public education must teach "truthfulness," and this means that scientific and moral education must
go hand in hand (see Pure Will, p. 517). The soundness of this view
seems hard to deny in an age in which the scientific destruction of
humanity poses an increasing threat. The second argument is that
the ideal state and capitalism are antithetical. For Cohen the state
must also seek to unite causal and moral laws, and this presupposes informed citizens who are familiar with both the natural
sciences and the various social sciences. Capitalism, however,
tends to lead to intellectual deprivation and to separation of the
different cultures. Moreover, it is difficult to see how independent
thought, moral responsibility, and decision-making can be eliminated for most people in the socioeconomic realm without having
the same effect in the political realm. A system that expects economic production to be settled by "experts" also expects politics to
be settled by "experts." Add to this our previous claims that great
economic inequality undermines true political democracy and that
capitalism by its very nature tends to privatize the public realm;
and, to paraphrase Kant, we can (with Cohen) conclude that the
ideal of true political democracy is empty without economic democracy; as we will see soon, economic democracy without true
political democracy is blind.

Is Cooperative Socialism a Viable Alternative?
Through his critique of capitalist private enterprise, Cohen arrives
at the view that high moral demands must be imposed upon the
cooperative: it must be a fully democratic institution, and it must
abide by an industrial policy of "truth." Considering the Kantian
moral ideal, we may assume that this latter claim entails that the
industrial policy of the cooperative must not only aim at the satisfaction of the needs of its own members but also seek to contribute
to the satisfaction of the needs of all human beings. The question
that we now confront is whether the cooperative can realize these
goals and, hence, can overcome the problems discussed concerning the capitalist economy. This question can be divided into two
basic questions that the cooperative socialist society must face.
First, what reason do we have to believe that the cooperative will
be anything more than an organization led by the class of managers through the fiat of the workers? Second, what reason do we
have to hold that the cooperative will not adopt the principle of the
maximization of profits, now serving the interest of all members of
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the economic company but still not the interest of humanity? Even
ii no good reasons can be given, there is still a gain made as
compared to capitalist private enterprise, but this gain is small, too
small, in the light of Cohen's moral ideal.
Braverman succinctly sets forth the first problem and points to
its solution as well:
The conception of a democracy in the workplace based simply upon the
imposition of a formal structure of parliamentarism---election of directors,
the making of production and other decisions by ballot, etc.-upon the
existing organization of production is delusory. Without the return of
requisite technical knowledge to the mass of workers and the reshaping of
the organization of labor-without, in a word, a new and truly collective
mode of production-balloting within factories and offices does not alter
the fact that the workers remain as dependent as before upon "experts,"
and can only choose among them, or vote for alternatives presented by
them. Thus genuine workers' control has as its prerequisite the demystifying of technology and the reorganization of the mode of production (Labor
and Monopoly Capital, p. 445n.).

Braverman further explains the matter by stating that "[t]he
worker can regain mastery over collective and socialized production only by assuming the scientific, design, and operational
prerogatives of modern engineering; short of this, there is no mastery over the labor process." Accordingly, true worker-control
socialism presupposes that "the antagonisms in the labor process
between controllers and workers, conception and execution,
mental and manual labor are overthrown" (ibid., pp. 444 and 445).
Cohen's view essentially accords with Braverman's. To be sure,
Cohen does not offer the same details, but we may interpret his
statement that the distinction between the different cultures must
be overcome and that everyone must come to participate in intellectual or scientific labor as implying that the ideal cooperative
worker is both developer and operator of the means of production.
Is this possible? Cohen himself, after stating his proposal that we
all come to participate in scientific labor, writes: "Perhaps one will
say that is utopian idealism. Thus one denies truthfulness. Truthfulness destroys the distinction that Kant has earmarked in the
saying, 'That may be right in theory, but it won't work in practice.'
Therein lies the difference between the despotism of experience
and pure morality" (Pure Will, pp. 507-08). In other words, on
Cohen's account it would be an instance of dogmatic metaphysics
to claim on the basis of past experience that most people lack the
capacity to become scientific producers. We simply do not know
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what the effect will be of the creation of favorable social conditions
for the intellectual development of all human beings. Thus the
primacy of praxis requires that we operate on the assumption that
all individuals can come to participate in scientific labor if favorable conditions prevail-the assumption sets a task. Furthermore,
increasing automation lends credibility to the idea of the cooperative as a community of scientific producers. The possible emancipatory effects of automation were already noted by Marx in the
Grundrisse: 4 '
[T]o the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth
comes to depend less on labor time and on the amount of labor employed
than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labor time, whose
'powerful effectiveness' ... depends . .. on the general state of science
and on the progress of technology. . . . Labor no longer appears so much
to be included within the production process; rather, the human being
comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself. . . . He steps to the side of the production process instead of
being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is .. . his own general
productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by
virtue of his presence as a social body-it is, in a word, the development
of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of
production and of wealth (pp. 704-05).

Now it may quite well be the case that there are limits to the
overcoming of the division of labor and the drudgery that accompanies some forms of manual labor, but then Marx's answer, and
we may assume Cohen's, is that there is the possibility of alternating between such tasks. More importantly, as the passage just cited
intimates, one aspect of the socialist ideal is that the process of
material production (the "realm of necessity") will take up a much
smaller part of human life than it presently does, opening up room
for the full development of our artistic, philosophical, and scien
tific capacities (the "realm of freedom").' 5
These last two claims raise the issue of economic efficiency
and growth under socialism. From a Kantian point of view, it
would be a mistake to argue that socialism must compete, as it
were, against capitalism in terms of its notion of efficiency and
economic growth-such socialism is an aborted socialism. In a
nontechnical sense, this efficiency involves creating the best balance of consumer satisfaction against costs, where costs comprise
labor and resources. 46 Now, provided that consumer satisfaction
means the shallow satisfaction portrayed in the endless stream of
advertisements, the ceaseless appropriation of goods for entertain-
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ment, and provided that we do not count environmental deterioration and dehumanization in the labor process as costs, capitalism
may quite well be more efficient than worker-control socialism.
Once the concern is socialist efficiency, however, the picture
changes completely; for this kind of efficiency views labor dissatisfaction and ecological destruction as great costs, whereas autonomy in the workplace is considered to be a great good. Moreover,
both Cohen and Marx see the socialist individual not as a passive
consumer but rather as a creative all-round individual for whom
artistic and intellectual satisfaction are at least as important, if not
more important, than material satisfaction. 47
The question of economic growth must be approached in similar fashion. We must ask "what kind of growth, and for whom?"
Walter A Weisskopf observes in his Alienation and Economics:'18
The trouble with most economic reasoning about growth is its onedimensionality. Economic scarcity includes only the dimension of intentionally produced goods and services, evaluated in money and mostly for
sale to others. . . . Existential scarcity includes much more: everything
that human beings may need, want, desire and do, including objectives
which cannot be reached by purposeful production... . Love, friendship,
primary, warm, affectionate human relations; the experience of beauty,
worship, the pursuit of truth and of the good, are of this nature (p. 188).

Weisskopf adds that "[t]hese noneconomic needs which cannot be
satisfied by more production for the market are the real costs of
economic growth and of striving for more and more goods and
services." In his view this applies to our society, not only because
most of our life-activity is spent on economic activity, but also
because the corresponding belief is dominant that "whatever has
no market value has hardly any value at all."
Weisskopf's alternative conception of growth-multidimensional growth, which includes, besides economic growth, such dimensions as moral, spiritual, communal, and affective growth (see
ibid., p. 190)-accords with the view of socialism propounded here,
although it needs to be emphasized (pace Weisskopf) that these
"noneconomic" dimensions must be incorporated and reflected in
the economic process itself, in the kind of goods that are produced
and in the manner in which this production takes place. It may be
noted, for example, that our present industrial process increasingly
creates an environment that blocks some of the "existential" experiences that Weisskopf treasures. 19 And, of course, from a socialist
perspective, but not from a capitalist perspective, a more equal
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distribution of both economic and noneconomic goods is in itself a
sign of "growth."
Returning to the two basic problems facing the cooperative
society which I have posed, we can now see that Cohen offers an
adequate answer to the first problem. His moral and political program involves not just economic democracy by ballot but rather a
true community of colegislators, a community of scientific workers, who seek to develop all their human capacities. In his program
the demand for the cooperative goes hand in hand with the demand for the most comprehensive education for all. Thus Cohen's
program also meets part of the second basic problem-the question whether the cooperative will not make the well-being of its
members the sole motive of its production. But in order to come to
a more conclusive assessment of this problem we must address the
issue whether the means of production should be in the hands of
the cooperative or should be placed with the community at large,
i.e., the state.
Although Cohen's notion of the cooperative suggests that the
cooperative itself should own the means of production, and this
was a common view at the time, the following passage from Pure
Will points in a different direction. It also indicates that Cohen was
aware of the second basic problem facing the cooperative society.
After noting the preoccupation with property under capitalism,
he writes:
It does not help to relieve the individual of property when the result is

only that a relative community of property owners is created. The cooperative forms merely an intermediate stage of the legal person; it must be
further developed as a true representative of the state as legal person.
Otherwise cooperatives will compete with each other, just as individuals
do. It is first within and under the state that property of objects in use
ceases to be dangerous for the individual. Property loses its frightening
character in the just state (p. 614) .
Thus it seems that Cohen held that ownership of the means of
production must be placed in the hands of the cooperative state.
The gain made by this step is that industrial policy can now be
subjected to democratic control by society at large and thus transcend the possible narrow outlook of the members of the cooperative ("economic democracy without true political democracy is
blind") . Yet one may wonder whether the cure is not worse than
the disease, as is suggested by the fact that collectivized ownership
in most present "socialist" countries has Jed to the very opposite
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of worker-control socialism. Cohen's analysis is too general and
indefinite to tackle this issue, 50 and for this reason I will in conclusion turn briefly to a recent response.

A Market Model of Worker-control Socialism
Most current writings on worker-control socialism are based on
the premise that a distinction must be drawn between a capitalist
economy and a market economy. Lucien Goldmann sets forth a
main motive for drawing this distinction in his The Philosophy of the
Enlightemnent. 5' After noting that the dominant values of the
Enlightenment- formal freedom, legal equality, and tolerationare threatened in existing "socialist" societies, he argues that it
has become manifest that "the picture of the world adopted by
the Enlightenment should be judged neither totally obsolete nor irrelevant, but that it enshrines values of crucial importance whose
preservation is one of the most urgent of the problems facing
socialism." Goldmann continues:
In the socialist society of the future, Marx saw the heritage and continuation of bourgeois humanism. It has now become clear, however, that
with the suppression of the market economy, which provides the basis of
bourgeois society, the principle values of its humanism are endangered
too. Socialist politicians and theorists who wish to remain loyal to the
spirit of Marx are thus obliged to answer the question how socialism can
transplant these values and realize them in a different form of society
(p. 94).

Goldmann, although expressing uncertainty about this form,
thinks that the answer might be a social system that seeks "to
combine the abolition of the private ownership of the means of
production with the maintenance of a market economy" -in a
word, market socialism. 52
Embedded in Goldmann's observations is the contention that
Marx's work points to a command-planning economy. This contention is, to say the least, debatable, not only because we can find
passages in Marx's work supporting the case for producer cooperatives, but also because at those points where he speaks of the
nationalization of private property and of a rational plan for the
socialist economy, it is not at all clear that he had in mind a plan
that originates from above (the state) and sets production quotas,
prices, wages, etc. 53 We may, however, criticize Marx for often
equating a market economy as such with the capitalist market
economy; for this strengthens the impression that a command-
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planning economy is the only alternative to the capitalist economy. 54 Furthermore, Goldmann perhaps establishes too quickly a
link between a command-planning economy and the repression of
individual liberties and rights. The very fact that in present Soviettype economies such a repression takes place might be more a
question of historical accident than of logical necessity. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that a command-planning economy carries
with it the danger of repression of individual liberties and rights in
that it requires an enormous concentration and centralization of
power in the state. Two other objections to a command-planning
economy are that it severely restricts the scope of decision-making
within the workplace; i.e., it is antithetical to worker-control socialism; and that it poses what seems to be an insurmountable problem of providing efficient allocation of economic goods.
Market socialism can take on different forms, depending on
such variables as the scope of the market (production goods may
be excluded), the organizational structure of the workplace (selfmanagement may not be included), and the precise form of productive property ownership.ss It falls outside the scope of this
study to discuss the various models of market socialism. But, considering our previous observations and value commitments (the
problems of central planning; self-management; and, democratic
control of economic policy), the kind of model that David
Schweickart expounds in his Capitalism or Worker Control? seems
most promising. His specific model of market socialism has, in his
own words, three basic features: "(1) each productive enterprise is
managed democratically by its workers; (2) the economy is essentially a market economy: raw materials and consumer goods are
bought and sold at prices determined by the forces of supply and
demand; (3) the government controls all new investment: it generates its investment fund by taxation [on capital assets], and
dispenses it according to plan" (ibid., pp. 49-50). Schweickart elaborates each of these features along the following lines. Although
the workers control the workplace, they do not own their means of
production. These are socialized property- the state does not permit productive assets not to be maintained, and, in case the workercontrol firm can no longer generate a decent income for its workers, bankruptcy will follow, and the remainder of the firm's capital
will return to the investment fund . The economy is still a market
economy, but not a capitalist market economy. This is so, not only
because the means of production are no longer in private hands,
but also because each individual who joins a cooperative firm is a
voting member and shares in its profits-i.e., labor power is no
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longer a commodity. Furthermore, the investment fund makes it
possible to develop a long-term economic policy subject to democratic control. Once a policy is established and approved through
legislative channels, individuals, groups, as well as representatives
of existing firms make specific economically feasible proposals as
to how they think they can realize certain features of the economic
plan. Local planning boards approve these proposals. Lastly,
Schweickart emphasizes that his form of socialism is a democratic
socialism, preserving and extending present civil rights and representative government (see ibid., pp. 50 ff. and 150 ff.).
We do not need to go into any more detail of this model of
worker-control market socialism to see that it provides an adequate
answer to the major pitfalls of the capitalist and command-planning economy. (It is best to speak of an adequate answer, because
we can think of other adequate models than Schweickart's, which
share its basic tenets but differ in detail-we may, for example,
think of a more direct public input in the worker-control firm
through elected officials who help to determine the specific policy
of the firm, representing the interest of local communities. "" Also-and this accords with the spirit of Schweickart's work-any given
model must continually be put into question and refined through
socialist theory and praxis.) Unlike the command-planning economy, the worker-control market economy provides an efficient allocation of economic goods and does not require a bureaucracy
that curtails the scope of self-management and may pose a threat
to human liberties and rights. And, as compared with the capitalist
economy, worker-control market socialism realizes autonomy in
the workplace and sets a framework conducive to the development
of a more rational economy, an economy for human need satisfaction, not for capital accumulation. Some basic reasons for this are:
First, public control over new investments leads to investments
that reflect public interest. Thus we may hope that new investments will not involve planned obsolescence, environmental destruction, and economic growth that develops at the cost of noneconomic values and needs. Second, continuous economic
expansion is hardly in the interest of the workers of existing cooperative firms, for it only means that more workers will share the
greater net revenues of the firm . (This may seem to create a serious
supply/demand problem, but we must not forget that new investments are likely to occur in profitable areas of the economy-see
Capitalism or Worker Control?, pp. 73 ff.) . Accordingly, we may
anticipate that worker-control firms will engage in less aggressive
selling techniques than capitalist firms, which means, among other
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things, that we may hope for fewer wasteful advertisements selling
a superfi cial way of Jjfe (cf. ibid., p. 89). And, finally, self-management makes viable the option of choosing less labor and more
leisure (cf. ibid., p. 88), which, togeth er with th e previous point, lay
the foundation for the development of the all-round individual
envisaged by Cohen and Marx.
It mu st be admitted, howeve r, that som e of th e gai ns of
worker-control market socialism here mentioned are a matter of
degree. This type of socialism without moral control is a step forward from ca pitalism, but a far cry from Cohen's idea l of th e
cooperative socialist society. Profit ma ximization per individual is
in the interest of the worker under worker-control market socialism, if his interest is a narrow ("material" ) self-interest. It follows
that planned obsolescence, aggressive selling techniques, environmental destruction, etc., may be in his interest. Besides, there are
the problems of unemployment; of competition between firm s; of
local areas with strong and weak economies, leading to intolerable
economic inequalities; and of the lack of international solidarity
(socialism in developed countries flouri s hing at the cost of developing countries). Socialized ownership of the mea ns of production and public control over new investments seem to offset thi s
projected negative balance (which is partly rooted in the market
system as such); but what if the pubUc at large opts for a policy of
the mere maximization of self-interest? And what if the workers
opt for democracy by ballot rather than true control over th e workplace? Without denying the tremendous importa nce of historical
experiments and new learning processes leading to better socialist
economic models, the point simply is that there is no foolproof
economic scheme as long as we assum e that the other is no t at all
recognized as a fellow person: the ideal of a harmony of devils
leads us nowhere, the human wasteland. A fundame ntal premise
of Kantian socialist ethics is that more favorable economic and
political conditions are conducive to th e development of th e mora l
disposition. Worker-control market socialism as sketch ed here
presents us with more favorable economic condition s, and Kantian
socialist ethics demands that we seek these conditions, 57 as well as
the ideal state and peace between th e nations. But it is only when
moral improvement has taken place that we may expect workercontrol m arket socia lism to become truly a worker-control socialism, that is, Cohen's idea l of cooperative socialism.

CHAPTER VII

Marx and Morality: A Kantian
Analysis and Critique

In this concluding chapter I aim to show that certain basic shortcomings in Marx's social theory can be corrected by making Kantian socialist ethics its moral foundation. The tenability of this
enterprise is underlined by the fact that there are various evaluative similarities between Kantian socialist ethics and Marx's social
theory. I will discuss these similarities in the first section below,
concluding that Kantian socialist ethics can strengthen the Marxian socialist evaluative perspective, both in foundational terms and
in terms of detailed content. In the second section I will tum to
Marx's contention that such a perspective does not have an important role to play in bringing about the ideal society. Marx's failure
to explore praxis as moral praxis is rooted in his materialist conception of history, which is, in tum, based on Hegel's understanding
of history as the unfolding of reason. I will argue that Marx's
Hegelian view of morality and historical progress involves an uncritical legitimation of revolutionary violence and lends itself to
repressive ideological purposes, justifying past and future crimes
against humanity. I will here also discuss Cohen's criticisms of
Marx. In the third section I will point out that the Hegelian framework in Marx is offset by a more Kantian orientation toward the
idea of historical progress and its relevance for social action. After
reconstructing and further exploring th e Kantian elements in
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Marx, I will offer in the fourth section my final conclusion that the
socialist cause is served by taking seriously the moral program of
Kantian socialist ethics.
Before starting this project, however, Jet me say a few words
about its rationale and limitations. The choice for a critical dialogue
between Kantian socialist ethics and Marxian thought is not solely
determined by considerations of theoretical affinities and differences. We can also find such affinities and differences between
Kantian socialist ethics and certain currents within the utopian
socialist tradition. But despite all its richness and diversity, the
history of socialism of the past century has been dominated by
Marxism. We will see in the Appendix that it is for this reason that
around the turn of the century some neo-Kantian socialists opted
for a "Kant-Marx" dialogue: they attempted through their intellectual labor to bring about various morally required changes within
socialist thought. More recently, a comparable endeavor to "ethicize" Marxism can, for example, be found in the Frankfurt School
(notably, Jurgen Habermas) and in the work of the Yugoslavian
Praxis group. It falls outside the scope of the present study to
examine such recent attempts to morally transform Marxism, but it
is my hope that my Kantian analysis and critique of Marx constitutes a contribution to these ongoing efforts.

1. Kantian Socialist Ethics
and Marx: Evaluative
Similarities and Differences
There are three basic evaluative affinities between Kantian socialist
ethics and Marx's view: the primacy of praxis; a condemnation of
capitalism as an economic system of domination, blocking the development of human autonomy or self-determination; and a vision
of the ideal society as a cooperative society, overcoming the division of labor and promoting the all-round individual. These similarities point to corresponding differences. I will discuss them in
the order presented.

The Primacy of Praxis
The primacy of praxis in Marx is manifest in the famous Eleventh
Thesis on Feuerbach: "The phi losophers have only interpreted the
world in various ways; the point is to change it" (The German Ideology, p. 617) . Of course, Marx's claim here is not that we must cease
interpreting the world-as if he were pleading for a mindless activ-
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ism-but that our interpretation of the world and our action in the
world must be guided by the socialist/communist ideal. (I will later
touch upon the distinction that Marx draws between socialism and
communism.) Like Kant, then, and in opposition to Hegel in particular, Marx holds that the ultimate purpose of philosophy is not
merely to contemplate the world but to guide the struggle for a
world in which contemplation is only one of our sources of satisfaction. In short, the mere metaphysical understanding of the
world must be replaced by a praxis-oriented philosophy. Undoubtedly, Marx had too high an expectation of such a philosophy in his
early work. In "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction," he postulates the schema that "[j]ust
as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the
proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy; and once
the lightning of thought has struck deeply into this virgin soul of
the people, emancipation will transform the Germans into men"
(Early Writings, p. 257). In other words, critical philosophy will
change the Germans from servants of the king into truly human
beings for whom (emanicipated) "man [is] the supreme being for
man" (ibid.).
As the last statement indicates, Marx's critique is directed not
only against traditional philosophy but also against religion. Holding that "[t]o be radical is to grasp things by the root" and that
"for man the root is man himself," he argues that "[t]he foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not
make man" (ibid., pp. 251 and 244). The religious person has an
inverted vision of the world in that he views the true world as the
world beyond and in that he projects his own essence upon a
divine being, without recognizing that these illusions are his own
creations. Thus he devalues himself, just as he does by worshipping the modern gods of capitalism, commodities, and money.'
But, Marx continues to argue, religious longing and alienation reflect the demand for real happiness in a world of suffering, which
means that religion is "a protest against real suffering. Religion is
the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world
and the soul of soulless conditions" (ibid., p. 244). This sets the
purpose of the critique of religion:
Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order
that man shall continue to bear the chain without fantasy or consolation
but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The
criticism of reljgion disillusions man, so that he will think, act and fashion
his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his
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senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true sun. Religion
is only the illusory sun which revolves around man as long as he does not
revolve around himself (ibid.).

Marx's alternative for religion, then, is praxis toward the social
ideal, seeking to replace the heavenly flower by the real flower, the
earthly flower.
Now it may seem that this particular application of the primacy of praxis shows the inadequacy of the Kantian notion and its
ramifications, but this is not so. We have seen that Marx is mistaken in maintaining that the concept of the highest good in Kant's
practical philosophy functions as a heavenly flower, making tolerable an intolerable and seemingly unchangeable social situation.
Moreover, the type of Copernican revolution that Marx seeks is
actually accomplished in the work of Kant, as well as in the practical system of Cohen, not by discarding religion altogether, as Marx
does, but by making the human person and his moral ideal the
center of religion, by transforming a reljgion of contemplation and
even resignation into a religion of moral praxis and human emancipation, a practical religion. For Kant the demand to seek
the moral community of colegislators--the kingdom of God on
earth--constitutes the rational-ethical core of the Judeo-Christian
tradition, and Cohen adds to this that socialism is anticipated in
this tradition. 2 I have little doubt that this ethicization of religion is
practically more fruitful than Marx's mere negation of religion, but
what is more important to note in the present context is that Kant's
and Cohen's analysis is philosophically more subtle and adequate
as well.
This is not to say that Marx is misguided in claiming that
religion is an ideational human creation which may function as the
"opium of the people." However, what is lacking in his analysis is
a philosophically explicated yardstick for distinguishing between illusionary and nonillusionary ideas. Here the Kantian analysis
provides an answer. Both Kant and Cohen, no less than Marx,
view religion as an ideational human creation, but they argue that
we should admit to the practical system precisely those practical
religious ideas which accord with the primacy of praxis and its
methodological corollary. Thus Kant argues that we must postulate
God for the sake of the belief in the practicability of the moral ideal
in the natural world, and Cohen makes a similar claim in maintaining that God is the "guarantee" of the possibility of "truth." 3 It
might be objected, as I have done with regard to Kant, that these
ideas have more content than the critical philosophy permits, but
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the main point remains: we must make some assumption to the
same effect in order not to conclude that socialism is an illusionary
practical idea; after all, the very possibility of the historical realization of this idea is a cognitively open question. Admittedly, there is
an alternative "solution": the socialist idea is not a possibility but
rather an inevitable "reality" unfolding in the historical process
itself. We will later see that Marx, in effect, opts for this "solution"
by developing his materialist conception of history as one that
describes the "immanent" and "natural" laws of history as leading
to the communist ideal. From the perspective of the critical philosophy and the reflective judgment, this conception of history is a
dogmatic (metaphysical) and, hence, illusionary idea. This conception also promotes an attitude of acquiescence, violating the primacy of praxis, and thus it may fulfill the same function of resignation that Marx ascribed to religion. We may conclude, then, that
the merit of Marx's analysis of religion, despite its too generalizing
character, must be sought in its social aspect rather than in its
philosophical dimension, in that it unmasks the repressive role
that is often played by religion in capitalist society.
This points to a more general conclusion: social analysis is the
strength of Marx's work, not only in terms of actual results but
also-and this is much more important in the long run-in virtue
of the direction that it sets for social research. The weakness of his
work occurs in the moral and philosophical underpinning of its
social analysis. The similarity of the primacy of praxis suggests this
conclusion. It is strongly affirmed by the second evaluative similarity between Kantian socialist ethics and Marx's thought.

Alienation, Heteronomy, and Exploitation
The second affinity is that capitalism is condemned primarily as a
system of servitude, only secondarily as a system of economic
injustice. As Eugene Kamenka rightly states in The Ethical Foundations of Marxism, Marx "came to Communism in the interests of
freedom, not of security."•
The claim that we must overthrow conditions of servitude,
such as the capitalist society, is a common thread in Marx's early
work. In "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right, Introduction," he writes:
The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that for man the supreme
being is man, and thus with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible
being-conditions that are best described in the exclamation of a French-
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man on the occasion of a proposed tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They want to
treat you like human beings! (p. 251) 5

The common denominator that Marx ascribes to conditions
of servitude is that they are conditions in which human selfdetermination (freedom) cannot be realized. The self here is explicated in terms of our "species nature." This nature is seen as a set
of characteristics that distinguishes us from nonrational animals.
Thus Marx's notion of species nature (being) correlates with one
aspect of Kant's notion of humanity. <· Yet, there is this essential
difference: whereas Marx stresses spontaneous communal activity
and cooperation, as well as creative labor, as the crucial aspects of
our true being, Kant emphasizes our capacity to act on principle,
i.e., our autonomy.
Just as autonomy and heteronomy are opposite terms, selfdetermination, i.e., the realization of one's species nature, and
alienation are opposite terms. Accordingly, Marx develops his condemnation of capitalism as a system of servitude in terms of alienation, contrasting this society with the communist society, in
which human alienation is overcome. It is difficult to detect a
common core or meaning in the wide variety of processes and
activities that Marx in his early writings describes as "alienated" in
capitalism, but Kant's notion of heteronomy gives a clue. An alienated process or activity is one that is not determined by one's own
law-for Marx this law is one's species nature-; rather, it is a
process or activity shaped by an alien law. Marx sets forth this
alien law in terms of egoism, economic competition, religious projection, political domination, and production for commodities, 1
whereas in Kant's notion of heteronomy the alien law is the law of
the inclinations. But this difference is less significant than it may
appear at first sight, for, as his historical writings in particular
make clear, Kant views the conflict between moral reason and the
inclinations not merely as an internal conflict but also, and primarily, as an interpersonal conflict. 8 He describes the unjust state
and war as heteronomous conditions, in that their law is not the
moral law but the law of competition, repression, anarchy, and the
lust for power, reflecting the unsocial sociability of human beings.
And Cohen extends this analysis to the economic realm.
There is no break between Marx's early and later writings, but
rather a gradually growing conviction that capital accumulation is
the alien law that is the root and final determinant of all alienated
processes and activities under capitalism. (His development of the
materialist conception of history corresponds to this gradual
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change, for we can already find the notion of history as a dialectical process in his early writings.) Thus the theory of alienation is
further explicated and narrowed down to a theory of exploitation
in the economic realm. Marx's labor theory of value, in conjunction
with his labor theory of surplus value, seeks to lay bare the mechanisms of this exploitation. To put the matter briefly, the worker
creates surplus value-that is, the value of his products minus the
value of his labor power; unpaid labor equals surplus value-and
this leads to capital accumulation. Such accumulation, in turn,
results in control over the worker; for the capitalist as owner of the
means of production determines the terms of the labor contract,
the conditions of production, the kind of commodities that will be
produced, etc. Moreover, Marx argues that economic power leads
to political power and cultural domination. His well-known thesis
that the rate of surplus value equals the rate of exploitation is,
therefore, to be understood as saying that the rate of surplus value
equals the rate of domination or servitude.
Some recent critics of Marx think instead that the main (or
even sole) purpose of his exploitation theory as based on his labor
theory of (surplus) value is to expose economic injustice under
capitalism. Their assumption is that exploitation is to be defined as
unjust appropriation of that which belongs to the worker-his
product or its value. Once this position is adopted, Marx's exploitation theory is to be dismissed (as one critic does not fail to point
out)9; for its thesis that the rate of surplus value equals the rate of
exploitation implies that a society free of exploitation is one in
which the worker receives all the value of his products, which
means that there is no right of society to make deductions from
this value for health insurance, public education, future investment, insurance for the disabled, etc. This conflicts with Marx's
view. Significantly enough, in Critique of the Gotha Program, he
himself censured the authors of the party program (of the German
socialists, adopted in May 1875, at Gotha) for making this error of
holding that the total product belongs to the worker. In response
to their demand that the worker have the right to the "undiminished proceeds" of his labor, Marx argued that, in the socialist society, as the society that forms the bridge between capitalism
and communism, deductions like those mentioned must be made
(see ibid., p. 344). (It will soon become clear that Marx held that
such deductions become superfluous in the final social ideal, the
communist society, partly because of increased productivity and
partly because of greater spontaneous cooperation among
individuals.)
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There are two other reasons for believing that Marx never
intended his exploitation theory to have the primary function of
revealing economic injustice under capitalism. First, throughout
his later work he castigates those socialists who focus on unequal
distribution as the moral watershed of capitalism, arguing that
distribution is derivative from production. Marx repeats this view
in Critique of the Catha Program:
The distribution of the means of consumption at any given time is
merely a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production
themselves . . . If the material conditions of production were the cooperative property of the workers themselves a different distribution of the
means of consumption from that of today would follow of its own accord.
Vulgar socialists . . . have followed the bourgeois economists in their consideration and treatment of distribution as something independent of the
mode of production and hence in the presentation of socialism as primarily revolving around the question of distribution (p. 348) .

And, in a direct attack on the authors of the Program, Marx concludes: "Why go back a step when the real state of affairs has been
laid bare?" (ibid.). Second, Marx views the concern with economic
justice as a typical bourgeois preoccupation-money and commodities as the modern gods. For Marx the real issue is self-determination, not the free and equal flow of consumer products, the
"socialist" cornucopia. An increase in the production of economic
goods is not an end in itself, but rather a mere means for the
realization of our true being or species nature.
We can also find in the recent literature on Marx the opposite
mistake of the one above: Marx viewed capitalist exploitation only
as a form of servitude, not at all as a form of economic injustice.10
To briefly assess this contention, we must further examine Marx's
rebuttal of the claim of the authors of the Catha Program that the
worker has the right to the total product of his labor. Although
Marx holds that their concern with economic justice reflects a
bourgeois orientation toward socialism, he concedes that in the
intermediate socialist society a principle of economic justice will be
operative which is a modification of their principle of distributive
justice: the worker will be rewarded according to the amount of
labor he invests, after deductions are made for the well-being of
society as a whole. But Marx can consistently make this concession, for he emphasizes with regard to the socialist society
that "[i]n every respect, economically, morally, intellectually, it
is . . . still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society from
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whose womb it has emerged" (ibid., p. 346). What Marx sees as
bourgeois about the socialist principle of economic justice, or right,
as he puts it, is that this right, like all bourgeois rights, presents us
with an equal standard that leads in effect to inequality. (Marx
adds that in the socialist society "principle and practice are no
longer at loggerheads," thereby rightly suggesting that under capitalism rights often remain mere principles for the vast majority of
people.) The socialist principle leads to inequality because there
are biological and social differences between human beings: some
workers must take care of a family, others not; some workers are
able to do more labor than others in the same period of time, etc.
In short, the formal principle cannot do justice to the "particular
side" of the individual worker. Holding that this is characteristic
for rights as such, Marx envisions a society beyond rights, the
communist society:
In a more advanced phase of communist society, when the enslaving
subjugation of individuals to the division of labor, and thereby the antithesis between intellectual and physical labor, have disappeared; when
labor is no longer just a means of keeping alive but has itself become a
vital need; when the all-round development of individuals has also increased their productive powers and all the springs of cooperative wealth
flow more abundantly-only then can society wholly cross the narrow
horizon of bourgeois right and inscribe on its banner: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs! (ibid., p. 347).

Thus the communist society does not inscribe a principle of economic justice on its banner (as is often thought). Rather, Louis
Blanc's formula is used by Marx as the former meant it to be
understood, namely to express the view that the communist society as the ideal society is a brotherhood of humans, each individual promoting the ends of others, not out of a sense of duty, or on
the basis of some principle, but spontaneously. 11
That Marx saw capitalist exploitation also as a form of economic
injustice is affirmed by the fact that he uses terms such as
'robbery', 'embezzlement', and 'theft' in reference to the appropriation of surplus value under capitalism. The socialist principle of
economic justice can account for this fact. As Ziyad I. Husami
argues in "Marx on Distributive Justice," for Marx the worker is
treated unfairly under capitalism because "his reward . . . is not
proportional to the labor he supplies [as in the socialist society]
but, at best, to the value of his labor power (a lesser quantity)." 12
Two critical notes, however, must be added to this argument. First,
the socialist principle of economic justice clearly establishes that
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the worker is economically exploited under capitalism, in particular if we take into account that many deductions under capitalism
benefit the capitalists rather than the vast majority of workers. But,
contra Husami, it must be said that Marx's exploitation theory as
rooted in his labor theory of (surplus) value is not really needed to
make this point, since we may simply observe that wages (and in
general the distribution of economic goods) under capitalism do
not correspond to labor contribution. Second, the socialist principle of economic justice is external to Marx's exploitation theory. It
may seem to be the normative equivalent of the basic premise of
this theory that value is "congealed labor time," but, strictly speaking, this premise says that the value of a product is determined by
the socially necessary labor time to produce it, and this means that
there is no one-to-one correlation between the value of a product
and the amount of labor that an individual laborer has invested at
a given time to create it. 13 The socialist principle of economic justice
seems instead to be based on a Lockean labor theory of property,
modified and applied to socialism by Proudhon and Lassalle. 14
All in all, then, we should not give too much meaning to
Marx's socialist principle of economic justice. Its significance is that
it offers a normative ground for the fact that Marx at times condemns capitalist exploitation in unmistakenly distributive terms.
Yet, it is less than certain that it is precisely this principle that
guided Marx's critique of capitalism as economically unjust; for the
principle receives little attention in his work, and capitalism as he
described it, for example in Capital, seems to be unfair in terms of
various other conceptions of economic justice as well. Thus we
may speculate that Marx mentioned the principle as a concession
to the at the time powerful Proudhonian and Lassallian factions
within the socialist movement at large, using the occasion of the
Catha Program for correcting their claim that the worker has the
right to the total product of his labor or the monetary equivalent
thereof. At any rate, Marx's exploitation theory seeks to reveal not
so much that capitalism is economically unjust as that the
seemingly reasonable mechanism of selling one's labor power is in
fact a mechanism for increasing "enslavement." And, as Marx's call
for a society beyond justice underlines, he condemned capitalist
exploitation foremost as a system of servitude, and only derivatively as a form of economic injustice. Accordingly, what makes
socialism, and in particular communism, superior to capitalism is
their characteristic of self-determination. Collective control over
the surplus product of society means that exploitation is basically
overcome. Once this control is established, the issue of distribution
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will become manageable or even will cease to exist as a consideration. For Marx the preoccupation with economic justice in virtually
all hitherto existing societies mirrors their nonsocialized mode of
production. And he extended this indictment to the concern with
rights as such.
We can now return to further exploration of the evaluative
similarity between Marx and Kantian socialist ethics with respect
to their critique of capitalism. Cohen shares Marx's view that what
is basically wrong with capitalism is that it cannot satisfy the conditions of autonomy: the labor contract is a contract of domination,
and great economic inequality undercuts the possibility of universal autonomy. And, like Marx, Cohen hopes for a future society in
which the human obsession with property, whether personal
property or ownership of the means of production, has become a
nightmare of the past. Contrary to Marx, however, Cohen does not
offer in an explicit manner a principle of economic justice that can
be used to condemn capitalism and guide the construction of the
new society. Yet, the demand for universal autonomy functions
indirectly as such, for it implies that all economic surplus must be
used to create the material, social, ·and political conditions that
make possible a moral existence for all human beings. Certainly,
our present world is one in which the majority of human beings
live under conditions antithetical to even minimal conditions of
autonomy: inadequate food consumption if not outright starvation,
poor health conditions, illiteracy, etc. So · capitalism can be condemned as unjust from a Kantian perspective in that it follows the
law of capital accumulation as the dominant determinant of its
distribution of economic goods instead of following the law of
universal autonomy. Also, this very same demand for universaJ
autonomy can settle the distributive question in the new society.
Moreover, Kantian socialist ethics adds to this the moral injunction
that human agents ought mutually to promote their personal ends.
For Cohen, then, the cooperative society is superior to capitalism
in that it is a society in which colegislators decide their own affairs
in a totally democratic setting, while they all enjoy adequate material conditions. But for Cohen, as for Marx, the former aspect
is central, both in the critique of capitalism and in the vision of
the ideal. 15
This similarity between Kantian socialist ethics and Marx's
view must, however, not blind us to their specific differences on
the same evaluative level. Autonomy as the central value of the
Kantian socialist individual cannot without important qualifications be equated with Marx's notion of self-determination, because
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the latter notion is much more comprehensive, including such elements as spontaneous cooperation, creative labor, artistic fulfillment, and intellectual activity. We may hesitate to adopt such a
rich and detailed notion of what it means to be truly human,
preferring Kant's minimal and more liberal notion of human happiness, as it is conditioned by the notion of autonomy. 16 Cohen's
view in this regard is closer to Marx's, sharing his vision of the allround individual, but, contrary to Marx, Cohen proceeds in a cautious and direct manner, arguing that the idea of the all-round
individual sets a moral task arising from the demand for autonomy. Such an argument and yardstick is lacking in Marx's work,
and herein lies a major difficulty with his view.
Marx's evaluative conception of human nature in his early
writings is not based on any philosophical defense, and so the
question arises of what the ground is for his claim that the communist individual will opt for the values embedded in this conception. Marx's later work provides an answer which is foreshadowed
in his early writings: it is the socialized mode of production that
will bring about this change. A more limited conception of human
nature is now adopted. It is· descriptive rather than prescriptive. It
is also thoroughly historical in its ramifications, which cannot be
said of the earlier prescriptive conception. The new conception is
the anthropological correlate of the materialist conception of history, and it holds that what characterizes human beings is that
they change their consciousness, needs, and social relations by
changing the manner in which they satisfy their material needs. 17
In other words, what is distinctive about human beings is that
their need patterns vary with the mode of production. Hitherto all
modes of production have been defective in nature, consisting of
antagonistic production relations which sooner or later block the
further development of the productive forces. The result is that
human consciousness and needs have been antagonistic and distorted as well-for example, possessive individualism is the product of a capitalist mode of production. (To complete the picture, it
must be noted that differentiation of need patterns within a given
mode of production is explained on the basis of social class, but
this issue is not important for our present concern.) Thus the logical outcome of Marx's mature theory is that the socialized mode of
production will lead to an undistorted and harmonious need pattern, the communist need pattern, and, as his descriptions of the
communist society show, this need pattern is essentially the same
as the realization of our species nature. The abolition of exploitation, or capital accumulation, as the alien law that is the root of all
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other alien laws, then, is the most basic reason why the communist
individual will opt for the realization of the truly human capacities.
Accordingly, Marx states in the Manifesto of the Communist Party
that "the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the
single sentence: Abolition of private property" (The Marx-Engels
Reader, p. 484)." Marx's sketch, in Critique of the Gotha Program, of
the transition period between capitalism and full communism
points in the same direction: the main tenet of his prediction is
that the socialized mode of production will lead to increased productivity, a gradual overcoming of the division of labor, greater
work satisfaction, and thus eventually to spontaneous cooperation
and other elements of the realization of the communist individual.
My discussion in the previous chapter of worker-control market socialism has shown that such economistic predictions and
expectations are misguided: the socialization of the mode of production is not in itself a sufficient ground for holding that human
agents will opt for the values of the communist individual. (It is to
some extent a necessary ground, since there are material prerequisites for the realization of norms; but this is a different claim.)
This is so even if we take into account other economic factors that
Marx mentions as preconditions for full communism, such as increased productivity, the gradual elimination of the division of
labor, and a socialized mode of production on a world-wide scale.
This means that there is a gap in Marx's analysis: he offers no
adequate account of how workers will come to accept his value
orientation. 16 Kantian socialist ethics provides a solution; for it offers a normative theory which argues that informed and rational
agents opt for values similar to the communist ones. Now there is
no certainty that human beings will ever take on the moral task
embedded in these values, but it is rational to hope that this will
happen once there are suitable empirical conditions for making
this task tenable and various impediments to the free exercise of
practical reason are eliminated. This is what the socialized mode of
production accomplishes, although we must-contra Marx-stress
not only the impact of more favorable economic circumstances but
also the impact of improved political conditions. Regulatively
speaking, then, Kantian socialist ethics fills the gap in Marx's analysis--to the extent that it shares his value orientation-and so
again we can see that the Marxian analysis stands to gain from this
moral theory.
Marx's sketch of how workers will come to adopt communist
values has negative ramifications for present social action. The
problem is that he fails to draw the subtle but crucial distinction
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between saying that improved social situations will lead directly to
moral improvement and claiming that improved social conditions
remove obstacles to moral improvement. The former view, which
seems to be Marx's, not only is inconsistent with the idea of selfdetermination or autonomy, for it signifies social or economic determinism, but will also lead to despair when it turns out that
human beings fail to make the great step forward under certain
improved social conditions. And, sad to say, historically, the response has been not only despair and a corresponding turning
away from praxis, but also sheer repression to force the great step
forward. Kantian socialist ethics avoids these pitfalls, for it holds
unambiguously that improved social conditions facilitate the moral
task, not that they make this task inevitably successful, effortless,
or even superfluous. We may add here that Marx's failure to draw
or recognize the above distinction sheds light upon another facet
of his thought, namely his view that we do not really have the
moral right to blame individual capitalists for their economic
crimes because they are conditioned by their historical circumstances.19 And, quite consistently, Marx also seems to have held
that the state within capitalism has no moral right to punish because crime is caused by a faulty economic system.20 Kantian
socialist ethics, to the contrary, with its view of the interaction
between individual and social change, leaves room for moral
responsibility, and, hence, the moral right to punish, although,
certainly, it does recognize and stress that social conditions play a
very important role here. Thus Kantian socialist ethics encourages
social action that aims at reformative changes in the present legal
system-without losing sight of the possibility of a punishmentfree society-whereas Marx's critique seems to lead to the wrongheaded conclusion that any such action is meaningless.

The Ideal Society
While analyzing the second similarity I have already dealt to some
extent with the third similarity between Kantian socialist ethics
and Marx's view, namely, their shared vision of the ideal society.
But, of course, this is not surprising, because the shared critique of
capitalism is rooted in such a vision. In recapitulation, both Cohen
and Marx sketch the ideal society as one in which the means of
production are socialized, in which the division of labor is overcome as a step toward the all-round individual, and in which
questions of ownership and distribution have been replaced by
mutual support and true enjoyment of the fruits of labor.
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A closer look, however, reveals some important differences
between their respective views. Cohen sees the reconciliation between individuals and between (inner) nature and morality as setting an infinite task, whereas Marx seems to have held the dream
that under certain economic circumstances social problems as well
as individual dilemmas will cease to exist. Thus Marx comes to
dream of a society beyond rights-a dream that we cannot find in
Cohen's work, and for good reasons. One reason is that, although
Marx's critique is to the point that rights in capitalist society remain "formal" for many people, the alternative is not to discard
rights. The danger of this is that the importance of rights-both for
and in the struggle for the socialist/communist ideal-is neglected,
as it has been by too many socialists, with dire consequences. The
alternative policy is to seek the effective implementation of many
of the "bourgeois" rights and the conditions that make this possible. As Cohen's work makes clear, socialism is not the negation of
the "rights of man," but rather its logical outcome. Another reason
to reject Marx's view is that, even if we assume that all human
beings obey the moral law and are of good will, social problems
and individual dilemmas remain, making necessary the idea of
rights. For one thing, even in the ideal society economic scarcity
and ecological limitations will continue to pose tensions between
the rights of present and future generations; for another thing, in
this society large institutions will still create inadvertent negative
consequences for their members, which can be directly rectified
only when individuals are aware of their rights and exercise
them. 21 Nonetheless, we may expect that in the ideal society there
will be many fewer occasions in which people need to stand on
their rights than there are presently. But also in this respect the
Kantian ideal seems more promising than the Marxian: colegislators who exercise moral self-constraint are less likely to harm others through paternalistic behavior than communist individuals
who are guided by spontaneous brotherly love.
Marx's dream of a society beyond rights (or justice) and
beyond a sense of duty is related to another dream in which the
allocation of goods no longer takes place through market mechanisms, while at the same time the political and legal state withers
away. 22 Cohen is, of course, highly critical of this view, arguing that
"[t]here is no freedom without law, and no free personality without a community rooted in law" ("Critical Epilogue," pp. 294-95).
What deserves special attention here, however, is that Marx's
dreams signify that it makes little sense to see his synoptic descriptions of the communist society as a blueprint for a possible future
society-in this regard his work offers some valuable but often
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conflicting suggestions 23- ; rather, their relevance lies primarily in
the fact that they display the values that guide his critique of
capitalism and his work in general. Also, and this is even more
crucial, what these dreams show is that the conclusion of his value
orientation is not simply that laws forced upon one's will by an
arbitrary will are alien laws but that any law whatsoever, including
the moral law, that functions as a corrective of one's desires or
interaction with others is an alien law. 2·1 The law of one's species
nature is not a prescriptive law, but the law of spontaneous selfrealization and objectification. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, Karl Kautsky shared Marx's dreams, and claimed that in
the communist society the possibility disappears of human agents
being treated as mere means and that "with that goes the necessity
of the Kantian Programme for the 'entire future world history.' " It
is, quite obviously, at this point that Kantian socialist ethics and
the Marxian view definitely part.

2. On the Role of Morality for
Social Action (A): The Hegelian
Elements in Marx
Thus far I have set forth criticisms of Marx's view that require fine
tuning, as it were, of his evaluative perspective; besides that, I have
argued that Kantian socialist ethics offers a more adequate underpinning of this perspective than Marx's own philosophy. My final
conclusion, however: that Marx saw communist values not as setting an infinite moral task, but rather as the spontaneous expression of communist human nature, intimates a point of disagreement between Marx and Kantian socialist ethics which shows that
a fundamental reconstruction of Marx's view is required if it is to
become adequate for socialist theory and praxis. This point of
disagreement is Marx's contention that the transformative praxis of
capitalist society must not be seen as a moral praxis. I will assess
this contention in the present section, analyzing Marx's conception
of what the subjective mechanisms are that possibly can change
capitaJism into a better society.

The Materialist Conception of History
and the Notion of Practice
At the outset, one would expect that the evaluative perspective in
Marx, in conjunction with his critique of capitalism, has a threefold purpose: to motivate the proletariat to engage in revolutionary
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action, eradicating the subjugating conditions of capitalism; to
steer this struggle toward the socialist or communist ideal; and to
place moral limits or constraints upon the revolutionary strugglefor example, revolutionary action must reflect the ends it seeks to
realize. A moment's thought, however, makes clear that Marx
could not consistently have had all this in mind, for, as we have
seen, it was his belief that the proletariat would opt for his value
orientation only after, and on the basis of, the emergence of the
socialized mode of production. So what will motivate the proletariat to change society? And what reason do we have for believing that this change will be oriented toward the ideal? And finally,
can we expect that the proletariat in its struggle will take into
account certain moral constraints? We will soon see that Marx was
not very much concerned with the last question. His earliest reply
to the first two questions can be found in "A Contribution to the
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction":
So where is the positive possibility of German emancipation? This is
our answer. In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil
society which is not a class of civil society, . . . a sphere which has a universal
character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to no
particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong
in general; ... a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from-and thereby emancipating-all the other spheres of
society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and which can
therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity. This
dissolution of society as a particular class is the proletariat (p. 256).

What is most striking about this reply is that Marx ingeniously
makes the motivational and directive role of morality superfluous:
the tota l loss of humanity will incite the proletariat to revolutionary action, or so Marx thought, and the historical position of the
proletariat as a class that suffers "wrong in general" makes it
unnecessary for its struggle to be guided by such moral notions as
universal rights or universal emancipation. What is also to be
noted is that the reply is a historical prediction along dialectical
(and Hegelian) lines, in that history pushes the proletariat into the
position of becoming the negation of the existing state of affairs;
universal emancipation (communism) as the total redemption of
humanity is the negation of the negation.
In Main Currents of Marxism (Volume I), Kolakowski presumably rightly claims that this Marxian schema of universal human
liberation through proletarian revolution was at the time the result
of "a philosophical deduction rather than a product of observa-
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tion" (p. 130) . Certainly, Kolakowski is correct when he adds that
this schema "remained the foundation of [Marx's] social philosophy." In my own terms, Marx continued to describe history as a
dialectical process, in which the proletarian overthrow of capitalism is the final negation that brings about the ideal society, while
he also continued to adhere to a notion of praxis that makes moral
praxis superfluous.
Marx's reductionistic view of praxis in his later work is clearly
manifest in The German Ideology, where the notion of praxis ("practice") is developed in terms of social activity (to which corresponds
his descriptive conception of human nature). Marx distinguishes
in this work between the following five basic aspects of social
activity:
(a) Social activity is the production of the means of subsistence.
Marx considers this to be the most basic aspect of social activity,
because life involves, before anything else, eating, drinking,
clothing, housing, etc.
(b) Practice under (a) leads to the production of new needs and the
instruments with which to satisfy these needs.
(c) Practice includes the propagation of the species. Thus the first
social relation arises, the family. This may suggest that Marx is
describing stages of historical development, but he states, not surprisingly, that "[t]hese three aspects of social activity are not of
course to be taken as three different stages but just as three aspects, . . . which have existed simultaneously since the dawn of
history and the first men, and which still assert themselves in
history today" (p. 48).
Thus far Marx states what is obvious; few would wish to deny
that production of the means of subsistence, human reproduction,
and the development of the means of production beyond the subsistence level are basic features of human activity throughout history. The problem with his view arises with the next two aspects of
social activity, in which we can see a strong tendency in Marx to
reduce all forms of human activity to social labor, denying that
other forms of activity may have their own efficacy, "logic," standards, and the like:
(d) Practice is "social intercourse," or a "mode of cooperation," and
this mode is itself a "productive force." Marx continues: "[T]he
aggregate of productive forces accessible to men determine the
condition of society; hence, the 'history of humanity' must always
be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and
exchange" (p. 49).
(e) Having described the above four aspects of social activity, Marx

258

Marx and Morality: A Kantian Analysis and Critique

states: "Only now .. . do we find that man also possesses 'consciousness' " (ibid.). Initially, Marx argues, this "consciousness"
was nothing other than consciousness of the collective transformation of nature, but with the division of material and mental labor
this changed: "From this moment onwards consciousness can
really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of
existing practice ... and . . . proceed to the formation of 'pure'
theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc." (p. 50). Marx immediately adds: "But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc, come into contradiction with the existing relations, this can
only occur because existing social [production] relations have
come into contradiction with existing productive forces."
Marx's reductionistic thesis that "consciousness" is determined by the productive forces and the production relations of a
given society, which, moreover, determine all other social relations
(the "condition of society"), is one building block of his materialist
conception of history. The other is the dialectical interpretation of
historical progress. The locus classicus of this conception can be
found in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy, where Marx argues that (a) "[t]he mode of production of
material life [consisting of the productive forces and corresponding
production relations, which "men enter into ... independent of
their will"] conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general" and that (b) "[a]t a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict
with the existing relations of production ... From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their
fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution" (The MarxEngels Reader, pp. 4-5) .
In Capital I this dialectical materialist schema is filled out with
regard to capitalist society and its transformation into a higher
social formation. Marx concludes this work by predicting an increasing contradiction within the capitalist mode of production,
leading to revolution:
[A]s soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own
feet ... [t]hat which is now to be expropriated is no longer the laborer
working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many laborers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital. One capitalist
always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralization . . . develop, on
an ever-extending scale, the cooperative form of the labor-process, the
conscious technical application of science, the methodological cultivation
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of the soil, .. . socialized labor, the entanglement of all peoples in the net
of the world-market, and with this, the international character of the
capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the
magnates of capital . .. grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery,
degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united,
organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production
itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production . .. . Centralization of the means of production and socialization of
labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their
capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitali s t private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated
(pp. 762-63).

And as if the dialectic at work is not clear enough, Marx adds that
capitalist private property is the negation of individual private
property and that "capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation
of negation .. .. the transformation of capitalistic private property ... into socialized property" (pp. 763-64).
Two things are to be noted about the above passage. First,
Marx's prediction is not a prediction of hope but rather one of
optimism (in the sense in which I have explicated these feelings in
Chapter III); for his prediction that capitalism will collapse and
lead to a better society is stated in terms of certainty, of immanent
(not regulative!) laws, and in terms of laws of nature. Second, the
passage indicates that Marx held that what motivates the proletariat to engage in revolutionary action is not a vision of the ideal
society and a corresponding sense of duty, but self-interest in its
most direct form : the laws of the capitalist production create misery, degradation, subhuman living and working conditions, widespread disease, and even the threat of starvation due to unemployment. All these factors are highlighted in the inevitable recurrent
economic crises of capitalism, and it is in one of these crisis situations, Marx thought, that the proletariat would make its decisive
move. It is to be observed, however, that the passage leaves room
for another interpretation: Marx stresses that the capitalist mode of
production creates the skills and conditions of cooperation, and
we may consider the possibility that this cooperation is the product not of mere self-interest but of cooperative values acquired in
the labor process itself. I will later discuss this interpretation; Jet
me here only point out that this interpretation conflicts with the
fact that Marx denied the motivational relevance of moral principles (see below) .
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It should now be clear on what grounds Marx comes to state in
The German Ideology that "[t]he communists do not preach morality
at all" (p. 264). It also should be clear on what grounds he can here
directly attack ethical and utopian socialists by stating that
[c]ommunism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established,
an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the
real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions
of this movement result from the now existing premise (p. 57) .

In summary, these grounds are that what is real in history-what
moves history and causes its ultimate realization (communism)-is
the mode of production, and what is real on the anthropological
level-what moves human beings and causes their ultimate selfrealization-is social labor rooted in their basic needs. And the
dialectic works on each of these levels. To mention only the individual level, the worker labors under capitalism so as to satisfy his
basic needs, but in fact he negates his needs, falling prey to misery
and the threat of starvation; he has acquired organizational skills
in the collective labor process, and his act of revolution, then, is
the negation of the negation, eventually leading to the full satisfaction of all his needs. Further, following Marx, what is not real
(wirklich), although actual (to use Hegel's distinction, fully accepted by Marx, but used for his own purposes), and what ethical and
utopian socialists wrongly took to be real, are the state and
cultural institutions on the structural level and "consciousness,"
including moral motivation and a notion of the ideal society as a
moral society, on the individual level.

The Hegelian Impact: the Progressive
Dialectic as Terror
For our purposes it is important further to expose the Hegelian
elements in Marx. We have seen in Chapter III that Hegel argues
that neither "private virtues" nor a critical social morality have any
place in history and that the way of history is the road of reason.
To recapitulate and somewhat further explicate, Hegel maintains
that reason is realizing the truly good in cunning fashion, using as
its instruments the actions of world-historical individuals, such
as Napoleon, as well as those of powerful nations ("national
Spirits"). That is to say, these individuals and nations unwittingly promote the modern state and freedom for all, making possible the ultimate aim of reason becoming aware of itself through
philosophical reflection. The actions of the world-historical figures
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and the powerful nations involve brutal violence and immense
human suffering, as Hegel himself emphasizes, but both moral
complaints about this and attempts to change this through moral
praxis are fruitless and, moreover, misguided, in that they are
based on a misunderstanding of the ways of the good (reason).
Thus Hegel maintains that the youthful moral idealist wraps himself in the illusion that he and his moral ideals can be the judge
and initiator of social change, but in fact his struggle is "deserted
by the living Spirit." The older and tolerant person, to the contrary,
realizes that history is reason incarnate and, hence, that "the history of the world . . . is the world's court of judgment."
Marx takes over this Hegelian schema but gives his own twist
to it. The paradigm of the misguided youthful person is no longer
the person of the categorical imperative with his "formal rectitude," but the ethical and utopian socialists with their abstract
demands for justice and a moral humanity. And, roughly speaking, the productive forces fulfill a role analogous to that of the
state, the bourgeoisie to that of the world-historical individuals,
and the leading industrial nations to that of the powerful nations.
Moreover, Hegel's view of history as the unfolding of reason can
be put on a par with Marx's view of history as developing from
primitive communism (reason in itself) to full communism (reason
in and for itself). Thus Hegel's cunning of reason becomes in Marx
the cunning of communism, as it were, embedded in the socioeconomic process, in which the capitalists so develop the means
of production that the emergence of the new social formation is
inevitable, a development which takes place against their will (behind their backs). The passage just cited from Capital I displays
this cunning, and we may here also cite Marx's famous words from
the Manifesto of the Communist Party that in revolutionizing the
productive forces the bourgeoisie has "forged the weapons that
bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who
are to wield those weapons- the modern working class-the proletarians" (p. 478). "What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces,
above all, is its own grave-diggers" (483).
History, as the unfolding of reason or communism, then, is on
the side of the proletariat, just as Hegel saw it on the side of his
universal class-the civil servants of the modern state (see Philosophy of Right, p. 132; § 205). In either case, this class constitutes the
"historical guarantee" for the ultimate aim. This means that the
revolutionary struggle of the proletariat is not right because it accords with some philosophically defended and projected ideal, as
the neo-Kantian socialists argued, but right simply because it is the
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struggle of the proletariat. In other words, the particular location
of the working class in the historical process legitimates its existence and its struggle. Once this position is adopted, a moral defense of the struggle of the proletariat becomes superfluous. Marx
writes in Capital I:
The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make
the working-day as long as possible. [T]he laborer maintains his right as
seller when he wishes to reduce the working-day to one of definite normal
duration. There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both
equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights
force decides (pp. 234-35).

These statements do not show that Marx actually thought that
both the capitalists and the proletarians were right to an equal
degree, as some recent Marx commentators have contested 25 ;
rather, they reflect his conviction that history will reveal whose
rights will prevail and that any rights claim is irrelevant and ineffective in this respect. As Marx said elsewhere, " [h]istory is the
judge-its executioner, the proletarian." 26
Marx's use of metaphors such as 'grave-digger' and 'executioner' suggests that the revolution of the proletariat will lead to a
complete break with present reality and that it is not the task of
those who bring about the new world to pause and think about the
means that are justified in the light of this end. The following
passage from The German Ideology illustrates this; here Marx attacks in typical Hegelian fashion those who have moral qualms
about the ways of the good (the direct target is Bruno Bauer's
doubt about the necessity of revolution in order to establish "real
humanism"):
[He] will be greatly surprised when judgment day overtakes him, the day
when all this is to come to pass-a day when the reflection in the sky of
burning cities will mark the dawn, when together with the "celestial
harmonies" the tunes of the Marseillaise and Carmagnole will echo in his
ears accompanied by the requisite roar of cannon, with the guillotine
beating time (p. 61n). 27

And, like Hegel, Marx contends that our personal moral feelings
are a bad guide when the issue is progress through the violent
dialectic. Thus he writes in an article on imperalism in India that,
although the destruction of the village system in India caused by
British industry and trade is a bitter pill for our personal feelings,
this is irrelevant, because England is "the unconscious tool of his-

Kantian Socialist Ethics and the Problem of Morality in Marx

263

tory" in creating a social revolution in India, sweeping away its
backwardness and repressive political order. Marx argues that this
social revolution with all its suffering will lead to the final revolution between capital and collective labor and that, therefore, "we
have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe: Should
this torture then torment us? Since it brings us greater pleasure?
Were not through the rule of Timor, Souls devoured without
measure ?" 28
Marx's view concerning the role of leading industrial nations,
such as England, in bringing about progress in less industrialized
nations, mirrors Hegel's view on the role of national Spirits. The
industrial nations, thanks to their ever-expanding productive
power, unwittingly and inevitably promote progress toward the
socialist/communist ideal, and, hence, any condemnation of the
cunning ways of progress on an international scale seems to be
misplaced. Marx remains rather constrained in defending this view
in his article on imperialism in India. Yet he greatly exaggerates the
backwardness of India and its oppressive political order so as to
drive home his point that the only road to the emancipation of its
people is the imperialistic industrial power of Europe. 29 Thus Marx
"permits" us secretly to enjoy the terror of this power. Engels
showed himself less restrained in this regard in some of the articles he wrote for the Neue Rheinische Zeitung (1849), echoing Hegel
in the indictment of all countries, peoples, or struggles that are
outside, or against, the stream of the progressive dialectic:
There is no country in Europe that does not possess, in some remote
corner, at least one remnant-people, left over from an earlier population,
forced back and subjugated by the nation w!jch later become the repository of historical development. These remnants of a nation, mercilessly
crushed, as Hegel said, by the course of history, this national refuse, is
always the fanatical representative of the counterrevolution and remains
so until it is completely exterminated or de-nationalized, as its whole
existence is in itself a protest against a great historical revolution.
And will Bakunin reproach the Americans with this 'war of conquest'
[against Mexico, 1845-47] which admittedly gives a hard knock to his
theory based on 'justice and humanity,' but which was waged simply and
solely in the interests of civilization? Or is it perhaps a misfortune that
magnificent California was snatched from the lazy Mexicans ... ? Or that
the energetic Yankees . . . are about to give world trade a new direction
for the third time in history? The 'independence' of a few Spanish Californians and Texans may suffer by this, 'justice' and other moral principles
may be infringed here and there; but what does that matter against such
world-historical events?30
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And obviously, this infringement becomes even less than a triviality once the concern is a historical event that ends history proper
and gives rise to a new humanity: the revolution of the proletariat.

A Kantian Critique
Cohen begins his critique of Marx's view of history and morality
on a positive note. After observing that historical materialists deny
that moral ideas play any significant role in shaping human history, he states:
It might quite well be that one is so indignant about the hypocritical use of

moral ideas that one points to the immoral power relations in order to
unmask in them the driving force of all past history. This would be then
anything but materialism, but rather a restrained idealism which guides
this view of history (Pure Will, pp. 36-37).

And in a similar vein Cohen writes:
When the socialism of a Marx, from its high historical perspective, insists
on the compelling power of material conditions, it unwittingly becomes
satire. A fiery ethical spirit motivates all his great work, theoretical as weH
as practical. It were pedantry to offer to such an emissary of the God of
history little maxims of spiritualistic morality (ibid., p. 312). 3 '

On Cohen's account, then, the role of morality in Marx's work is
"repressed," and one reason for this might be that Marx rightly
claimed that morality functions all too often as an ideological prop
for immoral conditions. But, Cohen continues to argue, it must
nonetheless be said that "[t]he materialist conception of history is
a logical mistake, and, since the issue is a moral problem, it also is
a moral mistake" (ibid., p. 313).
The logical mistake is that history is approached as determined
by economic forces or laws, so that the laws of morality remain
outside the picture. Or, as Cohen also puts it, the materialist conception of history errs in its determination of the relation between
theoretical concept and practical idea, between logic and ethics,
and between natural science and ethics, in each case reducing the
latter to the former. The upshot is that this conception of history
leads to an elimination or abolition of history. Cohen states: "Either history as the history of humanity and its works and deeds is
a history of spirituality and [practical] ideas, or there is no history
of the world but only a natural history" (ibid., p. 39). Even more
appropriately, he points out that Marx's view transforms social
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ethics into a social physics (ibid., p. 313). The proper alternative is
to recognize that pure practical reason produces moral ideas and
that these ideas, in no matter what concealed or distorted form, do
play a role in shaping the historical drama-an alternative which
follows from, or is a presupposition of, the transcendental method-for otherwise, Cohen argues, we are forced to bring morality
back onto the scene by sleight of hand. Cohen writes: "It is . .. a
false realism and nominalism to represent on the one hand everything as the product of economic forces, while on the other hand
moral tasks are seen as fearful apparitions and as post-historical
forces that appear as sheet-lightning in the hitherto dark historical
sky" (ibid., p. 38). 32 Thus the logical error becomes a moral error:
values are significant only at the "last moment." (Besides, Marx
engaged in considerable effort to free the ethical and utopian socialists from their "apparitions," thus unwittingly acknowledging
their significance.) And we may add that philosophy as critique
becomes a meaningful activity only at the moment when it is no
longer really necessary, i.e., in the post-historical ideal society
when the natural history of humanity has been overcome and is
replaced by a history of self-determination. What Cohen, however,
emphasizes in particular is that the materialist conception of history implies that the legal system and the state are seen as "mere
imaginary realities" and as "shadows" of the production relations.
The result is that the political process is not viewed as a true road
of emancipation. And, Cohen suggests, although the German socialists were at the time through their reformative political efforts
in fact the defenders of justice and the state, this created a certain
"uneasiness" in that such efforts conflicted with their "official"
Marxist theory, which told them to seek the "eruptive revolution," sweeping aside the necessity for the political state in the
first place. 33
Notwithstanding their rather synoptic character, Cohen's criticisms of Marx's materialist conception of history deserve our admiration, not only because Cohen was undoubtedly one of the first
to launch such criticisms, but also because embedded in them is
much sympathy with Marx and the socialist cause at the time,
which was no small feat in the repressive academic climate of
Wilhelmian Germany. Currently, the main gist of Cohen's critique
is most explicitly and fully set forth in the Frankfurt School, notably in the work of Habermas. Habermas contends that Marx failed
to see that the human agent is both a tool-making and a "symbolizing" animal-that is, labor and language are fundamental anthropological categories in the sense that one cannot be reduced to
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the other. And what Habermas means by "language" is the communicative or interactive dimension of human existence, which
includes moral praxis and reflection (critique) . Furthermore,
Habermas argues that Marx's self-understanding is too limited in
that he considers the knowledge acquired in the production process--practice as productive labor-as the model for all knowledge. This is exemplified by Marx's statements that the "science of
man" must be developed as a natural science and that the critique
of political economy is a natural science of society.:i.1 The result is,
Habermas argues, that Marx failed to recognize that his own empirical and historical studies involve a critique of society in the true
sense of critique-that is, a reflective study directed toward human
emancipation. All this accords basically with Cohen's claims that
Marx's materialist conception of history reduces practical ideas to
theoretical concepts and ethics to logic and natural science, while
at the same time a "fiery ethical spirit" lies at the basis of all his
writings. And Cohen could not but have agreed with Habermas's
statement that "[l]iberation from hunger and misery does not necessarily converge with liberation from servitude and degradation, for
there is no automatic developmental relation between labor and
interaction," 35 implying that human emancipation requires not only
instrumental or economic efforts but also communicative, i.e., moral and political efforts, including critical reflection. Yet,
although Habermas is not unfamiliar with Cohen's work, he fails
to note that the basic premises of his own analysis can already
be found in Cohen. 36
Cohen's contention that the materialist conception of history
steered the German socialists wrong-headedly in the direction of
the "eruptive revolution" has frequently been misinterpreted.
Most Cohen commentators, and, of course, in particular his
orthodox Marxist opponents, accusing him of "bourgeois reformism," have taken this to mean that he opposed revolution under all
circumstances. 37 Textual evidence conflicts with this interpretation.
Like Kant, Cohen expressed his commitment to the French Revolution and its ideals, and he states, moreover, that "all reform and
epoch-making revolution in religion, as in politics, is ethical idealism, even though principled awareness may be lacking." Cohen
adds: "Reforms and revolutions are periods of experimental ethics"
(Pure Will, p. 328). Cohen does not specify under what circumstances revolution is justified, but my thesis, defended earlier, that
revolution is justified if there are no other options left to counteract a systematic repression of the conditions of autonomy, is
consistent with his ethics. Clearly, Cohen held that such conditions
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did not prevail in Germany at the turn of the century, and on this
score there was, at least in practice, no disagreement between
Cohen and most other German socialists.
A broader meaning, however, can be given to Cohen's critique.
What he objects to is that the dialectical logic embedded in the
materialist conception of history legitimates revolutionary violence
a priori. Communism as the telos of history unfolds itself through
the negation of the existing state of affairs, and negation stands
here for revolution. Thus dialectical thought seems to exclude the
possibility of fundamental change through reformative steps and
to call instead for class polarization and structural violence, irrespective of the empirical conditions at hand. Furthermore, what is
objectionable about the Marxian notion of revolution as the negation of the negation is its eschatological exaggeration. Although
Marx develops the idea of a transitional society, he also often
suggests that one final revolution will suffice to bring about a
complete break with reality as we know it-the emergence of the
communist society as a brotherhood of humans, including even
the complete reconciliation between humanity and external nature
(see Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 348). This eschatological thinking also is manifest in Marx's claim in The German Ideology that a proletarian revolution is necessary, "not only
because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way,
but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution
succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted
to found society anew" {p. 60). This idea that time can come to a
stop in the revolutionary act and that humanity can start with a
clean slate is simply naive in the light of even a superficial knowledge of what revolutions have been able to effect in human history.
This naivete may lead to despair and even pessimism when the
"new era" fails to materialize along the lines of such irrational
expectations. It is also an invitation to brute oppression, so as to
clean the people of the "muck." To limit my remarks to morality,
the Kantian view is that there is no sudden break in moral progress; rather, the moral ideal sets an infinite task along gradualist
lines. In accordance with this, Cohen counterposes a "steady [permanent] revolution" to the "eruptive revolution" ("Critical Epilogue," p. 294) . This does not exclude the possibility of sudden
changes in the conditions of autonomy-revolutionary institutional
changes--or the desirability thereof; what it means is that the
realization of autonomy itself must be expected to proceed in incremental steps. Kantian ethics would, of course, not mind being
wrong about this, but a glance at ourselves or the world should
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suffice to make clear that it is not plausible to hope for more. It is a
hope that needs to be defended in the light of the deplorable
history of humanity.
Cohen launches similar, although more biting criticisms
against Hegel than against Marx. And, indeed, both Marx's and
Hegel's views of history develop within the same basic conceptual
framework. In either case, historical data are placed within a dialectical schema, and the purpose of history is seen as the product
of immanent laws, implying the reductionistic view that practical
reason and moral ideas have no role to play independent of
the movement of the "concept" (i.e., Spirit or communism, with
the state or the productive forces as their main means of " selfrealization"). Cohen is particularly bitter about Hegel's saying
that "what is rational is real, and what is real is rational," commenting that "[p]erhaps nothing has contributed so much to making philosophy contemptible in the pre-revolutionary [1848]
age than [this] reactionary motto" (ibid., p. 211). 38 Cohen adds
that Hegel thus destroys the distinction between "being" and
"ought," as well as between "reality" and "task" or "[practical]
idea." And, in Pure Will, Cohen sums up his critique by stating
with regard to Hegel's system: "[O]ld dogmatic metaphysics in
modern historical dress here takes the place of ethics" (p. 45).
This criticism also applies to Marx. Cohen is well aware of this, as
is manifest from his statement that Marx let the "ought" come
out of the "being" in the form of post-historical forces. Yet,
Cohen does not further elaborate how Marx's Hegelian schema
of fusing together the "ought" and "being" can lead to uncritical
or misplaced justifications other than by suggesting that Marx
offers a misguided a priori legitimation of the "eruptive revolution."
That this schema fulfills other such justificatory purposes is
clear from my exposition of the Hegelian impact on Marx. Like
Hegel, Marx tends to justify human evil in the name of the progressive dialectic, representing the "objective" interest of
humanity. Thus we have noted that Marx "permits" us secretly to
enjoy British imperialism, and Engels displays outright contempt
for all those people, nations, or struggles which are outside, or
against, the "stream" of history (they have existence but are not
wirklich). It is to be admitted, however, that this type of justification is less clearly pronounced in Marx's work than in Hegel's. This
is not surprising; for Marx holds that the final goal of history lies
in the future, whereas Hegel ascribes a telos to history which he
saw actualized in its major features in his own society. Moreover,
contrary to Hegel, Marx is not engaged in a theodicy. Yet, Marx is
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not always prepared to call evil by its name, at least if on his
account this evil serves the ultimate communist goal. To provide
another illustration, the Manifesto of the Communist Party is both a
condemnation of the bourgeoisie and an ode to its productive
power. We see Marx saying here with obvious approval that the
bourgeoisie has drawn "even the most barbarian nations into civilization" and that the creation of its immense cities "has
. . . rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy
of rural life" (p. 477). We do not have to decide what is more
striking here, Marx's cultural bias or his virtual silence concerning
the fact that these bourgeois "accomplishments" involved brute
oppression.
To digress for a moment, although one of the greatest merits of
Marx's materialist conception of history is that it has stimulated
extensive historical research concerning the working class and its
representatives, we should also note the opposite side of the
coin: his emphasis on the productive forces as the main vehicle of
human emancipation tends to be at the cost of the significance
of the revolutionary subject. It is, for example, striking that
Marx said in a speech to radical workers in London (1852) that the
"so-called Revolutions of 1848 were but poor incidents," although
they announce the "abyss," and that "[s]team, electricity, and the
self-acting mule were revolutionists of a rather more dangerous
character than even citizens Barbes, Raspail and Blanqui." 39 It
would perhaps be pressing the matter too hard to maintain that
Marx is degrading human agents who sought the betterment of
the working class to the status of unsuccessful means only; but
certainly Marx displays here little sensitivity to what, in Chapter
III, I have argued is an important theoretical and practical task of a
(socialist) philosophy of praxis: to uphold human dignity in the
face of progress. Likewise, Marx seems not to have been very
much concerned with another problem that I have discussed in the
same context, namely the issue of anamnestic solidarity. After noting that Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte argues
that the "social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot
draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future," and
that this revolution "must let the dead bury their dead," Christian
Lenhardt states in a recent paper on anamnestic solidarity:
"[T]he analysis itself might be called technically sophisticated.
[However], I can see nothing else here but an instrumentalistic
concern with revolution." 40 And, a little further on, he concludes
that "[t]he ancestors are not expressly assigned the role of avengeable predecessors in the Marxi:.in scheme of things. Their tendency
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to interfere with the really serious business of the living is
counterproductive, as the modern phrase goes, and hence they
had better be forgotten" (p. 148).
To come back to the main line of argument, what is more
objectionable and, historically speaking, of greater weight than
Marx's tendency to justify human evils in the light of their alleged
positive effect in bringing about the ideal society, is that the very
notion of immanent and inevitable historical progress constitutes a
backhanded way of justifying social action. Taken literally, this
notion makes any justification of social action superfluous, in that
acting, or feeling obliged to act, is determined by the social order
of things. The practical consequence is that the materialist conception of history invites us not to act, and, hence, this theory conflicts with the primacy of praxis. The same conclusion follows from
Marx's contention that "[n]o social order ever perishes before all
the productive forces for which there is room in it have fully developed.""1 Yet, throughout his work, Marx condemns certain
groups or classes for not acting in the right way (and the situation
is not altogether different for Hegel). We learn, for example, from
the Manifesto that "[t]he lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, [and] the peasant [are] conservative" and that a variety of socialist or communist groups are
mistaken, because, among other reasons, they promote the creation of experimental ideal communities within the existing order
and seek to proceed along gradualist peaceful lines. So what is the
basis of these evaluative claims? Marx states: "The lower middle
class .. . , the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the
middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the
wheel of history" (ibid., 482). Marx launches similar criticisms
against the wrong-headed socialists and communists. So the question becomes, What is the direction of the wheel of history? Once
we know this, we have a criterion for right action. But, of course,
our capacity to predict future events in such detail that they can
guide our actions is rather limited. What this means is that Marx's
predictive claims hide an evaluative claim that refuses to explicate
and defend itself. Practical choices--revolution versus reformative
change, political organizing within capitalist factories versus the
starting of cooperatives, present well-being versus future emancipation, and the like-are covered up as mere questions of theoretical necessity. History as the judge, then, is Marx as the judge.
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Besides, we can always repudiate the turn of the wheel of history
from an independently formed evaluative platform.
The crux of the matter is that the idea of history as the judge
discourages the formation of such a platform. In practical reality, it
is the leaders, notably the leaders of the "progressive" party, who
determine the destiny of the dialectic. Thus right action becomes
that which accords with their understanding of the course of history. The members of the party relinquish their independent moral
judgment. The wheel of history traces the line of the party, writing
'democratic centralism' in its path of human destruction and oppression. With obvious reference to the Stalinist era and the communist parties of the Comintern, Kolakowski states:
What is basic is that the communists w ho believed in the absolute
amorality of history believed at the same time in the superfluousness of
every morality capable of emancipating itself from history's demands, and
that they took no interest in the substance of that historical necessity at
whose doorstep they laid their own conformity. They . .. shift[ed] the
heavy burden of inquiring into the designs of the demiurge of history
onto the shoulders of their superiors. They willingly agreed to let others
divine the shrewd intentions of the Weltgeist and announce the results of
their communion with it (Toward a Marxist Hurnanism, p. 121).

Thus Kolakowski rightly speaks of "the opiate of the Weltgeist,"
capturing the fact that the Hegelian dimension in the materialist
conception of history makes this conception analogous to religion
as the "opium of the people." And what needs to be stressed is
that the prediction of the course of the Weltgeist contains evaluative elements, if it is only because in its name moral crimes have
been committed for the sake of its alleged inevitable telos.
Two of my criticisms of Marx's Hegelian notion of historical
progress may be approached from a different angle: this notion
gives rise to what Kant calls the "despotic moralist" and the "political moralist." Recall that the former fails to recognize and follow
the rules of political prudence in his enthusiasm for the moral
ideal, while the latter claims that the end justifies the means.
Marx's eschatological exaggeration concerning the effects of a
socialist revolution reflects the position of the despotic moralist.
And behind his thesis of history as the judge we can discover the
viewpoint of the political moralist. Looking back at the history of
Marxism, we can discern that Kant was right on two scores:
both positions lead to moral terrorism, but experience may lead
the despotic moralist to a better course, whereas the oppressive
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means employed by the political moralist block his vision of
the end and eventually tend to become the end.
In recapitulation, Marx's elimination of the various functions
of morality in adopting a Hegelian framework for his social theory
leads to a dogmatic and reductionistic view of history, which is
implausible in itself and which contradicts the whole point of developing a critique of society. Moreover, this view of history leads
to an uncritical legitimation of revolutionary violence, creates
unrealistic expectations concerning the effects of revolutionary
change, and lends itself to making the unacceptable "acceptable"that is, terror for the sake of "progress." In sum, the Marxian
amoral history for the sake of moral purposes leads to immorality.

3. On the Role of Morality for
Social Action (B): The Kantian
Elements in Marx
The materialist conception of history conflicts with the primacy of
praxis in Marx's work. Thus we may reinterpret his prediction
concerning the inevitable collapse of capitalist society and the
emergence of the socialist society as a regulative idea, intended to
stimulate social action toward the ideal. Undoubtedly, this has
been one historical effect of Marx's work. This means that there is
a tension between Kantian and Hegelian elements in his writings-but more about this later. Presently, it is to be noted that, if
we look at Marx's prediction as a regulative prediction, it can be
placed on a par with Kant's regulative idea that a race of intelligent
devils will opt for the perfect state (and peace between the nations) . To be sure, the two ideas are on different levels of progress-following Kant's distinction, Marx's idea is focused on the
technological level, whereas Kant's own idea is centered on the
pragmatic level-and they have different main ends in view, the
socialized mode of production and political peace, respectively.
Also, the mechanisms of the cunning of nature are different: in
Kant it is the ravages of war and political conflict that lead selfish
intelligent persons to organize political peace, whereas in Marx it
is the revolutionary expansion of the production forces and the
resulting misery of the proletariat that bring this class to the realization of the socialized mode of production. Yet, what the two
ideas have essentially in common is that it is predicted that the
existing state of affairs will evolve in such a way that self-interest
will compel human agents to bring about a certain ideal, while this
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same process will also provide the organizational means and skills
for this collective action. Moreover, in each case the self-interest
thesis is a minimal assumption for the sake of moral action toward
the ideal, in that it offers hope, facilitating the undertaking of this
action. And we may even interpret Marx as following Kant in
claiming that such moral action will then hasten the "inevitable"
realization of the ideal."2
The regulative idea that a race of intelligent proletarian devils
will opt for the socialized mode of production is inadequate. This
idea can be refuted along the same lines along which I have rebutted Kant's idea that intelligent devils will opt for political peace;
but, rather than stress the indispensable directive function of morality, I will now focus on its motivational significance. My refutation will be based on the public-goods objection to Marx's account
of revolutionary motivation, as raised and discussed in Chapter V
of Allen E. Buchanan's Marx and Justice. Buchanan does not project Marx's prediction of the socialist revolution as a regulative
prediction, but this does not make his analysis less fruitful for
our purposes.

Revolutionary Motivation and Morality:
The Public-goods Objection
Buchanan sets out to show that "even if revolution is in the best
interest of the proletariat and even if every member of the proletariat realizes that this is so, so far as its members act rationaJJy,
this class will not achieve concerted revolutionary action" (ibid., p.
88). This conclusion assumes that revolution is, for the proletariat,
a public good in the technical sense: its success will be beneficial to
all workers, even those who do not revolt. Another presupposition
is that the proletarians seek to maximize their self-interest- that is,
rational behavior is acting as a maximizer of one's own utility.·13
Both assumptions are justified in the light of Marx's sketch of how
capitalism wilJ be transformed into socialism, and, certainly, they
accord with the regulative idea that proletarian devils wilJ opt for
the socialized mode of production. Now what threatens the pursuit of the socialist revolution is the "free-rider" problem. Each
member of the proletariat, if rational, will reason as follows: "Regardless of whether I engage in revolutionary action and pay the
price for doing so, either enough other proletarians will participate
in the struggle to make it a success, or this will not be the case. (In
other words, it is extremely unlikely that my participation will
make the difference between success and failure.) If the former is
the case, then I will enjoy the benefits of revolution and I do not
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have to pay the price for participation. If the second alternative is
correct, my contribution would be wasted and again a loss to me.
So rational self-interest requires that I do not engage in revolutionary action but go for a 'free ride' on the efforts of other workers."
The revolution, then, will not occur when all proletarians act as
rational self-interested agents (cf. ibid., pp. 89-90) .
Buchanan argues that there are two types of strategy that
might be used to refute the public-goods objection. The first attempts to show that there is no public-goods problem for the proletariat; the second tries to solve the problem. Buchanan discusses
three versions of the first strategy: (a) historical materialism as an
epiphenomenalism, (b) absolute immiseration, and (c) a socialist
conception of rationality. Following version (a), there is no publicgoods problem for the proletariat, because the members of this
class do not engage in utilitarian considerations but rather act in
automatic response to changing economic conditions. This solution is Marxian reductionism in the extreme, and we do not have
to discuss it, since it conflicts with a regulative interpretation of
Marx's prediction of progress.
Solution (b) is that the socialist revolution will occur at the
moment that capitalism has pushed the proletariat into a condition
of absolute misery. The public-goods problem then does not arise
because the costs of revolutionary action appear to be negligible as
compared with the suffering imposed by capitalist exploitation.
One difficulty with this solution is that it is empirically untenable;
for capitalism has not led to absolute misery, and there is no good
reason to assume that this will happen in the future. In predicting
such increasing misery, Marx seems to have overlooked the possibility that the capitalists would organize themselves so as to prevent their own demise as a result of recurrent economic crises and
the centralization of capital (cf. ibid., p. 91). Another difficulty with
solution (b) is that it is doubtful that absolute misery incites revolutionary action-where there is no hope, no sense of human dignity, and the like, there is no social action toward the better. It is to
be granted, however, that Marx's immiseration thesis also may be
interpreted as stating that capitalism leads to relative immiseration-that is, an increasing gap between the wealth of the workers
and that of the capitalists. There is conflicting textual evidence for
this interpretation, but one reason for accepting it is that the economic position of the English working class was already improving
in terms of better wages, shorter working hours, etc., during the
two decades when Marx was preparing his magnum opus, Capital I.
The relative immiseration thesis offers a great gain in empirical
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credibility, but also brings the public-goods objection fully back
into the picture; for the costs of revolutionary action can no longer
be discounted when the proletarians have more to lose than their
chains of oppression.
Solution (c) is that a nonutilitarian socialist rationality will become predominant among the proletarians so that the publicgoods problem will not exist for them. Buchanan does not tell us
what the possible content of this rationality might be, but rather
brings up this solution to challenge those Marxists who may wish
to argue that maximization of self-interest is a mere bourgeois
form of rationality which the proletariat will gradually overcome.
Solution (c) is incompatible with the regulative idea that proletarian devils will opt for a socialized mode of production, and,
indeed, Buchanan also contends that this solution is hard to reconcile with Marx's interest account of revolutionary motivation (see
ibid., p. 99). Another problem Buchanan raises is that it will be
difficult to give adequate content to this socialist rationality without making an appeal to moral principles, a procedure which must
be followed because Marx denied that such principles have a significant role to play in revolutionary motivation. We may add that,
even if we set aside this latter point and incorporate moral principles, version (c) does not seem to be satisfactory; for it seems more
correct to say that moral rationality solves the public-goods problem than that it implies that this problem does not emerge in the
first place. This is certainly so if we take as our model Kantian
moral rationality; for neither Cohen nor Kant denies that maximization of self-interest plays an important role in our lives. Rather,
on their account, moral reason provides a motive for bracketing
such utilitarian considerations.
Buchanan also discusses three versions of the second strategy:
(d) coercion, (e) in-process benefits, and (f) moral principles. Version (d) offers a solution for the public-goods problem because the
use of force against nonparticipants during the revolutionary
struggle creates a (potential) cost for the individual worker, offsetting the benefit of becoming a free rider. However, the efficacy of
force here, as compared with the standard cases of the publicgoods problem, is rather limited, for there are essential differences
between revolution as a public good and, say, a pollution-free environment as a public good. The revolutionaries typically lack an
extensive coercive agency (like the state), and the victims of their
coercion may join the counterrevolutionary forces. Nonetheless,
the history of the communist movement, or, for that matter, the
history of many workers' struggles, shows that solution (d) has
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some bite to it, and what reinforces this is that we are assuming
here that the socialist revolution is in the interest of all proletarians. There is, however, no textual evidence that Marx adhered
to this solution. Force plays an important role in his vision of the
proletarian revolution, but it is force used against the capitalists
and their collaborators. As Buchanan observes, for Marx the communist party did not have a police function but constituted the
educational and tactica l elite of the workers' movement (ibid.,
p. 93). Accordingly, although solution (d) is all in all viable, the
public-goods objection to Marx's own account of revolutionary
motivation still stands. Or, to put it otherwise, solution (d) conflicts with the regulative idea that proletarian devils will opt for a
socialized mode of production.
Buchanan suggests a different variant of solution (d), stating
that "some group [will] threaten to use violence against noncontributors once the proletariat achieves power" (ibid., p. 92).
Buchanan does not tell us in what form this violence will occur,
but, practically speaking, there seems to be only one generally
effective approach, namely, for the revolutionary group to exclude
the nonparticipants from enjoying all the benefits of the revolution. Now a similar problem arises in the first place with regard to
version (d); for we must with Buchanan ask the question: "who is
supposed to use coercion against the proletarians to secure their
participation and, more importantly, what motivates these motivators and how does their motivation achieve collective action?"
(ibid., p. 93). Buchanan leaves this question more or less unanswered. For our purposes it suffices to note that, in the absence
of moral principles, the enforcing group can solve its own publicgoods problem, i.e., achieve collective action as a group, only when
it conveys special benefits upon itself after the revolution. And so
again we can conclude that version (d) conflicts with the regulative
idea that proletarian devils will opt for a socialized mode of production; instead, they will actualize a mode of production that
offers special benefits to the revolutionary vanguard.
Solution (e) is that there are certain benefits inherent in revolutionary action which outweigh the costs of engaging in this action,
thus changing the utilitarian calculus in favor of revolutionary action, as opposed to being a free rider. Buchanan (p. 94) cites the
following passage from Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
(p. 365) to show that Marx may have recognized the importance of
in-process benefits:
When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is
instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new
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need-the need for society-and what appears as a means has become an
end. This practical development can be most strikingly observed in the
gatherings of French socialist workers. Smoking, eating and drinking, etc.,
are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its turn has society as its goal, is enough for
them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is reality, and the
nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures.

There are three difficulties with this solution (cf. Marx and Justice,
pp. 94-95). First, Marx frequently emphasizes that egoism, competition, and individualism live among the workers in capitalist society. Moreover, he also maintains that unemployment strengthens
the competitive spirit, driving a wedge between the workers. It is
doubtful that associational benefits suffice to overcome these
mechanisms of interpersonal separation. Second, it is not very
plausible to hold that in-process benefits can really offset the costs
of revolutionary action when the chips are down. Revolutionary
motivation based on such benefits seems too weak when revolutionary action is met with brute force, and Marx describes capitalist society as a society with the likelihood of such use of force;
hence his usual insistence that the proletarian struggle requires
force for its success. We may note, moreover, that even reformative
action (e.g., civil disobedience) may cause serious harm to its participants in the form of police violence, imprisonment, and so on.
Third, in-process benefits are of little help in explaining how revolutionary organizations come into existence in the first place. What
motivates its initiators?
Solution (£) provides an answer and solves the public-goods
problem in general. Adherence to moral principles that require
one to establish ideal institutions produces cooperation in situations where none would be forthcoming if individuals sought to
maximize their own self-interest. Thus Buchanan comes to state:
"Marx seems to have overlooked the possibility that even where
morality and interest seem to speak as with one voice, morality
may still have an ineliminable function" (ibid., p. 97). And
Buchanan concludes with good reason that "[t]he foregoing analysis may help account for the persistence of two phenomena
[among revolutionary workers' struggles]: the revolutionary's use
of violence against the members of the proletariat and his reliance
upon what Marx called 'obsolete verbal rubbish' about justice and
rights" (ibid., pp. 100--01). 44 Clearly, either one of these courses of
action-coercion and appeal to moral principles--is inconsistent
with the regulative idea that mere self-interest suffices, in principle, to bring the proletarians to collective action toward the so-
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cialized mode of production. The only solution that is compatible
with a plausible interpretation of this idea is solution (e), and this
solution is not adequate to the task. It follows that this idea is not
suitable for supporting the hope for a socialized mode of production and the praxis connected with this hope.
We should, however, not draw the opposite conclusion that
only a race of saints can bring about a socialist revolution. There
are two reasons for this. 45 First, although it seems essential to the
initiation and successful continuation of a revolutionary struggle
that a sizable number of its participants have a strong moral commitment to their cause, others may display a more conditional
cooperative attitude. That is to say, the latter are prepared to participate if there is some assurance that others will participate as
well and that the revolutionary struggle will be successful. It
would be a mistake, I think, to deny that this common conditional
atittude lacks a moral dimension; yet, it must also be distinguished
from moral commitment proper. Moreover, it is to be noted that a
conditional cooperative attitude alone does not suffice for collective action. This is so not only because it is inadequate for the
initiation of such action, but also because it is likely to be unstable
in the face of setbacks, counterrevolutionary violence, etc. Second,
we have until now paid little attention to the fact that a revolution
is a dynamic process, and this very fact is conducive to revolutionary participation by utility maximizers. The reason for this is that
utility calculations of individuals change once the revolutionary
struggle is on its way; for the more people join this struggle, the
smaller the risk of being punished. Also, in-process benefits may
increase when the revolutionary struggle is beyond its initial stage.
Thus we may expect that more and more self-interested agents will
join the revolutionary struggle when the oppressive regime shows
signs of being close to its ultimate downfall. In short, a more
dynamic model of revolution shows that self-interested agents can
more adequately come to cooperation than a less dynamic model
would suggest. But again, we should recognize that there are clear
limits to the efficacy of such dynamic mechanisms. One problem
is that they do not explain how the revolutionary struggle gets
started. Another problem is that participation by utility maximizers is not one-directional: they may come to the conclusion that
it is in their best interest to become free riders once enough
others have joined the revolutionary struggle or once the oppressive regime fully exercises its coercive apparatus. Special benefits,
revolutionary violence against nonparticipants, and moral commitment provide solutions for both problems, but only the moral
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approach will lead to a socialized mode of production in the true
sense of the word.
We started our discussion of the public-goods objection by
assuming that the socialized mode of production is in the interest
of all proletarians and that they all are aware of this. Neither assumption is defensible, and this further strengthens the case for
morality. To begin with, individuals may have a distorted understanding of their needs and social situation, making necessary a
critique of ideology. Such a critique appeals to the notion of human emancipation, which is a moral notion. Furthermore, there is
no such thing as the interest of the proletariat, and, contra Marx,
capitalism has never led to a social condition in which the proletariat suffers "wrong in general." The different segments of the
working class have conflicting particular interests, a fact which is
gratefully used by modern management technicians and by the
ruling classes in general to maintain the capitalist status quo. Also,
Marx's idea of a socialized mode of production has an international
orientation, and there is a clear conflict between the mere selfinterest of the working class of the wealthy nations and that of the
developing nations. Thus we can further underline the conclusion
following from the public-goods objection: proletarian devils will
opt for a mode of production that reflects particular interests, not
the universal interest. Or, to put it otherwise, the cunning mechanisms of history cannot bring about a universal class; rather, the
idea of such a class is a moral ideal that encompasses all of humanity and sets an ethical task. The realization of the socialized mode
of production, then, requires not only the motivational function of
morality but also its directive function. And we have seen in the
previous section that the corrective function of morality is needed
as well, placing constraints upon the means of revolutionary
change. The upshot is that the hope for socialism must be differently grounded. Or, at least, the idea that proletarian devils will
opt for the socialized mode of production needs to be supplemented by the idea that socialist values emerge within the capitalist mode of production itself.
Moral Progress in the Economic Realm

Kant's main argument for supporting the hope that moral progress
is taking place on the pragmatic or political level is that the French
Revolution and the enthusiasm it incited among its spectators signify that a moral cause is operative in humanity, which is directed
toward the perfect state and international peace. More broadly, we

280

Marx and Morality: A Kantian Analysis and Critique

may reconstruct Kant as holding that moral progress emerges on
the pragmatic level within the dialectic of self-interest, including
the culture of skill and the culture of self-discipline. (It remains, of
course, true that Kant in fact placed too much emphasis on the
view that moral progress evolves after the cunning of nature has
done its work-a view that lacks mediation.) Can we discern similar approaches in Marx's work in respect to the economic or technological level? If so, we may be able to extract from his work an
adequate regulative idea concerning progress toward the economic
ideal. (Progress on the pragmatic level and its impact on progress
on the economic level must also be taken into account, but for the
sake of brevity and clarity I will not make this a special issue of
consideration.)
Although a variety of proletarian struggles provided Marx
with hope that his socialist or communist ideal was historically
tenable-as the French Revolution, and also the American Revolution, provided hope for Kant-the historical event that stands out
in Marx's work is the Paris Commune. Notwithstanding that Marx
had some doubts about the long-term viability of this social experiment, he discusses the Commune with unrestrained enthusiasm in
The Civil War in France. 46 He quotes with obvious approval the
manifesto issued by the Central Committee of the Commune on
March 18, 1871, which states that the workers of Paris "have understood that it is their imperious duty and their absolute right to
render themselves masters of their own destinies, by seizing upon
the governmental power" (p. 206). Marx mentions a variety of
beneficial products of the exercise of this right, such as the disappearance of street crime under the Commune, the disappearance
of prostitutes-"[i]n their stead, the real women of Paris showed
again at the surface--heroic, noble, and devoted, like the women of
antiquity" (p. 220)-, and the opening of educational institutions
to all people. Marx adds: "[N]ot only was education made accessible to all, but science itself freed from the fetters which class
prejudice and governmental force had imposed upon it" (pp. 20910) . The broader historical significance of the Commune must,
however, be sought elsewhere. Marx states:
That the workmen of Paris have taken the initiative of the present revolution and in heroic self-sacrifice bear the brunt of this battle, is nothing
new . . . The new feature is that the people, after the first rise, have not
disarmed themselves and surrendered their power into the hands of the
republican mountebanks of the ruling classes, that, by the constitution of
the Commune, they have taken the actual management of their revolution
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into their own hands and found at the same time, in the case of success,
the means to hold it in the hands of the people itself, displacing the state
machinery, the governmental machinery of the ruling class by a governmental machinery of their own (p. 261).

Marx observes that the main features of this new governmental
machinery are the abolition of a standing army and its replacement
by a people's army; political democracy with revocable delegates
instead of representative democracy in its usual form; the absence
of special benefits for officials of the government and municipal
administrators ("the public service had to be done at workmen's
wages"); the election of revocable judges; the union of executive
and legislative power; and a decentralized democracy, placing decision-making foremost in the hands of small "communes"-or,
more precisely, this was the long-range plan (see pp. 209-10).
We can leave it an open question whether all these political
innovations are indeed to be praised, as Marx thought. What matters for our purposes is that he saw these political innovations as a
crucial step toward economic emancipation. Marx claims that the
"true secret" of the Commune was that "[i]t was essentially a
working-class government, the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last
discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of
labor" (p. 212). He maintains that this emancipation was an important aim of the Commune, although its short and besieged life
made, of course, only the barest attempts possible in this direction.
Mocking the bourgeois critics of the Commune, he writes:
The Commune, they exclaim, intends to abolish property, the basis of all
civilization! Yes, gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class
property which makes the labor of the many the wealth of the few. It
aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land
and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving labor, into mere instruments of free and associated labor. But this is communism, 'impossible'
communism! (p. 213)"

Thus we may see Marx as holding that the Commune could serve
as a source of hope for moral progress in that the demand for a
socialized mode of production was living among the working class
of Paris. Admittedly, he does not explicitly state that this demand
is to be interpreted as a moral demand, but it is difficult to believe
that his own enthusiasm and the enthusiasm he detected among
the workers of the Commune was not at least partly a moral enthu-
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siasm. In Marx's own words: "Working, thinking, fighting, bleeding Paris-almost forgetful, in its incubation of a new society, of
the cannibals at its gates-radiant in the enthusiasm of its historic
initiative!" (p. 220). And, in accordance with this, we have seen in
Chapter II that Marx, in looking back at the Commune, declared
his solidarity and commitment to the socialist cause. Moreover, he
uses terms such as 'noble,' 'heroic,' and 'martyrs' to characterize
the revolutionaries of Paris-terms which make very clear that
he-against himself-saw this struggle as a moral struggle. We
may add that, on the basis of the previous analysis of the limits of
self-interest in bringing about concerted revolutionary action, we
are justified in interpreting the workers' struggle of the Commune
as displaying moral features.
As Kant did with regard to the French Revolution, Marx argued that the Commune is a historical event that will not be forgotten: "Working men's Paris," he writes in the closing words of The
Civil War in France, "will be forever celebrated as the glorious
harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs are enshrined in the great
heart of the working class" (p. 233). Thus we can see that on
Marx's account the Commune has a moral educative function similar to that which Kant ascribed to the French Revolution. It
grounds hope, moreover, in an analogous fashion. Marx suggests
that we may hope that in the future conditions will again prevail in
which the working class and its allies will rise and act on the
demand for a socialized mode of production. And, not unlike
Kant, Marx maintains that the final realization of the ideal requires
"long struggles," a "series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men," and a "heroic resolve" of the working class
(ibid., p. 213).'8 That Marx's hope was not misplaced is illustrated by
the Munich Revolution, which took place less than fifty years after
the Commune. Again, the call for political democracy went hand
in hand with the demand for economic democracy. What makes
the Munich Revolution, however, particularly interesting from a
Kantian perspective is that its most prominent leader, Kurt Eisner,
was a pupil and personal friend of Hermann Cohen. 49 Eisner's
leadership, in word and deed, reflected the Kantian socialist ideal.
We can also find in Marx the economic analogue of the Kantian idea that moral progress develops on the pragmatic level within
the dialectic of self-interest. Before examining this approach,
however, a few words must be said about what seem to be common misconceptions and mistakes by some Marxists (including
Marx) concerning prescriptive morality and its significance. We
have noted one such misunderstanding and error in the claim that
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prescriptive Jaws are in some sense alienating, as if there were no
distinction to be drawn between heteronomous and autonomous
laws. A related problem is that notions such as "duty-versusinterest" are viewed as typical for the "bourgeois individual"
and his moral psychology, the practical result of which is that
moral conflicts and dilemmas connected with emancipatory
praxis are often brushed under the carpet of spontaneous solidarity, collective consciousness, fusion into the group, the ultimate
coincidence of proletarian interests and the interest of humanity, and so on. so Not without good reason, Marx emphasized
that capitalism creates egoism, competition, and individualism.
But, if this is so, endeavors to overcome such "inclinations"
through cooperation, solidarity, and even self-sacrifice are moral
endeavors. Moreover, emancipatory struggles may lead to moral
conflicts, as exemplified by the conflict between the duty to support one's family and the duty to join a strike. Such dilemmas and
conflicts require moral reflection and, hence, prescriptive rules. A
third issue is that Marxist critics of prescriptive morality often
maintain that such a morality necessarily implies an abstract negation of the existing state of affairs, a calling for justice and humanity in the historical void. This is, of course, an important aspect of
Marx's critique of ethical and utopian socialism. But Kantian socialist ethics as a prescriptive ethics does not deny that the search for
mediation between the actual and the ideal is important, nor does
it deny that moral praxis should be praxis informed by social,
political, and historical knowledge, or that there are material prerequisites for the realization and general acceptance of certain
norms and values. What Kantian socialist ethics, however, does
stress-and this is a final point-is that the very fact that certain moral values, norms, and feelings arise within the working
class or the economic realm does not show anything at all
about their validity. 51 To argue otherwise is to fall back on the
Hegelian-Marxian error and a priori conviction that the "ought"
is inevitably unfolding within "being," that is, that history is
the judge and, happily, happens to be on the side of the proletariat. We must first determine and explicate the "ought" and then
see whether actuality-historical developments-provides hope
for the realization of the "ought." A critical morality is logically
prior to and independent of historical developments, and such a
morality is a prescriptive morality.
Taking these points into account, we can now examine the
second Marxian approach to the idea of moral progress in the
economic sphere. To begin with, we may interpret the passage that
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Buchanan cites from the Manuscripts to show that Marx may have
recognized the motivational significance of in-process benefits as
also indicating that certain socialist or communist values and moral feelings arise within the organizations of the workers. The
acquired "new need" for society reflects not only the joys of collective action but also the cooperative values and solidarity that
emerge within the struggles for economic emancipation. The
"brotherhood of man'' is anticipated in these struggles, and this
anticipation is best seen as a moral anticipation; for there are at the
same time opposite factors that must be overcome, such as competition and egoism. Recall, moreover, that the conclusion of Capital I
(cited on pp. 258--59) permits a similar interpretation. Marx contends here that the development of the means of production by
the capitalists makes necessary an increasing cooperation among
the workers in the production process. Furthermore, the development of the productive forces shapes an infrastructure which
makes possible the organization of the working class, besides
providing the skills for collective action. Thus the regulative idea
and hope evolve that the foundations for the emancipation of the
proletariat emerge within the dialectic of self-interest: the profit
motive makes capitalists create an industrial process that brings
unity in the factory, and this unity leads to unity among the workers in and outside the factory, a unity based on the moral motive.
Initially, the cooperation between the workers in the factory and in
their organizations is foremost a cooperation from without, enforced upon them by the necessity to work and survive, but,
through continuous struggles and with the inability of capitalism
to provide a decent living for all and the increasing socialization of
labor, this cooperation becomes a cooperation from within, involving the moral conviction that capitalism must be abolished and
replaced by socialism as a society of material well-being and, above
all, worker control.
Marx somewhat elaborates this schema of gradual progress by
discussing in Capital I the emancipatory potential of modern industry. We have seen in the previous chapter that in the Grundrisse
he predicted that modern technology has emancipatory potential
in that it holds the promise of the worker as "watchman and
regulator [of] the production process itself." On Marx's account,
capitalism obstructs this possible development, making socialism
necessary, but he also argues that capitalism simply cannot "permit" itself to continue to reproduce the detail-worker of today,
crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man'' (Capital I
/1
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p. 488). Holding that the constant revolutionizing of the means of
production is the lifeblood of the capitalist, Marx predicts that
modern industry will "compel" society to replace the detail-worker
"by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labors, ready
to face any change of production, and to whom the different social
functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope
to his own natural and acquired powers" (ibid.). Marx says that the
beginnings of this development are manifest in his own time, not
only in the form of workers who take on different jobs and learn
the corresponding technical skills but also in the kind of instruction that children receive in factory schools and other technical
schools (see ibid., pp. 483-84 and 487-88). But again, this development cannot fully evolve within the capitalist mode of production,
and this very fact constitutes one of its "immanent contradictions"
that will bring about its eventual dissolution. Marx does not state
here which subjective factors are connected with this particular
"immanent contradiction" and its dissolution, but the logic of his
argument is that the increasing technical control of the production
process by the workers will raise the demand for full autonomy in
the workplace, a demand that capitalism cannot satisfy. Besides,
education itself is conducive to moral emancipation and thus to the
evolution of the demand for a socialized mode of production. And
finally, Marx suggests, capitalism in its cruel search for cheap labor
cannot help but integrate women into this emancipatory process,
making the moral voice for socialism at least twice as strong (see
ibid., pp. 489-90). 52
A glance at the history of capitalist society of the past century
makes clear, I think, that much is to be said for both variants of the
reinterpreted Marxian regulative idea concerning progress in the
economic realm, although it seems that Marx had too high an
expectation of the kind of socialization of labor that capitalist modern industry effects. The call of the workers of the Commune
resounded for years throughout the industrial world, and the
strength and moral determination of the workers' movement went
hand in hand with the centralization and expansion of the means
of production. Marx was only one of the many upper-class midnineteenth-century critics of the capitalist industrial revolution;
but, notwithstanding the distortive Hegelian expectations in his
work, he was one of the few who cared to examine this process in
thorough fashion and to entrust its fundamental transformation
basically to the hands of its victims: the modern working class. The
same can be said of Engels, perhaps even more so. Considering its
hard-won gains, it would be insensitive and cheap to declare that
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the working class has in some sense betrayed this trust and expectation. Nonetheless, it is true that the working class at large has not
opted for socialism, and so the question arises what the possible
significance is of the Marxian regulative idea concerning progress
for our own time.

Present Perspective
Present hope for progress on the economic level can no longer be
grounded on the same empirical premises as those of the reinterpreted Marxian regulative idea in both its variants. The voice of
the heroic struggle of the working class in the past century is
hardly heard today, and the same must be said of the uprisings in
the early decades of our century. The changing conditions of the
struggle for economic emancipation are a factor that helps to explain this. These conditions are quite different from those of the
memorable uprisings of the working class, and for this reason
these uprisings may have lost some of their moral appeal. But
there is more at stake: historical amnesia is a sign of our time. Our
dominant "culture" does not know in any true sense a past and a
future; rather, it mirrors and repeats ad nauseam the sociopolitical
given. This cultural hegemony must be broken: what was once a
source of hope is now primarily a moral task: to recapture the past
for the sake of the future.
The changed conditions of the struggle for economic emancipation also indicate that the other variant of the reinterpreted
Marxian regulative idea is empirically inadequate for our time. To
be sure, the organizations of the working class in the advanced
industrial nations often remain threatened in their existence, but
the issue is no longer that the mechanisms of capital accumulation
promote the emergence of these organizations and that we may
hope that the struggle for better material conditions will go hand
in hand with the demand for worker control. The greatly improved
material conditions of the working class have weakened its revolutionary impulse. Another change is that the struggle of the working class was often centered around a demand that has now been
satisfied: the universal right to vote. Accordingly, the present issue
has become one of how to steer the organizations of the working
class beyond mere economistic concerns (although these are important) toward economic democracy and international solidarity.
The mechanisms of capital accumulation in our society run,
however, counter to the development of international solidarity,
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because they create an increasing gap between the material interests of the working class in the rich nations and those of the
working class in the developing nations. Add to this the continuous impact of the ideological discrediting of socialism by equating
it to the system of present "communist" countries, and it seems
that the prospect for a socialist future looks grim indeed.
Yet, despair is not justified. The mechanisms of capital accumulation seem in recent years to move away from work fragmentation and toward workers' input in the management of the
workplace, so as to counteract both low workers' morale and low
productivity. (Braverman's study, then, may need to be updated in
this regard. 53) Here we can discern a certain "cunning" along the
conceptual lines of the reinterpreted Marxian regulative idea concerning progress: the profit motive may at times unwittingly cooperate with the moral motive-that is, the moral demand for the
overcoming of the division of labor and the realization of economic
democracy. This demand is manifest in our society, although often
in a partial and distorted form, and we may hope that this demand
will become stronger once the first steps in the direction of its
realization have been taken. (European countries such as Sweden
and West Germany are far ahead of the United States in this respect. 5'1) Furthermore, similar mechanisms are operative in other
developments of the past years: workers who take over corporations that are not sufficiently profitable by the standards of capital
accumulation, and workers who receive stocks or a vote in the
policies of their companies in lieu of wage raises, in order to help
their companies out of an economic slump. Also, demands are
being raised to use pension funds for influencing investment policies, and plant relocations are no longer accepted as an unchangeable tragic fact. All these signs of hope are small signs, and it
remains to be seen whether they will be truly conducive to international solidarity. Yet, they show that worker control (and thus socialism) is not a dead issue, no matter how hard its adversaries try
to convince us otherwise. It is, however, only within a gradualist
Kantian schema that these small signs are encouraging; they seem
to be insignificant from the perspective of the eschatological expectations raised by the dialectical conception of revolutionary
change, which is a schema of despair. Finally, it may be once more
noted that, from a Kantian perspective, hope for progress is not a
precondition for moral praxis but a facilitation of such praxis. The
definitive remedy against despair is moral action itself, not only in
the economic realm but in every realm.
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4. Summary and Conclusion
My discussion of Marx has exposed a wide variety of conflicting
views in his work. The literature on Marx has classified and explicated these conflicting elements in various ways, such as the
young versus the old Marx, the humanistic versus the scientific
Marx, and the Marx of social democracy versus the Marx of revolutionary communism. The writings of Habermas add a similar distinction to this list: there is the Marx who sees natural science as
the paradigm of all sciences and labor as the central anthropological category, and there is the Marx who develops a critical social
science and deals with interaction as an additional fundamental
anthropological category. Habermas, however, also offers the important insight that this distinction parallels Marx's philosophical
self-understanding and his practice of inquiry. Using this distinction, while holding that the more basic tension in Marx is between
the Hegelian Marx and the Kantian Marx, I can recapitulate my
previous discussion and come to my final conclusion.
Kantian socialist ethics and Marx have in many respects a
shared evaluative perspective. They project essentially a similar
social ideal, which, in summary, may be described as a cooperative
society of colegislators or autonomous beings, and they both
launch their critique of capitalist society from this evaluative perspective. Once the question is raised, however, what the role is of
such a critique and evaluative perspective, crucial differences develop between the two views. Marx contends that morality in its
various functions is irrelevant for the struggle toward the socialist/
communist ideal, whereas Kantian socialist ethics sets forth this
struggle as a moral task. Marx's denial of morality is an aspect of
his reductionism as embedded in his materialist conception of history, but what is particularly important to note is that this conception of history contains a clear Hegelian dogmatic metaphysical
core in that the "ought" is seen as inevitably unfolding within
"being." I have argued that this view of immanent progress conflicts with critical morality, that it leads to moral insensivity with
respect to human suffering in the past and present, and that it
invites repressive action in the name of the allegedly inevitable
road toward the good. Moreover, since the unfolding of communism is seen as a dialectical process, it legitimates revolutionary
violence a priori and raises unrealistic expectations concerning the
effects of revolution. Yet, we have also seen that Marx's work dis-
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plays another dimension: the dogmatic metaphysical Hegelian
claim concerning the inevitable collapse of capitalism and the
emergence of socialism may be interpreted as a regulative idea on
a par with Kant's regulative idea about intelligent devils opting for
the perfect state. This interpretation is justified in the light of the
Kantian primacy of praxis in Marx's writings (a primacy which
conflicts with his reductionism and the materialist conception of
history insofar as it is an instance of dogmatic metaphysics), and
additionally in that the practical effect of his writings often has
been to support such a regulative hope. My discussion of the
public-goods objection has shown that this regulative idea is inadequate, and thus I have once again affirmed that morality is indispensable for socialist theory and praxis. Last, we have briefly
noted that a morally adequate and gradualist regulative idea concerning moral progress on the economic level can be extracted
from Marx's work. This idea is no longer empirically adequate for
our time, but it is still conceptually adequate and invites new
efforts in the same direction.
My thesis is that the Hegelian view of morality and historical
development shapes Marx's philosophical self-understanding,
whereas, in the practice of inquiry-that is, in his empirical and
historical studies, when Marx does not reflect upon the philosophical premises of his work-Kantian elements such as a regulative
understanding of historical progress and a recognition of the importance of morality for social action toward the good society come
into the picture as well. This means that in order that the Marxian
corpus may be able to serve as a suitable moral basis for socialist
theory and praxis, it must replace a Hegelian philosophical selfunderstanding with a Kantian practical philosophy. Thus a philosophical foundation will be created for the Marxian evaluative
perspective, and there is then the opportunity to make required
improvements with regard to this perspective. And, of course, the
negative ramifications of the Hegelian notion of history and morality will be avoided. Moreover, my thesis implies that Marx's
practice of inquiry still has merits for present socialist theory
and praxis, provided that the ("repressed") Kantian elements are
elaborated, stressed, and applied to our own time. Or, to put it
otherwise, what must be given up is not so much the materialist
conception of history as its reductionism and its dogmatic metaphysical aspects. What is required is a Kantianization of Marx's
writings. But this is, in effect, just another way of saying that
socialist theory and praxis stand to gain from taking seriously the
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Kantian socialist moral program. Irrespective of what Kantian socialist ethics may mean to Marx's social theory, however, I hope
that this study has shown that the union of Kantian ethics and
socialism is a promising one. The voices of those who labored
around the turn of the century in this spirit still deserve to be
heard.

APPENDIX

A Historical Note on
Kantian Ethical Socialism

ln an introductory note to Karl Vorlander's "Die neukantische Bewegung im Sozialismus" (1902), the editors of Kant-Studien wrote:
"The neo-Kantian movement in socialism has gained in the past
few years such a significance that the editors of Kant-Studien feel
obliged to keep their readers informed about this movement. The
editors have therefore requested Dr. Vorlander, who is most familiar with this movement, to report on it in an objective manner"
(p. 23n.). The editors had chosen well; for Vorlander may be described as the early historian of Kantian socialism as well as its
main popularizer (in a nonpejorative sense of that word). The
editors also correctly observed that Kantianism had made some
impact on the German socialist movement: Conrad Schmidt, a
member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) had argued
in 1897 that Kant's epistemology could function as a corrective of
" Hegel's poetic metaphysics" and thus provide a more adequate
epistemic framework for Marx's social theory. 1 Schmidt's polemical
thesis drew a vehement response by the Russian Marxist George
Plekhanov. The main impetus behind the debate on the significance of Kant's philosophy for socialist theory and praxis was,
however, the influence of Eduard Bernstein, leader and theoretician of the revisionist faction in the SPD. In 1899 Bernstein evoked
the critical spirit of Kant against the " Cant" of orthodox Marxism,
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with its belief in the inevitable collapse of capitalism. 2 The debate
soon took a broader turn, to include the question of the socialist
importance of Kant's ethics, and led to a series of papers, many of
which were published in the SPD organs Die neue Zeit and
Sozialistische Monatshefte. 3 Franz Mehring defended the traditional
Marxist view that Marxism does not need a critical ethics and that
Kant's ethics is a philosophy of reconciliation, weakening the class
struggle. The Kantian viewpoint was represented by Franz
Staudinger and Ludwig Woltmann. Others who jointed the debate
were Karl Kautsky on the side of the Marxian orthodoxy and Kurt
Eisner and Vorlander himself on the side of Kantian socialist
ethics.
A glance at Vorlander's report for Kant-Studien makes clear,
however, that the development of Kantians becoming socialists or
socialists adopting Kantian elements in their theoretical work was
not limited to Germany: Vorlander points out that Kantianism influenced various French and Russian socialists, such as Jean Jaures,
Charles Rappoport, Nikolay Berdyayev, and Peter Struve. Turning
to Vorlander's Kant und Marx (1911), we find an even broader picture emerging: Kantianism also influenced some Austrian and
Italian socialists, such as Max Adler and Alfredo Poggi. Nonetheless, it seems to correct to say-and this presumably accords
with Vorlander's view-that the link between Kant and socialism
was most closely and systematically made by Hermann Cohen and
the Marburg School, including such "members" as Eisner, Albert
Garland, Paul Natorp, Staudinger, and Vorlander. This is certainly
so if we take as our concern a Kantianism that functions not just as
an epistemic corrective of Marx's social theory but also as a source
of socialist values and moral guidelines-that is, a Kantian ethical
socialism.
Early Austro-Marxism, as represented by Max Adler and Otto
Bauer, may seem to be a noteworthy exception to this contention.
And, indeed, both Adler and Bauer held in the early 1900's that
Kantian ethics offered a necessary moral justification for socialism.
Yet, their intellectual labor was not focused on expounding this
idea, as was that of some Marburgers. Adler was interested mostly
in using Kant's epistemology to establish a transcendental foundation of Marx's social theory; Bauer's work was centered around the
growing problem of nationalism. Moreover, they both came to
reject Kantian ethical socialism. Adler, although still believing in
the importance of an epistemological synthesis of Kant and Marx,
claimed in the early 1920's that, even though the Marburg School
was not wrong in holding that Kant's practical philosophy offers
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a justification for socialism, Marxism as a social science simply
does not need such a justification; for it explains on the basis of
"formal-teleological causality" how "socialized man'' necessarily
comes "to realize what he considers to be morally justified." Thus
Adler concluded that "[i]f the idealism of Kant and his followers
was the philosophy of the conceptual possibility of socialism, the
scientific socialism of Marx becomes the theory of the actual reality
of idealism."• Bauer was less charitable. Echoing the early orthodox SPD critics of the Marburg School, he wrote in an essay on
the history of Austro-Marxism (1938) that the "bourgeois intelligentsia" and their Kantianism "aimed to win over the working
class, to pacify the socialist movement, and eliminate its revolutionary character.... [They sought to undermine] Marx's theory
of the historical inevitability of social revolution . . . , and socialism was reduced to an ethical postulate, a simple maxim for valuejudgments and action within the existing social order." And, Bauer
added, this "bourgeois criticism of Marx" was elaborated "at a
new level of sophistication" in Bernstein's revisionist thought as
well as in the works of such Kantians as Eisner and Staudinger. 5
The various members of the Marburg School displayed different philosophical interests, religious commitments, and attitudes toward revolution, the SPD, and revisionism. What tied
them together, besides Cohen's personality, was that they all took
Cohen's Kant interpretation as their point of departure, stressing
the transcendental method and rejecting any physiological or psychological understanding of Kant's epistemology. 6 Also, they all
agreed that the personality principle, i.e., the third formulation of
the categorical imperative, sets forth the idea of socialism, and that
a tenable socialism needs such a moral underpinning. It will suffice
here to say a few words about three key figures: Friedrich Albert
Lange as the forefather of Marburg socialism; Vorlander and his
attempt to synthesize Kant and Marx; and Eisner's efforts to bring
the Kantian ideal into practice in the Munich Revolution. My
remarks on Cohen will be largely in passing, for his work has
received ample attention in the text. I will also make some (additional) synoptic comments on the Kant discussion in the SPD and
on the link between Marburg socialism and the revisionism of
Bernstein.

Lange and the Marburg School
The indebtedness of the Marburg School to Lange is both personal
and programmatic in nature. Lange (1828-75) became full pro-
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fessor at Marburg in 1873 and that same year arranged a position
for Cohen as Privatdozent (university lecturer) at Marburg. He did
this partly due to the fact that he had read Cohen's Kants Theorie
der Erfahrung (1871), acknowledging its influence on his own understanding of Kant's epistemology in the second edition of his
classic History of Materialism. 7 [Lange's book was widely read
among socialists. It was in his Epilogue to the fifth edition of this
work (1896) that Cohen for the first time systematically expounded
his thesis that socialism is to be morally grounded in Kant. 8 ]
Cohen reminisced about his first meeting with Lange in these
words: "Following his noble nature he directly wished to draw
out an open-hearted statement about the religious issue that separated us. 'Are our views different with regard to Christianity?'
No, I said: What you call Christianity I call prophetic Judaism.
And immediately a close understanding arose between us. 'Yes,
I can also show you passages of the prophets that I have underlined.' Thus ethical socialism had at once overcome the barriers
of our religions." 9 This enlightened attitude was a rare exception
in Wilhelmian Germany; for, although it was not too hard for Jews
to obtain academic posts, the climb up the academic ladder was
extremely difficult, if not impossible, without conversion. It was
Lange's untimely death and his emphatic request for Cohen to
become his successor that freed Cohen from this arduous academic road: Cohen became full professor in 1876 and expressed
throughout his life his personal gratitude to Lange. History,
however, did not repeat itself; for in 1912 Cohen's wish to
make his distinguished student Ernst Cassirer his successor was
sidestepped. 10
There are some important differences between Lange and the
Marburgers. They agreed with Lange's rejection of metaphysical
materialism as set forth in his History of Materialism, but they were
critical of his rebuttal insofar as it was based on a psychological
interpretation of Kant. (Lange saw the a priori categories as constituents of the human mind rather than as rational or logical
constructs.) Moreover, Lange can hardly be called a Kantian socialist, even though he was an ethical socialist. To be sure, Lange did
not fail to mention some strengths of Kant's ethics and accepted
some of its aspects, but he was also rather negative about it, declaring it to be the "transitory part of the Kantian philosophy." Thus
Vorliinder came to state: "[T]he connection between [Lange's]
'Kantianism' and his 'socialism' is not a systematic one; it consists
rather in his noble personality filled with pure ethical idealism.""
Besides this inspirational link, however, there are also some
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programmatic affinities between Lange and the socialism of the
Marburg School. Like the Marburgers, Lange was a gradualist,
believing in the possibility of incremental improvement in the conditions of the German working class. In this vein he started a
consumer cooperative in Duisburg in 1862, hoping that this type
of cooperative would be a first step toward the producer cooperative, and a few years later he opened his own publishing
house, printing cheap pamphlets and a newspaper directed toward
the working class.12 But what is most interesting is that Lange did
not make the common socialist mistake of focusing attention primarily on industrial workers as the agents of social change: h e
made a plea for state credits and other forms of support not only
for industrial cooperatives but also for agrarian cooperatives. More
radically, Lange called for a redistribution of the land of the
Junkers. 13 Here, then, we can discern an additional influence of
Lange's thought on Cohen (and the Marburg School), in that they
both envisioned the ideal society as an association of cooperatives.
Presumably, Lange was more reformist-oriented than at least
Cohen was and also more doubtful concerning the possible emancipatory effects of state programs (emphasizing instead "selfhelp"14); yet, they also shared the belief that a true socialism is a
democratic socialism and that the struggle for the emancipation of
labor should be linked to the struggle for political emancipation.
Accordingly, the ultimate significance of Lange for the Marburg
School must be sought in the fact that he contributed to shaping its
social agenda.
Vorliinder and His Kant-Marx Synthesis

Vorlander (1860--1928), a Marburg native, studied under Cohen and
wrote his dissertation on Kant. Vorlander was primarily interested
in Kant's practical philosophy and emphasized aspects of Kant's
work which have been all too often neglected, such as his philosophy of history, his commitment to the French Revolution and other
liberal revolutions, and, in general, the social nature of his ethics.
He was also a distinguished biographer of Kant. Quite early in his
intellectual career Vorlander made the step from Kant to socialism,
which explains why, despite an impressive publication record, including studies on Goethe, Marx, and Schiller, and a two-volume
work on the history of philosophy, he remained a Gymnasium
teacher until 1919, when the more liberal climate made it at last
possible for him to obtain a university post at Munster. 15 The repressive political climate of Wilhelmian Germany also explains
why Vorlander, against his own expressed desire, did not join the
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organized socialist struggle until 1919: civil servants were not legally permitted to become SPD members. 1•
Vorlander's Kant-Marx synthesis is often misunderstood: he
argues not that Kantian ethics and Marx's social theory are in fact
compatible, but that they can be made complementary, forming
together a philosophy of socialism. To see this point, we must turn
briefly to the long systematic conclusion that Vorlander added to
the second edition of Kant und Marx (1926). Under the heading,
"What Do We Keep from Historical Materialism?," Vorlander seeks
first to eliminate possible misunderstandings concerning this conception of history: historical materialism should not be equated
with a mechanical or metaphysical materialism; for intellectual
lifeforms are "conditioned" but not "produced" by economic
(material) relations, and these relations, in turn, reflect intentional
human action. 17 Moreover, as the later Engels stressed, interaction
takes place between the superstructure and the economic basis of
society. 18 What is most important, however, is that the materialist
conception of history should be seen not as a "dogma" but as a
"guideline" for the scientific study of society and its evolution
(Kant und Marx, 2nd ed., p. 319). Vorlander then goes on to argue
that Marx and Engels did not think historical materialism through
philosophically as a "research hypothesis," since they tended to
reduce philosophy to "genetic-causal deduction" (ibid., p. 321). The
source of this mistake is to be found in Hegel: "[Marx] and his
friend Engels were philosophically still strongly under the influence of Hegel, whose genetic method is fruitful in itself but sets
aside the eternal distinction between being and ought .... Thus
they both placed in their theory 'the jump from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom' . .. in the future" (ibid., p. 322).
And, Vorlander writes a little further on, their mistaken claim that
the proletariat "has no ideals to realize" has a similar root: Marx
and Engels followed, in effect, Hegel's self-conscious attack on
Kant's view of ethics (ibid., p. 325).
In short, then, the main drift of Vorlander's view is that a KantMarx synthesis is possible once the materialist conception of history is freed from what I have described in Chapter VII as its
reductionism and its dogmatic metaphysical underpinning. And,
of course, Vorlander contends that this synthesis presupposes that
Kant's ethics be further developed as a Kantian socialist ethics.
Furthermore, Vorlander argues that, once historical materialism is
interpreted as a "research hypothesis," it is an open question
which epistemology or philosophy of science will fit best with this
conception of history, because Marx and Engels never (fully) de-
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veloped such a philosophical foundation. Referring to the work of
Max Adler, Vorlander suggests that a Kantian epistemology may be
adequate to the task, but it is clear that this is not his main concern
(see ibid., p. 335). Thus Vorlander arrives at his final conclusion
that a philosophy of socialism must fulfill two tasks: first, "it must
not be satisfied with utopian dreams that are merely created in the
head, as happened in previous centuries, but it must go hand in
hand with a secure method of exploring the economic and historical development of the social order of things. Marxism has in this
respect made an essential contribution. . . . " And second, as a
"socialism of praxis [Tat], it "must raise the question: What is the
end-goal that socialism must seek . . . ? Only a philosophy of
ought, i.e., ethics, can answer this question. Engels's 'jump into
freedom' ... cannot be postponed to an undetermined future but
must already start in the present, in the economy, law, and education" (ibid., pp. 347-48).
Although Vorlander emphasized that a philosophy of socialism must be open-ended and subject to continuous improvement,
explicitly rejecting Bolshevism as a "closed" system (see ibid.,
p. 347), he obviously hoped that his Kant-Marx synthesis-his
main intellectual life-task--constituted an important contribution
to the formation of an adequate philosophy of socialism. In my
view, this hope was (and is) justified. Admittedly, Vorlander did
not sufficiently explore the Hegelian elements in Marx, but this is
understandable in light of what he sought to show, namely that
Marx's social theory as an empirical theory is important to a tenable philosophy of socialism. It is, moreover, this same endeavor to
separate good science from bad metaphysics in Marx-so that a
critical Kantian ethics could be put in the latter's place-which
helps to account for the fact that Vorlander at times suggests that
our evaluation and interpretation of the world are two completely
independent processes. He states, for example, that ''the view of
Marxists is basically purely directed toward explanation, and not
toward the evaluation of ... what is happening. From this angle it
must reject any meddling of moral viewpoints in its pure theoretical sphere" (ibid., p. 330; cf. p. 322). To say the least, this statement
is misleading; for Marxism as a critical social science must be
guided in its theory formation by the socialist ideal, although such
an evaluative perspective must be set aside in the testing of hypotheses. This is implied by Kant's primacy of praxis, and Cohen's
notion that the scientist must seek the 'truth' as the unification of
causal and moral laws points in the same direction (see Chapter
VI, section 3, above).
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Bernstein and the Kant Discussion in the SPD
Vorlander, after learning of Bernstein's interest in Kant, began to
correspond with Bernstein, sending him papers by the Marburgers
and recommending literature on Kant. '9 Vorlander's rationale for
taking on this role of mentor is that he hoped that Bernstein would
thus come to give more content to his professed "Kantianism."
Bernstein's call "Back to Kant" was primarily a call for adopting a
healthy critical attitude toward some unquestioned beliefs
("Cant") embedded in the Erfurt Program (1891) of the SPD, such
as the increasing concentration of capital, the intensification of
economic crises, the growing class polarization, and the inevitability of the socialist revolution. Thus Bernstein writes in Evolutionary Socialism that "social democracy require[sj a Kant who
should judge the received opinion and examine it critically.. . .
Such a thinker, who with convincing exactness could show what is
worthy and destined to live in the work of our great champions,
and what must and can perish, would also make it possible for us
to hold a more unbiased judgment on those works which, although not starting from premises which to-day appear to us as
decisive, yet are devoted to the ends for which social democracy is
fighting" (p. 223). And, in apparent reference to the fact that the
orthodox Marxists of the SPD were not prepared to give up the
revolutionary road outlined in the Erfurt Program, although the
party was increasingly engaged in reformist and parliamentary
politics, Bernstein adds that "[n]o impartial thinker will deny that
socialist criticism often fails in [displaying a critical Kantian spirit]
and discloses all the dark sides of epigonism."
It was only secondarily that Bernstein appealed to Kant as an
antidote to dogmatic historical materialism with its reductionism
and its denial that the socialist ideal sets a moral task. Notwithstanding Vorlander's efforts, however, these issues hardly receive a
Kantian explication in Bernstein's work. Most significantly, Bernstein's understanding of ethics is decisively un-Kantian, in that he
held that morality cannot be based on a systematic and rational
foundation. Also, his view of the moral ideal is not Kantian; for he
stressed happiness rather than autonomy as its essential feature.20
Peter Gay in his excellent intellectual biography of Bernstein
rightly concludes then that "in spite of some superficial resemblances to the Critical Philosophy, Bernstein was never a Kantian.
[H]e never followed through Kant's speculations in the realms of
knowledge and ethics. . . . He called on Kant, but he remained a
common-sense philosopher." 21 And we may note in support of this
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conclusion that Bernstein claims in Evolutionary Socialism that
the call "Back to Kant" may be translated as "Back to Lange,"
because in Lange we can find the "union ... of an upright and
intrepid championship of the struggles of the working class for
emancipation with a large scientific freedom from prejudice which
was always ready to acknowledge mistakes and recognize new
truths" (pp. 223-24).
Bernstein's common-sense philosophy constitutes both a
strength and a weakness of his work. On the one hand, his rather
straightforward orientation toward the "facts" enabled him, notwithstanding his deep personal immersion in orthodox Marxism,
to question critically some of its dogmatic beliefs.22 Unlike most
orthodox Marxists, Bernstein had the courage to face the growing
prosperity of the German working class in the 1890s and to think
through the increasingly evolutionary politics of the SPD. On the
other hand, Bernstein tended to take the "facts" too much at their
face value, projecting the economic improvement of the 1890s toward the future and overestimating the capacity of capitalism to
overcome its economic irrationalities, such as its recurrent economic crises. 23 The result is that Bernstein at times sketched too
rosy a picture of the future, describing a unilinear model of progress in which class antagonisms would slowly diminish in capitalist society, while socialism would gradually and peacefully evolve
through reformist and parliamentary action. 2·1 Here his thought
again takes a somewhat un-Kantian turn; for the Kantian notion of
progress fully incorporates the possibility of temporary regress. In
Bernstein's defense, however, it is to be noted that he did not reject
revolution as such. Rather, he follows Kantian gradualism in criticizing the Hegelian conception of the socialist revolution as the
negation of the negation, leading to an a priori justification of
revolutionary violence as well as to eschatological expectations
concerning the effects of revolution. As Bernstein put it, this "vision" of "social collapse ... is the picture of an army. lt presses
forward, through detours, over sticks and stones, but is constantly
Jed downward in its march ahead. Finally it arrives at a great abyss.
Beyond it there stands beckoning the desired goal-the state of the
future, which can be reached only through a sea; a red sea, as some
have said." 25
In general, Kantian socialist ethics shares Bernstein's moral
concern with the means of social change. His view, for example,
that a political mass strike, paralyzing the economy, is justified as a
means of defending democratic rights or of pressing for such
rights, is Kantian in nature; for the very conditions of autonomy
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are at stake, and, once these conditions are threatened, action that
may lead to revolution is justified. 26 Also, the Marburgers could not
but have agreed with Bernstein's contention that democracy is both
the means and the end of socialism. 27 And, like the Marburgers,
Bernstein stressed the importance of cooperatives, both as an instrument for the emancipation of the working class and as an
essential aspect of the socialist ideal. 28 Last, Bernstein's (infamous)
slogan that "the ultimate aim of socialism is nothing, but the
movement is everything" accords with the Kantian socialist viewpoint, at least in the two dominant meanings Bernstein gives to
this slogan: incremental changes are significant in themselves
and must not be seen as mere preparatory steps toward the final
collapse of capitalis t society (the "great abyss"), as the orthodox Marxists in effect contended; and the socialist ideal must be
viewed as open-ended, in that continuous theoretical and practical
learning processes will shape its detailed character. 29 We may,
moreover, give two further Kantian twists to Bernstein's slogan: the
end must follow from the means, rather than vice versa; and the
moral ideal sets an infinite task. In sum, Bernstein was in a sense
correct in maintaining that his "Back to Kant" could be translated
as "Back to Lange"; for his relation to Marburg socialism is similar
to that between Marburg socialism and Lange: they share significant programmatic points, but clearly differ in their philosophical
underpinning of these points.
Bernstein's revisionism was definitely rejected at the 1903 Dresden congress of the SPD, although the revisionists were allowed to
remain within the party. The party once again affirmed its revolutionary character and predicted ever-growing class conflict and
struggle. This had, however, little effect: the reformists within the
party, and notably the representatives of the trade unions with
their economistic orientation, became stronger, and the party increasingly took a turn which conflicted not only with the orthodox
Marxist view but also with Bernstein's revisionism. The trade
unions succeeded, for example, in 1906 to eliminate in effect the
political mass strike from the SPD agenda, in opposition to Bernstein, Kautsky, and the Marxist party leader August Behel. 30 Likewise, Bernstein soon joined such Marxists as Kautsky and Karl
Liebknecht in their opposition to the SPD support of the Great
War. And, during the 1920s and early 1930s, Bernstein was a critic
not only of Bolshevism but also of the increasing right-wing turn
of the SPD and the Weimar Republic. His voice was not heard. Yet,
in the year of his death (1932), the 82-year old Bernstein wrote to
Kautsky: "You are right, we can only wish each other the strength
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to get through these miseral>le times without harm. What will be
the outcome? Will that which we have worked for so passionately
all our lives be preserved? We, as old fighters, cannot take such
thoughts lightly in view of t11e serious situation.... Meanwhile I
have full confidence in the energy of our party; it will carry
on ... . " 31 Bernstein did not live to see his heroic hope fatefully
crushed: he died a few months before the last trace of democracy
was eliminated in Germany i.n early 1933.
With the rejection of revisionism at the Dresden congress the
debate on Kantian ethics and its significance for socialism gradually receded. In philosophical terms, the criticisms raised against
the Kantian position were not of a high level. 32 We have examined
in Chapters VI and VII two main points of criticism that Kautsky
launched in Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History : the
personality principle is as consistent with liberalism or anarchism
as it is with socialism, and will be superfluous in the socialist
society. Mehring, the earlier critic of Marburg socialism, also set
forth the first objection. After citing Cohen's view that Kant "is the
true and real originator of German socialism," Mehring wrote: "He
[Kant] has not contributed a grain of sand to the foundation of
socialism, but he has contributed many a stone to liberalism and in
particular to an anti-socialist liberalism." Mehring added: "Have
these liberals or the neo-Kantians misunderstood their Kant?" 33
Now, obviously, Mehring is correct in observing that Kant's practical philosophy has been used to support various forms of liberalism-Mehring never tires of pointing out that Kant accepted capitalism and made the workers into passive citizens34-but this is
irrelevant; for the real issue is whether socialism can be logically and cogently derived from Kant's ethics. Both Mehring and
Kautsky failed to address this issue systematically. Mehring's view
somewhat differed from Kautsky's with regard to the latter's second point of criticism. Notwithstanding his contention that Kant is
essentially a philosopher of liberalism, Mehring argued that the
personality principle corresponds to Marx's description in the
Manifesto of the communist society as "an association, in which
the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." 35 Instead of drawing the conclusion, however, that
this means that Marxism needs a critical ethics, Mehring saw it as
an indication of the completeness of Marxism. 36 Moreover, on
Mehring's account, the ideal must be viewed not as a moral task
but rather as the inevitable product of the laws of history. But on
these terms Kautsky was also prepared to call the socialist ideal a
moral ideal, although he additionally attempted to undercut the
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need for a critical morality by turning to "social instincts" as the
determinants of human behavior.37 The upshot is that the main
bone of contention between the Marburgers and the orthodox
Marxists of the SPD still stood: only the former held that morality
in its corrective, directive, and motivational functions is indispensable for socialist theory and praxis.
A final major criticism against Kantian ethical socialism is
more tactical than strictly philosophical in nature: Kant's ethics
weakens the revolutionary impulse of the proletariat. Both Kautsky and Mehring raise this objection, Mehring less emphatically,
for he maintained that the neo-Kantians were of "good will" and
that "some of them stood close to socialism." 38 Kautsky writes in
Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History: "Despite the categ9rical imperative, which the Kantian Ethic cries [out] to the individual, its historical and social tendency, from the very beginning
on till today, has been that of toning down, of reconciling the
antagonisms, not of overcoming them through struggle" (p. 69). To
some extent, Kautsky's claim is correct: the Marburgers believed
that reformative labor and cooperation with progressive liberals
was the right tactic around the turn of the century. Most orthodox
Marxists, however, basically agreed with this, although their revolutionary program formed an obstacle to such cooperation and
gave a different meaning to reformative steps, as steps toward the
final collapse of capitalism. (Another problem was that German
liberalism only slowly gave up its anti-working class orientation.)
The Marburgers, then, established a more convincing link between
theory and praxis than the SPD orthodox did. Contra Kautsky and
Mehring, moreover, the issue of revolution was for the Marburgers
not a question of dogma but a moral and empirical question. True,
some of them may have held the view that revolution can never be
morally justified, but this was not the general view. We have seen
that Cohen held that revolutions constitute "periods of experimental ethics"; and one of the Marburgers played a leading role in
one such practical experiment: Eisner was prime minister of the
Bavarian Republic from November 1918 until February 1919.

Eisner and the Munich Revolution
Eisner (1867-1919) was above all a journalist. At the age of twentytwo he broke off his study at the Friedrich Wilhelm University at
Berlin and accepted a position at a Berlin news agency. 30 In 1892
Eisner worked at the Frankfurter Zeitung and finished a critical
study of Nietzsche. (Nietzsche was second only to Hegel as the
main target of the philosophical polemic of the Marburg School.)
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From 1893 to 1897 Eisner was a political editor at the Hessische
Landeszeitung in Marburg; during this period, under the influence
of Cohen, he began to define his socialism as a Kantian ethical
socialism. Eisner renewed his Kant studies (started earlier at
Berlin), followed lectures by Cohen, and became personally acquainted with Cohen and other Marburgers. He later wrote that
Cohen's ethical socialism touched him at the core of his being. 10
Indeed, Cohen's impact is clearly manifest in a series of articles
that Eisner wrote in 1904 for Vorwiirts on the occasion of the centennial of Kant's death. Eisner argued here that the categorical
imperative as the "eternal principle of morality" cannot be completely realized in any social order (i.e., morality sets an infinite
task), but that this imperative presently demands socialism. Such a
moral demand is, moreover, essential; for, Eisner noted, "[t]he
proletariat seeks not only to understand history but also to shape
it." Thus Eisner followed Vorlander in claiming that a philosophy
of praxis must combine Kantian ethics·and Marxian socioeconomic
analysis. And, finally, in his typical polemical fashion Eisner wrote:
"More idealism-that is the rousing cry of today-more idealism,
and this means-Kautsky don't turn pale-more 'ethics."' 41
Eisner's combative spirit landed him in jail in 1897: he was
sentenced to a nine-month prison term for indirectly referring to
the politics of the Kaiser as "Caesarean madness." His case caught
the attention of Wilhelm Liebknecht, one of the originators of the
organized socialist movement in Germany and the leading editor
of the largest SPD newspaper Vorwiirts. (In 1906 Vorwiirts had a
circulation of 112,000. 42) Liebknecht arranged a position for Eisner
on the editorial board of Vorwiirts, and within a year Eisner became its new leading editor. His position was difficult, for one of
his tasks was to mediate between the revisionist and orthodox
Marxist factions on the editorial board of the paper. Eisner had his
disagreements with both groups. He did not share Bernstein's belief that the class struggle would gradually become less sharp, but,
in opposition to the orthodox Marxists, he viewed this struggle as
a moral struggle. (Bernstein's belief was based on the claim that the
middle class was not disappearing and would come to cooperate
with the working class. He held the economic condition of the
workers was improving, but accepted the relative-immiseration
thesis.) Ultimately, Eisner's mediation efforts failed: the orthodox
Marxists led by Kautsky forced him to resign in 1905. 43 His "crime"
was independence of mind. After serving a few years as political
columnist for the socialist newspaper Friinkische Tage spost in
Nuremberg, in 1910 Eisner moved to his final home, Munich .
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Eisner started here as a free-lance writer, but he soon became a
political editor and literary critic of the SPD newspaper the
Munchener Post. In 1915 he was dismissed as editor because of his
opposition to Germany's role in the Great War.
Like Bernstein, Eisner had at first spontaneously supported
Germany's declaration of war, but, even sooner than Bernstein,
Eisner became one of the leading and sharpest critics of the German war machine and its annexationist policies. Former opponents
became fellow travelers for the cause of peace: Bernstein, Eisner,
and Kautsky were leading members of the Independent Social
Democratic Party of Germany (USDP), which was founded in 1917
in opposition to the SPD support of the war. Eisner became de facto
head of the USDP organization in Munich and, in this role, became
the force behind a mass strike for peace in Munich, which under
USDP leadership also took place in other industrial centers in
January 1918. Eisner's successful personal call for the strike in several Bavarian war industries led to his second prison term. On the
eve of the strike he was arrested, and he spent until mid-October,
1918, in prison. A few weeks later, on November 7, Eisner and the
USDP turned a massive peace demonstration into a bloodless
coup, effectively using the breakdown of the existing power structure to create the Bavarian Republic.
The Munich Revolution in its first phase (i.e., during the leadership of Eisner) was primarily a political and democratic revolution. Councils of soldiers, peasants, intellectual and manual workers were formed, but the socialization of the means of production
was postponed to a later date. Eisner declared in the name of the
interim revolutionary regime: "[I]t seems to us impossible, at a
time when the productive power of the land is nearly exhausted,
to transfer industry immediately to the possession of society.
There can be no socialization when there is scarcely anything to be
socialized.""" Thus the strategy was gradually to bring about the
socialization of the means of production through improving the
economic position of the workers and strengthening the councils.
Above all, the interim revolutionary regime saw as its first duties
to make Bavaria an effective democracy and to pressure the newly
formed federal government in Berlin to distance itself from the old
military hierarchy so that peace could become a preparation for
socialism rather than for another war. Or, more precisely, these
were the goals that Eisner had set for himself. A brief 'description
of Eisner's heroic attempt to realize these goals in a climate of
severe opposition displays Kantian ethical socialism in practice.

A Historical Note on Kantian Ethical Socialism

305

Although the SPD had not supported the overthrow of the
Bavarian monarchy, it accepted the new state of affairs and joined
the interim revolutionary regime. From the very beginning,
however, the SPD opposed the idea of placing any real power in
the hands of the revolutionary councils, which was the policy of
the USDP. The Bavarian SPD leadership largely embraced the existing bureaucracy and held in effect that parliamentarianism was
the only legitimate expression of democracy. The conflict between
the SPD, on the one hand, and the USPD and other radical groups,
such as the newly formed German Communist Party (KPD), on
the other hand, came to a final breaking point after the election of
the Bavarian parliament in January 1919. The new constitution had
greatly broadened the electorate, lowering the voting age from
twenty-five to twenty-one and giving suffrage to women. The election results were disastrous for Eisner and the USDP: the bulk of
the votes went to the SPD and the conservative Bavarian People's
Party (BVP). This result was not altogether surprising; for the SPD
had a well-organized party machinery, which the USDP lacked,
and the BVP was supported by the traditional Catholic Bavarian
peasants. Yet, the election day must have been one of the most
painful days of Eisner's life, posing a clear conflict between his
democratic and his revolutionary-socialist convictions. Eisner
sought the compromise of recognizing the Bavarian parliament,
while also retaining the council system as an instrument of the
emancipation of labor. He was desparately aware that without such
a compromise the outcome could be civil war, but his mediating
efforts between conservative and radical socialists were of no avail.
The day before Eisner planned to offer his resignation and that of
his revolutionary cabinet, placing legislative power in the hands of
the Bavarian parliament, he spoke to the congress of councils,
envisaging a "second [permanent] revolution": "The second revolution will not be plundering and street-fighting. The new revolution is the assembling of the masses in city and countryside to
carry out what the first revolution has started. . . . The bourgeois
majority is now to implement bourgeois policies. We will see
whether they are capable of ruling. In the meantime the councils
should do their job: to build the new democracy. Then perhaps the
new spirit will also arrive in Bavaria."''5 Indeed, the second revolution happened soon, and its fate was what Eisner had feared but
denied in his ethical hope. On the day of his intended resignation,
February 21, Eisner was murdered, and after another interim revolutionary regime of the SPD and the USDP, a council republic was
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set up, the Soviet Republic of Bavaria. In early May it was brutally
put down by the federal SPD government, with the support of the
Bavarian SPD and the protofascist Free Corps.
Eisner's peace efforts also failed. Two examples suffice to make
this clear. In late November 1918, Eisner made public some official
documents that showed that Germany had done little to avert
Austrian aggression toward Serbia. Eisner's direct aim was to pressure the federal government to dismiss the representatives of the
old order in the foreign office and the armistice committee, in the
hope that this would contribute to more promising peace terms
with the Allied forces. But we may assume that Eisner's broader
goal was psychological and moral: an honest public examination of
the past was crucial for opening the road toward a peaceful and
democratic-socialist future. Berlin, however, ignored the documents, and the general public reaction was disbelief. The second
example concerns Eisner's speech at the congress of the Socialist
International in Bern, early February, 1919. Here Eisner claimed
German war guilt, attacked the militarism of imperial Germany,
called for international socialist support for the "new" Germany,
and proposed that German workers and students voluntarily engage in reconstruction work in northern France. ' 6 The delegates at
the congress, with the exception of most German socialists, enthusiastically received Eisner's speech. The public response in Germany was one of strong disapproval, if not outright hatred. It is no
coincidence that Eisner was murdered by a fanatical nationalist.
Eisner represented everything that the Nazis came to hate: Jew,
pacifist, cosmopolite, and socialist.
Although it would be a mistake to place the revolutionaries of
the Soviet Republic of Bavaria on a par with those of the KPD in
the 1920's and the early 1930's, it can nonetheless be said that the
events surrounding and following Eisner's death presaged Germany's greatest tragedy: the bitter conflict within the left contributed to the emergence and victory of the fascist right. It is not,
however, my intention to claim that Kantian ethical socialism, if it
had been more influential, could have prevented this tragedy. Such
counterfactual claims are either truisms or at best oversimplifications. Instead, I hope that this historical note on Kantian ethical
socialism has shown at least two things. First, it is misguided to
equate Kantian ethical socialism with past or present mainstream
social democracy, i.e., a socialism that no longer really seeks to
challenge the core and foundation of the capitalist given. This
equation may contain a grain of truth with regard to some Kantian
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ethical socialists, but as a generalization it is simply false. Second,
Kantian ethical socialism, and we may include here Bernstein's
democratic socialism, offered a promising program: it sought to
bring about a socialist society through democratic and peaceful
means, even if this would mean that painful compromises had
to be made; yet, it preserved its integrity and did not lose sight of
the final ideal. Its critical interaction between means and ends
makes this kind of socialism still significant for our own time.
All too often courageous hope is confused with optimism and
self-conscious ethical idealism with political naivete.
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3. Virtue, p. 59 (Vil: 209). The translation of Lust and Unlust as
pleasure and pain is not accurate, although widely used. Lust has a more
general meaning than pleasure, and, as will soon become clear, Kant
explicates the Lust associated with moral feeling in terms of self-contentment and inner peace-a state of moral well-being which seems to have
little to do with pleasure as such. Obviously, similar remarks apply to the
translation of Unlust as pain. Cf. George Schrader, "The Status of Feeling
in Kant's Philosophy," in Actes du Congres d'Ottawa sur Kant, Volume 5
of Collection & Philosophica (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1976),
pp. 146££.
4. See Part II of Practical Reason, entitled "Methodology of Pure
Practica l Rea son." See also Part II of Virtue, "The Ethical Doctrine
of Method." Kant typically presents his examples set in the context of the
moral education of children. However, the life of morally courageous individuals may inspire adult agents as well. Kant's discussion of the Book of
Job may serve here as an example. See "On the Failure of All Attempted
Philosophical Theodicies," translated by Michel Despland in his Kant on
History and Religion (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1973). See
Cassirer ed., Vol. VI.
5. Kant-Studien 64 (1973): 283-314.
6. Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1970, p. 46.
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7. Cf. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 67.
8. P. 38 (VII: 190). Kant states here that "the notion that I am under
obligation to take as my end something that lies in the concepts of practical reason, and so to have a material ground of choice beyond the formal
one that Law contains, would be the concept of an end which is in itself a
duty." Kant is here drawing a distinction between the doctrine of law and
the doctrine of virtue.
9. The "politicians" are, for example, attacked in the first Appendix
of Peace and in the second section of "An Old Question." Kant's trust in
simple and ordinary persons is discussed in Beck's Commentary, p. 235.
10. Cf. Barrington Moore, Jr., Inju stice, The Social Bases of Obedience
and Revolt (White Plains, N.Y. : M. E. Sharpe, 1978), Ch. III.
11. See also L. W. Nauta, Argumenten voor een Kritische Ethiek (Arguments for a Critical Ethics) (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1971), p. 80.
12. Ibid., p. 145 (399). Kant adds the qualification that enthusiasm
cannot "be wholly esteemed, since passion as such deserves censure." In
Judgment (p. 112; § 29; V: 344) Kant explains that enthusiasm as an affection "makes it impossible to exercise a free deliberation about fundamental propositions so as to determine ourselves thereby." This remark seems
mistaken with regard to moral enthusiasm. What may be noted in this
context, though, is that moral enthusiasm may be accompanied by a lack
of critical assessment of those historical events which inspire this enthusiasm. In other words, the danger that must be guarded against is that, in
one's enthusiasm for a progressive historical event, one lose sight of the
Jess "promising" aspects of this event. We will see in Chapter V, section 1,
below, that Kant did not succumb to this danger in his enthusiasm for the
French Revolution-he criticized the regime of terror-and thus his own
example belies his remark on enthusiasm as in need of censure.
13. The feeling of Mitleid is analyzed in Hermann Cohen's Religion of
Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, translated by Simon Kaplan (New York:
Frederick Ungar, 1972), Chapters VIII and IX. The first German edition
appeared posthumously in 1919. Cohen argues that Mitleid transforms the
empirical Nebenmen sch into an ethical Mitmensch---co-suffering produces
the co-person. His analysis is discussed in Schwarzschild, "The Tenability
of Hermann Cohen's Construction of the Self."
14. Cf. Kant's discussion of practical Jove in Practical Reason, pp. 85ff
(V : 91ff) . See also Virtue, § 25.
15. It might be objected that the existence of poverty and crime cannot be explained on the basis of political factors alone, but we will see in
our discussion of Kant's philosophy of history that he was not unaware of
the fact that economic factors also directly cause such societal evils. Nonetheless, we will also note that his solution for such problems is too much
politically focused, this at the cost of required economic change.
16. The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1972, 1978), p. 524. Marx's statement that he will not withdraw
from the International reflects the bitter struggle between Bakuninists and
Marxists at the Hague Congress. To prevent the General Council of the
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International from falling into Bakuninist hands, Marx successfully arranged at the Hague Congress for the transfer of this Council to New
York. This meant, in effect, that the First International came to an end. See
further David Fernbach's Introduction to Karl Marx, The First International
and After, edited by Fernbach (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 49-50.
17. Cf. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, p. 27. See also Cohen, Kants
Begrundung der Ethik, pp. 354ff.
18. Religion, p. 92 (VI: 245) . That Kant's primary concern is not with
what will happen "in the end" is even more clear from the following
passage (ibid., p. 130; 287):
The idea of the highest good . . . cannot be realized by man himself. . . . And now there opens up before him the abyss of a mystery
regarding what God may do, whether indeed anything at all, and if so,
what in particular should be ascribed to God. Meanwhile man knows
. .. nothing but what he must himself do in order to be worthy of that
supplement, unknown, or at least incomprehensible, to him. (Translation
altered.)
Kant, however, somewhat overstates his point here, for, as we will see in
our discussion of the postulate of the existence of God, he holds that we
may in regulative manner ascribe properties to God on the basis of how
we conceive His "supplementary efforts."
19. See Virtue, p. 47 (VII: 197). Cf. Lectures on Ethics, p. 51. The issue is
d iscussed in some detail in John R. Silber, "The Moral Good and the
Natural Good in Kant's Ethics," Review of Metaphysics 36 (1982): 397-437,
pp. 419 ff.
20. Cf. Paton, The Categorical Imperative, pp. 85 ff. See also Mary J.
Gregor, Laws of Freedom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), p. 78.
21. See Foundations, pp. 35-36 (IV: 275-76). Kant mentions these ends
in the context of his argument that our conception of happiness is so
indefinite that we do not really know what we want and are inconsistent
in our willing when we wish to attain happiness. He overstates his case
here, his point being that the precepts of prudence, because of their variability, cannot function as practical laws. After all, taking Kant too seriously here would undermine his concept of the highest good. Moreover,
a certain degree of surprise, spontaneity, and creativity is not incompatible with happiness, but is rather an element of it. I will soon argue that
Kant tended to neglect this aspect of human happiness.
22. To the extent that Kant is correct that we do not really know what
we want when we desire happiness (see note 21 above), this formulation
of the duty to promote the highest good is to be preferred. Moreover, it
seems that this formulation better conveys what is really at stake: a tremendous amount of suffering in the world that can, and ought to be,
alleviated or prevented.
23. Thomas Auxter draws a somewhat similar distinction, namely,
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between the ectypal world (the realm of ends), which he calls the "highest
good,,'' and the highest good as the perfect (consummatum) condition in
which virtue and happiness exactly correlate, which he calls the "highest
good/' See his "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest Good," Journal of the
History of Philosophy 17 (1979): 121-134, p. 127. See also his "The Teleology
of Kant's Ectypal World," p. 491. One important difference between our
respective analyses is that Auxter views the highest good,. as a mere "otherworldly conception," thus, I think, drawing the wrong inference that the
two conceptions of the highest good do not partly overlap in Kant's work.
Auxter makes the same mistake in his Kant's Moral Teleology (Macon, Ga. :
Mercer University Press, 1982). This book came too late to my attention to
be discussed in the text. It offers some criticisms of Kant's highest good
doctrine that accord with the view defended here. In contrast to the present study, Auxter does not seek to explore the social (and historical) dimensions of Kant's moral teleology, although he promises us a future
book on this topic. See ibid., pp. xi and 182. That the highest good,,,, and
not the highest good 0 , is the final end of the moral law, seems also to have
been the view of Hermann Cohen. In Kants Begrundung der Ethik (p. 350),
he says that "the community of autonomous beings is the only highest
good." Cf. Reason and Hope, p. 82.
24. Cf. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 63. It may be
conceded that the highest good 0 sets a deontic "ought" for an omnipotent
rational being, but this does not mean that it is our duty to bring about
this end. Moreover, Kant's claim that such a being would bring about the
highest good 0 raises the suspicion of circularity: in order even to make
intelligible the view that this good sets a deontic "ought," Kant already
assumes in the antinomy what he still needs to show on the basis of the
antinomy, to wit, the existence of a being that can harmonize nature with
the moral intention.
25. Cf. John R. Silber, "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as
Immanent and Transcendent," Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 469-492, pp.
483 ff. Silber's notion of the highest good as transcendent has a similar
function to that which I ascribe to the highest good", although, as we will
soon see, he gives an altogether different interpretation of the duty to
promote this good.
26 . "The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics," Ethics 73
(1963) : 179-197, p. 183. See also his "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good
as Immanent and Transcendent."
27. Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "The Highest Good as Content for Kant's
Ethical Formalism," Kant-Studien 56 (1965): 102-110, p. 106. In "The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics" (p. 195), Silber seeks to avoid
this problem by claiming that the pursuit of virtue conditions the balancing of virtue and happiness; but, as Murphy notes, it is difficult to see how
Silber can consistently argue for this on his own terms.
28 . See, for example, Foundations, p. 9 (IV: 249) . See also note 31
below.
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29. Kant makes an exception to this rule in his discussion of capital
punishment, maintaining that in certain cases the death sentence is better
than penal servitude because it guarantees that criminals are punished
"in proportion to their inner viciousness" (Justice, p. 103; VII: 141). This is
just one of the many ways in which Kant's defense of capital punishment
conflicts with the basic premises of his practical philosophy. Cf. Chapter I,
note 30, above. See also Schwarzschild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty . . . ," pp. 348--49.
30. Cf. Religion, p. 16 (VI: 158). See also Murphy, "The Highest Good
as Content for Kant's Ethical Formalism," p. 107.
31. The first of these statements may seem to be contradicted by
Kant's claim in Practical Reason (p. 63; V: 68) that someone who annoys
"peace-loving fo lk" should not complain when he gets a "good beating,"
because "justice has been done to him ... the proportion between welfare and well-doing [is] here put into practice." But notice that Kant does
not say that we ought to bring unhappiness to the immoral person; rather,
he adopts the standpoint of the impartial observer and approves or disapproves the distribution of virtue and happiness in the universe. Cf. Foundations, p. 9 (IV: 249). Such an evaluative judgment does not commit one
to action in accordance with it. Cf. "On the Failure of All Attempted
Philosophical Theodicies," p. 288n (VI: 127n.). Another consideration is
that the above example is extremely banal. Should we take Kant seriously
here? The second of these statements may seem to be contradicted by
Kant's "Fragments of a Moral Catechism" (Virtue, § 52). I think, however,
that a careful reading of the text makes clear that Kant's main concern here
is to show that the virtuous deserve to be happy, not to argue that the
duty of beneficence must be limited to the virtuous.
32. Cf. Curtis H. Peters, Immanuel Kant on Hope (Dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis, 1975), pp. 31ff.
33. In Immanuel Kant on Hope (pp. 62ff. and 160££.) Peters offers an
interesting criticism of Kant in this respect, although his criticism loses
some of its force by equating the principle of justice to the jus taliones.
34. "The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics," p. 195.
35. Cf. Silber, "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent
and Transcendent," pp. 474-75. To futher illustrate the above inconsistency,
it may be noted that Kant claims in (c) that the highest good is to be
thought of as "to be made real by our will," although he claims in conclusion (m) that it is "our duty to promote the highest good."
36. This succinct formulation is given by Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 294.
37. See "On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies."
38. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 138.
39. Cf. Cohen, Kants Begriindung der Ethik, p. 368. Cohen argues here
that the issue of our time is not whether we have more sunshine than
rain, but rather the suffering that human beings inflict upon one another.
He adds that it is the merit of socialist thought that it poses precisely this
latter question.
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Chapter III
1. Kant added the question mark. Its purpose is not explained.
2. The distinction here between the natural and the moral end of
humanity corresponds to the distinction Kant draws in Judgment between
the ultimate end of nature and the final end of creation. The purpose of
culture as our natural end is the highest political good, whereas the community of colegislators is our moral end. See further Chapter IV, section 1,
below.
3. In his attempt to detect a progressive development within history,
the Kantian philosophical historian may come to suggest new empirical
links or field s of inquiry. Thus a reflective history may have some theoretical heuristic value for empirical history. Cf. Burleigh T. Wilkins, "Teleology in Kant's Philosophy of History," History and Theory 5 (1966): 172-185.
We should, however, not infer from this that Kant seeks to sit in the chair
of the historian proper; rather, we may say that he looks critically over the
shoulder of the empirical historian, emphasizing the emancipatory significance of historical research. Kant himself explicitly states in "Universal
History" (p. 25; IV: 165--66) that he does not attempt to play the role of the
historian proper: "That I would want to displace the work of practicing
empirical historians with this Idea of world history ... would be a misinterpretation of my intention. It is only a suggestion of what a philosophical mind (which would have to be well versed in history) could essay from
another point of view." Cf. Goldmann, Immanuel Kant, p. 212 n. 54.
4. See ibid., p. 78 (395) . Cf. "An Old Question," section 10.
5. "Today's Hope: Conversations with Sartre," by Benny Levy, Telos,
44 (1980): 155-181, pp. 180-81. Originally published in three parts in Le
Nouvel Observateur, March 1980. Translated by Lilliam Hernandez, George
Waterston, and Claire Hubert.
6. See ibid., pp. 171-72, and 179. That Sartre's project of grounding
hope is Kantian in orientation is argued in some detail by Steven S.
Schwarzschild in his "J.-P. Sartre as Jew," Modern Judaism 3 (1983) : 39- 73.
7. Cf. William A. Galston, Kant and the Problem of History (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 213.
8. In altering the translations of Kant's historical essays, I have benefited from Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, translated by Ted Humphrey
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), and Kant's Political Writings, translated by
H. B. Nisbet and edited by Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970).
9. Cf. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, pp~ 144--46.
10. Here, and elsewhere, I have departed from Beck in not capitalizing the word 'nature,' since I find that the capitals needlessly strengthen
the impression of personification.
11. Edited with an Interpretive Essay by Ronald Beiner (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982) .
12. The phrase 'the cunning of nature' is coined after Hegel's "cunning of reason" (List der Vernunft), and is used by Yovel, who bases him-
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self on Eric Weil. See Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 140n. The
fact that nature, and not reason, is the artist of deception suffices
to demarcate Kant's philosophy of history from Hegel's. I will discuss
some major differences between their respective views on history in section 3, below.
13. Cf. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, pp. 148ff, who rightly
argues that Kant anticipates here Hegel's master-slave dialectic.
14. Cf. Foundations, p. 11 (IV: 251). In "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" Kant discusses romantic and intuitionist attacks on reason, which
were increasing in his own time as a reaction to the Enlightenment, and
warns us that such attacks threaten civil liberties. Goldmann, in his Immanuel Kant, p. 122, perceptively observes that the rise of fascism in our
century has "shown us how penetrating Kant's vision was."
15. "Conjectural Beginning," p. 63 (IV: 336). Fackenheim's translation
here is rather liberal: the term 'second nature' is not Kant's, although it
captures his meaning. Kant said: " . . . bis vollkommene Kunst wieder
Natur wird . . . "
16. In Anthropology (p. 188; VIII: 221), Kant puts the dilemma in even
broader terms, arguing that human beings need moral education in order
to become virtuous and that those who provide this education are themselves in need of moral education.
17. Cf. Cohen, Kants Begriindung der Ethik, p. 510. See also Religion,
p. 92 (VI: 245).
18. Cf. Galston, Kant and the Problem of History, p. 241. See also
Hassner, "Immanuel Kant," pp. 588-89. The passage just cited from "Universal History" is, for example, contradicted by the following statement
from Peace (pp. 112- 13; VI: 453): "A good constitution is not to be expected
from morality, but, conversely, a good moral condition of a people is to be
expected only under a good constitution."
19. The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 595.
20. See Berlin, "Historical Inevitability," in The Philosophy of History in
Our Time, edited by Hans Meyerhoff (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), pp. 257 ff. Reprinted from Berlin, Historical Inevitability
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954).
21. "Universal History" p. 23 (IV: 163). Beck translates Staatskorper as
"international government." This is a bit misleading; for Kant argues that,
temporarily at least, it is better to work toward a federation of states,
because an international government carries with it the danger of universal despotism. See Peace, pp. 101-02 and 113 (VI: 442 and 453). See also On
the Old Saw, p. 79 (VI: 395). Cf. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 116. See
also Friedrich, Inevitable Peace, p. 46.
22. See also Chapter IV, section 3, below. I will later also argue (in
particular in Chapter VI, section 1, below) that Kant's proposal for peace
within the state suffers from a similar defect.
23. See, respectively, "Universal History;' pp. 23 and 22 (IV: 163 and 162).
24. See, for example, Kant and the Problem of History, pp. 88ff.
25. Thus Galston states in Kant and the Problem of History: "[T]he
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introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of History bears a startling (though entirely unacknowledged) resemblance to the 'Idea for a Universal History.' Yet in Hegel's thought all the Kantian hesitation, ambiguity, and
perplexity has vanished" (p. 262). That Galston ascribes such doubt and
ambiguity to Kant is not surprising, for he maintains that for Kant "[h]istory is the attempt to show that the world is just and benevolently
ordered" (p. 230) .
26. Again, this is implied by Kant's doctrine of the reflective judgment, which leads to a critical teleology, not a dogmatic one. Note, moreover, that even if we accept Kant's contention that the postulate of the
existence of God can be derived from the moral law, it does not follow that
a higher cause is at work within human history; for the major objective
function of this postulate is to provide a ground for the belief that there is
an ontic possibility in nature which makes feasible human action toward
the highest good. The minor objective function of the postulate points to
the same conclusion: we may hope for divine assistance-that is, the
bridging of the gap between the highest good"' and the highest good"only at the end of history.
27 . The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree (New York:
Dover, 1956), p. 25.
28. Cf. Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven, Conn.; Yale
University Press, 1946), p. 256.
29. Hegel uses the term 'wirklich' to refer to those aspects of reality in
which existence and essence are synthesized [i.e., where the Spirit is at
work (wirken)], whereas he uses the term 'real' to denote those aspects of
reality which have mere existence.
30. The first two of these objections can be found in the Preface to
Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967), pp. 4 ff. They are discussed in some detail in Shlomo Avineri,
Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (London: Cambridge University Press,
1972), pp. 123 ff. Hegel's critique of the French Revolution can be found in
The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper &
Row, 1967), pp. 599 ff ("Absolute Freedom and Terror"). Although this
critique is often specifically directed toward Rousseau, it seems that the
broader target is the Kantian heritage as such, in which, following Hegel,
an "abstract" ideal is counterposed to historical reality, with the result that
the desire emerges to violently change this reality.
31. Philosophy of Right, pp. 12-13. Avineri, in his at times far-fetched
attempt to portray Hegel as a progressive thinker, maintains that this
passage, though "seemingly quietistic," contains the hidden critical message that "philosophy cannot change the world, only interpret it; but by its
very act of interpretation it changes it, it tells the world that its time is up"
(Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, p. 130). This argument is plainly mistaken : Hegel's political thought becomes praxis-oriented only after the fact
(i.e., the demise of his own time) to which it did not seek to contribute.
After all, Avineri himself claims that "Hegel saw his own time as the
apotheosis of history, as the reconciliation of the actual and the rational"
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(p. 129). Or should we declare that any given political philosophy has the
hidden critical message of fundamental change to come, so that we should
presume that our time is up not some of the time but all of the time?
32. See, respectively, Philosophy of Right, p. 216, and The Philosophy of
History, p. 457.
33. Cf. Cassirer, The Myth of the State, pp. 272-73.
34. Hegel 's Theory of the Modern State, p. 234.
35. Philosophy of Right, p. 11. It may be noted that Michael Oakeshott
views enjoyment of the present as one of the basic features of conservatism. See Chapter I, section 2, above.
36. In accordance with this, Hegel says of the German nations of his
day: "Freedom has found the means of realizing its Ideal-its true existence. This is the ultimate result which the process of History is intended
to accomplish" (The Philosophy of History, pp. 109-110). It is true that Hegel
at some points in his work seems to suggest that the future is opene.g., his famous remark about America as the land of the future (see ibid.,
p. 86)-but it is difficult to see how on his own terms he could have meant
to say anything other than that the political principles embedded in
the German nations of his own time (notably, the Prussian state) would in
the future be extended to other nations. Thus Hegel's philosophy of history,
as contrasted to Kant's, remains within the political horizon of his
own society.
37. Both Arendt and Beiner neglect to tell us what they mean by the
"universal," but considering the fact that Arendt argues that Kant's notion
of dignity conflicts with his idea of (infinite) progress, we must assume
that she (and Beiner) had Kant's meaning in mind. At any rate, what
matters here is not so much Arendt's view per se, as an explication and
discussion of important objections to Kant's philosophy of history.
38. To avoid possible misunderstanding, Jet me note that my claim
here is not that on Kant's account only morally committed persons should
be treated as having unconditional worth. For Kant, it is our duty to treat
all human beings as ends in themselves. The issue at stake, however, is
whether those persons who have displayed dignity vis-a-vis history are
robbed of their dignity by Kant's notion of (infinite) progress. The very
fact that many human agents have not displayed dignity in the historical
drama is, of course, not something we can in some sense see as the fault
of Kant's ethics, and, as we have just noted in our discussion of Galston's
objection, Kant does not approve of the fact that history uses many human agents as means only. Kant himself seems to emphasize this point:
that his philosophy of history does not make individuals (or even whole
peoples), who are subject to the cunning of nature, into mere means, by
noting that these persons unintentionally bring about progress and that
"they would set little store by it if they did know it" ("Universal History,"
p. 12; IV: 151). Finally, it may be noted that Kant's ethics also recognizes
that dignity can be displayed through the fulfillment of individual duties.
39. Cf. Cohen, Kants Begrundung der Ethik, pp. 512-13.
40. Cited in Timothy R. Keck, Kant and Socialism: The Marburg School
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in Wilhelmian Germany (Dissertation, University of Wisconsin/Madison,
1975), p. 421. It must nonetheless be said that Toller had unrealistic expectations about the changes that the Munich Revolution could effect, and it
seems fair to say that with the murder of Kurt Eisner the Kantian road
came to an end. I will return to Eisner in the Appendix, below.
41. The qualification must be added that Kant was also sharply critical of the moral terrorism that accompanied the Revolution in its late r
stages, but this issue will be our concern in Chapter V, section 1, below.
42 . My description here of the moral society is influenced by Habermas's notion of the ideal speech community. My counterfactual "move" is
also indebted to his work. See note 44 below.
43. Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1976.
44 . In Habermas : Critical Debates, edited by John B. Thompson and
David Held (London: Macmillan, 1982).
45. Cited in ibid. Cited from Peukert, Wissenschaftstheorie, p. 282.
Habermas mistakenly claims that this passage is to be found in a personal
letter from Horkheimer to Walter Benjamin, dated March 16, 1937. This
letter contains the next passage cited; see note 46 below.
46. Cited in Peukert, Wissenschaftstheorie, p. 278. Cf. note 45 above.
47. Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen, An Inte rview with Commentary by Helmuth Gumnior (Hamburg: Furche, 1970), pp. 61--62.
48. Cf. Peukert, Wis senschaftstheorie, p. 284n. Peukert reformulates
Kant's famous question "What may I hope?" in a manner similar to mine,
but he fails to observe that this reformulation is actually in accord with
Kant's meaning. Cf. my earlier observations in Chapter II, section 3, above.
Chapter IV
1. Cf. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 183 n28.
2. See also Judgment, § 59, where Kant argues that beauty is the
symbol of morality. That science makes us susceptible to morality folJows
from Kant's claim that there are structural affinities between the natural
order and the moral order. See "Of the Typic of Pure Practical Reason" in
the second Critique.
3. Ibid., p. 285 (515) . Yovel maintains that Kant "must be [here] referring to other creatures that in his belief inhabit the universe" (Kant and the
Philosophy of History, p. 176 n20). Yovel misses Kant's philosophical point:
he refers to other rational creatures to emphasize that it is not a mere
biological fact which makes us into the final end of creation- this would
be an instance of what Peter Singer calls " speciesism"- but our moral
nature. Thus Kant also stresses that the supreme condition of humanity is
not a given but a task.
4. I assume here that Kant is best understood as a nonhedonist, a
viewpoint which I have defended in my discussion of his notion of happiness in Chapter II, section 2, above.
5. The more logical inference seems to be that such devils would opt
for a world government, i.e., an international coercive agency, but, for a
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reason that will be explained in section 3, point (g), below, Kant holds that
a league of nations is a more prudential choice.
6. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
7. Kant does not mention all these liberties and restricts the right to
vote to economically independent male citizens. See further Chapter VI,
section l, below. That he is in general a fierce defender of civil liberties is
clear from my earlier discussion in Chapter I of his view of the importance
of the freedom of public expression of one's thought. See also Chapter III,
note 14, above.
8. I will later criticize Kant's view on this issue. For a rebuttal of
Rawls's arguments in this regard, see Norman Daniels, "Equal Liberty and
Unequal Worth of Liberty," in Reading Rawls, edited by Daniels (New
York: Basic Books, n.d.).
9. Cf. Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 122ff.
10. Cf. R. M. Hare, "Rawls' Theory of Justice," in Reading Rawls,
pp. 90 and 101.
11. There are, of course, situations in which intelligent devils most
likely would not opt for such restrictions on liberty. To give one example,
the ethnic majority is an ethnic minority in an adjacent country. Fear that
their repressive measures will be met by similar measures in the other
country might prevent the ethnic majority from placing restrictions on
liberty. Such "happy" coincidences are significant behind the veil of ignorance, assuming that most people are conservative gamblers, but, in the
absence of this veil, they are nothing other than "happy" coincidences
and therein lies the problem.
12. Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 189. Yovel's view is criticized
in Riley, Kant's Political Thought, pp. 80ff.
13. More specifically, Kant argues that religious wars, accusations of
heresy, expulsion, and the like, emerge because the different faiths proclaim that their nonrational dimension is universally valid. Kant views the
Catholic church as the proto-example of this, but notes that the Protestant
church would often gladly follow suit were it not for the fact that part of
its identity is to reject the claim to universality of the Catholic church.
Thus Kant says that examples of "arch-catholic Protestants" abound. See
Religion, pp. 99-100 (VI: 253-54).
14. Cf. Goldmann, Immanuel Kant, pp. 171-72 and 178.
15. ju stice, p. 35 (Vil: 32). A little further on (p. 39; 35) Kant adds that
justice here is to be understood in a narrow sense, involving the "authorization to use coercion." Justice may also be thought of in a wider sense,
as denoting equity, but, Kant argues, this kind of justice "admits a right
without coercion," i.e., it is not a form of legal justice. To illustrate this
point, Kant says that it is a duty of justice (equity) to compensate one's
servant for inflation, but, if this clause is not added to the labor contract,
the master cannot be coerced to do so.
16. The distinction between wide and narrow duties is discussed in
Virtue, pp. 49 ff. (Vil: 199 ff.) . In a word, wide duties leave it a matter of
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individual choice how much and in precisely what manner one wishes to
contribute toward the realization of an obligatory end, whereas narrow
duties do not leave such room, but specify how one should act. Kant holds
that the duties of virtue are of wide obligation, whereas juridical duties
are of narrow obligation.
17. The rationale for this view is that it seems that in the moral
society education and information can fulfill all the rational purposes of
punis hment proper, such as prevention of rule violations and encouragement of law-abidingness. Cf. Tom Campbell, The Left and Rights (London :
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 79 ff., where Campbell argues in some
detail that socialist society can be based on a noncoercive lega l order. It
falls outside the scope of my study to address the question whether the
regulative idea of the end of all punishment, as sketched here, is compatible with Kant's retributive theory of puni shment. The issue receives some
attention in Schwarzschild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty ... ,"
pp. 369-70.
18. For references, see Chapter III, note 21, above.
19. Although Kant recognizes that such threats do not guarantee
total compliance (see Religion, p. 87; VI: 240), it seems that he, like many
other legal theorists, overestimates their efficacy (see "Universal History,"
p. 16; IV : 157; and justice, p. 19; VII: 19). Cf. Campbell, The Left and Rights,
p. 69. For obvious reasons, sociological evidence is limited. Relying on this
evidence and common sense, a recent report comes to the cautious conclusion that "[t]he threat and imposition of punishment is called for in
order to secure compliance-not full compliance, but more compliance
than there might be were there no legal penalties at all." See Andrew von
Hirsch, Doing Justice (New York: Hill & Wang, 1976), p. 44. Report of the
Committee for the Study of Incarceration.
20. Cf. William W. Murdoch, The Poverty of Nations (Baltimore, Md. :
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 309.

Chapter V
1. Robert E. Anchor, the tran slator of "An Old Question," adds the
explanatory note that Wieland's Die Geschichte der Abderiten (1774) must
have made the term 'abderitism' readily understandable to Kant's readers.
Thi s popular novel described ancie nt Abdera as a city of huma n
foolishness.
2. See Lewis White Beck's Introduction to Kant, On History, p. xii,
where he says that Kant was "almost the last and certainly the greatest of
the 'Jacobins' in Germany." Beck draws from G. P. Gooch, Germany and the
Fren ch Revolution (London, 1920) .
3. See Justice, p. 140 (VU: 180). See also Peace, Second Supplement,
and Lectures on Ethics, p. 253. Contra Nicholson, it may be noted that Kant
typically views such a reform as also resulting from a growing public
enlightenment. But this does not invalidate the main point that change
through "legal" means is one aspect of Kant's thesis of progress.
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4. See, for example, Religion (pp. 176-77n.; VI: 338-39), where Kant
states that he will raise no protest against the ruling powers when they,
constrained by the prevailing circumstances, postpone very far into the
future the granting of civil freedom to all, provided that they at least
acknowledge that this must eventually occur.
5. See further Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, Chapter V.
Yovel also argues in detail that the noumenal status of practical reason
is inconsistent with this idea that moral reason arises within history, stating that Kant, "unlike Hegel, ... cannot allow for the temporalization of
reason" (p. 271). Placing the problem in the broader context of Kant's distinction between noumenal and phenomenal reality in general, Yovel
views the difficulty at hand-that is, no mediation is possible between
rational and empirical history-as so serious that he concludes his book
with the following words: "Between the Kantian failure and Hegel's overachievement, the idea of history must be questioned anew." In response,
a few brief remarks are in order. First, we can accept Kant's thesis that we
are both moral beings and beings with inclinations, without committing
ourselves to the view that we are members, as it were, of two worlds, i.e.,
the world of noumena and that of phenomena. Cf. W. David Ross, Kant's
Ethical Theory (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 85. Likewise, we
can accept Kant's description of practical freedom as our ability to act
independently of our lower desires and be guided by the moral law without committing ourselves to his particular account of transcendental freedom as the nontemporal power to begin causal series in time. This
procedure I have followed. (My occasional use of the terms 'noumenal'
and 'phenomenal' in reference to the ideal self and the self of the inclinations should not be interpreted as implying these commitments.) Second,
once we accept, however, Kant's noumenon-phenomenon distinction as it
relates to reason and human action, and interpret it as an ontological distinction, not only the problem of the historical evolution of practical reason
emerges, but a variety of other problems as well, each contradicting Kant's
moral beliefs. For example, the idea of moral progress becomes selfcontradictory, and we can no longer claim that the enthusiasm of the
spectators of the French Revolution signifies a good will, because all our
observable actions must be seen as resulting from prior causal series.
For a further explication of these types of problem, see Allen W. Wood
(ed.), Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1984). Third, a step toward a solution is to replace the "two-world
theory" by a "two-standpoint theory" -that is, the scientist proceeds in
terms of causal language, whereas the moral actor proceeds in terms of
the language of freedom, but no claim is made that one of these languages is privileged in an ontological sense. The ramifications of this view
for Kant's epistemology cannot be addressed here, but Beck, who proposes
a similar view, briefly discusses some of them in his Commentary (p. 193).
(He also claims-perhaps too hesitantly-that this view is intimated in
Kant.) The gain is that there is no longer an overriding reason for placing
our moral agency in a timeless realm "beyond" the world of phenomena.
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Fourth, we can now consistently argue that moral reason evolves within
history and has expressed itself (no matter how imperfectly) in some historical events. Moreover, we can still give meaning to the idea of nontemporaJ
reason; it must be seen as a regulative notion, referring to posthistorical
reason as the complete elucidation of the moral law (an infinite task), the
postulated point of focus of historical and temporal forms of reason. Cf.
Steven S. Schwarzschild, "Authority & Reason," Studies in Jewish Philosophy (1982): 45--63, pp. 48-49. Finally, it is along these latter lines that I approach in the present study Kant's thesis of the progress of pure practical
reason (as one aspect of moral progress as such).
6. See Hans Reiss's Introduction to Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 3.
7. These examples are mentioned in Reflexion 8051, cited in Beck,
"Kant and the Right of Revolution," in his Essays on Kant and Hume (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 173. Reprinted from The
Journal of the History of Ideas 32 (1971): 411- 22.
8. The issue is not further explained. Earlier in Justice (pp. 41-42;
3&-37) Kant had argued that the right of necessity is really an imaginary
right. This underlines that Kant is here far from offering a justification for
revolution, even under life-threatening circumstances.
9. This suggestion is mentioned in Beck, "Kant and the Right of
Revolution," p. 172, and rejected as "incredible."
10. This suggestion is mentioned in Beck, "Kant and the Right of
Revolution," p. 180, and it too is rejected. A similar proposal is made by
Dieter Henrich, "Kant iiber die Revolution," in Zwi Batscha (ed)., Materialien zu Kants Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976),
pp. 360-61. Henrich claims that Kant's rejection of the right to revolution
may be seen as directed against the British attempt to overthrow the
French state. Preliminary article 5 of Peace- "No State Shall by Force
Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another State"-suffices, however, for this purpose. Henrich's main solution is (f).
11 . The solution is offered as a partial one by Goldmann, Immanuel
Kant, p. 213n.
12. An anonymous reader of the present study suggested this solution. It resembles Beck's initial solution, but after a further explication of
this proposal Beck himself concludes that "some inconsistency remains."
See "Kant and the Right of Revolution," pp. 181 and 187.
13. See Justice, p. 89 (VII: 129-30). This solution is proposed by
Schwarzschild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty ... ," p. 354.
14. Cf. Nicholson, "Kant on the Duty Never to Resist the Sovereign,"
p. 227.
15. This solution is proposed by Henrich, "Kant iiber die Revolution," pp. 363-64. It is also discussed in Beck, "Kant and the Right of
Revolution," pp. 179-80. My refutation of this solution is indebted to
Beck's discussion.
16. See Vorlander, Immanuel Kant, Der Mann und das Werk, Part II, pp.
213 and 310. Vorlander also offers a detailed account of Kant's undying
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enthusiasm for the French Revolution (see pp. 220 ff.). That the French
Revolution rather than the American Revolution receives all the attention
in Kant's work is not surprising. The American Revolution took place
before Kant's major practical writings; moreover, the French Revolution
was at the time much more important in political terms, certainly for
Germany.
17. It is also difficult to reconcile with Kant's claim in "Universal
History" that we may hope that perpetual peace will emerge after "many
reformative revolutions" (Revolutionen der Umbildung) (p. 23; IV: 163).
18. Cited in Justice, p. 138 (178-79). The critical review appeared in
the Gottingen Journal (February 18, 1797). The reviewer was presumably
Friedrich Bouterwerk of the University of Gottingen. See Justice, p. 130n.
19. Cf. Schwarzschild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty ... ," p.
355; Schwarzschild draws from Werner Haensel's Kants Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht (Berlin, 1926).
20. Cf. Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right, p. 138.
21. Cf. John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in Hugo
Adam Bedau (ed.), Civil Disobedience (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969),
p. 247.
22. To avoid possible misunderstanding, it is to be noted that, strictly
speaking, the categorical imperative is concerned with the universalization of maxims, not of actions. The civil resister cannot rationally will that
everyone follow his example in a given situation, but this does not mean
that he cannot rationally will that everyone adopt the maxim of civil disobedience. Comparable remarks hold with regard to such maxims as freedom of movement and freedom of choosing one's occupation. The basic
point here is that, in testing such maxims, we should not assume that
everyone will act on them at the same time and in the same manner;
rather, we should assess whether we can rationally will that all human
agents adopt these maxims and then act on them in accordance with their
particular needs and circumstances. Now there might be situations in
which our acting on such morally permissible maxims as the right to civil
disobedience and freedom of movement would lead to unintentional conflicts or immoral results. What this shows is that these maxims express
prima facie rights, which means that, before acting on them in a given
situation, we should see whether other moral considerations come into
play. Alternatively, we can approach this type of problem by further specification and determination of our maxims, taking into account how other
people are most likely to act or choose in a given situation. Cf. note 23,
below. See also my remarks at the end of this section.
23. Cf. Richard A Wasserstrom, "The Obligation to Obey the Law,"
in Civil Disobedience p. 258; Wasserstrom also analyzes problems similar to
those raised in note 22, above.
24. Cf. Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 60. Arendt,
however, seems to overstate her case by arguing that Kant could conceive
of action by the governed only in terms of conspiratorial activity. After all,
Kant was familiar with the French Revolution.

Notes: Chapter V

329

25. Cf. Larry May, "Mob Action," where May draws from Sartre's
analysis of the French Revolution in Critique of Dialectical Reason. Paper
read at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 1985. Copies made available by the APA.
26. In L. W. Beck (ed.), Proceedings of the Third International Kant
Congress (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 314-15.
27. What makes the "prima facie" approach ultimately to be preferred, I think, is that it conveys more clearly that there is something
profoundly wrong with a situation in which we have to break certain
moral rules for the sake of duty. In other words, this approach keeps the
moral ideal in the foreground, whereas it tends to get lost in the approach
of further specification and determination of one's maxims.
28. For Kant's denial that we have a right to lie in certain circumstances, see his (in)famous "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic
Motives," in Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral
Philosophy.
29 . Cf. Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1983), p. 204. This book became available to me too late to be
discussed in the text. It offers the most extensive critical exposition of
Kant's political philosophy currently available in the English language.
30. Cf. my earlier observations on the anger of oppressed human
nature in Chapter II, section 1, above.
31. Cf. Despland, Kant on History and Religion, pp. 42-43.
32. Broadly speaking, the work of Jurgen Habermas may serve here
as an example. Additionally, Kant's philosophy of history is helpful for
studying the moral evolution of the individual, for there are structural
affinities between this evolution and the evolution of the stages of historical development interpreted as stages of social evolution. Rex P. Stevens
approaches Kant's philosophy of history from this angle in Kant on Moral
Practice (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1981), Chapter V.
33. See Lectures on Ethics, pp. 252-53. Cf. my discussion in Chapter I,
section 1, above. In his later work, however, Kant was more doubtful in
this regard, arguing that emancipation through education is not to be
expected as long as the state itself is not emancipated. See "An Old
Question," section 10. A good analysis of the importance of education (in
the broad sense of the word) for the evolution and effective functioning of
democratic institutions can be found in A. P. Simonds, "On Being Informed," Theory and Society 11 (1982): 587-616. Simonds also shows that the
overcoming of illiteracy- the enemy of democracy-was possible only
thanks to the development of the printing press, thus illustrating my
thesis that processes on the different levels of progress are best understood as feedback processes.
34. Kant's Perpetual Peace is discussed from this angle in Friedrich,
Inevitable Peace. Vorliinder undertook a similar effort with respect to the
League of Nations in his Kant und der Gedanke des Viilkerbundcs (Leipzig:
Felix Meiner, 1919). A more recent discussion of the historical accuracy of
Kant's peace analysis and prediction is offered by Michael Doyle, "Kant,
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Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12
(1983): 205-35 and 32'.>-53. Doyle defends with much historical detail two
theses that resemble two of Kant's "cunning" roads toward peace: (a) even
though liberal democracies have many times fought with nonliberal states,
secure liberal democracies have not yet engaged in war with one another;
and (b), periods in the last two centuries that show the greatest number
and/or intensity of wars also display the greatest increase in the number of
liberal democracies (see, respectively, pp. 213 and 352). Projecting this
pattern toward the future, Doyle concludes that liberal foreign policy is
essentially sound and provides the most promising road toward international peace. (It is also a slow road, because Doyle offers the remarkable
prediction that global liberal peace is not to be expected before the year
2113. See p. 352.) A major weakness of this analysis is that it views economic imperialism, covert intervention, war with Third World nations,
and so on, as mere abuses of liberal foreign policy rather than as expressions of its capitalist core. The mistaken over-all result is that a fair international economic order is not seen as a necessary and even first
step toward international peace. Cf. my observations in Chapter IV,
section 3, above.
35. Toward a Marxist Humanism, translated by Jane Zielonko Peel
(New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 152.
36. In "Widerstand und Friede," Materialien zu Karzts Rechtsphilosophie, p. 373. Translation by Schwarzschild.
37. Cf. Richard L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History (New York:
Harper & Row, 1975, 1978). Rubenstein discusses the impact of bureaucracy on systematic human destruction in our century. Bureaucracy is
not only a precondition for such slaughter on a large scale, but also facilitates it by diffusing responsibility. Modern technology has a comparable
effect in that it makes human destruction "clean."

Chapter VI
1. In Chapter III, section 2, above, I have discussed two such criticisms: Kant condemned the commercial nations of his time for their
colonial conquests, and he saw the international credit system as contributing to the war effort. I will not analyze Kant's more technical economic
views. They are discussed in Susan Meld Shell, The Rights of Reason: A
Study of Kant's Philosophy and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1980), pp. 147-150.
2. This view is already displayed in the passage just cited from On
the Old Saw, but see also justice, p. 79 (Vil: 120-21). Although Kant had
in mind primarily, of course, domestic servants, apprentices of artisans,
and farm laborers, his view concerning the economic dependence of the
worker can be extended to the industrial worker.
3. Cf. Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State, in Marx,
Early Writings, edited by Quinton Hoare (New York: Vintage Books, 1975),
p. 194. A recent analysis of the legitimation problems embedded in repre-
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sentative democracy is offered by Carole Pateman, The Problem of Political
Obligation (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1979).
4. Cf. Andrew Levine, Arguing for Socialism (Boston: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 133-34. Levine also offers a good analysis of the
legitimation problems posed by representative democracy.
5. Cf. Daniels, "Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty," pp.
258-59; Daniels raises objections against Rawls which are similar to mine
against Kant. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be noted that my
arguments here do not assume that the wealthy always deliberately pursue their own self-interest; ideological distortion must also be taken into
account.
6. Cf. Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right, p. 146.
7. Cf. Chapter I, note 39, above.
8. Reflexion 8000, cited in Materialien zu Kants Rechtsphilosophie,
pp. 51-52. Also cited in Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 197.
9. Cf. Schwarzschild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty ... ,"
pp. 350ff.
10. This latter point is manifest in Justice, § 2, where Kant argues that
the possibility of legal private property is a "juridical postulate of practical
reason," because without this possibility "freedom would be robbing itself
of the use of its will in relation to an object of the same will inasmuch as it
would be placing usable objects outside all possibility of being used." This
view is plausible with regard to some forms of personal property, but
mistaken with regard to most forms of productive property.
11. In other words, my aim is not to argue that Kantian socialism
constitutes the only logical reconstruction of Kant's practical philosophy;
rather, I seek to show that it constitutes a possible and convincing reconstruction. See further the Preface. And, of course, the ultimate concern is
the merits of Kantian socialism itself.
12. Cf. Howard Williams, "Kant's Concept of Property," Philosophical
Quarterly 27 (1977): 32-40, p. 35. See also his Kant's Political Philosophy,
pp. 81 ff.
13. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Studies in Critical Philosophy, translated by
Joris de Bres (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 86 and 94. See also Karl
Vorlander, Kant und Marx (Tiibingen: J. C. Mohr, 1911), p. 31. We have seen
in the previous chapter that Kant's legitimation of political obedience to
the de facto powers points to resistance and revolution.
14. The three commentaries are Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871,
1885, 1918), Kants Begriindung der Ethik (1877, 1910), and Kants Begri.indung
der Asthetik (1889).
15. This is the only major work of Cohen that has been translated
into English, which reflects the fact that in the English-speaking world
only his philosophical interpretation of Judaism has received ample philosophical attention . The situation is different in the German-speaking
world, as is exemplified by such recent studies on Cohen's epistemology as
Geert Edel's Von der Vernunftkritik zur Erkenntnislogik (Dissertation, Bonn,
1986) and Helmut Holzhey's Cohen und Natorp, 2 vols. (Basel: Schwabe,
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1986); Cohen's practical philosophy is analyzed in Gunther's Philosophie des
Fortschritts (1972) and in Eggert Winter's Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft: Eine
historisch-systematische Llntersuchung zur Ethik-Konzeption des Marburger
Neukantianismus im Werke Hermann Cohens (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
1980). Moreover, a new edition of the works of Cohen is in process of
being published by the Hermann Cohen Archives at the University of
Zurich. Finally, Cohen and the Marburg School have received adequate
historical analysis in Keck, Kant and Socialism, and in Thomas E. Willey,
Back to Kant : The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical
Thought, 1860-1914 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978).
16. My reason for this focus is that Cohen's socialism is most clearly
developed in this period. This is not to say that I hold that there is some
break between the Cohen of the second period and the Cohen of the third
period. That there is such a break, in particular with regard to Cohen's
conception of God, is often argued by scholars who are concerned mainly
with his philosophical interpretation of Judaism. The practical effect has
been that one limits one's attention to the Cohen of the third period and
neglects the socialist dimension in his ethics and philosophy of religion.
Cf. note 15, above. Cohen himself, however, saw a clear link between his
socialist and moral-religious commitments. See Pure Will, p. 559, and
"Critical Epilogue," pp. 279-80. The issue is further discussed in
Schwarzschild's forthcoming Introduction to Cohen's Religion of Reason, as
part of Cohen, Werke, published by the Hermann Cohen Archives (and
Georg Olms Verlag). See also Schwarzschild's " 'Germanism and Judaism'-Hermann Cohen's Normative Paradigm of the German-Jewish Symbiosis," in David Bronsen (ed.), fews and Germans from 1860 to 1933
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1979).
17. Cohen italicizes excessively throughout the Pure Will. Whenever
no loss in meaning would be the result I have left out the italics.
18. The term 'community' (Gemeinschaft) has naturalistic overtones
that are absent both in Cohen's use of this term and in his work as a
whole. Like Kant, Cohen places society (Gesellschaft) above Gemeinschaft.
Cf. Chapter I, note 37, above.
19. The phrase 'possessive individualism' is coined by C. B. Macpherson to characterize the liberal tradition rooted in Hobbes and Locke. Macpherson argues that, within this tradition, political society is seen as 1'a
calculated device for the protection of [individual] property and for the
maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange." See The Political Theory of
Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 3.
Cohen also criticizes the liberal tradition for viewing history merely as
the product of "powerful" individuals and argues that the result is that
the real heroes of history-the "poor and tired" -are neglected. See Pure
Will, p. 33. A similar moral motive can be detected behind the Marxian
materialist conception of history and its critique of "liberal" history.
20. See "Critical Epilogue," pp. 298-302. It may be noted that Cohen
wrote these pages in 1914. His (infamous) support of Germany during the
First World War receives a balanced discussion in Keck, Kant and Socialism,
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Chapter VIII, as well as in Schwarzschild, " 'Germanism and Judaism' ... ," pp. 134 ff.
21. "Ethik und Sozialismus," Archiv fi:ir Soz ialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik 29 (1909): 895-930, p. 910. (The first part of this review can be
found in Vol. 25, pp. 573-612.)
22. See L. Roeloffs, De Cooperatie, Maatschappe lijk e11 Fiscaa/ Beschouwd (The Cooperative from a Social and Fiscal Point of View) (Alphen
aa n den Rijn, Netherlands: Samson, 1971), pp. 15 and 27, where Roeloffs
points out that this conception of the cooperative is dominant in the
American school as represented by J. V. Emelianoff and that Emelianoff
criticizes such socialists as Fran z Staudinger (one of Cohen's pupils) and
W. Sombart for characterizing the cooperative instead as a union of persons. A synoptic history of the cooperative idea in socialist thought can be
found in Winter, Ethik und Rechtswissensclrnft, pp. 295-96n.
23. Such a contractarian understanding of Kant can also be found in
Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 77
(1980): 515-72. It would be a worthwhile project, beyond the scope of my
study, to compare Rawls's Kantianism with Cohen's. One striking difference, though, may be noted: only Rawls is explicitly concerned with
distributive justice, but only Cohen comes to the conclusion that a socialization of the means of production is necessary. (For Rawls such a socialization is a mere possibility.) This difference reflects a broader one: socialists
typically focus on the conditions of production, whereas (welfare) liberals
typically focus on the conditions of distribution.
24. Schriften z1;r Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, Volume 11, p. 332. This
essay on the right to vote is Cohen's reply to a questionnaire of the biweekly Ethische Kultur (1904). Cohen defends a similar view in Pure Will,
p. 519.
25. In contrast to the Prussian lower chamber, the federal lower
chamber (the Reichstag) was directly elected by all males over twenty-five
years of age. The members of the federa l upper house (Bundesrat) were
appointed by the rulers of the different German states, although here, as
elsewhere, the Prussian state had the decisive voice. The rea l political
power resided in the king of Prussia (the Emperor of Germany) and in his
appointed chancellor. See further John E. Rodes, The Quest for Unity :
Modern Germany 1848-1970 (New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971),
pp. 44--45 and 85-86. The role of the German Social Democratic Party in
the struggle for democracy is discussed in Willey, Back to Kan t, Chapter I.
Willey also links this struggle to Kantian socialism.
26. See Pure Will, p. 588. This ranking is also suggested by the fact
that Cohen calls the family a "relative community."
27. Pure Will, p. 584. Cohen does not explicitly mention that Plato
prescribed the end of the institution of marriage only for warriors and
philosopher kings, and it is precisely this fact that weakens somewhat his
criticism of Plato. After all, the philosopher kings are the state, as it were,
and, hence, they do not need a mediating institution. Nonetheless, it
seems fair to say, as Cohen suggests, that Plato's ideal city has totalitarian
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overtones. The classical source for this view is K. R. Popper's The Open
Society and Its Enemies, Volume I (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945) .
In general, however, Cohen admires Plato, praising his ethical idealism
and his method of moving from the collective ideal subject (the state) to
the individual ideal subject. See Pure Will, pp. 7 and 14. See also Reason
and Hope, pp. 66 ff.
28. See, respectively, Religion of Reason, p. 442, and Pure Will, p. 588.
On the ground of faithfulness Cohen also rejects Plato's community of
children. See Religion of Reason, p. 443. Cf. note 27, above.
29. Cf. William Kluback, Hermann Cohen: The Challenge of a Religion of
Reason (Chico, Cal.: Scholars Press, 1984; Brown Judiac Studies 53), p. 34.
30. The importance of the family as a transmitter of radical values is
discussed in Kenneth Keniston, You ng Radicals (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1968). Too many socialists tend to dismiss the family as a
bourgeois institution. They fail to see that Marx attacked the bourgeois
family rather than the family as such. Cf. Paul Corrigan and Peter
Leonard, Socia l Work Practice under Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1978),
Chapter XI. Although Cohen recognizes the moral significance of the
family, his view of the family is not altogether satisfactory. Cohen argues
that it is instructive that the family is never defined as a legal person,
adding the rhetorical question, "Would it have been the natural character
of the family that has sca red away the legal person?" See Pure Will, p. 78.
This is by now a familiar point-the moral subject should not be constructed on a naturalistic basis-but one would expect Cohen to continue
to argue that the family should move in the direction of the notion of the
legal person, both morally and legally, thus overcoming its mere natural
character. It is along these lines, I think, that a socialist conception of the
family is to be developed, eliminating the patriarchal notion of the family
(as in Kant), while sustaining the family as a source of moral commitment
and value development in general.
31. Translation (except for minor changes) by Schwarzschild, " 'Germanism and Judaism' . . . ," pp. 146-47.
32. This demand was already set for th by F. A. Lange in the early
1860s. See Willey, Back to Kant, p. 94. The impact of Lange on the Marburg
School is discussed by Willey as well as by Keck, Kant and Socialism,
Chapter II. See also the Appendix, below.
33. "On Closing the Borders," in Reason and Hope, pp. 189-90. It is
interesting to note that this essay was written during the First World War.
Cf. note 20, above.
34. See note 32, above. For Lassalle's view, see Leszek Kolakowski,
Main Currents of Marxism, Volume I, translated by P. S. Falla (Oxfo rd:
Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 238--44. The General German Workers
Association united with Bebe\ and Liebknecht's Social Democratic Workingman's Party (1869) to form the German Social Democratic Party (SPD)
(Gotha, 1875).
35. Cf. David Schweickart, Capitalism or Worker Control? (New York:
Praeger, 1980), p. 4.
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36. Kan t-S tu dien 7 (1902): 23-84, p. 24. C f. " Ka nt u n d d er
Sozialismus," p. 363.
37. Yet Goldmann criticizes Cohen fo r ta king the critical angle out of
Kant. See ibid., pp. 112 ff. Gold mann's otherwise excellent study becomes
at this point su rprisingly superficial. He rightly notes that Coh en rejects
Kant's highest good, but fa ils to understand the reason fo r th is (i. e., the
priva tistic and religious dime nsions of the summum bonu111). Goldmann
also fa ils to see that Cohen puts socialism in the place of the highest
good, and arrives at the absurd conclusions tha t Cohen brings Ka nt close
to Stoicism and th at an "apologetic spirit" lies at the basis of his work. A
similar, albeit less p ro nounced, misunderstanding of Cohen can be fo und
in Yovel's Kan t and the Philosophy of History; Yovel main tain s that his own
"substantive" reading of Kant could evolve only after he had freed himself
o f the "formalistic" neo-Ka ntia n influence "originating in Herm an n
Cohen's Marburg School" (p. ix).
38. Tra nslated by John B. Askew from the fo urth German ed ition
(Chicago: Charles H. Ke rr, 1911), pp. 57-58. The fi rs t edition appea red
in 1906.
39. Braverman cites the words "animated tool of the man agement"
fro m a critical editorial in the In ternational Molders joumal. See Labor a11d
Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 136. Taylorism also was introduced in the Soviet Union under Lenin. See Carmen
Sirianni, Workers Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience
(London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1982). Siriann i extensively criticizes
Lenin for thinking that a socia list society could be realized on the basis of
cap italist industrial o rganization and management (pp. 253 ff.). Cf. Labor
and Monopoly Capital, pp. 22-23.
40. Cf. Richard T. De George, Business Ethics (New York: Mac millan,
1982), p. 82.
41. My claim is not that moral respon sibility always ca n and s ho uld
be lin ked with legal liability, but rather, th at we should create socia l conditions that make this link as close as possible. Strict liability fo r (consumer)
goods may seem to be a notable exception. Yet even h ere it seems that
fai rness de mands tha t the burden be shared by society at large. Ce rtainly,
this was Marx's view. In Critique of the Gotha Program, he argues that
within socialist society all wo rkers must contribute equally to "a reserve or
insurance fun d [fo r] accidents, disruption s caused by natu ra l ca lamities,
etc." See The First International and Aft er, p. 344.
42. A recent powerful condem na tion of America n capitalism along
these lines can be found in Harold Freeman, Toward Socia lism in A merica
(Ca mbridge, Mass.: Sch en kman, 1982 2) .
43. Cf. Schwa rzschild 's Introd uction to Pure Will, p. viii. Cohen emphasizes this " methodic" link ra ther than the practical link that I discuss
below. My reason for reversing the emphasis is that the practical link has
more critical potential. The "methodic" link receives extensive discussion
in Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, Volume I, pp. 318 ff.
44. Translated by Ma rtin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
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45. The ilistinction between the realm of necessity and the realm of
freedom is hinted at in the Grundrisse, p. 706, and further developed in
Capital, Volume III (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 820.
46. Cf. Schweickart, Capitalism or Worker Control? pp. 58 ff.
47. That Cohen held such a view follows from his condemnation of
the division of labor as destroying the "unity of culture." His claim that
we must all become concerned with science points in the same direction
(Wissenschaft includes both natural and humanistic sciences). For Cohen's
view of the importance of art for full human development, see Gunther,
Philosophie des Fortschritts, pp. 63 ff. For Marx's plea for the all-round
individual, see, for example, The German Ideology, p. 53.
48. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971.
49. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston : Beacon
Press, 1972), pp. 60 ff., where Marcuse argues that the environment created by modern capitalism stimulates aggression and obstructs esthetic
experiences, and the like. The deeper problem with Weisskopf's analysis is
that he puts too much emphasis on attitudinal change as the road toward
a more humane economy. Weisskopf concludes his book by stating that
we all must take "seriously the Kantian maxim that men should never
be used as means but always as 'ends."' I fully agree, but I also hope to
have shown that this implies a more "structural" approach toward
social change.
50. Cf. Hermann Liibbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutsch/and: Studien
zu ihrer Geschichte (Basel: Schwabe, 1963), p. 108. (Li.ibbe offers a brief but
adequate overview of Ma rburg socialism.)
51. Translated by Henry Maas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973).
52. See ibid., p. 96. Goldmann specifically mentions the Yugoslavian
" social experiment" and says that it "may perhaps lay the foundation s of
a synthesis of the socialist-historical consciousness with individual freedom and toleration." Some shortcomings of the Yugoslavian market socialism are discussed in Schweickart's Capitalism or Worker Control?
53. Cf. R. Selucky, "Marxism and Self-management, in Jaro slav
Vanek, editor, Self-managment (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Education, 1975),
pp. 47 ff.
54. Cf. Marcel van Herpen, Marx en de Mensenrechten (Marx and
Human Rights) (Weesp, Netherlands: Het Wereldvenster, 1983), p. 166. It
would be a mistake, however, to argue that Marx's social critique applies
only to a capitalist market economy. I will soon point out that there are
significant problems embedded in the market system as such, and it is
clear that at least part of Marx's social critique of capitalism applies to
these problems. The issue is further discussed in Allen Buchanan, Ethics,
Efficiency, and the Market (Totowa, N.J. : Rowman & Allanheld, 1985),
pp. 106 ff.
55. Cf. Buchana n, Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market, p. 104. A short
historica l and systematic overview of various market-socialist models can
be found in Vanek's Introduction to Self-management.
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56. Cf. Edward Sankowski's book review of Schweickart's work in

Ethics 93 (1983): 624-25.
57. Schweickart hardly offers a moral theory that supports his model
of market socialism, but rather attempts to show, as he himself says, that
this model is superior to capitalism in terms of a "set of widely shared
values" (ibid., p. ix). The strength of his approach is clear. A weakness,
however, is that it seems to make Schweickart-notwithstanding his acknowledgment of various problems inherent to his model- too confident
about how far "economistic" solutions can lead us toward a truly cooperative socialist society. See ibid., pp. 219-20. I will argue in the next chapter
that Marx made a similar mistake.

Chapter VII
1. See "Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy," in

Early Writings, pp. 260 ff.
2. See Chapter VI, note 16, above.
3. It is, of course, true that Kant also postulated God in order to
bridge the gap between universal virtue and universal happiness, but, as I
have argued in Chapter II, section 2, above, the main systematic function
of this postulate in his work is to bridge the gap between the natural order
and the moral order in general. For Cohen's view, see, for example, Pure
Will, pp. 440 ff., and Religion of Reason, pp. 410 ff. A brief discussion of
Cohen's view can be found in Nathan Rotenstreich, Jewish Philosophy in
Modern Times (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), Chapter IV.
4. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, 1972, p. xii.
5. Not too much meaning should be given to Marx's use of the term
'categorical imperative'. What is more significant is that Marx condemns
here any situation in which human beings are treated as means only, i.e.,
as less than a dog.
6. See my discussion of the essays of Atwell and Hill, Chapter I,
section 3, above.
7. Thus Marx contends that the worker under capitalism is alienated
from his fellow beings, his product, his labor activity, the state, etc. Marx
also held that the capitalist is alienated, although that issue receives little
systematic attention in his work. See Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Early Writings, p. 366. See also Bertell Oilman, Alienation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 1976), Chapter 23.
8. Andrew Levine also argues that there are some links between
Kant's notions of autonomy and heteronomy and Marx's concepts of selfdetermination and alienation, although Levine stresses the heteronomyalienation link. See his "Alienation as Heteronomy," Philosophical Forum 8
(1978): 256-268. One difference between our analyses is that Levine argues
that "in Marx's hands, the Kantian notions of autonomy and heteronomy
are not primarily ascribed to actions nor even persons, but to societies.
Even in his early writings, while still a Kantian, Marx breaks with the
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extreme individualism of Kantian moral philosophy" (ibid., p. 259) . To say
the least, this view of Kant is debatable. Cf. Konstantin Kolenda, "Kant
and Racism," Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, where
Kolenda observes that "[t]he locus of moral phenomena for Kant is the
human soul or mind, [but] [t]his inner dialogue is obviously metaphorical,
[and] there seems to be no reason why Kant's analysis of the moral situation could not be broadened to include interpersonal dialogue or debate"
(ibid., p. 363). On my account, however, we not only can but should make
this "extension." In addition, I have argued in Chapter I above that we
should see Kant's social critique as concerned with heteronomous
societies.
9. Robert Nozick makes this point in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New
York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 253. In contrast to some other critics, however,
such as Milton Friedman, Nozick also seriously considers the possibility
that the issue at stake is control over the means of production. For Friedman's view, see Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962, 1982), p. 167. For some other examples of critics who assume
that exploitation for Marx is primarily a distributive notion, see Allen E.
Buchanan, Marx and justice (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1982),
p. 44. My rebuttal of this view is indebted to Buchanan's analysis. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the assumption is not only made by opponents
of Marx, but also guides to various degrees some of his sympathizers. One
example is G. A. Cohen's "The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of
Exploitation," in Marx, Justice, and History, edited by M. Cohen, T. Nagel,
and T. Scanlon (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980).
Buchanan's book and Cohen's paper are reviewed in my "Marx and Morality: An Impossible Synthesis?," Theory and Society 13 (1984): 119-135, from
which I draw some of my arguments in the present chapter.
10. That Marx did not view capitalist society as economically unjust is
argued in great detail in Allen W. Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice," in Marx, Justice, and History. Wood partly bases himself on Robert C.
Tucker, "Marx and Distributive Justice," Nomo s VI: Justice (New York:
Atherton Press, 1963).
11. Cf. Tucker, "Marx and Distributive Justice," p. 310.
12. Marx, Justice, and History, p. 59. Husami also cites several passages
from Marx's work that show that Marx held that capitalism is unjust. Cf.
note 47 below.
13. Cf. Cohen, "The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation," pp. 142ff.
14. Cf. Tucker, "Marx and Distributive Justice," pp. 310££., where Tucker
discusses Proudhon and Lassalle's view of economic justice. Tucker fails to
note, however, that Marx not only criticized their view but also accepted it
in modified form .
15. Thus Cohen typically argues that, although it is misguided to
criticize socialism as being concerned with the Magenfrage (the question of
the stomach), it must also be said that "from the very beginning this
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question must be related to the issue of spiritual development and, hence,
to the issue of moral freedom" (Pure Will, p. 311; cf. p. 295).
16. In "Scientific Socialism and the Question of Socialist Values," in
Marx and Morality, Supplementary Volume VII of the Canadian Journal of
Philosophy (1981), edited by K. Nielsen and Steven C Patten, Andrew
Collier argues that humanist (ethical) socialism contains within it the danger of repression designed to bring about truly human capacities, whereas
scientific socialism has the merit of avoiding this pitfall because it orients
itself toward the actual desires and values of the working class. Although
Collier's contention is partly based on terminological abuse-he detects,
for example, "humanistic" arguments in Gorky's defense of Stalin's oppression of homosexuals, as well as in Austrian Marxism, Gramsci, and
the Khmer Rouge-I do not wish to dismiss his contention altogether.
What it shows is that the socialist struggle must reflect on the means by
which the ideal can be reached. Typically, humanist socialism (in the
proper sense of the word) has performed this task, and, certainly, Hermann Cohen's ethical socialism excludes repression for the sake of the
ideal, because it holds that socialism can be reached only through autonomy. (Forced autonomy is a contradiction in terms.) Collier's essay is discussed in more detail in my "Marx and Morality: An Impossible
Synthesis?"
17. This view is developed in Part I of The German Ideology. My interpretation here is indebted to Buchanan's, Marx and Justice, pp. 27 ff.
18. Cf. Buchanan, Marx and Justice, pp. 34-35.
19. See Capital, Volume I (New York: International Publishers, 1967),
p. 10, where Marx states that although he "paint[s] the capitalist and the
landlord in no sense coleur de rose," it is also the case that: "My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is
viewed as a process of natural [!] history, can less than any other make the
individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains,
however much he may subjectively raise himself above them."
20. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Marxism and Retribution," in Marx, Justice, and History.
21. Cf. Buchanan, Marx and Justice, pp. 165ff.
22. In Critique of the Catha Program, p. 345, Marx states that "[w]ithin
the cooperative society based on common ownership of the means of
production the producers do not exchange their products." For Marx's
view that the political and legal state will wither away, see "After the
Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin," in The Marx-Engels Reader. Here
Marx claims that the state will keep some administrative functions, but at
other places in his work he even suggests that the state will disappear
altogether in the communist society. See Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 347. For a more detailed discussion, see Bertell Oilman, Social
and Sexual Revolution (Boston: South End Press, 1979), Essay 3, "Marx's
Vision of Communism." See also Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism,
Volume I, p. 360.
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23. Two such conflicting suggestions are an economy with a plan
versus an economy without any regulation (i.e., spontaneous exchange of
goods in a society of abundance), and material production as a realm of
necessity versus material production as the total embodiment of our species nature. See also note 22 above.
24. Cf. Eugene Kamenka, Marxism and Ethics (London: Macmillan,
1969), p. 12; Kamenka states that Marx's notion of freedom or selfdetermination signifies a Kantian strain in Marx, but that it is a "simplified, Prometheanized Kant."
25. Both Tucker and Wood (see note 10, above) use this passage to
support their view that Marx did not see capitalism as unjust, failing to
recognize the Hegel-rooted optimism in Marx.
26. Marx said these words in a speech in London in 1852. The speech
was published in the Chartist People's Paper. See The Marx-Engels Reader,
p. 578.
27. Marx continues to state that Bauer will be surprised "when the
infamous 'masses' will shout i;:a ira, i;:a ira and suspend 'self-con sciousness'
by means of the lamp-post." Like the Marseillaise and Carmagnole, c;a ira
was a popular song during the French Revolution; its refrain was: "Ah! i;:a
ira, i;:a ira, i;:a ira. Les aristocrates ii la lanterne!" See ibid., pp. 638-39.
28. "The British Rule in India," New York Daily Tribune, June 25, 1853,
reprinted in The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 658.
29. Cf. Kate Currie, "The Asiatic Mode of Production: Problems of
Conceptualising State and Economy," Dialectical Anthropology 8 (1984) :
251- 268, p. 257. Currie also notes that Marx's view of India before the
British colonization as a despotic, unchangeable, and simplistic society
rooted in small agriculhtral communities is similar to Hegel's view in Th e
Philosophy of History. Cf. Victor Kiernan, "Marx and India," The Socialist
Register 1967 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 162. Kiernan also
makes the interesting observation (p. 160) that Marx in response to the
Indian Mutiny wrote that "[t]here is something in human history like
retribution; and it is a rule of historical retribution that its instrument be
forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself." We have seen
that this "rule" is also manifest in the capitalist mode of production, in
that Marx argues that the capitalists create the weapons of their own
destruction, besides creating their own executioner, the proletarian.
30. The Revolutions of 1848, edited by David Fernbach (New York:
Vintage Books. 1974), pp. 221-22 and pp. 229-30. The first quote comes
from an article entitled "The Magyar Struggle," published on January 13,
1849; the second quote is from "Democratic Pan-Slavism," published on
February 15, 1849 in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Cf. note 50, below.
31. Translation (with a minor revision) by Schwarzschild, "The Democratic Socialism of Hermann Cohen," Hebrew Union College Annual 27
(1956): 417-438, p. 420. This paper also discusses Cohen's critique of historical materialism.
32. We may see Cohen commenting here on Marx's statement, cited
earlier, that "once the lightning of thought has struck deeply into [the]
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virgin soul of the [German] people, emancipation will transform the Germans into men." This dialectical schema of sudden enlightenment is rooted
in Platonic mysticism, although liberation is transposed from the individual to the collective level. Hegel's system was strongly influenced by this
mysticism. See further Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume I,
Chapter I, "The Origins of Dialectic."
33. See "Critical Epilogue," pp. 293££. See also the Appendix, below.
34. See respectively, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 355,
and Capital, Volume I, pp. 18-19. For Habermas's view, see his Knowledge
and Human Interest, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press,
1971), p. 46.
35. Theory and Practice, translated by John Viertel (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1973), p. 169.
36. In light of this, and the Kantian elements in Habermas in general,
it is ironical that he states in Communication and the Evolution of Society,
translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p. 97, that
" the melodies of ethical socialism have played through without result."
These melodies are the songs of Kantian socialism; for Habermas refers to
Hans Jorg Sandkiihler and Rafael de la Vega, editors, Marxismus und Ethik
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970, 1974), to substantiate his claim, and
this reader contains selections from the works of the Marburg socialists
and their critics. In general, Habermas is "out of tune" in downplaying the
Kantian elements in his own work. For a brief discussion of these elements, see Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Habermas
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 325££. and 379££.
37. One such opponent is Sandkiihler. See his "Kant, neukantianischer Sozialismus, Revisionismus," in Marxismus und Ethik. We will
soon see that Cohen holds a plea for a "steady [permanent] revolution."
Curiously enough, in citing Cohen, Sandkiihler changes "stetigen [steady]
Revolution" into "stetigen Evolution." See ibid., p. 30. Sandkiihler's
view may be summed up in his approvingly quoting Plekhanov, who
maintained that the bourgeoisie had an interest in promoting Kant's philosophy and hence, Kantian socialist ethics, because "they hoped to find
in it an opiate to put the proletariat to sleep." See ibid., p. 29. Some Cohen
sympathizers who wrongly claim that he rejected revolution as such are
Keck, Kant and Socialism, pp. 179 and 291; Liibbe, Politische Philosophie in
Deutsch/and, pp. 109- 11; and, Willey, Back to Kant, p. 103.
38. Contra Cohen, it must be said that this motto alone does not
establish that Hegel was conservative; for Hegel claims that the rational is
wirklich (and vice versa), not real. Cohen's view, however, can be defended
on other grounds (see Chapter Ill, note 36, above), and the main point
here is that Hegel does not offer an evaluative perspective that is logically
independent of the course of history.
39. The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 57Z Cf. note 26 above. Armand Barbes
(1809-70) was a religious socialist who participated in French revolutionary politics from 1830 to 1848. At the time when Marx gave his speech
Barbes was in jail (where he spent almost two decades of his life). Frarn;ois
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Vincent Raspail (1794---1878) participated in revolutionary politics during
the same period, wrote medical guides for the Paris working class, and
engaged in jail reform (which he knew from the inside). The workers from
Paris called him "father Raspail," reflecting the warm esteem he received.
A brief portrait of their lives can be found in H.P.G. Quack, De Socialisten,
Volume III (Amsterdam: P. N. van Kampen & Zoon, 1922 4), pp. 237-42 and
488--89. The life of Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805-81) and his impact on
Marxist thought is briefly sketched in Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume I, pp. 214ff.
40. "Anamnestic Solidarity," Telos 25 (1975): 133-54, p. 147. The statements from The Eighteenth Brumaire can be found in The Marx-Engels
Reader, p. 597. Lenhardt also rightly notes that, with the exception of the
writings of the Frankfurt School, issues of intergenerational solidarity
"have remained blank spots in the Marxian literature" (p. 152).
41. The Marx-Engel s Reader, p. 5. This view might even imply that
emancipatory praxis must be suppressed; for improvements in the economic and social position of the working class may lead to less surplus
extraction, slowing down the development of the productive forces. Cf. A.
Anthony Smith, "Two Theories of Historical Materialism," Theory and Society 13 (1984): 513-40, pp. 523-24; Smith launches a similar criticism
against G. A. Cohen's defense of historical materialism. Marx also suggests
that social action may hasten the inevitable downfall of capitalism (see
note 42, below), but he does not explain how this can be squared with the
statement just cited.
42. See Capital [, p. 10, where Marx maintains that his study seeks to
discover the economic law of modern society and that, once this law is
known, society cannot suddenly realize a new society, but "can shorten
and lessen the birth-pangs."
43 . Buchanan also considers the possibility that rational behavior is
the maximization of class interest, and argues that in this case the publicgoods objection holds as well. He pays, however, much less attention to
this case than to that in which rational behavior is the maximization of
self-interest, and for a good reason: only the latter case seems to fit with
Marx's view, or, at least, an aspect thereof.
44. We must, of course, be careful, as Buchanan is, in ascribing descriptive validity to a normative model. The conclusion here stated assumes that utilitarian considerations play an important role in our lives.
On the whole, this seems a reasonable assumption.
45. Cf. Gregory S. Kavka, "Two Solutions to the Paradox of Revolution," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume VII, edited by P. A. French, T.
E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1982). My two reasons parallel Kavka's two solutions for revolutionary action as a public-goods problem, and, accordingly, my discussion
contains an implicit critique of his view. It is to be noted, however, that
Kavka is concerned not with the socialist revolution but rather with explaining how revolution in general can occur once we make such assump-
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tions as that human agents are utility max1m1zers. Thus Kavka views
special benefits to the revolutionary group as an aspect of solving the
"paradox of revolution," whereas this aspect must be discounted if the
concern is the socialist revolution.
46. Marx expressed these doubts in a personal letter to Ludwig
Kugelmann, dated April 12, 1871. See Letter 204, in The Letters of Karl
Marx, translated and introduced by Saul K. Padover (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1979). Cf. Fernbach's Introduction to The First International and After, p. 33. The Civil War in France was written during the later
days of the Commune and printed almost immediately after its defeat. I
will quote from both the final and first drafts as printed in The First
International and After.
47. This passage, I think, shows that Marx viewed capitalism as a
system both of economic injustice and of servitude, and that the emphasis
is on the latter aspect. Cf. my analysis in section 1, above.
48. Yet Marx states on the same page that the workers of Paris "have
no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with
which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant." Now insofar as
Marx simply makes the point here that mediation is important, there is
nothing wrong with his statement. It seems, however, that here again the
Hegelian dimension in his work is manifest. One way of explaining this is
that Marx in this statement is reflecting on his practice of inquiry, and, as I
will argue in section 4 below, his philosophical self-understanding is
Hegelian in nature, though his practice of inquiry contains Kantian elements as well.
49. See Richard Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria (London: Arthur
Barker, 1973), p. 37. See also the Appendix, below.
50. The contention that the notion of "duty-versus-interest" reflects
a bourgeois moral psychology is made by Anthony Skillen, "Workers' Interest and the Proletarian Ethic: Conflicting Strains in Marxian Antimoralism," Marx and Morality, p. 162. Skillen offers a good analysis of the
first strain of anti-moralism in Marx, which roughly corresponds to the
Hegelian dimension in Marx. SkiUen's discussion of this strain brought to
my attention the two passages cited in note 30 above. The second strain
Skillen detects concerns a "materialist ethics" -that is, ethics as a way of
life, rooted in the passions, suffering, and joys of the proletariat. See ibid.,
p. 166. Skillen's rather synoptic reconstruction of this strain brings him
much closer to prescriptive ethics than he thinks, for he wrongly assumes
that prescriptive ethics by its very nature is individualistic, not concerned
with mediation, etc. Once these mistakes are eliminated, the second strain
somewhat resembles the Kantian dimension in Marx, even though Skillen
tends to romanticize proletarian values and feelings.
51. The notion of a class morality fails to satisfy this claim and is
therefore to be rejected. Engels defended the idea of a class morality,
arguing that that morality is correct "which, in the present, represents the
overthrow of the present, represents the future, and therefore [this moral-
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ity is] the proletarian morality." See Anti-Diihring (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), p. 117. This is a backhanded way of justifying a moral
viewpoint, and Engels here makes the error I point out below in the text.
52. It is tempting to include within this Marxian regulative idea concerning progress Marx's claim that socialism is possible through peaceful
means. I can, however, detect no moral concern here on Marx's side;
rather, his proposal seems to be motivated by purely instrumentalistic
considerations. See "The Curtain Raised," The First International and After,
p. 395. In this interview by a reporter from New York's World Ouly 18,
1871), Marx states with respect to the English condition: "Insurrection
would be madness where peaceful agitation would more swiftly and surely
do the work." Cf. Marx's speech in Amsterdam, on September 8, 1872, in
which he said that there are countries, "such as America, England, and if I
were more familiar with your institutions, I would perhaps add Holland,
where the workers can attain their goal by peaceful means." See The MarxEngels Reader, p. 523. Again, there is no indication that Marx held that this
possibility was morally desirable.
53. Labor and Monopoly Capital was written in 1974. Some recent developments in the direction of economic democracy are discussed in Drew
Christie, "Recent Calls for Economic Democracy," Ethics 95 (1984): 112-28,
pp. 112-13.
54. Cf. Christie, "Recent Calls for Economic Democracy," pp. 112-13.

Notes: Appendix
1. See Vorliinder, Kant und Marx, pp. 157-58. Cf. Keck, Kant and
Socialism, p. 260.
2. See his Evolutionary Socialism, translated by Edith C. Harvey
(New York: Schocken Books, 1961), pp. 201 and 222-23.
3. Die neue Zeit was the traditional SPD organ; the revisionists
started the Sozialistische Monatshefte.
4. Austro-Marxism, texts translated and edited by Tom Bottomore
and Patrick Goode (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 64 and 68.
Cf. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume II, pp. 274-75.
5. Austro-Marxism, pp. 51- 52. Cf. Kolakowski, Main Currents of
Marxism, Volume II, pp. 27~76. Bauer's suggestion that Kantians such as
Eisner contributed to weakening the revolutionary impulse of the working
class is misplaced and insensitive, considering Eisner's role and fate in the
Munich Revolution, especially since Bauer wrote these words in 1938 after
the defeat of the working class by fascism.
6. Cf. Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, Volume I, pp. 49-53; Holzhey
offers a similar but more detailed description of the "connecting element
of the Marburg School." Dimitry Gawronski sketches a fine portrait of
Cohen as teacher and central figure in the Marburg School in his "Ernst
Cassirer: His Life and His Work," The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, edited
by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Evanston, ill.: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949),
pp. 7-12. (Gawronski studied with Cohen in the early 1900's and was one
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of the first who criticized the Bolshevik state from an ethical socialist
perspective. See Schwarzschild, " 'Germanism and Judaism' ... ," p. 141.)
7. See Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 70.
8. Cohen had earlier expressed his socialist commitment in Kants
Begrundung der Ethik (1877) as well as in several other works, but in a
rather passing manner. Vorlander states in Kant und Marx (p. 179) that
Bernstein wrote him in a personal letter that Cohen's Epilogue had influenced his interest in Kant. Cf. Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 260. Mehring
was also familiar with Cohen's Epilogue. See note 33, below.
9. "Critical Epilogue," pp. 279-80. Cf. Pure Will, p. 559, where Cohen
states that the politics of the prophets "is nothing other than what nowadays we call socialism." Cf. Chapter VI, note 16, above.
10. For a discussion of the career problems that Jews encountered in
Wilhelmian Germany, see Peter Gay, Freud, fews and Other Germans (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 114 ff.; Gay also touches upon the
careers of Cassirer and Cohen. For a more detailed account of Cohen's
career at Marburg, see Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, volume I, pp. 1-3 and
20--22.
11 . "Kant und der Sozialismus," p. 370. The two differences between
Lange and the Marburgers are set forth in Kant und Marx, p. 120.
12. See Willey, Back to Kant, pp. 89 and 91. Cf. Keck, Kant and Socialism, pp. 51 and 54.
13. See Willey, Back to Kant, p. 91.
14. See ibid., pp. 91-92. Cf. Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 55.
15. See Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 218. Keck provides what may be
the only existing extensive bibliography of Vorlander's writings, covering
87 works.
16. See ibid., p. 219. Vorlander expressed this desire in a personal
letter to Bernstein in 1899. Vorlander was active in party politics in the
1920's and was elected to the Westphalian Diet. See Willey, Back to Kant,
p. 175.
17. Marxismus und Ethik, p. 317. This reader contains a complete
version of the systematic conclusion added to the second edition of Kant
und Marx.
18. Ibid., p. 319. Although Vorlander does not give a precise reference,
we may assume that he is directing our attention to Engels's famous letters
on historical materialism, written to Bloch, Mehring, and Starkenburg.
Vorlander discusses these lette rs in Karl Marx (Leipzig: Felix Meiner,
1929), pp. 288-90, and defends h ere his Kant-Marx synthesis along the
same lines as in the second edition of Kant und Marx.
19. See Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 273
20. See Vorlander, Kant und Marx, pp. 187 and 189.
21. The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge
to Marx (New York: Octagon Books, 1983), p. 160. Reprint of the Columbia
University Press edition (1952, 1962).
22. Bernstein was one of Engels's closest friends and one of the executors of his will. Moreover, Engels entrusted his unpublished writings to
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Bernstein and August Bebe!. See ibid., p. 68. Thus it is not surprising
(although there are other reasons) that Bernstein frequently argued that
his revisionism was in accord with a main tenet of Engels and Marx's
social theory. This issue cannot be addressed here, but in view of my
analysis of Chapter VII above of the Kantian elements in Marxian thought,
it seems that Bernstein's contention has a prima facie plausibility.
23. See Evolutionary Socialism, pp. 79 ff. Cf. Gay, The Dilemma of
Democratic Socialism, pp. 191 ff. Gay also detects a similar strength and
weakness in Bernstein's work. See ibid., pp. 298-99.
24. Cf. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, pp. 146 ff.
25 . Cited in ibid., p. 148. Cited from Der Revisionismus in der
Sozialdemokratie (Amsterdam: Martin Cohen, 1909), p. 41.
26. Cf. my analysis in Chapter V, section 2. For Bernstein's view on
the political mass strike, see Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism,
pp. 237 ff. Considering the conditions under which Bernstein held that
the mass strike is justified, he rightly called it "an economic weapon with
an ethical object." See ibid., p. 240.
27. See Evolutionary Socialism, p. 166. Also, the Marburgers could not
but have applauded Bernstein's claim that "with respect to liberalism as a
great historical movement, socialism is its legitimate heir" (ibid., p. 149).
28. See ibid., Chapter III, section (d) . This section shows that Bernstein was influenced not only by Lange but also by the British cooperative
movement and Fabian Socialism.
29. See ibid., pp. xxix and 204. The critics of Bernstein interpreted his
slogan literally and thus saw it as an instance of opportunism. Bernstein addresses this misunderstanding on the pages just cited
30. See Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, p. 244.
31. Cited in ibid., p. 297. The letter is dated Jan. 23, 1932.
32. Cf. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume II, p. 35,
where he maintains that "[a) striking feature of Kautsky's work is the
complete lack of understanding of philosophical problems. This harsh
judgment is not without justification: Kautsky argued, for example, that
Kant's view that the moral law is independent of experience is flawed
because this law "assumes not only men outside of me, but also the wish
that these fellow men should behave themselves in a particular manner."
See Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, p. 54. Although
Mehring was better philosophically schooled, his Kant critique never
reaches great depth.
33. "Kant und der Sozialismus" (1899n900), in Aufsiitze zur Geschichte
der Philosophie (Leipzig: Phillip Reclarn, 1975), pp. 269 and 270. Cf. "Immanuel Kant" (1903/04), in ibid., pp. 74-75.
34. See "Immanuel Kant," p. 75; "Kant und der Sozialismus," p. 270;
and, "Kant, Dietzgen, Mach und der historische Materialismus" (1909/10),
in ibid., p. 291.
35. See "Die Neukantianer" (1899/1900), in ibid., p. 280. See The
Marx-Engels Reader, p. 491.
36. Cf. Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 274. Mehring displayed in his
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early work such a reductionistic understanding of historical materialism
(cf. below) that Engels felt obliged to correct him, writing him one of the
well-known letters on historical materialism. See note 18, above. Cf.
Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume II, p. 58.
37. See Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, Chapter V,
sections 4 and 5.
38. "Kant und der Sozialismus," pp. 273-74. It characterizes the communist viewpoint of the editors of Aufsiitze zur Geschichte der Philosophie
that they add the note that "Mehring falters here-and elsewhere-in his
judgment of the revisionist supporters of neo-Kantianism. He underestimates partly the damaging effect of neo-Kantian philosophical revisionism." See ibid., p. 396n.
39. My biographical sketch of Eisner is based primarily on Grunberger's Red Rising in Bavaria, Chapter III, and Allan Mitchell, Revolution
in Bavaria 1918-1919 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965),
Chapter II. Mitchell offers the more scholarly but much less sympathetic
discussion of Eisner and his work. Regrettably, Grunberger's study contains some factual errors.
40. See Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 25Z
41. See Vorlander, Kant und Marx, pp. 219-21. Cf. Willey, Back to Kan t,
pp. 177-78. Natorp expressed his approval of Eisner's articles in a letter to
Gorland, calling Eisner "our student." Natorp had earlier expressed his
pleasure with the fact that Eisner as a "schooled Kantian" was offered a
position at Vorwiirts (see below). See, respectively, letters 84 and 45 in
Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, Volume II.
42. See Gary P. Steenson, "Not One Man! Not One Penny!": German
Socia l Democracy, 1863-1914 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1981), p. 134.
43. Eisner had incensed Kautsky by publicly defying his view that
the class struggle would be more intense in a republic than in a monarchy
and that therefore a republic is to be preferred. Their conflict came to a
climax when Vorwiirts did not fully support a mass strike in solidarity with
the Russian Revolution of 1905. Under pressure Eisner and some revisionists resigned. Thus is is often concluded that Eisner was a pure revisionist. This conclusion is drawn, for example, by Steenson (see note 42,
above) and by George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critica l Study
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 293-95. Reprint of the
Praeger edition of 1969. Mitchell convincingly shows that this interpretation is mistaken. See Revolution in Bavaria 1918-1919, pp. 49 ff. Mitchell's
view accords with Vorlander, Kant und Marx, p. 221. We will soon see that
Eisner did not in principle object to the political mass strike.
44. See Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria 1918-1919, p. 120. My sketch of
the Munich Revolution is based primarily on this study and on Grunberger's Red Rising in Bavaria.
45. See Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria 1918-1919, p. 269. Cf. Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, p. 78.
46. See Grunberger, Red Rising in Bavaria, pp. 71-72.
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